Engaging Enemies: Non-State Actors and Peacebuilding

Recent experience around the world demonstrates that armed non-state actors (ANSAs) have become a defining feature of political conflicts, seriously eroding the state monopoly over the use of legitimate coercive force. Indeed, a comprehensive external pagestatistical database on armed conflictscall_made highlights the fact that the vast majority of major armed conflicts in the past decade (30 out of 33) were fought within the borders of single states between governments and non-state rebel movements over issues of territory (in nine cases) or governmental power (in 21 cases). Such conflicts are usually asymmetric by nature and very often rooted in societal fragmentation and power inequality, leading to the adoption of violent strategies on the part of societal forces who feel discriminated against or oppressed. Their armed resistance tends to build on the support of large segments of society that consider them to be legitimate defenders of their interests and grievances. These groups thus represent influential political stakeholders who have the capacity to either impede or promote peace and constructive social change.

If political violence is a tool of both state and non-state actors, reaching political settlements needs the active involvement and cooperative engagement of all concerned actors. Since the end of the Cold War, an increasing number of conflicts have been resolved through negotiated settlement rather than military victory, and ANSAs have thus become central stakeholders in processes of war termination and peace implementation. Peacebuilding in post-war societies depends to a great extent on the continued political will of all concerned parties to contribute to a participatory political order and to bring about necessary reforms to democratize, demilitarize and develop the country.

Definition and features of ANSAs

As the name implies, armed non-state actors are characterized by their independence from state control and the use of violent strategies against their political opponents. However, for these actors, challenging the state monopoly on force represents a means to an end, and any attempt to external pagedefine their featurescall_made should also encompass an understanding of their broader goals and aspirations. With the exception of state-sponsored actors such as paramilitaries, most armed groups (whether rebels, warlords or so-called terrorists) are engaged in a political struggle to redefine the political and legal basis of society. They often have clearly articulated political or socio-economic objectives (social revolutionary or ethno-nationalist) based on collective grievances recognized under international law, such as the right to self-determination or the right to fundamental freedoms. As recognized by the external pageGeneva Conventionscall_made, armed movements are also distinguished by their clear hierarchy and command structure and their readiness to assume political responsibilities in the territories under their control.

Transitioning from war to peace

The external pagedecision by ANSA leaderscall_made to shift from waging a violent conflict to negotiating and implementing a peace agreement proceeds from the consideration and weighing of complementary factors at the intra-group, inter-party and international levels.

Internal dynamics are primarily linked to the reassessment and adjustment of the means and ends of the insurgency in light of an evolving environment. This highlights the ability of individual leaders to engage proactively, react swiftly to arising windows of opportunity and evaluate rationally the opportunities offered by engagement in conventional politics. Internal cohesion and consultation within the movement and its support base are also important factors in effective political transitions. Back-channel and formal negotiations are often preceded, accompanied and followed by intense intra-party debate (e.g. between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’) and top-down communication in order to ensure a high degree of accountability and unity among members and supporters.

The dynamics of inter-party power relations also represent important conflict transformation incentives. The literature on peace processes has been strongly influenced by the concepts of external page'ripeness'call_made and 'mutually hurting stalemates,' which focus on the structural and perceptual (military, political, economic, symbolic, legal, etc.) balance of power between contending parties. Often ANSAs, having reached a more favorable bargaining position vis-à-vis state actors through armed activities, become eager to transfer these gains to the negotiation table. Other societal factors, such as alliances with civil society and other political forces, represent an additional form of leverage that ANSAs employ to pressure the government into talks. But an increase in social ‘war fatigue’ can also provide a powerful push for peace on a society-wide level.

On the international level, geopolitical trends play a role in enhancing conflict ripeness for negotiations. The end of the Cold War and more recent events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent ‘global war on terror’ have had serious consequences for ANSAs around the globe. They have been induced to adapt their courses of action to the new legal and ideological environment, albeit not always in the intended (pro-peace) direction. Indeed armed actors such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elan (LTTE) in Sri Lanka or Hamas in Palestine have, as some would argue, become more radicalized as a result of their international isolation.

