Enduring Radioactive Dangers in Central Asia

The detonation of a radiological dispersal device, a so-called dirty bomb, has the capacity to kill 1,000 people in a densely populated city, spread radioactive contamination over tens of square kilometers, require the area to be evacuated and decontaminated, render immediate parts of the affected area off limits to human habitation and pose a cancer risk for decades.

It only takes a few grams of deadly radioactive substances to make a dirty bomb, and these materials can be acquired from any number of inadequately protected radioactive sites. In recent years, the trafficking of such materials has largely swung from Europe to Central Asia, the Caucuses and Turkey. As such, this article explores Central Asia’s risk factors as a source of radioactive material and a route for smuggling.

In January 2008, Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the United Nation's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), named Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as possible sources of dirty bomb material for terrorists. Sources of concern include radioactive substances used in medicine and industry, as well as low-grade uranium from abandoned uranium mines with poorly secured tailing dams and radioactive waste from nuclear power plants. Radioactive isotopes, products of nuclear reactors and weapons testing, are attractive to terrorists seeking to devise a dirty bomb.

Although the Central Asian nations rid themselves of all radioactive sources in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, uncontrolled radioactive material still can be found in most countries in the region. Anti-terrorism analysts have noted that in the coming few years, terrorists could shift their focus to Central Asia, given the significant deposits of uranium ore they contain. Uranium storage depots in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan hold more than 100 million tons of radioactive waste. Nuclear wastes inherited from the Soviet Union, the former Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe have been stored in uranium mines located on the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and along the Mailuu-Suu river in Kyrgyzstan since 1946. The total area of the nuclear waste burial site reaches 1,000 hectares, and according to some estimates, about two million cubic meters of lethally dangerous radioactive waste has accumulated for over 50 years. Most recently, Kyrgyzstan, which according to the latest data has about 70 radioactive waste sites external pagecoveringcall_made close to 600 hectares of its territory, was implicated for failing to control “radioactive waste and contaminated equipment being taken outside Kyrgyzstan in a pile of scrap metal.”

Kazakhstan was one of the key Central Asian countries with a nuclear infrastructure and a host to the world's largest nuclear weapons testing ground. Although it has successfully removed all of its 1,000 nuclear warheads, 104 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 40 nuclear-capable bombers (having transferred its last nuclear weapon to Russia in April 1995 and external pagedestroyedcall_made its nuclear testing site by July 2000 ), weapons-grade nuclear materials are still present in the country, and their security and safety warrant greater attention. The country has witnessed several smuggling attempts, though none of the seized materials were weapons-usable.

Acquiring these materials is not very difficult, as they are stored in poorly sealed and guarded, often in open-air, areas in Central Asia. As most radioactive materials in Tajikistan remained susceptible to theft and smuggling following its five-year civil war, a radioactive waste storage manager external pagenotedcall_made that the country was lucky since “maybe the radiation hazard signs kept looters away.” The director general of the Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center commented that even taking soil samples of nuclear blasts could be of value to a terrorist or rogue state. Even if uranium is 4-5 percent enriched, it eases the task of further enrichment with centrifuges.

The early 1990s saw a surge in nuclear material smuggling - mostly of uranium and plutonium - to Europe from the former Soviet Union. Western and Central Europe were the primary destinations of nuclear materials from the Newly Independent States (NIS), rather than potential end-users in the Middle East and South Asia. The NIS states were sources of large supplies of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. Some reports assert that there has been a decline in reported illicit nuclear trafficking in Europe since 1994, which is external pageattributedcall_made either to the absence of a market for such material or the effective work of European intelligence and security agencies. However, according to the IAEA, the number of cases of smuggled nuclear materials seized in Europe since 2002 has doubled, reaching 300. The real figures may be considerably higher in light of the additional 344 cases in the past 11 years that have not been authenticated by any of the 75 countries monitoring the illegal trade in radioactive materials. Reportedly, western intelligence agencies foiled 16 attempts to smuggle plutonium and uranium in 2005 alone.

In 2001, the IAEA expressed concern that routes for nuclear material smuggling were shifting. Nuclear materials were being transported to the South with countries in Southern Asia and the Middle East, including India, Pakistan and Iran, representing smuggling destinations. The external pageoriginscall_made of the material also began changing, as “the number of confirmed cases of nuclear smuggling had fallen in the rest of the world, but had risen in Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia.” Central Asian countries serve both as sources of radioactive materials and transit routes for smugglers due to their porous and poorly guarded borders, the region's proximity to unstable areas in the Middle East and South Asia, and inadequate and corrupt law enforcement in almost all the countries in the region.

To strengthen counter-proliferation efforts, Central Asian countries signed in September 2006 an agreement to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone in the region. On 14 December 2007, Kazakhstan received a further boost to its non-proliferation efforts when it extended a bilateral cooperative agreement with the US to “control and neutralize scrap materials and equipment that may be used as WMD.” As part of a separate agreement reached that same month, the US also sought to further boost radiation control systems along the Kazakh border.

Such progress notwithstanding, several factors underscore the dangers of further circulation of radioactive materials in the region. Without improved political stability and economic well-being in these countries, nuclear and other types of smuggling will remain a low priority for these states. This is further compounded by weak intra- and inter-state cooperation to fight proliferation, as well as the states’ inadequately guarded borders.

In 2005, the Kazakh authorities external pageacknowledgedcall_made that the country lacked a clear program to prevent the flow of radioactive and nuclear materials in and out of the country. The problem appears to be less about a lack of available resources and more about poor coordination of counter-proliferation activities at the intra- and inter-state level. Furthermore, corrupt officials in the region could engage in lucrative smuggling activities, thereby creating additional challenges to the counter-proliferation efforts of all NIS governments. According to a Russian analyst, “those who left the ranks of the political elite” in the early 1990s created organized crime groups and began “engaging in profitable ‘radioactive trade’.” The danger exists that government officials or police officers may commit serious crimes with potentially harmful international implications.

In addition, inadequate security for over 100 million metric tons of waste at uranium storage facilities, tailing and mining dumps in numerous sites in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan stands out as a serious security threat and a potentially massive regional public health disaster. Regional leaders have largely attributed the problems with safeguarding these sites to a lack of financial resources.

Finally, because the former Soviet Union is the largest producer of legal and regulated radioactive materials in the world, it is not surprising that there is a parallel illicit market in nuclear substances. Illegal trade in these materials could result in a significant loss of the regional governments' revenues gathered from legitimate trade. This could be particularly damaging to Kazakhstan, as it seeks to become one of the leading producers of uranium by 2010 and to build a more advanced nuclear fuel assembly technology to increase the value of its uranium business.

Counter-proliferation policies in Central Asia must concentrate on funding nuclear detection equipment, securing employment for nuclear scientists and ensuring compliance with formal non-proliferation treaties. Such efforts must also focus on securing or eliminating existing nuclear tailing and mining dams and safeguarding nuclear waste from radioactive blasts. Kazakhstan's recent external pageagreementcall_made with India on civilian nuclear cooperation and the uranium-export potential of other countries in the region to meet the anticipated global demand for nuclear power must serve as vehicles to address the security and safety of radioactive sources. Finally, the issue of corruption and collusion between government officials and smugglers, as well as the ability of nuclear industry insiders to deliberately and clandestinely sell nuclear goods to third parties, must be better understood and addressed.