Toward Swiss Self-Interest

19 May 2010

Swiss political identity has demonstrated a long history of self-restraint, with citizens often deferring to political elites and the needs of the state above their own individual self-interest at the voting booth. But recent ballot outcomes seem to illustrate an emerging independent streak among Swiss voters.

 On 29 November 2009, the Swiss people clearly accepted the ban on the construction of minarets. The result surprised even the Swiss themselves in part because it ran counter to the longstanding pattern of Swiss voter restraint. Historically, Swiss citizens have shown an unusual tendency to vote against their most immediate interests. Just after World War I, for instance, they overwhelmingly refused the introduction of a special tax on personal fortunes although the Swiss population suffered from an intense post-war economic crisis, and the tax would have affected less than two percent of the population. This example, though rather extreme, is by no means unique. On the contrary, Swiss citizens' willingness to vote against initiatives that would be in their self-interest has been one of the main features of the country's political culture.

Unsurprisingly, this observation is not novel and has been mentioned by most Swiss political scientists interested in the functioning of Swiss democracy. Most of them, however, do not try to explain this feature but simply present it as a sign of, and precondition for, a proper functioning democracy. In other words, their approach is mainly descriptive and ontological: Swiss political restraint is stated as a fact and is considered the outcome of history and nation building, if not as a ' external pagenatural' feature of the state.

Theoretical limitations

While this scientific trend is still alive and well, several political scientists, especially 1970s left-wing scholars, have adopted a more constructivist approach to the topic. They too noticed their fellow citizens' rather strange political attitude. However, they did not understand it as a natural manifestation of 'Swissness.' Rather, they saw it as the result of deliberate techniques created by the political elite, consciously aimed at driving people to make decisions that might not be in their direct interest.external pageFrançois Masnata, for instance, goes so far as to external pagesay that Swiss political masochism is the ultimate result of elite manipulation, which is so insidiously powerful that it makes its 'victims' act against their own interests, while simultaneously persuading them that they are acting on their own initiative.

Actually, both these approaches seem dissatisfying. Stating the existence of this exceptional self-restraint and simply claiming it as the outcome of history or even nature, does little in the way of providing a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon. Conversely, by considering it the result of some obscure, top-down manipulation, the second approach falls into the trap of conspiracy theories, depriving social actors of free will and hence constituting an inappropriate heuristic tool in order to analyze the functioning of democracy.

However, by examining these approaches and exploring both the history of Swiss restraint and the way it was achieved, a more precise picture of this intriguing political feature - and its recent seeming dissipation - begins to appear.

In fact, the current waning of political restraint already suggests that the 'naturalistic' argument, if not totally absurd, is at least constructed. When looking at official documents starting from 1848 (when all Swiss male citizens were given the right to elect and revise their national constitution), this supposition proves to be true. Along with the development of democratic structures and tools, Swiss authorities elaborated a discourse that aimed to moderate their fellow citizens' political culture and attitude.

This discourse contained one main message: It is in the citizen's own best interest not to do what on the face of it would be assumed as their interest. The shift from one kind of interest to another could be temporal or spatial. Sometimes, people were asked to act against their immediate interest for the sake of their future interest. Most frequently, voters were requested to consider the interest of the state above their own, given that the state would be able to care for their individual (future) interests.

This discourse distinguished 'wrong' from convenient political posturing, and consequently 'bad' from 'good' Swiss citizens. Since it was first formulated, this message has undergone at least two main changes. On the one hand, its general formulation has progressed from request to statement, where citizens were no longer asked to behave reasonably but rather were loudly praised for doing so. On the other hand, the values underlying 'good' and 'evil' citizenship have significantly evolved. During the 19th century, the qualities required of citizens were closely related to the notion of rationality: intelligence, perspicacity and education. Unsurprisingly, any feature that contradicted these qualities had to be rejected. During the first half of the century, when voting techniques were still rather archaic, the official discourse especially castigated the lack of individual independence that allowed electoral corruption to take place. During the second half of the century, the government's message mostly characterized bad citizens as ignorant and inexperienced.

Swiss exceptionalism

Just before World War I, this rhetoric imperceptibly altered and was coupled with - if not replaced by - another more naturalistic one. Ever since, the qualities that have distinguished good citizens have been related to their 'Swissness,' be it their origin, their individual history or their habits. These notions, in turn, were more and more associated with robustness, vividness and, last but not least, masculinity. Therefore, all characteristics attributed to bad citizens could be summed up in the word 'stranger,' be it a foreigner or one who fundamentally differs from the speaker.

