History's Double Bind

Sino-Japanese interactions during the prime ministerial terms of Abe and Fukuda suggests that relations are improving. On the surface, Chinese President Hu’s May 2008 visit to Japan supports this perception. Although a triumph for public diplomacy, bilateral agreements and public statements were vague and far from resolving the ongoing disputes that are both rooted in and exacerbated by China and Japan’s turbulent history. The question is whether these differences can be overcome through increasing economic cooperation or if such an approach is superficial, hiding the political reality and failing to create strong foundations for the future.

The love-hate relationship

Sino-Japanese relations are paradoxical; both nations are dependent on each other for economic growth, yet each nation warily anticipates the future course the other might pursue. Japanese aid since 1979 has provided China with the essential infrastructure for its rapid modernization. And it is Chinese growth that has boosted Japan’s economy during its recent financial difficulties, with a compounded annual trading growth of 16.6 percent between 1990 and 2006.

At the same time, however, Japan has felt threatened by China’s rapid development and vast potential power. The growth of China is perceived by many in Japan as a danger, yet its collapse would be a catastrophe. Similarly for China, Japan is viewed as a powerful regional competitor, but without continued Japanese investment current levels of growth could not be sustained.

The burden of history

The enduring nature of historic tensions may prevent the resolution of existing disputes. Recent events have demonstrated how past events continue to shape the development of trust between China and Japan. For example, Japan’s constant rhetoric against China’s military growth reveals its concern over China’s motivations (an issue often repeated in the September 2008 Japanese defense white paper).

In China there has been political and public opposition towards Japan’s attempts to acquire a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; some 44 million Chinese citizens signed an oppositional poll in 2005.

In December 2007, there was the Gyoza food scandal, in which imported Chinese dumplings were contaminated with pesticide and poisoned ten Japanese citizens. This led to a drawn-out diplomatic dispute that illustrated the lack of confidence that exists below the surface.

Longstanding grievances continue to exacerbate tensions between the two. For example, distrust continues 71 years after the atrocities committed by the Japanese during the Nanjing Massacre in 1937, where an estimated 150,000 to 300,000 were killed and 20,000 women and children raped.

History has a powerful influence within Asia. It has been described by William Faulkner as “not even past.” The Chinese, for example, view individuals as responsible for the actions of their ancestors [See Zhang Quanyi’s “external pageThe New thinking in Sino-Japanese relationscall_made", 24 June 2008. Accessed on September 2008.]. This was illustrated during the 2007 G-8 Summit in Germany when Chinese President Hu reminded Japanese Prime Minister Abe that appropriately resolving the problems of history would be “the political basis for maintaining Japan-China relations” (See James J Przystup, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Comparative Connections, Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations).

China claims that Japan has failed to show remorse for atrocities committed before and during World War II, despite the Japanese government’s apologies on 17 separate occasions. This has, however, been trivialized by the continual visits of Japanese ministers to the controversial Yasukuni shrine where 14 convicted Class A war criminals are venerated. There were widespread protests in China in 2000, 2005 and 2007about the publication of school textbooks that minimized Japanese atrocities. There was also an uproar in June 2007 after the Japanese Historical Education Council concluded the Nanjing Massacre was a “fabrication.”

There is frustration and even anger within China that Japan’s failure to accept its past will allow future generations to forget their ancestors’ lessons and subsequently lead to the revival of Japanese militarism. This argument is strongly disputed by many within Japan, as pacifism was institutionalized after the second world war. Concerns linger that a prolonged economic downturn at a time of apprehension towards China’s growth and military ambitions could improve the fortunes of Japan’s hawkish elites and result in rising nationalism and militarism.

The economic antidote to the past?

The strong economic relationship that has developed between China and Japan has created an important connection that may prevent such a reaction. In 2004, China surpassed the US and became Japan’s largest trading partner. In 2007, bilateral trade reached US$236.6 billion. Japanese technology and investment in China reached US$60.7 billion in 2007 and has been fundamental in the latter’s rapid growth. At the same time, Chinese markets have been vital for Japan. In December 2007, the first Japan-China High Level Economic Dialogue took place in Beijing and established agreements on increased trade and commerce between the two nations. Shortly after, Japan announced that China’s growth was not a threat but an opportunity.

Can historic wounds and political differences be overcome through further development of this economic relationship? Similar ties were instrumental in resolving deep-rooted distrust between Germany and France. Bilateral economic activity indeed appears to have been critical to the current stabilization of Sino-Japanese relations. There is some debate, however, whether economic integration can be further developed to overcome power politics. In the long run, China’s technological advances will lead to a reduced need for Japanese capital. In 2006, Japan was the largest economic power in Asia, with a US$4.3 trillion economy compared to China’s US$2.7 trillion. In the same year, however, Japan’s GDP was 2.4 percent compared to China’s 10.7 percent; in 2007 these figures were 2.1 and 12.5 respectively. What would happen to Sino-Japanese relations if one is no longer a necessary economic partner for the other? Would the existing relationship crumble?

Regular state visits and bilateral statements suggest that Sino-Japanese relations have improved under Prime Ministers Abe and Fukuda. This may be the situation on the surface but substantial differences have yet to be overcome. This is particularly worrisome given that both countries have traditional cultures where the past is omnipresent. An official Asian historical agreement could help improve existing tensions. This would involve both nations coming to an understanding on their former relations, acceptance of each side’s actions and concurrence on official figures. This would be a difficult feat for two countries that have previously adopted resolute positions towards history and where national pride and dignity are important. Until such an achievement, however, relations are likely to remain tentative.

Progressive economic interaction has enabled China and Japan to move away from the past to a certain degree and establish new understandings and perceptions. This has been elemental for further political cooperation. Failing to overcome unresolved differences will prevent the creation of a secure foundation for the continued development of Sino-Japanese relations. This may make it more likely for differences to reemerge and tensions to harden. Economic and political turmoil, conflict over resources, suspicious military build-up, a weakening Japanese-US alliance, or Fukuda’s successor are a few of the many factors that could destabilize the present situation. Relations appear to be in a transitional stage but to continue progression towards steadier grounds requires continued cooperation, understanding and codependence to overcome the haunting past.