Moscow Attack Illustrates Importance of Prevention

2 Feb 2011

The terrorist attack at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport last week prompted President Dmitry Medvedev to call for tightened airport security and the ouster of airport security officials. While these measures may harden airports as targets, plenty of other dangers remain, demonstrating the limitations of such a reactive approach and the need for systemic, preventive measures.

"We are going to pursue terrorists everywhere. If they are in the airport, we will pursue them in the airport. And if we, excuse me please, capture them in the toilet, then we will waste them in the outhouse too, eventually. That is all. The question is dealt with once and for all," Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told Russian television on 24 September 1999.

Putin went on to become the Russian president while his vow to "waste terrorists in the outhouse" became the unofficial slogan behind his method of taming terrorism. More than a decade late, however, Russia continues to suffer from the deadly menace of indigenous terrorism, of which the 24 January suicide bombing at Moscow's busiest airport has become the latest manifestation.

Although no one so far has claimed responsibility for the attack that killed 35 and injured 180, investigators suspect it was carried out by a 20-year old member of the North Caucasus-based terrorist networks, which have carried out the majority of terrorist attacks in Russia in the past years and which often use suicide bombers.

The head of the suspected suicide bomber recovered from the scene appears to look like that of a native of Russia's North Caucasus or an Arab, investigators say. Deputy chairman of the State Duma's security committee Magomed Vakhaev told Kommersant on the day of the attack that Dagestan-based factions of North Caucasusian terrorist networks are likely behind the attack in retaliation against the Russian security forces' recent dismantling of these factions (which killed one of the leaders). And Putin external pagesaid on 26 January that those behind the attack were not linked to Chechnya.

Investigators say the bomb, which had a yield of up to 10 kilograms, was set off by the man who may have been accompanied by an accomplice left at the privately-managed airport's parking lot. It was from this parking lot that the suicide bomber accessed the building via an elevator and walked to the international arrivals zone.

Medvedev - whom Putin handpicked as his successor and helped get elected to the Kremlin in 2008 - seized on this information to lambast management of Domodedovo for "either absence of control" or "partial control of movements" in the airport. Speaking at the annual meeting of the Federal Security Service's (FSB) top brass on 25 January, the Russian president said there was only "partial control of movements, which in practice didn't apply to those who were meeting passengers" at the airport.

He called for the ouster of the airport's management and for the introduction of "a more rigid system of checks, total control" of airport security in Russia. Medvedev also demanded the resignations of officials responsible for transport security at FSB, Russia's leading counterterrorism agency, and the Interior Ministry (MVD). He also called on these agencies to find the organizers of the attack. "The nests of these bandits will be liquidated," he vowed.

Medvedev's tough talk may convince the general public that he is capable of rising to the challenge; as important for Medvedev in this pre-election year as it was for Putin in 1999. But these statements may also be a sign that the president doesn't see the big picture clearly.

Masking the real problem

A substantial toughening of the security regime at airports will indeed make it more difficult for terrorists to strike such facilities, but it may also considerably slow passenger traffic. More importantly, terrorists tend to switch to softer targets after such measures are implemented, and unfortunately there is a long list of public and private facilities with a large concentration of people to choose from.

Further, although it is within his rights to demand the resignation of MDV and FSB officials, Medvedev is on rather shaky ground when faulting managers of a privately-managed airport for security lapses in a public access zone beyond security and customs barriers where law enforcement officials should be in charge.

After all, counterterrorism is the job of these law-enforcement entities and security agencies, which at the very least require airport management to install additional control barriers and post patrolmen at entrances. Authorities were tipped off one week before the attack that "something is being prepared" and may take place near Domodedovo's customs control zone. However, policemen assigned to the airport continued to focus on shaking down foreigners arriving from Central Asia, an employee of the airport's private security service told Lifenews.ru news portal on 24 January. Prosecutors announced on 26 January that they had exposed a scheme set by officers of the airport's police station to extort bribes from passengers arriving at Domodedovo. In a 27 January with Interfax Vladimir Kulakov, retired col. General and member of the federal parliament's upper chamber, identified corruption in law-enforcement agencies as one of the main causes of what has happened at Domodedovo airport.

If these allegations are true, then it is clear that as long as corruption persists, any government measures taken to fight terrorism will be found lacking. The motivation that drives policemen and detectives to choose money over their job of protecting the public must be addressed. The same goes for those responsible for airport security, especially given the fact that two suicide bombers, pretending to be in a rush had already managed to bribe their way onto planes at the same airport in 2004, killing 90 people.

Authorities also need to reverse the decision to reform the Interior Ministry's directorate that used to deal with terrorism and organized crime, which was reformed in 2008 to focus on 'extremism' and now has to spend a significant amount of time working on radical political opposition. So far, Medvedev's call for total control of airports and the firing of Domodedovo's private managers illustrates that authorities are not turning the focus back on terrorist groups and the threat they pose.

Addressing root causes

There is hope that the attack will motivate federal authorities to amend laws and practices to fight terrorism rather than introduce another round of what Russians call "tightening of the screws", the kind that occurred after the 2002 Dubrovka and 2004 Beslan hostage-taking tragedies. These measures simply introduced new curbs to media freedoms and the cancellation of several elections.

Russian authorities have made significant progress in dismantling North Caucasus-based terrorist networks, with most veteran leaders either killed or captured; more, however, needs to be done to keep them on the run. If indeed organized by the North Caucasus-based network, the 24 January attack demonstrates that the recent schism in the leadership of these networks has had little impact on their overall capabilities, but may even promptsplinter groups to up the ante in an effort to outbid each other.

Furthermore, the authorities also need to address the root causes and contributing factors of terrorism in Russia, chief among them the increasing popularity of militant Salafiya ideology in the North Caucasus, law enforcement agents' abuse of the local population, poverty, joblessness, lack of education and lack of upward social mobility for youth.

Until this is done, terrorist groups will continue to enjoy a steady stream of new recruits. As member of State Duma's security committee and retired FSB colonel Gennady Gudkov told Kommersant: Terrorists used to spend months trying to find and train suicide bombers, "now there is a line of suicide bombers formed in the North Caucasus waiting for their turn to blow themselves up anytime."

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