Bridging the Demographic Divide

In recent decades, dramatic world population projections have spanned the doomsday scenario spectrum: Fear of a Malthusian apocalypse created by unchecked growth and resulting in mass starvation clashed with anxiety over tanking birthrates that would leave societies childless and economies ravaged.

These different demographic outlooks were fueled by divergent population trends: rapid population growth in much of the developing world contrasted with aging population structures in many wealthy, stable countries. These disparities frame a complex “demographic divide” that leave us without a uniform, integrated population policy. Indeed, the interaction of numerous development factors - including poverty, inequality, institutional capacity and health - with population trends is neither formulaic nor universal.

Yet while no direct causal relationship between population and development can be demonstrated, evidence shows that countries with quickly growing populations - and the youthful age structures that result - are more likely to experience violence and autocratic governance.

Development experts continue to grapple with the current and future challenges of rapid population growth. Fifty-seven percent of the world’s people, including nearly all of Africa, live in countries with growing populations. In the 50 countries defined by the UN as “least developed,” women have an average of five children each, and populations are growing at a rate that, if sustained, will lead to doubling in about 30 years.

In April 2008, former CIA Director Michael Hayden articulated clearly this critical nexus between development and population growth: "In thinking about the future, one of the most important things that our analysts brought to...my attention was world demographics...Most of that growth is almost certain to occur in countries least able to sustain it, and that will create a situation that will likely fuel instability and extremism - not just in those areas, but beyond them as well."

The connections between demographics and development can be illuminated through the lens of population age structure - the relative size of different age groups within a population. As countries move through the “demographic transition” process - the gradual shift, over a period of decades, from low life expectancy and high fertility to smaller families and longer lives - they pass through different types of age structures, ranging from very young to mature. Over the period from 1970 to 1999, countries in which at least two-thirds of the population was younger than age 30 were four times as likely to have experienced an outbreak of civil conflict than those with lower fertility rates and more balanced age structures. Countries with very young external pageage structurescall_made were also nearly 90 percent certain of having undemocratic governments over the same period.

A external pageglobal regression analysiscall_made for the period 1950 to 2000 showed that countries in which the share of young people aged 15 to 24 exceeded 35 percent of the total adult population were 150 percent more likely to experience an outbreak of civil conflict than those with a more balanced age structure. The underlying hypothesis supporting this connection is that large cohorts of young people (sometimes called a “youth bulge”) have both greater opportunities and greater motivations – particularly if they are unemployed - to participate in rebel and other groups instigating uprisings.

Along with conflict, researchers have also studied the relationship between population and governance. external pageOne studycall_made showed that as countries’ populations matured and the percentage of young adults aged 15 to 29 (a broader cohort definition than that used in the research on conflict described above) as a share of the total adult population falls below 40 percent, countries are better able to sustain meaningful democracy. These connections apply to aspects of governance beyond democracy: Countries with very young and youthful age structures are also more likely to experience weak institutional capacity, government corruption, poor regulatory quality, and fewer political freedoms and civil liberties.

It is important to note that this evidence does not imply that youth themselves are inherently dangerous; in fact, they are the drivers of a country’s future. However, when governments cannot provide adequate opportunities for growing numbers of young people, their societies are more vulnerable to instability and autocracy.

The ties between population trends and economic growth or stagnation are also complex. However, economists have been able to identify a point during the demographic transition process when countries are offered - but not guaranteed - a unique economic opportunity. Termed the “demographic dividend,” this phenomenon describes an age structure that contains a large proportion of working-age adults, while family size is shrinking. This smaller family size reduces the proportion of children in a population, just as their parents comprise a larger share because of the previous generations’ higher fertility.

external pageResearchcall_made demonstrates that with favorable economic and social conditions, such as an educated workforce, sufficient jobs and secure financial institutions, this demographic window of opportunity can allow families and governments to save and invest more in the health and well-being of their children. Smaller family size also promotes greater participation of women in the labor market, which can bring economic benefits at the household and national scale as well. In the 1970s and 1980s, the East Asian “Tigers” seized on the demographic dividend, which was responsible for external page25 to 40 percentcall_made of the region’s economic growth during the period. Unfortunately, other regions that have progressed through the demographic transition, such as much of Latin America, have not implemented the focused policies necessary to capitalize on the changes in their age structures.

Because steady fertility declines have occurred in most regions of the developing world and industrialized countries face the emerging challenges of sustained low birth rates, it would be easy to surmise that population aging is inevitable. However, rapid population growth will remain the main demographic focus for the foreseeable future in a wide swath of the developing world, incorporating most of sub-Saharan Africa as well as countries in southwest Asia, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. For the entire sub-Saharan Africa region, fertility rates have declined less than 20 percent since 1960 and remain very high at 5.5 children per woman. More than 800 million people live in countries where populations are on track to external pagedoublecall_made in less than 35 years, with fertility rates of four children per woman or higher.

Across the demographic divide, policymakers planning for future demographic effects on development, such as the demand for new schools and teachers or changes in health care and pension costs, rely on population projections. Demography is unique among the social sciences, because current conditions reliably inform us of much that lies ahead. Most of the people who will constitute the world’s population in twenty years are alive today.

Nevertheless, in some cases, the dramatic changes that will be required to achieve population projections seem unlikely. For example, in Uganda, the total fertility rate declined by just four percent between 1960 and 2005. Yet in order to achieve the commonly-cited “medium fertility variant” of the UN’s population projections, external pageUganda’scall_made fertility rate must drop by 59 percent between 2005 and 2050. Meanwhile, 41 percent of Ugandan women of reproductive age have an unmet need for family planning. The projections require optimistic assumptions at the other side of the demographic divide as well. In Russia, where fertility fell from 2.6 to 1.3 children per woman between 1960 and 2005, the country is projected to immediately reverse its downward population trajectory and climb to 1.7 by mid-century.

As demonstrated by considering the assumptions that underlie population projections in places like Russia and Uganda, the connections between demographics and development often call for further research at the country level. Most countries with youthful, growing populations pass decades free from outbreaks of conflict despite demographic pressures, and the ultimate successes and challenges to development depend on individual context.

The two country case studies that follow explore the relationship between population and development in Haiti and Yemen. Both countries have a history of repeated civil conflict during the past 20 years and have very young population age structures. While demography’s impact on development and security continue to be studied, the following case studies clearly illustrate the challenges facing nations at the beginning of the demographic transition, as well as the opportunities that lie ahead, should governments and their partners implement comprehensive, forward-looking policies to shape demographic trends.