Uncovering China's Hidden Agenda on Nuclear Proliferation

The People’s Republic of China released their latest defense white paper, “external pageChina’s National Defence in 2008call_made,” on 22 January this year, two days after US President Barack Obama’s inauguration. The 100-page document provides an authoritative guide to China’s national security policy and the military, diplomatic, economic and technological resources required to achieve it. Members of the international community are likely to use the white paper in formulating their own foreign and defense policies toward China, including China’s stated position on nonproliferation.

Usually published in December, the delayed release of the latest white paper was intended to make clear to the incoming Obama administration that the actions of the US and the international community would determine to what degree China would cooperate with or compete against enhanced international security.

The twin theme of cooperation and competition is heavily weaved into the paper’s first chapter on China’s interpretation of its security situation. While “[p]eace and development remain the principle themes of the times,” “global challenges are on the increase, and new security threats keep emerging.” While “major powers are stepping up their efforts to cooperate with each other,” they also “continue to compete with and hold each other in check.” The chapter asserts that China will pursue security policies based on “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.”

However, it also observes that “hegemonism and power politics continue to exist” and that China “also faces strategic maneuvers and containment from the outside.” As such, Beijing’s implication is that the US and other major powers have failed to adhere to the agreement to strengthen international cooperation. Hence, China believes it is being forced to embrace the lowest common denominator and play the game of realpolitik just like everyone else. This translates into a belief on the part of Chinese leaders that they are not culpable for their behavior, because their policies are “purely defensive in nature.” In other words, China believes it is simply responding to the ‘offenses’ railed against it by other powers.

While the latest white paper - and others that preceded it - outlines how China opposes nuclear proliferation and actively supports international efforts to curb its spread, Beijing also makes clear that it is obliged to adopt the very double standards embraced by other states. This is until the international community establishes a global security environment in which cooperation and trust on nonproliferation are both guaranteed and reciprocated.

Until such an agreement is struck, China believes it cannot be faulted for reneging on its nonproliferation obligations, such as when it fails to meet the demands of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Extending this line of reasoning, China cannot be accused of double-dealing with North Korea, Iran and other states of concern that aspire to arm themselves with WMD for reasons with which China would empathize.

China’s cooperation-competition double standard has been in play for sometime. Beijing’s cooperative behavior is well-reflected by its participation in a range of major international treaties and conventions. In addition to the NPT, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement, China signed (though not ratified) the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. It formally joined the Zangger Committee in 1997 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004. The Chinese government also publicly pledged not to provide assistance to nuclear facilities failing to meet international safeguards in 1996. It has frequently expressed that its conduct with nuclear exports adhere to IAEA safeguards, are undertaken in the spirit of peaceful use and will not allow ‘re-transfers’ to a third country without prior consent.

However, Beijing’s competitive behavior, which has helped fuel the proliferation of WMD in general and the spread of nuclear-weapons-related technology in particular, is also equally apparent. It is already well-documented that China has aided the nuclear and missile programs of Pakistan, Iran, Libya, North Korea and Saudi Arabia in various capacities. It is difficult to rule out the possibility that China continues to aid these states.

China’s provision of ballistic missile technology to these states is of specific concern. China is already reported to have exported missile components and technology to some of them. If this is true, then China is violating its pledge to adhere to the original 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. The US maintains its opposition to China’s MTCR membership bid for this reason.

This ebb and flow in China’s proliferation behavior is certainly not contradictory to its foreign and strategic policy. In fact, the opposite is true.

China’s proliferation is completely rational and consistent once the principle of external pageshicall_made, a key driver in Chinese strategic thinking, is taken into account. Roughly translated as the “strategic configuration of power” or the “propensity of things,” shi compels Chinese decision-makers toward “taking actions that make sense in light of the predominant tendencies at any given moment.” It translates, among other things, into a ‘synchronic’ approach to China’s international conduct. Chinese decision-makers seek to exploit all the available opportunities that serve to benefit China’s national interest, even though they may independently appear to be at odds with each other.

Overall, the western view that China has come a long way since the 1960s, when its declared policy was to support nuclear proliferation as a means of “breaking the hegemony of the superpowers,” actually glosses over the nature of China’s agenda.

In a way, nothing has changed. Beijing is still seeking to break the hegemony of the world’s remaining superpower, while seeking to manage the balance between the major powers (such as Britain, France and Russia), which now includes an emerging India and Japan. Only its articulation has changed. Rather than breaking hegemony, China now seeks to foster a multi-polar world. Beijing quietly believes that nuclear proliferation is a necessary evil that can help ‘equalize’ the strategic balance within the international system.

In the end, there is a silver lining in Beijing’s message to the Obama administration about reciprocity in US-China relations. Beijing seeks to remind President Obama that important progress was made during the Clinton administration, especially after the Clinton-Jiang summits in 1997-1998. This led to China’s cancellation of its nuclear-reactor deals with Iran and halted delivery of C-802 cruise missiles to that state. Beijing also seeks to remind President Obama that the opposite was true during the recent Bush administration. During that presidency, the US imposed more sanctions on Chinese entities than those of any other state for transfers related to ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and cruise missiles to Pakistan, Iran and other countries. The exact US tally is 78 separate sanctions on a total of 32 Chinese entities.

The Chinese leadership has a clear understanding of US presidential power shifts. As some Chinese scholars have observed, Chinese leaders often strive to exploit the second and third years of a new presidency as a means of improving US-China relations before an administration is caught-up with the prerogative of reelection in its first term or beset by ‘lame-duck’ syndrome in the second term. Thus, the years 2010-2011 are critical for reaping new dividends on both sides.

Certainly, there are no easy answers about how the US and the international community should deal with China. It is clear that China should be included and engaged in all nonproliferation endeavors, rather than excluded and contained. Policymakers should not undervalue any attempt to ‘socialize’ China in ways that will make its international behavior more predictable and hence easier to manage. In 2004, members of the NSG, including the US, extended membership to China as soon as they saw a semblance of improvement in China’s nuclear export behavior. The Obama administration, for a start, could decide on a more achievable set of criteria on responsible behavior in regard to China’s missile-technology transactions, and therefore, seriously consider extending MTCR membership to China should it meet them.