Power and Education in Iran

The Azad University chain is no ordinary institute of higher learning. Established in 1982 by Hashemi Rafsanjani, it was meant to spread higher education to millions of young Iranians living in the far-off corners of the country. It has lived up to that promise with some qualifications.

With nearly 400 campuses and a student enrollment of 1.3 million, it is the third largest private university in the world, and with assets estimated at $240 billion, it is easily the best-endowed in the world. As far as its promise to make higher education accessible and affordable to everyone, it has received only a passing grade. While some less fortunate local students have gained entry to Azad, most of its enrollment has come from the middle classes.

Almost immediately after he took office, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad coveted the assets of the Azad University for his factional purposes. But it wasn't easy to wrest control of the institution from his archrival, Hashemi Rafsanjani.

When it was founded in 1982, the university had six members on its board: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Hashemi Rafsanjani, present-day opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi, ayatollah Khomeini's son Ahmad, chief prosecutor ayatollah abdolkarim Musavi Ardebili, and the university's own president, Abdollah Jasbi.

Ahmad died, and ayatollah Khamenei resigned from his position once he became the Supreme Leader, leaving four people - representing three factions - to preside over the university's affairs. Ardebili and Mousavi represented the reformists, Rafsanjani represented the pragmatists and Jasbi was a hybrid Traditionalist-Pragmatist.

With the center of gravity leaning heavily to the technocratic side of the ledger, the university's curriculum, hiring practice, campus environment and general orientation took on a modern and innovative outlook. Thus, millions of students flocked to its halls for a moderately untraditional education. When it came to factional fights, the university either took a neutral or anti-hardline stance.

Power struggle

Once Ahmadinejad became president, it was natural to expect a power contest over the university's vast properties and assets as well as its potential factional stronghold. A one-off power grab by the new faction was out of the question. Rafsanjani was still a powerful figure in the establishment and the then-head of the judiciary ayatollah Mahmood Hashemi Shahroudi was ill-disposed to the transfer. Thus, a low-intensity battle for power was launched, and continues today.

Upon being sworn in, Ahmadinejad reactivated a dormant entity called the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution (SCCR) to counter the influence of other factions in higher education.

Next, he took on Azad University (AU) publicly for allowing great waste and corruption to fester in its educational system. In the summer of 2006, the president's allies in the parliament got involved. A special AU supervisory committee was established to oversee and audit AU's activities. The committee was headed by Alireza Zakani, an old friend of Ahmadinejad and former head of the paramilitary student Basij Militia.

Zakani's attempts to prove massive malfeasance and corruption were not terribly successful. Jasbai had powerful backers in the parliament. His brother-in-law, Ali Abaspoor, was the chairman of the parliamentary Education and Research Subcommittee. In frustration, Zakani published an eight-page indictment of the AU system on his website.

Jasbi's support base in the Majlis (parliament) was not confined to his brother-in-law. Throughout the years, the university had educated tens of thousands of middle- and higher-level technocrats and cadres including many judges, politicians and members of parliament. In addition, Jasbi had made a point of asking MPs to teach courses or to join the offices of local campuses where they were represented in the Majlis.

In November 2006, Ahmadinejad tried to gain the support of AU students and parents by criticizing an announced tuition hike. "If the university does not reconsider the tuition increase, we will show them some revolutionary action," he stated.

In response, Jasbi promised to reconsider the tuition hike. Rafsanjani - who had been quiet until that moment - then realized the gravity of the situation. He called the moves made against the university's office holders "mendacious" and "venal," and promised that they would lead nowhere.

To the chagrin of Ahamdinejad supporters - such as the Azad University student Basij - a large number of MPs wrote a letter of gratitude a few months later to ayatollah Khamenei praising both Jasbi and AU for their "great services rendered to the nation."

Government spokesman Gholam Hossein Elham announced that "revolutionary action" against AU had been suspended on account of "some expediencies." Experts believed the expediencies in question referred to Khamenei and Shahroudi's counsel against the move. Shahroudi was apparently suspicious of the president’s motives, and Khamenei apparently thought the move was premature.

Without a warning, on 8 October 2008, the SCCR announced that it was changing the constitution of the university. Jasbi's deputy responded by saying that only the AU founders' board had the right to do so. After several back-and-forths, the SCCR finally handed down a two-month ultimatum: Either change the constitution to reflect the SCCR's wishes or a wholly new constitution will replace the old one. The ultimatum was ignored.
 
