Tensions Over Constitution Reforms Loom

Turkey’s parliament has approved a controversial package of constitutional amendments, but the ruling AKP still faces fierce resistance from the secularists as it seeks public approval for the reforms, writes Gareth Jenkins in Istanbul for ISN Security Watch.

On 7 May, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) succeeded in securing parliamentary approval for a package of controversial constitutional amendments. But the reforms failed to secure the support of a large enough majority to be enacted automatically and are now expected to be put to a referendum by President Abdullah Gul in mid-July.

The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) has already announced that it will apply to the country’s Constitutional Court for the package to be annulled before being put to a public vote. If the court rules in the CHP’s favor, the AKP is expected to call an early general election in September or October. If the referendum goes ahead, it is likely to be preceded by one of the most bitter political campaigns in recent Turkish history.

In what may be a sign of things to come, on 7 May, just hours after the reform package had been passed by parliament, a secretly recorded videotape purportedly showing CHP Chairman Deniz Baykal in a state of undress in a hotel room with a female CHP parliamentary deputy was posted on several Turkish language websites. On 10 May, Baykal announced his resignation. In a press conference carried live on national television, Baykal directly accused the AKP government of being responsible for the videotape; a charge which was immediately furiously rejected by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan.

Secularist suspicions

There is a general acknowledgement that Turkey’s current constitution, which was promulgated in 1982 during a period of military rule, needs to be comprehensively revised or even completely replaced. The EU has repeatedly stressed the need for extensive constitutional reforms as one of the main prerequisites for eventual Turkish accession.

Ever since the AKP first came to power in November 2002, its political opponents have accused it of harboring ambitions to undermine the principle of secularism enshrined in the Turkish constitution and establish an Islamic state. Yet, during its first term in power from 2002 to 2007, the AKP did little to confirm its opponents’ suspicions, initiating only a handful of tentative attempts to change the prevailing interpretation of secularism in Turkey, and quickly backing down in the face of secularist protests. But the AKP’s opponents remained unconvinced, arguing that the party was merely biding its time, aware that the three traditional bastions of the Turkish establishment – the presidency, the higher echelons of the judicial system and the military – were all still dominated by hardline secularists.

The balance of power changed dramatically in 2007. In April that year, Turkish Chief of Staff General Yasar Buyukanit implicitly threatened to stage a coup if the AKP pushed ahead with its plans to appoint the then-foreign minister Abdullah Gul to the presidency when the post fell vacant in the following month. The AKP responded by calling an early general election in July 2007 and was returned to power in a landslide. Humiliated, the military could only watch as Gul became president in August 2007. Since the July 2007 election, dozens of serving and retired military personnel have been arrested on charges of plotting a series of coups. No substantive evidence has yet been produced and many of the alleged plots are riddled with apparent contradictions and absurdities. Yet, regardless of their authenticity, the accusations have undoubtedly forced the military onto the defensive and further reduced its already waning political influence.

As a result, Turkish secularists have looked increasingly to their higher echelons of the judiciary. Nor have their hopes been disappointed. On 5 June 2008, the Constitutional Court, which is still dominated by hardline secularists appointed before the AKP came to power, annulled an attempt by the AKP to lift the ban which prevents women wearing Islamic headscarves from attending universities. On 30 July 2008, the Court found the AKP guilty of trying to undermine the principle of secularism enshrined in the Turkish Constitution but voted narrowly to allow the party to remain open on payment of a $20 million fine; and warned that any further attempts to undermine secularism would result in the AKP being outlawed.

In January 2010, the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges (HSYK), which oversees the members of the judiciary, dismissed four pro-AKP public prosecutors who had charged a secular prosecutor with membership in a terrorist organization after he allegedly uncovered evidence that individuals and religious organizations close to the AKP leadership had been fixing state contracts. In February 2010, the AKP announced that it was preparing a series of amendments to the Turkish Constitution.

Pluralistic democracy or a one party state?


The constitutional reform package which the AKP submitted to parliament at the end of March 2010 contained a number of proposed changes which were supported by the EU and for which there is a broad domestic consensus. These include lifting obstacles to positive gender discrimination; granting civil servants union rights and allowing them to engage in collective bargaining negotiations; introducing the right of appeal against summary dismissal from the military; preventing civilians from being tried in military courts except in times of war; making military personnel liable to trial in civilian courts; allowing those responsible for the 1980 military coup to be taken to court; and creating the office of ombudsman.

