There's Life in the Old NATO Yet

Unlike its 1999 predecessor, external pagethe new strategic conceptcall_made promises to be a valuable guiding document for facing the challenges of the 21^st century. Under the title "Active Engagement, Modern Defence", it reaffirms NATO's traditional focus on collective self-defense. The two other pillars of "NATO 3.0", as NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen likes to call it, also figure very prominently: crisis management and cooperative security with an emphasis on enhanced cooperation with key global and regional institutions.

The document strengthens the focus on crisis prevention and post-conflict stabilization through a distinct focus on "active engagement", drawing lessons from experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan. For instance, NATO is to "further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations" and "develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones". Moreover, civilian-military planning will be enhanced, and there will even be "an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability" (although the language on this point is remarkably bland - even for its context). More effective and efficient structures are also emphasized, a formula described by NATO diplomats as " external pageLess belly and more musclecall_made".

The document distinctly defines NATO as a global security provider, with member states proclaiming their intention to enhance capabilities for this purpose. One notable omission from the document is any reference to the concept of human security.

A few other items are particularly noteworthy. Nuclear proliferation and terrorism feature prominently - as does the importance of defending against "cyber attacks," phrasing which wisely avoids the linguistic pitfalls of cyber "crime" or "war". Quite sensibly, the response to cyber attacks remains detached from Art. 5, and therefore cannot activate NATO's collective defense apparatus.

Moreover, the new concept outlines a commitment to substantial disarmament and "to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons", while reaffirming NATO's status as a nuclear alliance as long as there are nuclear weapons. In essence, this point was a compromise between France and Germany. The former was, as ever, intent on maintaining its nuclear status and independence, while the latter had even tried, and failed, to insert into the document the idea that the new missile defense would diminish the need for nuclear weapons.

Rapprochement with Russia

Missile defense and strong partnerships feature heavily in the new concept. Both aspects, of course, point directly to improvements in relations with Russia, which may turn out to be the truly historic feat of the summit. The potential breakthrough on a joint missile defense could not only substantially improve relations between the West and Russia, it might also provide an important step on the way to creating a European security order that aims to take care of the external pageunfinished business of unifying Europecall_made.

The strategic concept's language on the importance of cooperation with Russia may be rather measured and sober. This, however was to be expected in the face of Central and Eastern European skepticism. Considering the state of NATO-Russian relations only two years ago in the wake of the war in Georgia, the improved atmosphere and potential for far-reaching cooperation toward a "true strategic partnership", as laid out in the external pageNATO-Russia Council joint statementcall_made, is stunning.

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev external pagecalledcall_made the meeting "indeed a historic event", echoing European leaders. "[W]e have traveled a long distance." Or, as Rasmussen external pageput itcall_made, "The NATO nations and Russia have, today, agreed, in writing, that while we face many security challenges, we pose no threat to each other. That, alone, draws a clear line between the past and the future of NATO-Russia relations."

On missile defense, the ground is prepared for a Russian seat at the table. The strategic concept calls for developing "the capability to defend our populations and territories

against ballistic missile attacks" and for seeking Russian cooperation on this front. Medvedev in principle agreed on a common missile defense, yet also offered a few words of caution, emphasizing that the obstacles remain large. He external pagewarnedcall_made that it would have to be "a full-fledged strategic partnership between Russia and NATO. Otherwise, it's a no-go. [...] Everybody's clear that the missile defense system will be useful only when it is universal. I'll be blunt with you, we need to sort it out."

The fact, however, that they will try to sort it out, with a good chance of success, is no small feat.

Afghanistan: Putting a date on uncertainty

Finally, NATO-Russian cooperation was also improved on the key issue of Afghanistan. Russia and NATO agreed on broadened transit arrangements to Central Asia, facilitating the provision of supplies to ISAF forces.

Yet in general, the results on this front are mixed at best. The summit was meant to demonstrate NATO's unity, particularly in agreeing to gradually external pagewithdrawing its combat forces from the country by 2014call_made while supporting Afghanistan for decades to come. However, the idea of setting a timeline appears contested. In an attempt to cater to public opinion at home, many governments are drawn to talk of a set timeline that offers an end to active engagement in Afghanistan.

A tight timeline obviously plays into the hand of insurgents, who can adapt their strategy in order to merely survive until withdrawal. In addition, as external pagemost experts already agree, and NATO officials concedecall_made, Afghan security forces won't be able to provide a sufficient level of security within four years. It is thus a real possibility that tens of thousands of troops may have to remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014, a hard sell for many NATO country politicians.

Consequently, it is almost a given that member states will use "2014" in a manner that best serves their objectives. In a way, external pagethe post-summit press conferencecall_madeof German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, and Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg epitomized this problem: The three spent most of the conference attempting to explain what the date did and did not mean, and how that meaning may change over the coming years - with each putting a different emphasis on the importance of the date, despite claims of total agreement.

It could be excruciating to watch NATO go through a similar process as 2014 approaches.

Some ISAF countries may opt to use 2014 as a rather absolute date, while others, in particular the US, will accept longer and more flexible timeframes. Needless to say, the consequences of an abrupt or messy withdrawal would be detrimental to cohesion and trust within the alliance.

Will the spirit of Lisbon last?

Despite the summit's successes, NATO's struggles have not disappeared. Its relationship with Russia might very well take a turn for the worse again. Potential pitfalls abound. The New START treaty may stall in the US Senate, leading to deteriorating US-Russian relations. Negotiations over a common missile defense may go poorly. At this point - with the level of commitment recently demonstrated - a missile defense agreement that excludes Russia would be disastrous.

Afghanistan remains a thorn in the alliance's side, especially since it magnifies the lack of burden-sharing and the enormous divergence in capabilities among allies. It also remains an important test for whether the alliance is able to perform successfully in an increasingly complex security environment.

Ultimately, as is always the case with concepts or strategy papers of this sort, the new strategic concept's worth will be determined by member states' actions, decisions and political will to live by the concept's letter.