Japan, Obama and the Bomb
By David Cliff for ISN
If, as part of his forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, US President Barack Obama
external pagechooses to declarethat the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons is to deter or respond to nuclear attacks (as he well might), he will have Japan on his side, according to a
external pagerecently published reportby the US-based
external pageUnion of Concerned Scientists (UCS).
And he need not worry that such a declaration would lead to Japan developing its own nuclear arsenal, as some fear, because that is simply not going to happen, argues Gregory Kulacki, the report's author. "To the contrary," Kulacki writes, brushing aside concerns of detrimental consequences for the US-Japanese security alliance, "it appears that both the Japanese public and the Japanese government would welcome these changes in US nuclear weapons policy."
It is a conclusion based in large part on six months of interviews conducted by the UCS with current and former Japanese officials and nongovernmental experts, coupled with a confidential 1995 study of the country's nuclear options commissioned by the Japan Defence Agency – and obtained by the UCS. Four major findings were the result.
The first is that, while some Japanese officials are concerned about the credibility of the US nuclear ‘umbrella’ that extends over Japan, these concerns are nothing new. Nor are they a consequence of a potential shift in nuclear policy from the ambiguous position maintained by former US president George W Bush – who kept the nuclear option open to chemical, biological and conventional threats – to the clear declaration of sole purpose currently under contemplation by the Obama administration. (China is presently the only nuclear-armed state to explicitly limit its nuclear weapons to nuclear threats.)
Second, the report notes, all those interviewed agreed that developing nuclear weapons would not be in the interests of Japanese national security. The aforementioned 1995 study reportedly reached the same conclusion, as did an earlier study in 1968.
Nor, for that matter, do the people of Japan want nuclear weapons, which forms the third finding (this one gleaned from opinion polls): As the only nation to bear the scars of a nuclear attack, popular opposition to nuclear weapons in Japan is intense, emotive and longstanding. For decades, Japanese governments have – at least ostensibly – followed the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” of non-possession, non-production and non-introduction of nuclear weapons to Japanese territory.
It was only earlier this month that Japan’s government confirmed the existence of external pagesecret Cold War deals allowing nuclear-armed US ships to dock in Japanese ports. (An uncomfortable truth, certainly, but not a revelation: Declassified US documents brought these arrangements to light some years ago.)
The fourth finding of the UCS is the remarkable level of outspoken support for a narrowing of US declaratory policy among senior Japanese politicians – including Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, and over 200 members of the Japanese Parliament.
In a external pageletter delivered to the US Embassy in Tokyo last month, the parliamentarians announced their strong desire for the US to “immediately” adopt a sole purpose declaration governing the use of its nuclear weapons. In addition, its 204 signatories were, they said, “firmly convinced that Japan will not seek the road toward possession of nuclear weapons if the US adopts a ‘sole purpose’ policy.”
All in all, a compelling case. It should be noted, though, that were a future Japanese government to decide differently, however unlikely that may be, building a nuclear bomb would present them with no significant technical difficulties. As a technologically advanced country with a well-established civilian nuclear power program (one involving external pageplutonium reprocessing facilities no less), Japan represents a prime example of what former IAEA director-general Mohammed ElBaradei has in the past termed a external page“virtual” nuclear weapon state. A state, that is, without actual nuclear weapons but with the capability to manufacture them in a short space of time – months, or thereabouts. Just as well it doesn’t want to, then.
And he need not worry that such a declaration would lead to Japan developing its own nuclear arsenal, as some fear, because that is simply not going to happen, argues Gregory Kulacki, the report's author. "To the contrary," Kulacki writes, brushing aside concerns of detrimental consequences for the US-Japanese security alliance, "it appears that both the Japanese public and the Japanese government would welcome these changes in US nuclear weapons policy."
It is a conclusion based in large part on six months of interviews conducted by the UCS with current and former Japanese officials and nongovernmental experts, coupled with a confidential 1995 study of the country's nuclear options commissioned by the Japan Defence Agency – and obtained by the UCS. Four major findings were the result.
The first is that, while some Japanese officials are concerned about the credibility of the US nuclear ‘umbrella’ that extends over Japan, these concerns are nothing new. Nor are they a consequence of a potential shift in nuclear policy from the ambiguous position maintained by former US president George W Bush – who kept the nuclear option open to chemical, biological and conventional threats – to the clear declaration of sole purpose currently under contemplation by the Obama administration. (China is presently the only nuclear-armed state to explicitly limit its nuclear weapons to nuclear threats.)
Second, the report notes, all those interviewed agreed that developing nuclear weapons would not be in the interests of Japanese national security. The aforementioned 1995 study reportedly reached the same conclusion, as did an earlier study in 1968.
Nor, for that matter, do the people of Japan want nuclear weapons, which forms the third finding (this one gleaned from opinion polls): As the only nation to bear the scars of a nuclear attack, popular opposition to nuclear weapons in Japan is intense, emotive and longstanding. For decades, Japanese governments have – at least ostensibly – followed the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” of non-possession, non-production and non-introduction of nuclear weapons to Japanese territory.
It was only earlier this month that Japan’s government confirmed the existence of external pagesecret Cold War deals allowing nuclear-armed US ships to dock in Japanese ports. (An uncomfortable truth, certainly, but not a revelation: Declassified US documents brought these arrangements to light some years ago.)
The fourth finding of the UCS is the remarkable level of outspoken support for a narrowing of US declaratory policy among senior Japanese politicians – including Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, and over 200 members of the Japanese Parliament.
In a external pageletter delivered to the US Embassy in Tokyo last month, the parliamentarians announced their strong desire for the US to “immediately” adopt a sole purpose declaration governing the use of its nuclear weapons. In addition, its 204 signatories were, they said, “firmly convinced that Japan will not seek the road toward possession of nuclear weapons if the US adopts a ‘sole purpose’ policy.”
All in all, a compelling case. It should be noted, though, that were a future Japanese government to decide differently, however unlikely that may be, building a nuclear bomb would present them with no significant technical difficulties. As a technologically advanced country with a well-established civilian nuclear power program (one involving external pageplutonium reprocessing facilities no less), Japan represents a prime example of what former IAEA director-general Mohammed ElBaradei has in the past termed a external page“virtual” nuclear weapon state. A state, that is, without actual nuclear weapons but with the capability to manufacture them in a short space of time – months, or thereabouts. Just as well it doesn’t want to, then.