However, the package also included three highly controversial proposals. The AKP proposed expanding the number of the Court’s members from 11 to 17, of whom 14 would be chosen by the president, up from three at present. The changes would be introduced as soon as the amendments were published in the Official Gazette and would enable Gul to provide the AKP with an almost instant shield against the threat of closure. Just to make sure, the AKP also proposed transferring the final decision on the closure of political parties away from the Constitutional Court to a parliamentary committee.

The AKP also proposed a radical restructuring of the HYSK, which currently has seven members and is chaired by the justice minister. In January 2010, Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin attempted to prevent the dismissal of the four pro-AKP prosecutors by refusing to attend meetings of the HSYK, only for the board to convene in his absence. The EU has long called for the reform and expansion of the HSYK to include a broader representation of judicial officials. But it has also insisted that the presence of the justice minister as chair of the HSYK is incompatible with the principle of the separation of powers. Under the constitutional changes proposed by the AKP, the HSYK would be expanded to 21 members, including four appointed by the president, but would continue to be chaired by the justice minister.

Opposition parties immediately accused the AKP of disingenuousness. They argued that, far from being, as the government claimed, a prerequisite for Turkey’s EU accession, the package was designed to strengthen the AKP’s grip on the apparatus of state. They noted that the AKP had ignored many other reforms called for by the EU; most notably the lowering of the 10 percent electoral threshold for representation in parliament which gives the party with the largest share of the popular vote a disproportionately large number of seats in parliament. 

Under Turkish law, constitutional changes have to be approved by 367 of the 550 members of the Turkish parliament in order to be enacted automatically. If they receive the support of 330 deputies then they can be forwarded to the president who can opt to put them to a referendum. The AKP currently has 336 seats in parliament, meaning that it needed the support of opposition deputies in order for the changes to be legislated automatically.

The CHP suggested that the AKP should separate the proposed amendments into two packages, offering to support the less contentious changes and enable them to be enacted immediately and leaving the three more controversial reforms to be put to a referendum. The AKP refused.

Prime Minister Erdogan forbade AKP deputies from leaving Ankara and for over two weeks all other government business came to a halt as parliament voted on the amendments, with heated arguments occasionally boiling over into physical tussles between rival deputies. Even though a backbench revolt by a handful of AKP deputies forced the government to drop the amendment granting parliament the ultimate authority over party closures, the rest of the proposed changes were finally approved by 336 deputies in the early hours of 7 May.

The Constitutional Court’s last bow?

Under Turkish law, President Gul has up to 15 days in which to decide whether or not to put the constitutional amendments to a referendum, with the vote itself being held 60 days after Gul’s decision is published in the Official Gazette. The current expectation is that Gul will announce a decision early in order to ensure that the referendum is held before the beginning of the harvest in late July, when a significant proportion of the rural population – where the AKP has considerable grassroots support  -- temporarily migrate from the areas in which they are registered to look for seasonal work.

Even before the package had been passed by parliament, the CHP had already begun preparations to apply to the Constitutional Court for its annulment on the grounds that the changes violate the principle of the separation of powers. But it cannot make a formal application to the court until Gul’s decision has been published in the Official Gazette. It is currently unclear what the Constitutional Court will decide, although it is likely that at least some of its hard-line members will regard the CHP’s application as a last opportunity to rein in the AKP before it seizes complete control of the apparatus of state.

It is also unclear how the Turkish electorate is likely to vote if the constitutional amendments are eventually put to a referendum. Recent polls suggest that public opinion is fairly divided, with many people likely to be swayed by the campaigns by the political parties in the run-up to the referendum. The posting on the internet of the “sex tape” purportedly showing Deniz Baykal suggests that the campaign is likely to be a particularly acrimonious one.

There seems little doubt that the release of the tape was timed to damage the CHP as it sought to rally opposition to the constitutional reform package. But, contrary to Baykal’s claims, there is no evidence that the AKP was involved in the tape’s release. Privately, some AKP officials insist that, although it may have thrown the CHP into temporary disarray, in the longer term Baykal’s resignation could work to the government’s disadvantage. Cantankerous and uninspiring, during his ten years as head of the CHP, the 72 year-old Baykal has singularly failed to capture the Turkish public’s imagination. Rather than wishing to see him step down, many in the AKP are now concerned that Baykal will be replaced by someone younger and more energetic who will prove to be a much more formidable opponent.
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