New reality

Last year's presidential election irrevocably altered the political terrain by heightening political tensions to hitherto-unheard-of levels. During the presidential debates, Ahmadinejad accused Rafsanjani and his family of having plundered public funds for their own personal purposes. For both sides, it was now a contest for survival.

Sensing the danger of an imminent takeover by a determined Ahmadinejad, on 29 August 2009, Rafsanjani mounted a brilliant master stroke. He announced that the private university would be converted to a full-fledged religious endowment (Vaghf) run by a board of trustees who were themselves appointed by the founders' board. Further, he added that the Supreme Leader had agreed to the conversion in principle.

In a surprise twist to the drama, the office of the Supreme Leader denied that news only three days later. Soon afterwards, Ahmadinejad's SCCR submitted a list of five new members for the university's governing board.

The announcement and subsequent denial came at a delicate time, when Ayatollah Khamenei and Rafsanjani were involved in sensitive negotiations, and when Khamenei's relations with Ahmadinejad were still cordial.

By May 2010, virtually two rival constitutions and two rival governing boards had been put forward by each camp, alliances were made and a closure for the long-simmering saga seemed at hand.

In April, a judge ruled that the road was open for a takeover by the government. On 19 June, a higher court overruled the earlier decision, passing an injunction against the takeover by Ahmadinejad's SCCR. The fight finally came to a head on 21 June, when the majority of parliamentarians passed a resolution upholding the injunction and endorsing the university's conversion to a religious trusteeship.

It seemed for once that the drama was reaching its denouement. However, the next day, several hundred young hardcore militants were bused to the area adjacent to the parliament building and staged a rowdy demonstration. They were joined by three notorious hardline MPs, chanting such colorful slogans as "Death to British Parliament," "Death to Hashemi," and "Death to Hashemi's Cronies."

The widely publicized demonstration and the counter move by pro-Ahmadinejad MPs resulted in a new bill, which endorsed the government's claim. However, this was not without several bruising speeches and a fistfight by the inflamed MPs. Simultaneously, the new Judiciary chief, Javad Larijani, sided with the government.

In matters of policy dispute such as this, when conflicting bills are issued, the Guardian Council arbitrates before sending them back for further modulation. That's what happened on 1 July. The hardline Guardian Council voted to reject the university's motion to convert into a religious endowment and returned the parliament's bill for adjustment.

Just when it seemed that victory was at hand for hardline forces, the office of the Supreme Leader issued a tersely worded statement on 5 July, which dashed their hopes. "Since the disputes over the Azad University have given rise to tedious and unnecessary dialogues between some officials…it is advisable to suspend for now both the issue of the religious endowment and the new SCCR-proposed constitution," said the official statement by ayatollah Khamenei.

Behind Khamenei's move

On 6 July, Fardanews, operated by Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, ran an important story shedding light on what we may expect in the near- or medium-term. According to Fardanews, Khamenei has appointed a group of jurists and legal scholars headed by Judiciary Chief Larijani to arbitrate and "give expert opinion" on the dispute.

Khamenei's demarche marks the first time in several years that the Supreme Leader has taken a public position demonstrably at odds with his own hardline constituency.

To understand the reason for this important development it is necessary to look back to the time of the 2009 election, which was a watershed event for the Islamic state in many ways. The spectacular failure of the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad-RGCI troika in achieving a successful political coup in that election forced a permannt transformation - and in the case of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, a breakdown - of their strategic alliance.
From that moment on, Khamenei's view of Aahmadinejad changed from an obedient if troublesome surrogate to a potential rival placing his protégé on the same plain as the other contestants to power.

In the new post-election political dynamic, the Supreme Leader has reverted to his older behavioral pattern of playing off political factions against one another to maintain his unchallenged position - this is particularly true when one faction acquired too much power compared to the others.

Had the Supreme Leader not reacted to the Guardian Council's move (to transfer AU assets to Ahmadinejad), the hardliners would have become intolerably too powerful and this would have jeopardized his own position in the hierarchy.

As far as Rafsanjani is concerned, Khamenei would be perfectly happy to see his old rival cut down to size as long as it doesn't overly strengthen the Ahmadinejad faction and would not anger Rafsanjani too much. Hence, Khamenei's appointment of his chief of the judiciary for a grand compromise solution.