Uncertainty Remains Over Black Sea Fleet

A boat cruise around the harbor in this Crimean port city reveals the notorious fleet of shabby and aged Russian vessels. Some haven’t left port since the collapse of the Soviet Union, while others seem barely afloat where they sit. All have seen better days.

But Russia is proud of its historic Black Sea Fleet’s presence in Ukraine, one that has periodically stoked tensions between the two countries since Ukraine’s independence in 1991. In April, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych extended the fleet’s 1997 lease on its base in Sevastopol, which was set to expire in 2017, for up to another 25 years in exchange for a discount on natural gas imports, sparking concerns among pro-Ukrainian politicians that it diminishes the country’s sovereignty.

Now, as Kiev and Moscow head to the negotiating table later this month to hash out the explicit terms of the agreement, serious questions remain. Among them are the provisions for modernizing the tattered ships and the dubious influence the fleet yields over the already heavily Russified city.

And though Yanukovych is by far the most pro-Russian president in Ukraine’s short history, analysts say his sympathies toward Moscow may not matter. Rather, they say, Ukraine should be prepared to deal with the burden of an ever-demanding Big Brother.

“For Ukraine, the Black Sea Fleet is like a cancer that will grow larger and more dangerous until 2042,” Sergiy Kulyk, director of the Sevastopol-based NOMOS Center for Black Sea security studies, told ISN Security Watch.

The new facade

The Black Sea Fleet (BSF) has been perhaps the most prominent obstacle in Russian-Ukrainian relations. Especially under pro-western former president Viktor Yushchenko, it had been used as a rallying call against Russian influence in Ukraine, one that ruffled many a feather at the highest echelons of the Kremlin.

Now, just more than six months into his presidency, the pro-Russian Yanukovych and his hand picked government is making up for lost time. Repairing relations at lightning speed, he has set out to prove to Moscow that he’s a compatible partner. Besides extending the BSF’s lease, he invited a batch of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agents back to their base in Sevastopol after Yushchenko kicked them out last year for alleged subversive activities.

And so far, Moscow likes what it sees. Yanukovych has received across-the-board approval from Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and especially in Sevastopol circles, the local Russian elite touts the Kremlin line of support. Hinting at the dismal Russian-Ukrainian ties under Yushchenko, Vladimir Solovyev, former BSF intelligence chief and director of the Kremlin-backed Institute for CIS Countries in Sevastopol, told ISN Security Watch he’s certain that Russia has finally received the cooperation for which it had longed desired from the Ukrainian government.

“We are glad we finally have a president we can work with,” said Solovyev. “It’s a good idea that both the president and prime minister have good relations with Russian leaders.”

But independent analysts say this rhetoric is a façade for Moscow’s true intentions. Instead, Yanukovych’s pro-Russian inclinations have paved the way for a juggernaut of Russian incursion, according to Kulyk, and the signals Yanukovych’s team sends that they’re open to warmer relations with Moscow are interpreted in the Kremlin as passive capitulation to Russia.

“Russia will not take into consideration this willingness [of Yanukovych] to extend an olive branch,” he said, “but will instead do whatever what it wants, just as it had been doing before.”

Modernization pains

The latest question to arise in the BSF’s basing in Sevastopol is one of modernization - seemingly the buzzword of the year for the Russian leadership. Though Russia has long touted the fleet as the pride of its storied navy, the reality is that it needs a serious overhaul.

Today, the BSF has about 40 operational vessels (far less than in its Soviet glory days), but a handful of them are on their way to decommissioning. Shortly before the agreement was signed, Russia announced its plans to add up to four new frigates and four submarines to the fleet by 2015, giving it a much-needed boost.

But the terms of modernizing the fleet are ambiguous, experts say, leaving plenty of room for manipulation. And here, curiously, is where Yanukovych seems to break from passive cooperation. The 1997 argument allowed only for a ship-for-ship swap - that is, it allows Russia to replace old ships only with similar ones. And since the new lease is an extension of the first agreement, Ukraine seems to stand by its restriction of a total overhaul.
 
For Moscow, it would be a hard pill to swallow, especially since its leadership has banked on full cooperation from Kiev. Solovyev remains confident, however, that the fleet will ultimately have its way.

“Nothing was said about the number of ships in the agreement,” he said. “Yushchenko said that new ships would not be allowed because, in his mind, the fleet was supposed to leave in 2017. But Russia responded that it was just his opinion and that this problem should be solved, and I think under Yanukovych this problem has been solved.”

Others are not as certain as Solovyev. Crimea expert John Jaworsky told ISN Security Watch that the ambiguity of the agreement could play to Ukraine’s advantage, creating a loophole that effectively prevents Russia from modernizing its rapidly rusting fleet.

“A lot depends on how you interpret those agreements,” said Jaworsky, assistant professor of political science at Canada’s University of Waterloo. “The Ukrainian argument essentially dooms the fleet to irrelevance, because ultimately, the existing ships would just rust away.”

Spheres of influence

Sevastopol is no ordinary city. Rather, it’s a living memorial to the Russian and Soviet sacrifices in the defense of the ‘hero city’ throughout the fleet’s 227-year history. Draped Russian flags handily outnumber Ukrainian ones, and most prominent streets are named after Russian admirals. The writing on the wall - literally, in some cases - reads that Sevastopol is a Russian city.

But times have changed, and Russian officials seem reluctant to accept it. The BSF’s basing in Sevastopol is perhaps the most glaring example of this. While the official Russian line is to accept Ukraine’s authority over the city, the truth is far more sinister.

For years, the fleet has been connected to dubious, non-military activities that, at best, nurture Russian influence, and at worst, illegally abuse Ukrainian assets. A prime example is the Russian Community of Sevastopol, an ostensibly civic organization that advocates for pro-Russian policy, but whose newspaper is curiously printed from the BSF’s headquarters.

Even more serious are allegations that the fleet dips into the city budget, which is funded directly by Kiev, to pay for its property and other local assets it uses. While the popular argument holds that the fleet contributes to the local economy, experts say the reality is that it drains Sevastopol of badly needed cash.

“If the property which is being illegally used [by the BSF] with the Sevastopol budget was handled in a legitimate fashion, the local economy would benefit considerably,” said Jaworsky. “To date, there has not been a good inventory done on the property of the Black Sea Fleet. And in the absence of that inventory, you can’t calculate the costs of the property being turned over to Ukraine.”

Trouble ahead?

Now, as Yanukovych’s honeymoon dies down and the notoriously moody Ukrainian electorate gets its first chance to voice its opinion - first in October’s regional elections, then in next year’s parliamentary elections - rumors of possible change linger on the horizon.

Since Yanukovych signed the agreement in April, opposition politicians have made it their cause célèbre, alleging not only that it endangers Ukraine’s sovereignty, but that rampant vote fraud by Yanukovych’s Party of Regions during the deal’s ratification in parliament renders it illegal. Opposition leader and former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, among others, has promised to annul the agreement if the opposition scrapes together a majority in next year’s elections.

But given Yanukovych’s increasingly apparent authoritarian bent, the chances of serious change are slim. Still, rumors are enough to get Russian officialdom roiling. Solovyev says that if a new government would force the fleet’s ouster, it would stir certain trouble and catapult Russian-Ukrainian relations back to the dark age.

“Politicians should be more careful about what is agreed between Russia and Ukraine, and speak less about the idea that things can change if there is a new government,” he said. “Because if this happens, God forbid, then it would create a truly terrible situation between Russia and Ukraine.”