Hopes for Multilateral Renewal

Official announcements by the Obama administration have inspired hopes of a US return to the multilateral negotiating table. After years of stalemate, a fresh and ambitious approach by the Obama team could open a window of opportunity for new disarmament treaties that respond to today's security demands. A closer look at recent events in Geneva and New York, however, reveals that the limited progress made in the last decade has only been achieved among like-minded coalitions outside the UN disarmament process. The Obama administration must therefore also play a leading role in restoring confidence among negotiators and increasing pressure on those who have blocked progress at the UN.

Disarmament machinery deadlocked by consensus rule

2008 marked another difficult year for disarmament. The traditional UN arms control and disarmament system again struggled to deliver appropriate answers to urgent challenges - both in the field of nuclear weapons and in the field of conventional weapons.

The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) could not agree on a work program, which would open the way for negotiations of urgently needed legally binding treaties such as a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. And states parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which were mandated to prohibit cluster munitions causing unacceptable harm to civilians, ended their seven weeks of contentious negotiations without an agreement.

While traditional UN structures failed to deliver, an ambitious agreement providing a complete ban on cluster munitions was negotiated outside the UN system and signed by 94 states in Oslo in early December 2008. Following on from the adoption of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, this represents another critical step forward outside traditional UN structures - to the regret of some major UN powers. A closer look at the success factors in Oslo sheds light on some of the reasons for the slow progress in disarmament in general and in particular at the Conference on Disarmament, which remains the world's only multilateral disarmament negotiation forum.

A stigmatization beyond the convention

Success factor number one of the so-called Oslo process was a resolute and skilled coalition between states parties and civil society actors. Second, real world events in southern Lebanon illustrated the humanitarian problem of many types of cluster munitions. The case fueled the discussion and boosted earlier suspicions that even technically advanced bomblets were not reliable enough. At the same time, it illustrated that the "footprint" of the weapon system often resulted in indiscriminate effects.

A third important factor for the success was that the more or less like-minded process did not incorporate states opposed to taking humanitarian action and states that would shrink from agreements contrary to their perceived military or economic interests. And finally, the Oslo process - in sharp contrast to traditional UN disarmament processes - was not bound by the consensus rule that so often provides a de facto veto for any state wishing to block progress.

The ban on cluster munitions agreed in 2008 will no doubt have an enormous impact on what types of munitions will be developed, produced and eventually used in the future - not only by Oslo states parties themselves, but also by their coalition partners and other military forces which will be unable to escape the stigmatization effects that go beyond the convention itself. We have already seen examples of this in the Russia-Georgia conflict, where each party accused the other of cluster munitions use even though neither one was involved in the Oslo process, and, more recently, in the Israeli offensive on Gaza where it refrained from using cluster munitions despite its non-involvement in the Oslo process.

Nuclear Weapons - less than universal is not good enough

Yet, while even a non-universal agreement can have a real world impact in the area of conventional weapons, "non-universality" is not good enough when it comes to the most terrible weapons of mass destruction: nuclear arms.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which celebrated its 40th birthday last year, is still suffering because not all relevant states are party to it. While paradoxically the NPT is the most universal arms control agreement, three key nuclear power states - India, Pakistan and Israel - continue to remain outside the treaty, and North Korea claims to have left the regime and indeed tested a nuclear device in 2006.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been signed by 178 states and ratified by 144. But it will enter into force only when the 44 nuclear-capable states listed in the treaty have ratified it. Nine of these 44 countries have not yet done so: India, North Korea and Pakistan still have not signed the treaty, and China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and the US have signed it but not yet ratified.

Negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which would prohibit production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and should one day complete the nuclear proliferation and disarmament regime, have not even begun, as Pakistan and others with their own fissile material agendas are blocking the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva by not letting the conference adopt a program of work.

National security interests instead of disarmament progress

With one treaty not being universal, another not entering into force and a third not even being negotiated, the nuclear regime illustrates like no other field of disarmament how difficult meaningful arms control progress can be when perceptions of security interests differ.

It is not a new phenomenon that national security interests prevail over multilateral engagement. Yet, while the Conference on Disarmament could not serve its primary purpose and negotiate new disarmament treaties, it still served an important role. It acted and continues to act as the point of departure for the disarmament community to meet, work constructively and agree on smaller (albeit less spectacular) issues.

Restoring confidence in existing treaties

Disarmament delegations have put efforts into the patient and realistic step-by-step approaches needed to put two important arms control processes back on track.

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first treaty banning a complete category of weapons of mass destruction, was in terrible shape at the beginning of the 21st century. After negotiations on a verification system failed, states parties found themselves in significant disagreement and with a convention lacking credibility. A less ambitious but more consensual process put the BWC back on track, and by the 6th Review Conference in 2006 much confidence had been restored. 2008 marked the middle of a second intersessional process, which included a wider variety of actors than ever before and was guided by a small but highly competent and efficient support unit.

The 2001 UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons - the arms control process with the most immediate impact on human security - had almost derailed after a failed conference in 2006. It took months of careful preparations, which included not only diplomats from both UN headquarters but also indispensable civil society expertise, to restore confidence and agree on a number of key issues essential for the program's impact in the future. In summer 2008, states parties were eventually able to set the basis for future work.

Small steps and a lot of housekeeping

Not negotiating new deals also meant that delegations could revisit existing arrangements and enhance their implementation and universalization - which is the hard work that follows in the years after treaties have been inaugurated. Instead of building new houses in 2008, the community had some serious "housekeeping" to do, not only by translating agreements on the national level but also by strengthening credibility and restoring confidence.

