Europe's Extreme Right

Political scientists and commentators alike are unusually divided over the very notion of the 'extreme right.' A derogative phrase for some, and a label that most parties usually considered to be on the 'extreme right' systematically reject, it is, in political science terms, an analytical category that corresponds to one of the party families that seems to have consistently emerged as a significant force in most European countries between the 1970s and the 1990s. However, while most political scientists agree that there is such a thing as an 'extreme right' party family (also sometimes called 'far right,' 'populist right,' or even 'new right'), they partly disagree on (1) the analytical consistency of the category; (2) the unity of this party family; and (3) the exact list of parties that belong to this class.

The question of the extreme right's ideological identity is key. Part of academic literature classifies extreme right parties as single-issue parties focusing on anti-immigration sentiments. By contrast, others think of extreme right parties first and foremost as populist 'anti-party' parties, highlighting one of the paradoxes of a series of political parties which claim to be 'different.' Finally, a recent study argues that extreme right parties are defined by a reliance on two dimensions: negative identity and authoritarianism. Each of these dimensions can be expressed in two contrasting forms either as xenophobic (fear of what is foreign) or populist (antipathy for the elite) type of negative identity and as reactionary or repressive.

The question of what makes the ideological identity of extreme right parties also has strong implications for whether the family is perceived as 'united' or 'divided' across Europe. While most of the literature thinks of the extreme right party family as globally coherent, some authors claim that there are really two types of extreme right parties: 'old' (which revive the ideology of the fascist and Nazi extremist parties of the 1930s and 1940s) and 'new,' more populist ones. Based on this more complex model, I have argued, together with Sarah Harrison that the reference to fascist and Nazi roots is not necessarily relevant for the classification of contemporary parties. Rather, the parties' choices on the negative identity and authoritarianism scales can lead to four possible types of extremist parties: xenophobic-reactionary, xenophobic-repressive, populist-reactionary and populist-repressive.

Finally these different models have, as mentioned, some implications for the categorization of parties that various authors consider to be 'in' or 'out' of the extreme right family. In general, the majority of authors agree on the classification of most parties. However, at the margins, a few differences exist. Cas Mudde, a prominent expert, notes that authors use dozens of different criteria to 'test' whether a party is of the extreme right or not. Our own research has shown that even when looking at a single country, such a multiplicity of criteria and results does occur.

Typically, some authors may question whether Scandinavian right-wing populist parties are really extreme right or not, whether a party such as UKIP should be classified as extreme right or is instead a eurosceptic single issue party, and indeed, whether a large number of 'parties' which typically gain less than one or two percent of the vote in elections should be deemed to be political parties at all. For analytical purposes, this article will include parties which most experts typically consider to belong to the extreme right.

Why is the extreme right strong in some countries and not others?

The general perception of most citizens is that the extreme right has dramatically increased its presence on the European political scene. It is worth noting, however, that the strength of the party family varies across the continent. On the one hand, some parties generally considered to be of the extreme right have participated in coalition governments in no fewer than seven European countries since the 1990s (Austria, Italy, Denmark, Switzerland, Poland, etc). In over a dozen European countries, extreme right parties also regularly obtain over 10 percent of the vote in national, local, or European elections (France, Belgium, UK, Hungary, etc). By contrast, however, it is worth remembering that extreme right parties are virtually unheard of in as diverse political systems as Finland, Spain or Estonia.

One explanation that should be dismissed almost immediately is that extreme right parties might do well in countries with lots of immigrants and poorly in low immigration countries. Many Central and Eastern European countries, Poland and Hungary among them, where extreme right parties have enjoyed significant electoral successes have very low levels of immigration, and conversely, many countries where immigration has strongly progressed in recent years (Ireland, Spain) have no strong extreme right presence at all. Indeed it seems that the strength of the extreme right is not directly proportional to a country's openness to immigration.

Similarly, the simplistic assumption that the extreme right would do well in countries in crisis is hard to support. Countries such as Switzerland and Austria are some of the wealthiest and economically most stable in Europe and yet they have highly successful extremist parties. Similarly, in the UK, extremist parties started to do well during one of the greatest periods of sustained economic growth in the country while elsewhere, in Greece and Ireland for example, they still do poorly despite the severity of the most recent economic crisis.

