A Lexicon Deconstructed: H-M

H is for Hubris

The modern definition of hubris is over-bearing pride or self-confidence, often caused by lack of historical knowledge. The charge implies future retribution, as in the ancient Hebrew proverb that states, "pride goes before a fall." Linking the notion to current grand strategy is easy, as evidenced by former CIA official Michael Scheurer's bestselling 2004 book, Imperial Hubris, which took the Bush administration severely to task for both its post-9/11 pursuit of al-Qaeda and its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, arguing that the US was foolishly suckered into wars of occupation that only compound radical Islam's long-standing fury at America's foreign policy in the region.

Here's the larger reality as I see it: Because transnational terrorist groups tend to emanate from, and find sanctuary within, some of the world's most traditional societies, meaning those largely disconnected from globalization's advance to date, any U.S. strategy of dealing directly with those sources and their lasting grievances will necessarily place Americans inside civilizations where our cultural knowledge is inherently weak. The same is true for failed states in general. Can this deficiency be corrected? Of course, but it will take time. In the early Cold War, it took an entire generation before a sufficiently large, homegrown cohort of Russian experts was developed within the military and intelligence community. Until then, the US government relied very heavily on expatriates, enduring the particular biases that came with them. Much the same situation exists today with regard to the Islamic world: to wit, the Bush administration's heavy reliance on a narrow group of Iraqi expatriates in planning for the occupation of post-Saddam Iraq proved especially troublesome.

I is for Interests

Interests can be described as any grand strategy's "crown jewels," or those principles or assets that the state will not surrender under any circumstances - save utter ruin. As Britain's Lord Palmerston once observed: "Nations have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies. Only permanent interests." At this most fundamental level, this concept is easily understood. One would not expect a nation to readily relinquish some of its territory or forego - without a fight - access to some trade that defines its economic well being. To borrow Boyd's term, a national interest would be anything that served as a significant source of enduring fitness, such as the value of freedom of the seas to an island nation. Besides securing the country's territory and economic health, national interests can also extend to the preservation of culture, especially in the defense of co-religionists or those who share your nationality but live beyond your borders. Many interventions throughout history have been justified on this basis.

Particularly tricky for the US, however, is the casual inflation of our national interests over time. We have the unfortunate tendency to let today's exigencies morph quickly into tomorrow's requirements and then segue quietly into posterity's "national interest." Years later, when some crisis arises, the logic of our original obligation may no longer hold, and yet, there we'll be, guns drawn and ready to go to war over that "long established national interest." Our long-standing defense commitment to Taiwan is a good example. In general, interests are easier to add than to prune.

J is for Jingoism

Jingoism is basically imperial hubris with an Anglo-American slant, or the notion of extreme patriotism in support of an aggressive foreign policy designed to achieve de facto control over a weaker state. Naturally, jingoists invoke the preservation of national interests as a rationale for their advocacy of force. The term also refers to the general assumption that Anglo-American culture is superior to others. The word was first used in Victorian England (it began life as a barroom lyric - as in, "We don't want to fight but by Jingo if we do, we've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too!) and migrated to America during Theodore Roosevelt's presidency. Having first achieved international fame for leading the Rough Riders up San Juan Hill in Cuba, Teddy was a natural target for the charge. That timing is particularly fascinating to me in a larger sense, though, because of that era's passing of the global policeman's torch from aging Britain to rising America. T.R. was our first president to travel abroad while in office - to Panama, naturally. His securing of the territorial rights to build the Panama Canal was considered a crowning achievement of his first term.

Fast-forward to today, when a Hong Kong-based firm, Hutchinson Whampoa, operates the Panama Canal, and there's no shortage of commentators willing to dub "rising China" as the pseudo-imperial power of the age. Aware of this danger, the Chinese leadership takes great pains to emphasize the non-political nature of their economic interactions with less powerful states. But it's only natural that, as China continues to emerge as a global power, its people will become more chauvinistic-meaning aggressively nationalistic. Chinese foreign ministry officials have recently confessed to their US State Department counterparts that they are struggling to deal with the rising tide of personal demands for official services and representation by Chinese nationals living abroad. In the past, such requests were minimal and routinely ignored by ministry officials. Today, however, Chinese expatriates expect a different level of care, one befitting a powerful nation with a proud culture. At what point do the Chinese start being accused by locals of acting like the superior race? By Jingo! It's already happening in Africa.

K is for Kinetics

Kinetics is US military jargon for the use of physical force - as in, making holes and breaking things. Kinetics is the American way of war, which historically has involved complete annihilation of the enemy. The term reached widespread use in the US military since the turn of the century primarily in tandem with its antonym, non-kinetics, or operations that focus on filling holes and repairing things. Because of the rising incidence of postwar reconstruction and stability operations in the post-Cold War era, the US military in general, and the Army and Marine Corps in particular, have systematically expanded and codified their repertoire of non-kinetic tactics. The most important recent achievement in this regard is the publication of the first-ever joint Army-Marine Corps field manual on counter-insurgency (COIN) operations that argues more is less when it comes to kinetics. Taking a page out of Mao Zedong's playbook, the Army and Marines now promote the notion that successful counter-insurgency is only 20 percent kinetic and 80 percent non-kinetic, meaning the traditional American way of war is now considered only one-fifth of the solution set.