For delegations of the 2008 Meeting of States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty, "housekeeping" meant striking the balance between upholding the treaty's core obligations and meeting real world challenges with pragmatism. Belarus, Greece and Turkey found themselves in non-compliance with the treaty's core obligation for stockpile destruction. In addition, the conference had to process fifteen states' requests to extend their ten-year mine clearance deadline. As a first in the Convention's history, this was a demanding procedure, but it was particularly challenging since some states parties like the UK had clearly not done their utmost to meet their obligations. In addition, a border incident in Southeast Asia involving antipersonnel mines troubled the waters of the meeting, just one year before the important Second Review Summit in Carthagena. Despite this, states parties kept the house in order, dealt with these issues in a professional spirit of cooperation and agreed on solutions that even enhanced the credibility of this important regime.

United States back in the driver's seat?

Following the departure of a UN-critical and often unilateralist Bush administration, US President Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are expected to bring the US back as a driving force of multilateral negotiations.

Bilateral negotiations on a follow-up to the US-Russian 1991 START treaty represent the first and most urgent challenge. Re-engagement with Moscow will offer Obama/Clinton and their Russian counterparts an opportunity to demonstrate responsible leadership and to return to legally binding and verifiable agreements. Apart from a fresh start after years of tensions over Missile Defense and NATO-expansion, upcoming negotiations are also expected to include a serious dialogue at the highest level on the future role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines.

Down to a thousand for a start?

For many observers, a result without deep, irreversible and verifiable cuts in the immense nuclear arsenals would be unsatisfactory. After calls for radical disarmament steps by a number of key decision makers, both past and present (Ban Ki-moon and Henry Kissinger among them), President Obama and his team can now initiate a number of sustainable steps in order to avoid that these weapons will ever be used again - be it by a state or terrorists.

A radical reduction of existing arsenals to only a thousand weapons in the American and Russian arsenals would mark an inspiring restart in the 41st year of the NPT's disarmament obligations. Such a clear sign would be understood by all nations in the world, including the other nuclear weapons possessing states. Many hope that such a commitment would create favorable conditions for tackling the panoply of challenges waiting, such as Iran and North Korea.

Setting the UN disarmament machinery back in motion?

With regard to multilateral progress, much will depend on the signals the new US team will send out in the coming months. Analysts expect it will take a few months to review existing policies and formulate new ones. In May, a conference to prepare the next Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2010 is expected to reveal first insights on future US approaches. Many observers expect the new US approach to exert a positive influence on the other nuclear powers recognized by the NPT.

However, it is not only the US and Russia that bear the responsibility for keeping the unique 1968 deal credible and alive. The rest of the so-called P-5 - the official nuclear states of China, France and the UK - also have to bear their share. The P-5 can show leadership by renewing their commitment to reduce nuclear arsenals and diminishing the role nuclear weapons play in their doctrines and strategies. Much is at stake since many states with nuclear capabilities are already deeply disappointed in what they received from nuclear weapons states in exchange for giving-up their own nuclear option.

Securing Success in 2010

One of the biggest disarmament challenges at the 2010 NPT Review Conference will be the unresolved question of the Middle East, where Israel's nuclear capabilities have long posed a problem and Egypt as well as others are pushing for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The solution has certainly not been made easier by the unclear nuclear ambitions of Iran and the continued tensions this causes in the region.

A tangible outcome of the 2010 Conference is expected to have effects far beyond the conference itself. A complementary step by the US Senate, the long awaited ratification of a world-wide nuclear test ban treaty, could have additional positive influence.

The next decade could then mark the start of a new disarmament era and open-up a window of opportunity for progress in a number of fields, not only nuclear.

If such a new atmosphere were to emerge, more than merely further bilateral cuts between the US and Russia could be within reach. China, France and the UK, who hold smaller arsenals but equally rely on the atomic bomb, would come under increased pressure to demonstrate similar responsibility and commitment.

Even by just revising its position that the verification of a future regime on the production of fissile material for military purposes would not be possible, the US would put the unofficial nuclear powers like India, Pakistan and Israel under serious pressure. It was all too easy for these states to oppose the start of these negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament by hiding behind the US position.

Looking ahead

Progress in disarmament has been limited in recent years. The political space available in New York and Geneva did not permit much more than care-taking of existing treaties. Real progress with a meaningful outcome was not possible in the consensus-based UN disarmament system but only in like-minded coalitions external to UN structures.

With a new US administration taking a fresh look at a number of disarmament and non-proliferation issues, progress seems possible once more. Yet, while it is important to be optimistic and hope that policy reviews would inspire and revitalize the disarmament system, it is also prudent to remind ourselves that high expectations might prove unrealistic in the months and years to come.

Obama and Clinton first need to negotiate a bilateral nuclear arms reduction with Russia. Such a treaty is urgently needed before the 2010 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. A proof of willingness to reduce nuclear weapons arsenals significantly could help create the momentum needed to make this conference a success and to provide a boost to the Conference on Disarmament where further treaties such as the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty are waiting to be addressed.

While the US has to assume leadership in the multilateral arena and set an example to others in order to initiate negotiations, change in Washington alone will not be sufficient to put disarmament back on track. Security policy perceptions need to change, and all major players including all nuclear weapons possessors - inside and outside the NPT - need to show commitment to multilateral disarmament.