By contrast, a traditional explanation for the varying fortunes of extreme right parties is institutional and has to do with the electoral system in use. The argument that countries with majoritarian systems are more 'protected' than countries with proportional representation, where it is easier for smaller parties to gain representation is, however, limited. Indeed, France has been a prototype of country with a strong extreme right while using a majoritarian system in national elections, and most of the countries without an extreme right presence (Spain, Finland, Malta, etc.) use proportional representation.

Therefore, a new take on the institutional explanation worth considering is that in many ways the rising importance of multi-level governance and multiple elections has increased the chances of the extreme right to establish itself in some niche markets. In most European countries, local, national and European elections now offer many different avenues for the extreme right parties to, and indeed, many extreme right parties have now 'specialized' in either European or local campaigning and rhetoric rather than systematically or uniquely targeting the national level. A geographically specific focus is yet another hallmark of many European extreme right parties, including the Lega Nord in parts of Lombardia and the Vlaams Beland in Antwerp.

Extreme right: rising or declining?

The question of what helps the extreme right to do well also has implications for our understanding of whether the extreme right party family is on the rise or in decline throughout Europe.

We need to move away from the impression of an ineluctable trend upward as seemed to be the case in the late 1980s and early 1990s across the continent. Clearly, the extreme right party family has established itself as a firm player on the European ideological scene in the past two decades. In a majority of countries, they are now able either to pretend to participate in government or to upset the electoral game of 'mainstream' parties in either local, national or European elections.

By contrast, one is forced to question the impact of right parties participating in 'peaceful' coalition governments. It should be noted that the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), for example, paid a heavy price for participating in government before recapturing some of its electoral appeal. Similarly, the Italian Alleanza Nazionale did not do very well after joining forces with Silvio Berlusconi's party. However, the Lega Nord gained further support in recent elections after being in exactly the same coalition situation. Finally, the Polish Law and Justice party (PiS) and League of Polish Families (LNR) which ruled Poland after their victory in the 2005 elections collapsed a few years later.

And it is not only extreme right parties in government which seem to face unequal fortunes over time. Indeed, after Jean-Marie Le Pen came second in the 2002 French presidential elections, the party suffered one of its worst results in decades five years later. Nevertheless, in 2010, the party was already regaining ground in regional elections.

In 2010, therefore, the European extreme right landscape seems contrasted. Parties with relatively diverse but nevertheless coherent ideological profiles have managed to break through in a majority of European nations either at the local, national or European levels. In countries where they emerged early on, in the 1980s, some parties seem to have reached a certain ceiling, while in others, where they only appeared later, as is the case of Jobbik in Hungary, their progress was sometimes extremely fast. While some extreme right parties have had a 'taste of power' through their participation in coalition governments, they have often then been punished for poor governance or rewarded when voters thought that they represented an opportunity for change.

This normalization of the perception of extreme right parties in Europe is perhaps in itself one of the greatest changes in the European extreme right scene. After portraying themselves as 'different,' many extreme right parties have changed their strategies and asked to be considered 'like any other party' by voters, brushing off the fear they once aroused. Paradoxically, the changing fortunes of extreme right parties are symptomatic of their establishment in national party systems. It is also one of the elements that anti-extreme right campaigners worry about the most, as it signals an increasing difficulty in convincing the public that extreme right parties must be blocked at all cost because they represent a unique danger. In this sense, it is noteworthy that when looking at survey answers, fewer and fewer people across Europe lie or admit shame in recognizing that they have voted or will vote for extreme right parties in the future.

Additional resources

Bruter, M. & Harrison, S. (2009). The Future of Our Democracies? Basingstoke: Palgrave
Harrison S. and Bruter M. (2010). Mapping the Extreme Right Ideology. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Harrison, S (2007) 'Extreme Right' in Deloye, Y and Bruter, M (eds) Encyclopaedia of European Elections. (Basingstoke, Palgrave).
Ignazi, P (1992) 'The Silent Counter-Revolution Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe', European Journal of Political Research 22
Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Van der Brug, W, Fennema, M & Tillie, J. (2005) 'Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed. A Two Step model of Aggregate Electoral Support', Comparative Political Studies, 38:5