The European Evolution of the Human Rights Concept

In marking the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we celebrate a great achievement of humankind. At the same time, we acknowledge that gross human rights violations continue to occur all too frequently. This knowledge, however, implies we have a notion of what human rights are. Even if we have never read the Declaration or any other codification of these rights, we have a broad and often implicit understanding of what they encompass.

Nevertheless, what seems - at least normatively - obvious to us, namely the idea that human beings are free and equal in rights, is a radical departure from the dominant political paradigm of just a few centuries ago. Reason enough to examine the political philosophy of a number of influential European thinkers who constructed the normative human rights framework of - and beyond - their time.

Some philosophical definitions

On a philosophical level, one can distinguish between negative, active and positive rights, which developed in chronological order. A negative right is a right not to be subject to coercion, particularly that exercised by the state. These constitute the classical liberal rights as we find them articulated in the philosophy of John Locke (1632-1704).

As outlined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), active human rights imply the right to participate in the political process by engaging in such activities as voting and protesting.

Finally, there exists the notion of positive rights. These are economic, social and cultural rights for which we find a basis in the philosophy of Karl Marx (1818-1883).

Alternatively, one can divide human rights into three generations, the first encompassing the negative and active rights described above, while the so-called second generation covers positive rights. The third-generation of human-rights are the most disputed, since they challenge state sovereignty by making claims to group rights, such as a rights to self-determination or the right to natural resources.

From the antique political animal to the modern individual

According to Aristotle (384-322 BC), man is a political animal. It is in his nature to live in a political community. And it is in a state order that human beings are consummate. People have political rights in this antique community, but as political animals they are not protected individually.

In the early modern period, a new regard for the value of the individual began to grow. English philosopher Thomas Hobbes’ (1588-1679) Leviathan set out his doctrine for the foundation of states and legitimate governments. To this end, he first describes what life would be like without government, in the so-called state of nature. In that state, each person would have a right to everything, which inevitably leads to a "war of all against all." To escape war, humans accede to a social contract and establish a civil society - a population beneath a sovereign authority - to whom all individuals in that society cede their natural rights for the sake of protection. Any abuses of power by this authority are to be accepted as the price of peace.

Hobbes' proposed omnipotent state does not fit into a modern understanding of human rights. However, Hobbes plays a role in the development of the idea of individual human rights because of the way he portrays men in the state of nature: In the absence of state power, they are all equal in the sense that each one can kill the other. Their individual will to self-preservation is stronger than traditional social bonds, and hence Hobbes' philosophy allows for norms to be constituted individually.

The individual as bearer of negative rights

With time, the absolutist monarchs provoked the claim of individual rights that limit government power and protect individuals from arbitrary acts of state. English philosopher Locke expresses this idea in his Two Treatises of Government. Locke turned Hobbes' prescription around, saying that if the ruler went against natural law and failed to protect "life, liberty, and property," people could justifiably overthrow him and put a new government in place. The rights Locke proclaims are negative rights, those considered defensive, like property rights or the right to freedom of speech and religion.

From protection to active participation

Unlike Locke, Swiss philosopher Rousseau stands against the liberal idea of limited government and constitutional rights. Rousseau's contribution to the development of the modern human rights idea is important, however, because he postulates political participatory rights in his famous Social Contract. "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains," Rousseau opens his treatise. According to him, individuals become free if they abandon their natural rights and join together in a civil society through the social contract. They agree to submit to the authority of the general will of the people as a whole, which ensures that they only obey themselves because they are, collectively, the authors of all laws. As such, they have active rights, which namely are political rights, such as the right to vote.

Human rights as entitlement to social benefits

In his essay On the Jewish Question, German philosopher Marx criticizes the above-outlined human rights as mere rights of the bourgeois, whom he believes are isolated and egoistic human beings. He argues that negative rights such as property rights are useless for someone without property. His focal point is not the human being as an individual but the human being as part of society. He hence propagates the rights of citizens, where the individual is only consequent in conjunction with others, as an alternative to human rights. While there is an inherent inequality in the bourgeois conception of human rights according to Marx, citizens' rights imply equality. As such, he emphasizes positive rights, which lay claim to state services such as basic welfare and the right to education.

Negative, active and positive human rights

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not distinguish between negative, active and positive human rights but includes all. Critics of the distinction between negative and positive rights point to the issue of enforcement, arguing, for instance, that individuals can only defend their negative right to property if the state successfully repels attempted theft, which implies positive action such as maintaining a publicly funded police force.

Distinguishing between negative, active and positive human rights is useful, however, to help us understand how the concept developed over time. This distinction also demonstrates that human rights are not self-evident or fixed because we have witnessed their evolution, and it is our duty to safeguard the progress we have made and continue blazing the trail of further development of this noble construct.