Continuity and Change: Foreign Policy Since 9/11
3 Nov 2009
By Victor Mauer for ISN
In a few days, the world will remember the 20th anniversary of 11/9 – that day when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down and the international political system turned upside down. The reunification of the two German states on 3 October 1990 was the antithesis of the proclamation of the German Reich on 18 January 1871. The German question had been resolved; the four former occupying powers had given their consent, as had Germany’s European neighbors. Under the external page2+4 Treaty, the Federal Republic was once again a subject of global politics with unqualified sovereignty – this time on Western European terms. Its post-World War II borders were acknowledged under international law. And for the first time ever, German national unity met a democratic system, and integration into the political, economic and military structures of the Western democratic community became feasible.
In May 1989, when the seeds of democracy in Eastern Europe still lay dormant, buried under the frozen tundra of the Cold War, former US President George H W Bush laid out his vision of "external pageA Europe Whole and Free" and called on Germany to act – along with the US – as "partners in leadership." Flattered and yet somehow uncomfortable, the German political elite largely left Bush’s remark unacknowledged and unheeded. To be sure, the German governments had found their respective niche and style of leadership within the Cold War system, but the new world order required a very different kind of leadership.The 329 days between 9 November 1989 and 3 October 1990, when Germany was unified and Europe transformed, did indeed, without in any way underestimating the people power that so heavily drove the revolutions in Europe, reflect an exercise in statecraft – not only on the part of the Bush administration and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who gained strength out of fundamental weakness, but also on the part of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.
Some were hopeful that this would mark the beginning of a new German foreign and security policy that would remain rooted in the fundamental parameters of the old Bonn Republic but also display a willingness and ability to assume greater responsibility on the world stage. Others – academic pundits and political heavy- and lightweights alike – feared for the worst. International relations theorist John Mearsheimer predicted the end of European integration and a nuclear-armed Germany; the London Times saw the coming of 'The Fourth Reich;' British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher external pagefantasized of ‘Deutschland, Deutschland über alles’ when listening to the German national anthem and scribbled "nationalism, n’est-ce pas?" in the margins of one of her mandarins’ memorandum; and her hapless minister Nicholas Ridley seriously believed that European integration was a German racket to take over the whole of Europe, comparing the loss of sovereignty under the proposed European Monetary Union to the servitude Britain would have had to endure had it surrendered to Adolf Hitler.
The same but different
Anyone reviewing the past 20 years of German foreign and security policy since the fall of the Wall will discern both continuity and change. Germany may be more self-absorbed and self-satisfied, less driven by personal historical experience, and all in all more self-interested. It is obvious, however, what the country is not: It is neither unbound by nor disinterested in the European Union, and it is most certainly not nationalistic.
The key parameters that informed German foreign and security policy during the Cold War still apply. First of all, the burden of the past continues to influence a foreign policy marked by a commitment to multilateralism, restraint, voluntary self-restriction and military reticence – regardless of its considerable troop commitments in international peace support operations.
Secondly, Germany remains anchored within the West, without neglecting the East. The notion of a Sonderweg (special path) between East and West remains a taboo. The European integration process and the preservation of the transatlantic security community remain at the center of German foreign policy, though under fundamentally changed circumstances. It was precisely because of these considerations that the Federal Republic advocated the eastward expansion of both NATO and the EU. The attendant gain in terms of political and economic stability and security has been considerable. Moreover, under Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, Germany remains the chief consensus builder within, and chief paymaster of, the EU.
Nevertheless, there are two distinct differences: The Germany of today is less willing to neglect its own political interests for the sake of furthering the European integration process, and the Franco-German engine of European integration has been stalling badly. The partnership remains solid but somehow hollow. If the EU aspires to raise its stature on the international stage, a close cooperation between Berlin and Paris is essential, though not sufficient.
Thirdly, the eastern connection that Germany has been relying on increasingly since the early 1970s is not only geared toward fostering transformation but is based on taking into account Russia’s security concerns, even if this rouses suspicion among European neighbors.
The quest for balance
The real challenge to German foreign and security policy may be described as the quest for a balance between the collective experiences of the 20th century and the new challenges of the 21st. Here, too, three aspects are crucial. First of all, there is not so much skepticism as rather a sense of expectation on the part of allies and partner states that Germany should take on greater responsibility for tasks related to security policy arrangements in and for Europe and the world in accordance with its abilities. Secondly, the reduced reliance on US security guarantees implies greater freedom to formulate policy options of its own, which, however, is limited by domestic politics' influence on foreign policy. While the unilateralism of the former US President George W Bush administration on occasion seemed to propel German foreign policy in the direction of countervailing power status, it still has a tendency to orient toward Europe. Thirdly, because the new security policy challenges go beyond the classic tasks of territorial defense, Germany can no longer limit itself to making a functional contribution to collective security.
These changes add up to a difference of degree that is a difference in kind – a different kind of German foreign and security policy, all in all more assertive, at times stubborn but somehow also reluctant – not only to play a leading role in world politics but also to acknowledge the considerable changes that have either come about or been pursued since the end of the Cold War.
The new government will find it difficult to tread a path in foreign and security policy that balances the traditional culture of restraint, the expanded scope of action and the expectations of allies and partners. There is a growing discrepancy between the country’s pretensions to political influence and its shrinking resources; this is complemented by a lack of interest and expertise on the part of the parliamentary elite in foreign and security policy themes, which may in part be historically motivated. The case of the Federal Republic’s engagement in Afghanistan shows that it is slowly losing its compass in foreign and security policy matters. To this day, the government refuses (mainly out of domestic political considerations) to explain the rationale of the mission and to address the dangers and challenges of its engagement – despite the fact that the Bundeswehr accounts for one of the largest troop deployments.
The two novices in the foreign and defense ministries, Guido Westerwelle and Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, will have to advance the process of adapting Germany’s foreign and security policy to the new international framework more credibly, taking into consideration national interests and international responsibilities. So far, little is known about their intentions. More than a few partners are irritated about being forced to engage in guesswork, which only creates more leeway for speculation.