A Look Back - and Ahead

For centuries, terrorism has been employed as a tactic by non-state actors seeking to express their political goals through the use of indiscriminate violence aimed at civilians. By the 1960s, terrorism had taken on a more theatrical, transnational dimension as groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine began carrying out more spectacular and symbolic attacks. Religiously motivated terrorism took center stage in the 1990s when the number of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups declined and the number of religious terrorist groups – those having aims reflecting a predominantly religious character – proliferated. Images of the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in Tokyo and the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal office building – two examples of attacks that were carried out by religiously motivated groups - brought the threat of terrorism to the doorstep of communities all across the globe.

Despite the increasing brutality of attacks, domestic and international terrorism was not a national security priority for most nations, including the United States (US). It wasn’t until the coordinated attacks of 11 September 2001 (herein referred to as 9/11), carried out by al-Qaida affiliated terrorists, that this changed.

What was, and remains, truly significant about the 9/11 was not that it ushered in a different type of terrorism, but rather that it introduced a new era of state response to asymmetric threats in a globalized world. For its part, the US government redefined terrorism as an act of war rather than as a criminal activity. In response, it launched a “external pageglobal war on terrorismcall_made” that enabled various military, political and legal instruments to be employed. Since then, much has happened and much has changed. This article will briefly examine the evolution of the terrorist threat post-2001. It will also discuss significant trends within terrorist groups and how they operate, as well as within the counterterrorism field.

Trends in terrorism

Al-Qaida: Yesterday and today

In 2001, al-Qaida was a hierarchical, centralized, Afghanistan-based terrorist organization that had carried out massive attacks against civilian and military targets in Kenya, the United States, and other countries across the globe. Following 9/11, the US, in partnership with the United Kingdom and others, invaded Afghanistan and launched “external pageOperation Enduring Freedomcall_made,” a broad military campaign that led to the rapid removal of the Taliban from power and concluded al-Qaida’s use of Afghanistan as a haven for their activities and operations. Other counterterrorism instruments such as intelligence gathering and economic sanctions were also used to disrupt al-Qaida’s organizational resources and capabilities.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq affirmed the US decision to use military force to counter al-Qaida and its affiliates. It also marked the beginning of an even greater investment of military resources – many of which were re-directed away from Afghanistan. Military efforts appeared to fracture al-Qaida’s structure by forcing it to become more decentralized and suffer significant blows due to the loss of key leaders. However, the US and its allies were not prepared to counter sectarian civil strife and the thousands of domestic and foreign fighters from around the Middle East that flocked to Iraq to join the insurgency. What emerged as a consequence were al-Qaida franchises and a “grassroots” movement of networks and cells that were incredibly resilient, innovative, adaptive, and inspired by al-Qaida’s ideology.

Since 2006, al-Qaida’s base has regrouped and strengthened due to its global alliances, most notably with Pakistani militants in the vast region that runs along the Afghan-Pakistan border (Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) being of particular concern). While the al-Qaida of today is not as centralized as it was prior to 9/11, it is now connected to web of franchises that stretch across North Africa, the Middle East, Europe and beyond. In 2006, the Algerian-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which was on the verge of dismantling, merged with al-Qaida to become Al-Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). As a result, the GSPC went from being a domestic Islamist armed group to one that now carries out transnational attacks on Algerian and western targets. Thus, while al-Qaida is in many ways a much different organization then it was in 2001, it is still a grave threat and one that has gained visibility, networks and, in many cases, prominence for its brand.

Terrorists and technology

Protecting critical infrastructure and preventing terrorists from acquiring chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons was one of the main concerns that states addressed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Indeed, protecting such assets and materials continues to be a major concern among government leaders. A more recent phenomenon, however, concerns the use of modern technology by terrorists and their supporters. Increasingly, counterterrorism officials are discovering the many ways in which politically violent groups are capitalizing on the development of more affordable technology – be it digital cameras, cell phones, camcorders, and computers – but also the rapid flow of information and knowledge exchange.

