Somalia and Shabaab

Somalia’s capital Mogadishu has been ravaged by a protracted battle between the Somali jihadist group Shabaab and a counterterrorism alliance backing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for years.   Armed clashes and suicide bombings have intensified since the summer of 2010, but the battle lines have remained remarkably stable during the past two years. 

Since mid-2008, Shabaab  has controlled nearly all of southern Somalia and most of the capital Mogadishu, leaving the TFG confined to a few districts of the capital, protected, to varying degrees, by an African Union peace operation (AMISOM) now numbering 7,000.  The TFG has been utterly unable to mount an offensive and hold territory; its security forces defect or fail to fight.  For its part, Shabaab has successfully harassed the AMISOM forces and the TFG with suicide bomb attacks, roadside bombs, and mortar attacks, but has lacked the capacity – or perhaps the will – to overrun AMISOM positions.

The result has been a very costly stalemate in which the main victims have been Somali civilians caught in the crossfire. Whole neighborhoods of the capital have been emptied as desperate residents flee the city.

The logic of stalemate

The prolonged stalemate in Mogadishu has at times raised suspicions that both sides benefit from the stand-off.  Shabaab benefits from perpetual mobilization in many ways.  Endless jihad attracts foreign funding and recruits, postpones potentially treacherous decisions about how it would govern the country were it to consolidate control, and uses AMISOM’s continued presence to frame the struggle as 'Somali versus foreign occupier'.   

For its part, the TFG leadership has approached the enterprise of transitional governance as a short-term profit-taking venture, pocketing customs revenue and foreign aid while making little effort to govern or push back against Shabaab.  They do not need to win to continue this lucrative enterprise; they simply have to avoid losing. 

It could also be argued that key foreign interests are served by the prolonged stalemate. According to this line of argument the current situation is not optimal for anyone, but represents a minimally acceptable outcome for many.  Not surprisingly, some Somalis have concluded that the state of perpetual low-intensity war in Mogadishu amounts to a 'fixed game'. After many years of warlord politics, in which battles were waged not to win but to create conditions of disorder within which armed groups could loot and plunder civilians, Somalis are all too familiar with this approach to armed conflict.

Exporting the conflict

Shabaab’s suicide attacks in Kampala, Uganda in July 2010, and its sustained offensive inside Mogadishu in the past month, appear to be challenging this interpretation.  For whatever reason, the group’s leadership seems to have concluded that prolonged stalemate is no longer in its interest, and that it must drive AMISOM and the TFG out of the capital. If so, this is a risky gambit for the group.

One of the risks Shabaab faces is blowback from powerful interest groups within Somali society.  It’s best hope in driving AMISOM out of Mogadishu is to take the war to the states contributing troops to AMISOM or providing other support to the TFG (Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Kenya, among others), in the hopes of producing a public backlash in those countries against their governments’ commitments in Somalia.  This was the apparent logic behind the suicide bomb attacks in Kampala. 

But the Kampala attack has also had the effect of intensifying already significant law enforcement scrutiny of Somali populations around the world.  The large Somali diaspora – now thought to number 1.5 million or more – is the economic lifeline of Somalia, the source of an estimated $1 billion or more in annual remittances to the country. Anything that compromises that remittance system constitutes an existential threat to millions of Somalis.

The diaspora also holds millions of dollars of investments in places like Nairobi, Kenya.  Both the business investments and the remittance system are vulnerable to disruption in the event of a law enforcement crackdown targeting Somali communities. There is already considerable anxiety in the Somali diaspora over the growing legal restrictions on remittance companies.   

The coming blowback?

In the aftermath of the Uganda bombings, the US and other governments made a point of reassuring Somali communities abroad that they would not be victims of collective punishment.  Western governments took care not to respond in ways that would drive Somalis into the arms of Shabaab.  But additional terrorism abroad by the group will unavoidably raise the level of law enforcement scrutiny on Somalis abroad and their remittance companies.

As Somali communities feel the squeeze, the critical question is whether they will blame Shabaab or their host countries.  Shabaab will be counting on Somalis to view legal crackdowns as yet another instance of persecution of Somalis by western and African governments, but it is at least as likely that the group could face blowback from Somali interest groups that conclude they can no longer tolerate the damage done to their livelihoods and investments by Shabaab’s actions.  Put another way, Shabaab may be overplaying its hand in a context of growing Somali anger and frustration with the group.

To date, few Somalis have dared to openly oppose the group for fear of assassination. Violence and threats against any source of opposition and criticism has led to a devastating exodus of civic leadership out of Mogadishu and the silencing of a once-vibrant private media.  In the absence of any viable alternative to Shabaab, most Somalis have understandably kept their heads low, despite their strong aversion to the group’s radicalism. That could change if Shabaab pushes already desperate Somalis any closer to the brink.

In the end, the pivotal question is whether Shabaab needs to concern itself with the impact of its actions on Somali interests. If it does – if it sees itself first and foremost as a Somali Islamic-nationalist movement – that will serve as a deterrent to additional terrorist attacks abroad. But if the group’s leadership embraces the globalist vision of al-Qaida, in which the impact of its behavior on Somalia is of little consequence, then we can expect to see more terrorist attacks abroad.  This tension between global and local agendas represents a major fault line within Shabaab and could easily unravel the group.  But even the al-Qaida inspired jihadis among them understand that the group will be hard pressed to continue to operate in Somalia if reckless acts of terrorism abroad mobilize Somali business, clan and other groups against it. Shabaab’s best friend in Somalia is the current climate of passivity and fear among Somalis.