Swiss citizens praised this discourse, and their acceptance had at least two apparently contradictory consequences, setting the stage for a growing disconnect between self-restraint and increasingly sectarian voting patterns

According to the discourse, being Swiss was a necessary and sufficient condition to possess these exceptional qualities. However, it must be said that the affirmative tone of the message has long had the predicted effect on those to whom it was addressed: Not only did they believe that they were genuinely good and wise citizens, they also adopted the (moderate) political behavior advocated by the government in order to be considered so.

During the 20th century, however, the internalization of this flattering message led to sectarian attitudes. It is as if, once Swiss citizens had been granted exceptional rights by virtue of exceptional qualities, they considered that they were the only ones equipped to enjoy them and did not want to share them with 'strangers.' This became obvious in 1959, when Swiss male citizens denied Swiss women the right to vote. Moreover, in 1970, an initiative proposing the expulsion of foreign workers was refused by only 54 percent of the voters, although the government, all major political parties and the country's economic leaders fiercely opposed it.

This outcome not only shows the limits of 'natural' Swiss self-restraint, but it also challenges the hypothesis of a manipulation by powerful elite. This does not mean that the Swiss elite did not intend to influence their fellow citizens' political behavior, but they did it in a way that was not always successful and was usually rather obvious.

Role of the Swiss elite

The Swiss elite played on several kinds of rhetorical registers in order to persuade their fellow citizens to behave as they wanted. Some of these rhetorical tools openly revealed the reasons that lay behind the authorities' request. Thus, especially in cases of European war, they frequently used threats, explaining the terrible evils the whole society would suffer if the citizens did not behave 'correctly.' Most of the time, however, their modus operandi did not clearly state the elite's reasons for wanting people to act according to their suggestions. This is, for instance, the case with emotional manipulation on nationalistic grounds: If you do not behave as we wish, your Swiss worthiness is questioned. This rhetoric was used above all during the 19th century. Later, with the development of the 'naturalistic paradigm,' the official discourse exploited flattery and affirmation, stating that Swiss citizens were both genuinely intelligent and moderate.

In order to increase the persuasive effect of such messages, various logic was applied to increase credibility. Depending on the situation, the logic could be scientific, moral, historical, emotional or even pragmatic (i.e. a factual logic according to which only one resolution exists for a problem). The choice of logic also depended on the locus where it was presented. There were actually rather few symbolic or effective spaces where the general public and the elite could meet. Of course, they met on political occasions such as elections, campaigns or meetings. Most of the festive life of the country was especially organized in order to further such encounters. And last but not least, all educational institutions, be it church or school, also acted as resonance chambers and disseminators of the elite's message.

But more than its alleged rationality, this message more often than not addressed people's emotions, playing on two profound human wishes: the desire for dignity or, to put it differently, reaction to frustration, and the desire for security in reaction to fears. Utilizing emotions was one of the main requirements to ensure that the elite's message would be obeyed. This statement implies that these emotions were crucial to forging citizens' political behavior, which means that citizen loyalty was at stake during struggles among different political elites. The need to emotionally manipulate the population also implies that Swiss citizens did not always follow the recommendations made by their authorities.

Both latter configurations regularly occurred, especially when internal struggles among elites led to conflicting uses of people's emotions, prompting citizens to choose the option that was supported by the most appropriate uses of emotions. Sometimes this option was not that of the majority government but that of their opponents.

Toward Swiss self-interest

As a result, Swiss citizens currently seem to show a receding willingness to act against their own immediate interests. Among the numerous reasons, three ought to be stressed. First, the Swiss government sometimes instrumentalized the people's refusal in order to reject measures it secretly did not want to apply, leading to a distrust of official voting recommendations. Second, this major shift in Swiss citizens' political attitude seems closely related to the changes that have affected the whole (at least western) world since the late 1980s. Since then, most western societies entered a period of what the French historian François Hartog calls "presentism" that prevents one from perceiving the future. In these conditions, it is not really tempting to act in the interest of a future that seems unimaginable. Third, it is difficult to act in the interest of the government because of both external and internal reasons. On the one hand, less political engagement is/would be at odds with the current tendency of (over-)democratization, which illusively claims that the opinion of each citizen is valuable, however inconsistent his knowledge may be. This global phenomenon prompts Swiss citizens to challenge the previous dynamic of responsibility and to think that by acting in their own interests they also act in those of the state.

Finally, Switzerland's recent prestige deficit has prompted citizens to no longer blindly trust their authorities. This shrinking confidence is borne of Swiss history and identity or, more precisely, what Swiss citizens were told was their history and true identity. The current lack of political 'reasonableness,' or self-restraint, is the result of the methods previously used to forge it. In order to make Swiss citizens become 'responsible,' they were told time and again that they were the best in the world. Today, because they are absolutely convinced of their responsibility, they feel free to act without restraint.

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