The internet has not only provided terrorists and their sympathizers a place to communicate safely within the virtual confines of chat-rooms and social networking sites, it has also provided the external pagespace for propaganda campaigns to attract new recruitscall_made.
The As-Sahab Foundation for Islamic Media Publication, al-Qaida’s media arm, has profited from such technology as it produces a external pageconstant stream of video statements, articles and other media materialscall_made that are disseminated broadly through formal and informal information channels. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is another politically violent non-state armed group that uses the internet, primarily to communicate with journalists, but also to external pageclaim or threaten attacks on Nigerian energy infrastructurecall_made. The ability to develop and disseminate information quickly, and often anonymously, has given many such groups more communicative power – a key characteristic of terrorism.

Technology has also offered groups the opportunity to glorify attacks through still photographs and the use of videos. For example, soon after the December 2007 car bombing of a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) building in Algiers, AQIM external pagereleased a videocall_made that showed preparations of the attacks and still photographs of the two suicide bombers. In addition, mobile phones are increasingly used as detonation devices in attacks perpetrated by the Spanish Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), but also during the 2004 Madrid train bombings, which were external pageperpetrated by terrorists affiliated with al-Qaidacall_made.

Terrorism and crime – a malevolent nexus

Following 9/11, global counterterrorism efforts were energized and existing sanction regimes such as the United Nations Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanction (1267) Committee were strengthened to counter the financial support of terrorist networks. Assets were frozen and countries created, or enhanced, anti-money laundering and terrorist financing legislation to monitor, and in some cases dismantle, the well-established network of money transfers that were being used by terrorist groups. As a result, networks have adapted their funding structures and sources to cope with tighter controls. Today, many organizations not only seek out private donations, they increasingly engage in the black market via the smuggling of drugs, human beings, weapons, and other illicit materials.

For years GSPC used the porous borders and rich illicit market along the Sahel to external pagefund its activitiescall_made. In addition, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's external page2008 World Drug reportcall_made noted that Afghanistan and Colombia are home to the two areas that show the greatest increase in illicit production of drugs in the world. Furthermore, it highlights that such illicit productions are controlled by the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. Terrorist groups are increasingly turning to the underground banking system, such as hawala in the Asian, Middle Eastern, and African communities. This allows them to move funds without detection.

Informal transfer networks and the trading of illicit goods to fund criminal or terrorists activities is now a major concern. To counter this trend, regional bodies, governments and policymakers need to perform a comprehensive review of the current threats and explore new mechanisms that can be adopted to address such changes in terrorist funding sources and methods.

Counterterrorism efforts

International efforts: The role of the UN

Since 2001, efforts to combat terrorism at the international, regional and domestic level have been evident and robust. While the US government has been the main state-sponsored driver in this campaign, the United Nations (UN) has been the essential international body that has brought the global community together to develop laws, monitoring tools, and create strategies to assist states in implementing and enforcing sanctions and other global and domestic counterterrorism measures. Such international cooperation and exchanges has resulted in the freezing of terrorist funds via the 1267 Committee and led to the capture of key terrorist leaders in Iraq, Pakistan, Ethiopia and the Philippines.

The UN, however, is far from perfect and while many complain of its inability to agree upon a universal definition of terrorism, its ability to bring nations together to counter this threat is vital. Nevertheless, there is considerable room for improvement and, external pageas noted at the 2008 G8 meetingcall_made, the UN’s efforts to counter terrorism should be strengthened rather than limited.

The question remains: how can the UN be strengthened and who will lead the way? Despite its incredible efforts in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the US’ desire to use the UN in countering terrorism has steadily decreased over the years. Furthermore, many complain of a lack of transparency and effectiveness when it comes to the UN’s counterterrorism committees.

