Between Palestine and Iran: Saudi Arabia and Middle East Peace

9 Mar 2010

Saudi Arabia's regional standing and foreign policy interests are under threat from an increasingly powerful Iran, a troublesome Syria and an intransigent Arab-Israeli conflict. But the country has an opportunity in 2010 to use its sponsorship of the Arab Peace Initiative to solidify its standing in the region – while providing a chance for meaningful revival of the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Almost a decade ago, Saudi Arabia launched what came to be known as the Arab Peace Initiative (API), which was endorsed in the March 2002 Beirut Arab League Summit and has been reaffirmed in every annual summit since. While it continues to face numerous challenges, a resurgence and convergence of interests in the API could create the conditions not only for a meaningful revival of the Arab-Israeli peace process but for wider Middle East peace.

The API demands that Israel withdraw fully from territories seized in the 1967 war and agrees to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, with East Jerusalem as its capital. The initiative also stipulates that "a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem should be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194," which states that Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date. In return, the Arab states will consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended and relations with Israel would be normalized.

With this document, the Arab League not only agreed to recognize Israel’s existence and its right to live in peace but expressed a willingness – under certain conditions – to establish full, normal relations with Israel. As such, the API constitutes the most conciliatory and promising pan-Arab position toward Israel since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

API advantages all around

The API offers clear advantages for key players in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Saudi Arabia who first proposed the deal in 2002. For Israel it provides the only viable political framework for a resumption of the Arab-Israeli peace process toward the normalization of relations that Israel so craves. For the Palestinians, the API constitutes a crucial contribution toward ending its internal political crisis that carries the threat of civil war and jeopardizes any prospects for statehood for some time to come. For Saudi Arabia, the API is a political tool that can be used to curtail Iran’s growing political and military power across the Middle East since the invasion of Iraq.

More specifically, Iran has been one of the main beneficiaries of the US-led invasion of Iraq. It has created a strong foothold in Iraq through the provision of finance, training, weapons' supply and political support to Shiia backed militias; it is exerting influence in Lebanon through its powerful proxy, Hezbollah, and through its alliance with Syria. Iran has also established a presence in Palestine through the supply of weapons and finance to Hamas in opposition to the international boycott of the organization. To compound matters further, Iran has been developing nuclear capabilities in defiance of the international community.

Iran’s power ascendency and its evident hegemonic aspirations have profound implications for Saudi Arabia, undermining its influence in the region. The prospect of a Shiia crescent, stretching from Iran, through Iraq into Lebanon, threatens the Saudi monarchy, renowned for its anti-Shiia, conservative Sunni disposition. Iran’s appeal to Shiia Muslims across the region also has domestic repercussions for Saudi Arabia, whose population includes a significant Shiia minority. The current war in Iraq has had the notable effect of strengthening Shiite aspirations and Sunni suspicions and generally deepening confessional divisions throughout the kingdom. Though sectarian relations in Saudi Arabia are far from the boiling point, any external interference that could aggravate these tensions poses a challenge to the internal stability of Saudi Arabia. And finally, the threat of an Israeli or US-led military strike targeting Iran’s nuclear installations is a source of deep concern for Saudi Arabia.

In view of these threats, attempts to revive the API should be seen as part of Saudi Arabia’s efforts to counter Iran’s regional ascent. The logic behind this is sound. Iran, faced with an Arab-Israeli dialogue instead of increasing Arab-Israeli violence, would find it difficult to translate military and financial support to Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas into regional political gains. Thus pro-western, Arab elements who are adversely affected by Iran’s hegemonic aspirations, such as Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait, are likely to be supportive of the Saudi initiative. The Saudi agenda also fits the interests of the Obama administration in reigniting the Arab-Israeli peace process, which so far has remained stalled.

Obstacles to peace

Yet can opportunity spring merely from an initiative to contain Iran that is sponsored by Saudi Arabia and championed by other pro-western Arab elements? While a good starting point, it is not sufficient. If the API is to take off properly it must deal with the obstacles in the Israeli and Palestinian arenas and Syria’s reluctance to fully commit to the plan.

Hamas’ refusal to meet the three basic requirements of the Quartet – renouncing violence, recognizing Israel and respecting previously signed agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) – is one obstacle to peace. The stipulation that the Palestinian refugee problem be resolved in accordance with UN resolution 194 constitutes yet another. This proposed solution is incompatible with Israel remaining a Jewish and democratic state, and it is not, politically, economically or socially viable to allow all refugees and their three generations of offspring into Israel. The initiative emphasizes, however, that Resolution 194 will be implemented following agreement from all sides. Thus, it keeps open the option that Israel and the Palestinians would resolve between them the differences concerning the interpretation and implementation of Resolution 194. And finally, since 2002 the Israeli political landscape has significantly shifted to the right, as evidenced by the composition of the current Israeli government and the policies advocated by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman.

Syria poses another problem. While it has formally accepted the plan, Syria has undermined the initiative by continuing to support Hezbollah, hosting Palestinian rejectionist groups and strengthening its alliance with Iran. Just recently on 25 February, Syrian President Bashar al Assad hosted summit talks in Damascus with Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasserallah and Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmedinajad, who announced that "with Allah's help the new Middle East will be a Middle East without Zionists and Imperialists."

Syria’s close relations with Iran and its support of Palestinian rejectionist groups constrains Saudi Arabia’s ability to promote the peace initiative; the kingdom’s standing in the Arab world would be severely damaged if it entered into negotiations with Israel in the face of Syrian opposition – let alone signed a peace treaty – while Israel continued to occupy the Golan Heights. Hence, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will promote the API further unless Syria’s support is secured. In this context, the recent rapprochement between the US and Syria is a positive development, as it opens for Syria an alternative route to its earlier position of siding with Iran and challenging US policies in the region. Yet it still remains to be seen whether the thaw in US-Syrian relations can drive a wedge between Syria, Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah. In this respect, past experience is not encouraging, and there is no guarantee that Syria's full support for the API can be secured.

In this month's upcoming Arab League Summit in Tripoli, participant states will have the opportunity to reaffirm the API. The initiative's architect, Saudi Arabia, should do its utmost to keep it alive. The alternative – further escalation in violence between Israel, Syria and the Palestinians, and a more powerful Iran – poses a direct threat to Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy interests and standing in the region. Notwithstanding the formidable obstacles the API faces, the chance to turn it into the hallmark of Middle East diplomacy in 2010 should not be allowed to slip away.

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