Illicit Crop Cultivation and Drug Trafficking

May 2008

Columbia's critical role in marijuana, cocaine and heroin production and trade is investigated.

Colombia is the only country in the world to produce three plant-based drugs: marijuana (from hemp), cocaine (from coca leaf) and heroin (from poppy). During the mid-1960s first the marijuana trade developed. Colombia was a major supplier of marijuana to the US in the 1970s, but this ended when presidents external pageJulio Cesar Turbay (1978-1982) and external pageBelisario Betancur (1982-1986) conducted major eradication campaigns. Currently, marijuana and heroin production in Colombia only represent a small amount of the international supply.

Already in the late 1970s and early 1980s marijuana was beginning to be replaced by the more profitable trade in cocaine. The traffickers began by importing coca base from Bolivia and Peru, and processing it into cocaine in Colombia for re-export first to the US, then to Europe. The coca cultivation boom in the country only began in the late 1980s and reached its peak in the last half of the 1990s. Cocaine production in Colombia has increased extraordinarily since the mid-1990s. In 1991, Colombia cultivated only 13.7 percent of the world's coca leaves, but according to the US external pageNational Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) as of October 2006 it is the source of an estimated 70 percent of the world's coca leaves and cocaine, which makes it the principal world producer.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, the illegal drug business was primarily controlled by two large cartels, the Medellín and the Cali cartels. In the mid-1990s several leaders of those cartels were killed, which prompted their disintegration. After the downfall of the cartel leaders, around 50 different trafficking organizations and an additional 250 smaller groups were identified. Throughout the ensuing years, this new constellation has made an effective persecution of drug trafficking much more demanding. The decentralization of cocaine production and trafficking has thus facilitated the growth of the illegal drug business.

Heroin production is still more recent and represented only one percent of the international supply in 2002. With the explosion of poppy production in Afghanistan in recent years, Colombian production has an even smaller role, although it remains an important part of the US market.

Interconnections between politics and the illicit drug industry

In the early 1980s, drug money started to penetrate Colombian institutions – the police, armed forces, political parties and the justice system – and thus challenge democratic governance.

During the "external pagenarco-terrorist" period (1983–1993), the external pageMedellín and external pageCali cartels coordinated Colombian drug processing and export channels and controlled about 80 to 90 percent of the Colombian cocaine exports. The cartels were represented in the country's economy, society and political system. Narco-terrorists furthermore ordered the assassination of three presidential candidates in the 1980s and commissioned the murders of numerous government officials and politicians. But popular support was high, as particularly the Medellín cartel provided social welfare, built infrastructure and invested in real estate. Thus, the influence of the large drug cartels in the late 1980s had reached a level equal to the regional government in the areas they controlled.

Since the mid-1990s external pagebribery and intimidation have been favored over high-profile acts of terrorism and assassinations as the latter had resulted in the dismantlement of the large cartels. Drug trafficking has come to be the first cause of institutionalized corruption. Bribery has spread throughout Colombian government authorities, involving the former president of the national congress, congressmen, judges, army officers and policemen. A comment by former Cali cartel leader external pageGilberto Rodriguez Orejuela illustrates this: "We don't kill judges or ministers, we buy them."

The most striking illustration of the range and power of drug money in the political system has been the case of former president external pageErnesto Samper (1994-1998), whose 1994 election campaign reportedly was financed by millions of dollars from the Cali cartel. This information produced an unprecedented political crisis.

One of the reasons for the wide dissemination of drug money in Colombian politics is that the illegal industry has had to develop social and political support networks to protect their investments and to prevent the government from jailing traffickers. More importantly, it stops their extradition to the US. For this reason, most traffickers so far have avoided extradition and many have even been able to continue running their business from jail.

The illicit drug industry and the internal conflict

Drugs play a large role in the financing of the left-wing insurgent external pageRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the far-right external pageUnited Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and thus are an integral part of Colombia's conflict. It could even be said that drug trafficking has become one of the main fuels of the internal conflict.

The growing importance of the illegal drug business in the late 1970s and early 1980s played a crucial role in the development of paramilitary groups. When the drug cartels, as a consequence of the growing difficulties to import drug base from Peru and Bolivia due to counternarcotics efforts, began to encourage coca cultivation in Colombia's south, some agreements were reached with FARC to protect coca fields in exchange for tax. Soon these agreements came to an end due to ideological differences. In 1981, the self-defense force Death to Kidnappers (MAS) was created by wealthy landowners and drug lords who were seeking to put an end to the kidnapping of members of their families by guerrilla groups. Many other paramilitary groups were created for similar reasons.

Currently, these groups are primarily involved in the trafficking of coca paste, cocaine and heroin and earn around 60 percent of their income from those sources. NGOs and authorities document collaboration between paramilitary groups and the Colombian Armed Forces in massacres and human rights violations.

FARC, which was founded in 1964 by the peasant guerrilla leader Manuel Marulanda, initially aimed to undo the unequal land distribution and establish an agrarian program. When peasants began to grow coca in southern Colombia, FARC strictly forbade coca cultivation. Today, drug trafficking, along with ransom payments and extortion, is the largest income source for FARC. It accounts for roughly 50 percent of its total revenue. Whereas paramilitary groups are primarily involved in trafficking, FARC receives the highest profits from coca cultivation by protecting small coca farmers along with securing the storage and processing of cocaine.

Also in 1964, the left-wing external pageNational Liberation Army (ELN) was founded by a group of students. Connections between the ELN and the illegal drug business are not clear. The ELN central command denies any participation, whereas the Colombian Armed Forces suspect that the ELN is also involved in the drug business, although on a considerably smaller scale than the AUC or FARC.

Although the links between left- and right-wing armed groups and the illegal drug business are not well documented, the available data demonstrate that this business has become the AUC's and FARC's first and most important income source. The high profits from illegal drug-related activities boost both left- and right-wing power and military strength. Consequently, the drug business is often said to perpetuate the Colombian internal conflict and is considered to be one of the most important obstacles on the way to peace and democratization in the country.

The Colombian and US governments primarily fight the illegal drug business in order to weaken the armed groups' positions. While this strategy certainly addresses an important element in their power source, the underlying causes for the armed conflict are to be sought in other areas and have to be addressed differently in order to sustainably improve social conditions.

This dossier includes analysis on developments in the illegal drug business, interconnections between the illicit drug industry and politics as well as influences of the industry on the internal conflict, economy, society, environment and Colombia's foreign relations. It addresses the issue of perspectives for the future, options to reach a change on the international level and discusses legalization as a measure for drug demand and supply reduction.

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