Interestingly, since 1999 Switzerland has been one of the countries pushing for the improvement of the UN’s external pagetargeted sanctions regime and counterterrorism effortscall_made. [1] This endeavor slowly gained momentum and in 2007 the Swiss mission to the UN launched the “external pageInternational Process on Global Counterterrorism Cooperationcall_made.” [2] This effort, in cooperation with the governments of Costa Rica, Japan, Slovakia, and Turkey, has performed an exhaustive study of the UN’s counterterrorism efforts, assessed their effectiveness, and attempted to “identify ways to make its institutions more relevant to national counterterrorism strategies and better able to support implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy.” Such engagement by Switzerland and other member states offers the UN an opportunity to not only re-energize but also improve its counterterrorism efforts and become a more effective, transparent, and efficient force.

Countering radicalism and employing soft power techniques

A recent survey conducted by the RAND Corporation found that most terrorist groups dissolve because of local measures that include policing, intelligence gathering or engaging terrorist groups in the political process. [3] In fact, of the 648 groups surveyed between 1968 and 2006, only 7 percent of these disbanded due to military force. [4] Such findings indicate that the predominant use of military force to counter terrorist groups will not render positive results. Softer measures found through community engagement and local policing are the keys to success.

Aside from policing and gathering intelligence another important measure that employs softer techniques concerns de-radicalization programs. Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have incorporated rehabilitation programs into their prison systems to assist former terrorists in the de-radicalization process. The US government has also sought to external pageimprove the treatment of prisoners in the coalition's detention centers in Iraqcall_made where Commanding General Douglas Stone initiated an effort to improve facilities, due process, and provide inmates with courses on job training, Islamic civics and other tools. Such trends in counterterrorism show that instead of employing harsh interrogation techniques, government officials are exploring ways to neutralize the ideological foundations of Islamism by providing incarcerated terrorists with more moderate teachings of Islam, monetary assistance for their families, job training and other resources. [5] As most terrorists, or sympathizers, are born into tightly woven communities it makes sense that community based efforts are having such positive returns and should continue to be encouraged and replicated.

Conclusion

In 2008 the threat of al-Qaida and its affiliates carrying out deadly attacks remains very real. The availability and use of technology that serves dual purposes as well as the growing nexus between terrorism and organized crime present some serious challenges that are not easily overcome. Such challenges sit within a grey area, where groups blend and cross-collaborate, lone wolves who are inspired by al-Qaida ideology can carry out deadly attacks, and individuals become inspired and engaged by militant videos they find on the internet. This threat is not becoming increasingly transparent but rather more difficult to locate and assess.

While much success has been achieved through military efforts, economic sanctions, and global policing, they only mark the beginning of what should be a multi-pronged strategy that is counter-balanced with non-military approaches, enhanced research, international cooperation, multi-sector partnerships, the collaboration of businesses and community leaders who can work together to address the core social and economic issues, and the creation of transformational structures. The recent report by RAND only confirms that in the 21st century, non-military approaches in the fight against terrorist groups will be essential.

1. Targeted sanctions are those that specifically sanction an individual and can include a travel ban, freezing of assets, and other measures. “The First Expert Seminar in Bonn in November 1999 brought together experts from governments, academia and NGOs to achieve three objectives. First, experts analyzed the deficiencies of the concerned sanctions, noting weaknesses at the UN-level and implementation problems on the ground. Second, experts discussed a broad range of proposals to increase the effectiveness of arms embargoes and travel and aviation bans. The third task was to select a number of proposals from the broader list that would benefit from a more thorough examination by an Expert Working Group.”
2. Also see the “external pageInternational Process on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: A Compilation of Key Documentscall_made” which includes key documents from the International Process on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation including background papers, discussion questions, and summaries from each of the meetings.
3. Jones, Seth & Martin C. Libicki, 2008. “How Terrorist Groups End: Implications for Countering al Qa`ida,” Rand Corporation.
4. Ibid.
5. Schulze, Kristen E., 2008. “Indonesia’s Approach to Jihadist Deradicalization,”CTC Sentinel, 1(8), p. 8.