Engaging with ANSAs in security governance

Ideas like ‘local ownership’ and the empowerment of ‘peace constituencies’ have become popular in peacebuilding circles and among practitioners and researchers in the field. In order for these ideas to translate into reality and result in sustainable conflict settlement, all conflict stakeholders must be treated as peacebuilding partners who take an active role in the transformation process. This is particularly important in the case of ANSAs that serve core governance and security functions in their constituencies and have the potential to play vital leadership roles in implementing post-war political reforms. However, peacebuilding programs very often fail to adequately include ANSAs and their (former) combatants in stabilization efforts in war-torn societies and in the process of (re-)building democratic institutions. They are often looked at as passive recipients or target groups of assistance programs, who have to become ‘educated’ and ‘socialized’ or as ‘spoilers’ who should disband and disappear once peace has prevailed.

This illustrates the need for an inclusive approach to conflict transformation: the broader the ownership, the greater the chances that the parties will feel genuinely committed to a process that addresses the root causes of the conflict. Externally imposed or state-centric approaches to post-war security promotion tend to emphasize the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of non-statutory armed forces in order to restore the primacy and integrity of the state monopoly of force at the expense of necessary structural reforms and organizational support for ANSA involvement in peace- and state-building. However, for rebel movements to generate and maintain the political will to demobilize and transform themselves into legitimate actors, there need to be reciprocal provisions for a genuine democratization of the political system. In addition, a structural transformation of the security, socio-economic and justice sectors of the state (e.g. constitutional change, free and fair elections, army or police reform, decentralization of power, land redistribution, demilitarisation, etc.) is vital for the sustainability of a peace process.

When disarmament takes place in the absence of a broader political solution, it can also create some ‘safety hazards’ for the individuals and groups involved. In post-war situations characterized by extreme inter-party mistrust, mere promises under the auspices of peace talks or agreements do not offer sufficient guarantees for combatants to disarm unilaterally. In order to retain leverage, their members often hesitate to renounce the use of force until they can be convinced that their political status and legitimacy is fully recognized and that a backlash against the people who they stand for can be ruled out. In other words, security is both an outcome and a precondition for demobilization and should be treated as such in the peacebuilding process.

As indicated by emerging literature on ‘external pagerebel-military integrationcall_made,’ the integration of statutory and non-statutory forces into a new national defense and security apparatus (e.g. army, police, intelligence) represents a primary means for reconversion for former combatants and an entry-point into shared governance structures in the security sector.

Regarding the fate of combatants who do not join the ‘shared’ security apparatus, findings from a recent external pageglobal conference on DDRcall_made indicate that socio-economic reintegration packages (e.g. cash provision or training schemes) to prevent the relapse of former combatants into political- or criminal-armed activities are doomed to failure if they exclusively target registered members of ANSAs at the expense of addressing their broader social base. This is all the more true as the ‘return’ of combatants is less of a problem than rebuilding the social fabric as a whole. Such programs, therefore, must be embedded into larger socio-economic reforms to address structural grievances and post-war development needs. The redress of past human rights abuses – especially within the security apparatus – is also a precondition for societal reconciliation. Useful ways to link security and justice aspects in the short-term include partial amnesties for low-level combatants, conditionality of DDR benefits upon collaboration with transitional justice mechanisms and the sequencing of disbursements with reparations for war victims.

Peacebuilding is political

Finally, peacebuilding must also be understood as a politically driven undertaking, and the effective reconversion of underground militant structures into civilian entities (such as political parties or veteran associations) helps convince ANSAs that they can effectively protect their interests through conventional political means. Peace agreements therefore need to facilitate such organizational shifts by offering incentives for political participation (e.g. electoral reform or power-sharing arrangements). Moreover, ANSAs are not always sufficiently experienced in political organization and require internal and external capacity-building support in administrative skills, good governance, financing and campaigning. International agencies thus have a welcome role to play in offering specialized and focused assistance in the transition from the battleground to the political arena.