A Changing (Political) Climate?

2 Dec 2009

Even before world attention turns to Copenhagen later this month, hopes for a substantive conference outcome already are dwindling, as big players are unlikely to cede much ground during another round of contentious climate change negotiations.

The last three years clearly helped create new momentum to tackle global climate change. In spring 2007, the external pageIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published its external pageFourth Assessment Report, definitively signaling that climate change is happening and accelerating. Warming of the climate system is considered unequivocal today, evident from observed increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice as well as rising sea levels. The widely publicized decision to jointly award the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize to the IPCC and former US vice-president external pageAl Gore further raised the issue's international profile. The new US administration under President Barack Obama has also external pagepropelled hope for progress on climate policy.

But the political process to adopt concrete measures to effectively address the climate problem has proven to be more complicated than many expected. The upcoming external pageUN Climate Conference in Copenhagen will be convened to hammer out an agreement on a follow-up climate regime to succeed the external pageKyoto Protocol post-2012. It will, however, most likely result in only a rather general declaration that signifies the severity of the problem and the willingness to continue negotiations. Most negotiators and observers now believe that no legal deal will be struck at Copenhagen. Climate scientists, however, remain convinced that the world must stop the growth in climate warming greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions  and begin to quickly reduce them.

The political track record so far is not promising, with the Kyoto Protocol showing mixed results at best. According to the latest external pageUN figures, emissions by the 40 industrialized countries committed to the Protocol are down five percent compared with 1990 levels. But recent trends indicate a growth in GHG emissions for most countries since 2000. Also, little evidence exists that achievements in the 1990s had much to do with climate policy. Lower emissions achieved during that period are mainly the result of structural changes in eastern European economies following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The transition toward market economies and the collapse of heavy industries have contributed both to more energy efficiency and less carbon intensive production sectors. Without these reductions during the 1990s, GHG emissions of external pageAnnex 1 parties under Kyoto would have external pagegrown by almost 10 percent since 1990. Another big drawback of Kyoto: Its binding measures do not apply to China, India and other emerging economies that are external pageprojected to account for the vast majority of emissions growth in coming decades.

The most contentious question still swirling in international climate negotiations is, 'who should make the urgently needed emissions cuts?'. Industrialized countries such as the US, European states, Australia and Japan have been the big polluters since industrialization and, therefore, mainly responsible for today’s GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. Under the Kyoto Protocol, they are held accountable for current levels of atmospheric GHG and have to bear the main burden of emissions reductions. China, India and other emerging countries not committed under the current climate regime insist in being allowed to continue to pollute (at least for some time) to enhance development and thereby improve their citizens’ lives. This developing countries' exemption, however, led the US to external pagewalk away from the Kyoto process in 2001 and, more generally, increased disagreement within the economically highly developed world.

Superpower stasis

The US-Chinese relationship has become absolutely crucial for moving toward a post-2012 climate regime. Not only are the countries two of the world’s biggest polluters in terms of absolute numbers of GHG emissions, but their relationship to the political process  and each other  will also be critical for the prospects of a new global climate deal. Kyoto has demonstrated that other countries (not only the US) have become reluctant to strengthen their climate policies. But not including emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil in a future climate regime will hardly shift the political debate in the US toward a political majority that accepts binding (and costly) restrictions on GHG emissions. Due to these mutual dependencies, it is no surprise that both the US and Chinese governments have been very hesitant to indicate any specific targets and measures to cut or limit their own emissions, at least publicly.

Just recently, with worries of a Copenhagen failure mounting, the White House external pageannounced that the US will strive for emission reduction targets in the range of 17 percent below 2005 levels in 2020, 30 percent in 2025, 42 percent by 2030 and a full 83 percent by 2050. These provisional targets fall far behind those of other rich countries (especially in Europe) but are in line with the legislation currently under debate in the US Congress and, therefore, reflect a goal that seems politically feasible. But Washington also made clear that they should be achieved in the context of an overall climate treaty that includes robust contributions from China and other emerging economies. China itself external pagedeclared that it would go to Copenhagen with a commitment to cut the amount of carbon dioxide per unit of GDP in 2020 by 40 to 45 percent compared with 2005 levels. However, the Chinese government sees this plan as a “voluntary action,” indicating that it will be highly unlikely that China will commit itself to internationally binding reduction targets under the given circumstances.

More of the same

Despite these movements, which could be interpreted as a US-Chinese political approximation on the climate issue, deeply entrenched disagreements between the rich and developing worlds about how to cope with global climate change are more than likely to continue. The negotiation process will continue to meet with serious cooperation problems between the delegations from different negotiating parties. Even with many financial and technical solutions available to mitigate and solve the climate crisis, political cooperation to move the process forward is a precondition to overcome this global ‘tragedy of the commons.’ Otherwise, to invoke external pageHardin’s famous metaphor, the atmosphere will continue to be over-exploited because polluters gain from the material advantages of activities that contribute to global warming but suffer only a fraction of the environmental costs. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that states and their constituencies show little willingness to reduce their GHG emissions unilaterally: In doing so, they would pay the full price of their efforts, while gaining only a fraction of the benefits.

However, the history of environmental politics also shows that purely rational and interest-based approaches (when applied in isolation from other potentially explaining factors) hardly explain the outcome of political processes. Other explaining factors discussed in the literature with reference to climate change challenges include the type of regime designed to address the issue, linkages to other issues on the political agenda and the role of values and norms that structure the political debate. Scholars have also turned their attention more to inter-linkages between domestic politics and international relations to understand international climate negotiations. The current inability of the international political community to reach an agreement on a post-Kyoto climate regime indicates clearly the current role of domestic political considerations of key governments such as the US and China. As long as the political debate in the US over climate change remains external pagedivided and China continues to follow in lockstep with the western world by ‘polluting first and cleaning up later,’ a shift in the political climate over global warming seems unlikely. The politics of climate change could gain new momentum next year, however, when the US Senate takes up Obama’s external pageClean Energy Leadership Act. Until that time, however, the president’s hands are tied.

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