From Armed Conflict to Power Sharing

In many cases, conflict parties are only willing to accept an agenda of peace if they are guaranteed a share of state power. As a consequence, the majority of recent peace agreements and post-agreement constitutions provide for some form of power sharing. In many cases of peace negotiations and constitution-making, the question is not so much whether there will be power sharing but how and what kind to introduce.

Power-sharing mechanisms are normally used to ensure that power is not concentrated in the hands of a few or ‘50 percent plus one,’ but is shared between representatives of different groups and parties. Almost all countries have some form of power sharing in the broad sense, even if they do not refer to it as such.

In general, two different categories of power sharing are distinguished: vertical and horizontal. Vertical power sharing distributes power between different levels or spheres of government, by providing (political, administrative and financial) autonomy to territorial units at the local or regional level or to communities.

Horizontal power-sharing mechanisms concern one state level: for instance in the executive, through a coalition government or a rotating presidency; in the parliament through proportional representation, quotas, specific committees or special majority requirements and procedures or through second chambers in bicameral parliaments; and in the judiciary through criteria of proportionality for the selection of judges or the composition of the bench.

A further distinction can be made regarding the main criteria of power sharing: Power can be shared between different identity groups (based on ethnicity, religion, language or culture) or between populations of different geographic areas.

While debates on the benefits and risks of power sharing often primarily focus on the potential for conflict and conflict transformation of various mechanisms, this article will take a slightly different approach, focusing on the stages from armed conflict to power sharing: (1) the stage in which different actors agree that there is a need for power sharing, (2) the negotiations and decision-making on power-sharing mechanisms, sometimes in the framework of peace negotiations, sometimes as part of a constitution-making process, (3) the transition phase in which provisions of power sharing have to be implemented, leading finally (4) to the stage in which power-sharing mechanisms are in place and hopefully working.

Each of these stages brings its very own distinct challenges. It can be difficult to agree on the need for power sharing and to negotiate, implement and finally see it become a reality. Surely, only some of the myriad challenges can be depicted here.

Stage 1: Agreeing on the need for power sharing

Armed intra-state conflicts are always complex, and each one has its own context, real and perceived root causes, and its own variety of directly and indirectly involved parties and actors. Every conflict has its own domestic and international dynamics. Nevertheless, it can be argued that many recent and current intra-state conflicts include conflicts between different groups over who can rule over a people, territory and resources. During the conflict phase, normally at least one of the conflict parties aims at maintaining or achieving a dominant position and is challenged by others who want to keep or enlarge their share of power either in certain areas or in the whole of the country. The reasons that conflict parties seek power differ from case to case.

Especially, when armed intra-state conflicts run into mutually harmful stalemates on the battlefield, conflict parties start to consider power sharing as the best alternative to an uncertain victory. The risk exists, however, that parties will stop seriously engaging in negotiations when alternative options emerge or negotiations encounter difficulties. The parties’ evaluation of the chances of a negotiated success and their best alternative to a negotiated settlement will influence whether and how seriously they enter negotiations. Though trust between different actors tends to be nonexistent or very low, negotiations presuppose an element of trust. Each time negotiations fail and conflict resumes, it becomes more difficult to restart the peace process.

Stage 2: Deciding on power sharing

Decision-making about power-sharing mechanisms normally presupposes complex negotiations. In the case of peace negotiations, the conflict parties or their representatives tend to be the main negotiators, and power-sharing mechanisms in peace agreements tend to be compromises between the negotiating parties.

This brings to light the common risk that the power-sharing arrangement will reflect the power balance between the conflict parties at the time of negotiations and will mainly distribute the power between the former adversaries. Other groups might surface during negotiations, take up arms and also demand a share of power. It is often difficult to assess how much support the different actors have in the population and to ensure that the interests of the people and of groups who have not been actively involved in the conflict will be taken into account. There are different approaches to create inclusion: to enlarge the group around the negotiation table at least when certain topics are discussed; or to only provide interim or basic agreements on power-sharing mechanisms and leave final decisions to a more inclusive constitution-making process.