Why does that matter to grand strategy? Consider this: Fifty years ago the average war ran five to ten years. Today, they average well less than a year, with many clocking in at a couple of months or less. Meanwhile, experts will tell you that the average postwar reconstruction, recovery from a major disaster, and successful counter-insurgency campaign runs upwards of ten years. That means your average two-month US military intervention can buy you a decade's worth of follow-on commitment. There's a saying among convicts in American prisons: Don't do the crime if you can't do the time. The same has to hold true for major US combat operations. Otherwise we'll find ourselves trapped in the Powell Doctrine's pointless recycling of the same rogue regimes and/or failed states every five to ten years. You want America to get off the merry-go-round of repeat interventions? Then be prepared to do the time. The Army and Marines have now signed up to the strategic reality. The question is, will America do the same? The answer? It depends on whether or not the average American can be convinced there's some realistic grand strategic vision attached to that global pattern of interventions.

L is for Leviathan

The concept of the Leviathan comes from the 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who argued that the chaotic "state of nature" in which man find himself is best remedied by a supreme sovereign power that would prevent a "war of all against all." Not an argument for autocracy per se, but rather for a strong state that maintains a monopoly over the instruments of violence, this notion is easily elevated to the level of the international system, where, because there is no global government, it can be argued that the system, and all the states within it, are best served by the existence of a single, all-powerful military force that prevents outbreaks of major war. In many ways, nuclear weapons act as a Leviathan as far as the great powers are concerned, because each possess just enough of them to raise the specter of a devastating counterpunch to any other power that might attack them. Thus the nuclear doctrine of mutually-assured destruction (you can't kill me without my being able to kill you too) essentially killed great power war - six-plus decades and counting.

But the nuclear Leviathan doesn't prevent non-great power wars, nor civil strife, nor genocide within states, nor transnational terrorism. None of these current problems can be effectively deterred by the threatened use of nuclear weapons, meaning, that as far as the international system outside of direct conflict among great powers is concerned, there's still a profound need for something to act as a Leviathan. Ideally, the United Nations would serve that function, but since it's original rule set enshrines the notion of state sovereignty, and since most mass violence today occurs within states, the UN has never adequately stepped up to that task. In short, UN troops can keep the peace but they can't make the peace. No, the only military force capable of playing the role of international Leviathan, able to project significant combat power to anywhere in the world and sustain it over time, is the US military. No other national military even comes close.

What does that mean for America's grand strategy? Just this: everyone in the world knows that America has the only force capable of stopping a war anywhere on the planet. Thus, when any war is allowed to unfold, the global community tends to view it as occurring with America's implicit approval. Fair? Not really. But that's the burden of owning the world's largest gun. To deny that reality is to call into question why America should own that gun. Because if our grand strategy does not take into account our de facto role as global Leviathan, then we fund a military far too large for its natural purpose of defending our nation's basic security. How do you get from that baseline requirement to finding yourself considered a Leviathan? Just keep adding up those national interests, one after the other, and I guarantee you, you'll get there.

M is for Monroe Doctrine

Since the start of the Cold War, American presidents have sought to stamp their individual marks on our nation's ever-evolving grand strategy by enunciating their own personal doctrines. Harry Truman started the Cold War grand strategy of containment by arguing for its first great expression: economic aid and military alliance extended to Greece and Turkey, who were then threatened by Soviet penetration. This effort became known as the Truman Doctrine. Subsequent Cold War presidents (Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Reagan) all offered variations on that theme.
Prior to the Cold War, however, only one American president ever enunciated what history has judged to be a coherent foreign policy doctrine, and that was James Monroe in 1823. His doctrine held that it was an inherent national interest of the US to prevent any future colonization of Latin America by European powers, who were, in effect, told to keep their hands off those states just emerging from Spain's decaying empire. Monroe's doctrine essentially declared America to be the Western Hemisphere's Leviathan, which was a big step forward for a country less than five decades old. But that first step started our nation's long journey toward global Leviathan status, with the primary driver being the same all along: the progressive collapse of European colonial empires. Each presidential doctrine since Monroe's has essentially extended his original concept further around the planet, expanding our national interest as a result. Look around the planet today and count up all the failed states and rogue regimes and you will see former colonies in virtually every case-typically with badly drawn borders that constitute much of the problem. Some experts describe America's current situation as "accidental empire," suggesting an absence of grand strategy. I call it taking up the responsibility of Leviathan, demanding that we acknowledge our grand strategy.