Constitutions are considered to be a social contract. With this understanding, constitution-making processes are supposed to be inclusive and participative. This can increase legitimacy but also complexity. In particular if disputes about power and influence were among the causes of conflict, it has to be expected that those conflict lines will come to light again when power-sharing mechanisms are debated. Challenges can also arise when decision-makers in the more inclusive constitution-making process start to question compromises that were reached in the peace agreement. In a way, constitution-making becomes the extension of peace negotiations. The failure of the constitution-making process can lead back to conflict. The constitution-making process can be jeopardized by disputes that take place during the constitutional debates but also by other issues outside the reach of constitution-making that influence the peace process (e.g. security sector reforms).

Irrespective of whether power-sharing decisions are made in the framework of peace negotiations or in a separate constitution-making process, difficult debates and stalemates have to be expected. The debate on power sharing can create huge expectations of those who expect to gain, and fears of those who expect to lose, power. As for peace negotiations in general, the process is of highest importance. It must be conducive to conducting difficult political and technical debates on complex and interlinked issues in a fragile environment. Proper sequencing will be the key to success.

For instance, a compromise on the boundaries of autonomous territorial units might only be possible once agreement on minority protection within an autonomous area is reached. The process must provide space that such compromises can be taken. The very best proposal can fail if it is introduced at the wrong time, by the wrong person or in the wrong way. In every peace negotiation or post-agreement constitution-making, some ‘make or break’ issues will emerge and need specific attention. The definition of the boundaries of territorial units as well as the distribution of powers and resources tend to be among the difficult issues when power sharing is concerned.

Stage 3: Implementing power sharing

A peace agreement will remain just a piece of paper if it is not implemented. It has been said that peace agreements are small utopias on which full implementation cannot be expected. To some extent this is also true for post-agreement constitutions, in particular if they pursue a very large agenda of change. Non-implementation however will jeopardize the trust that might have emerged during the negotiations on power sharing and is detrimental to the emergence of constitutionalism and the rule of law.

Non-implementation easily leads to an escalation of demands. A typical cycle of escalation looks as follows: At first marginalized groups demand better integration into political institutions (horizontal power sharing); when this is not granted or granted only on paper but never implemented, demands for self-rule (e.g. through decentralization) emerge. When decentralization is not implemented, demands for federalism emerge. When again no actions follow, the last step might be to request secession and independence. The hope is to break the cycle early by reacting to demands and implementing the agreed compromises.

In particular, those who fear losing power will be sceptical of implementation. Implementation is particularly difficult if support from the population (or important parts of the population) for the peace agreement or the new constitution is weak. For instance, this can happen if the peace agreement or the constitution was adopted under huge international pressure rather than popular will.

Implementation will also be difficult if mid-level cadres or regional leaders do not fully support the outcome, despite main leaders' endorsement. Those who are engaged in the negotiations know why they made certain compromises. Others who were not closely involved might regard these compromises as a betrayal of their principles.

Implementation is also difficult if the bureaucracy is opposed to the reforms. Certain power-sharing mechanisms will directly affect the administration, such as proportionality requirements or the introduction of federalism. Implementation requires the support of the administration, and there are normally ample opportunities to at least slow down the process of implementation.

Weaknesses in the decision-making process will become fully apparent during the implementation phase. In the ideal case, implementation is already considered during the decision-making process. A discussion on the concrete steps for implementation of different provisions (who is doing what, when and with what kind of financial means) will show whether there is a common understanding and whether provisions are realistic and implementable.

 In some cases it might be possible to revise provisions so that the effects remain but are easier to implement. Clear decisions on implementation can build trust, will help to manage expectations and avoid new conflicts about interpretation of constitutional provisions as well as priorities and responsibilities for implementation.

Conclusion: Stage 4: Living power sharing

All the three above-mentioned stages are designed to arrive at the point at which power-sharing mechanisms are introduced and functioning. To reach this stage means that different actors remained dedicated to power sharing, they managed to agree on concrete power-sharing mechanisms and these mechanisms were implemented. Now these mechanisms can be tested as to whether they achieve their intended purpose. The success of power-sharing mechanisms will have to be measured against their intended objectives. In a successful scenario, the inclusive decision-making that helped broker an agreement and the implementation of the provisions of the peace agreement or constitution might already have helped to build trust, an important precondition for the functioning of the power-sharing mechanisms.

Here the debate on the merits and effects of different power-sharing mechanisms could start.