Electing the Future of Sudan

In his recent book external pageWars, Guns, and Votes,call_madeOxford economist Paul Collier discusses the prospect of democracy in poor countries with armed conflicts. His conclusion confirms what critical peace research has argued for years: Elections are not a panacea for implanting democracy in post-conflict countries, and they may even be counter-productive. Lacking the necessary infrastructure to absorb electoral competition – the rule of law, protection of minorities, political freedom, etc. – there is a risk that elections ignite political violence in these countries.

Sudan is a case in point. The largest country of Africa, Sudan has experienced several extremely violent civil wars, pitting insurgent groups from the country’s peripheries against the central government in Khartoum. The 2005 external pageComprehensive Peace Agreementcall_made(CPA) pacified the main axis of conflict between the north and south, even as the conflict in the western region of Darfur remained unsettled. Next week, for the first time since external page1986call_made, and against a highly volatile political backdrop and myriad logistical difficulties, nationwide elections are scheduled to take place in Sudan.

Hopes of democratic transformation

National elections are one element of the CPA, signed in January 2005 between the Sudanese government (controlled by the external pageNational Congress Partycall_made, NCP) and the dominant rebel group in the south (the external pageSudan People’s Liberation Movementcall_made, SPLM). The CPA has two aims. First and foremost, the agreement seeks to make peace between the dominant military forces of the north and south. It is an elite pact negotiated by the NCP and the SPLM, to the exclusion of other actors such as political parties in the north, insurgent groups in peripheral areas like Darfur and civil society.

The CPA institutes a power-sharing arrangement between the NCP and the SPLM in this form: a Government of National Unity led by the NCP’s external pageOmar al-Bashircall_made; a fixed percentage of seats in the national parliament (52 percent NCP, 28 percent SPLM); and the establishment of an autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) controlled by the SPLM. The CPA also proposes a external pagewealth-sharing formulacall_made by which half of the oil revenues from the south are kept by the government in Khartoum and the other half is transferred to GoSS in Juba. Regarding security, the CPA provides for separate armed forces for the north and the south, as well as 40,000 shared troops in joint integrated units.

The second aim of the CPA is to provide a blueprint for the democratic transformation of Sudan. The architects of the CPA wanted to initiate fundamental changes in the way governance works in Sudan, making it more inclusive and more democratic. The challenge was to build a “New Sudan”, as the leader of the SPLM, the late external pageJohn Garangcall_made put it. For this purpose, the CPA stipulates a six-year interim period, at the end of which a self-determination referendum would be held in the south, allowing southerners to vote on whether or not they want to remain part of Sudan. The plan was “ external pageto make unity attractivecall_made” during the interim phase to demonstrate to southerners and other marginalized peoples that they are not second-class citizens in their own country. To this end, the CPA proposes, among other measures, a bill of rights, civil service reform and the devolution of power to the regions. National elections were to be an additional element of democratic transformation, by fostering accountability and conferring legitimacy on the national government before the referendum. external pageRejected by the parties at first,call_made elections were finally included in the CPA at the insistence of international actors, most importantly the US.

Hopes disappointed

Five years after the CPA signing, hopes for Sudan’s democratic transformation have gone largely unfulfilled. Governance in Sudan remains an exclusive affair, as the NCP firmly controls power in the center, including the government, army and security services. The peripheries continue to be managed through an elaborate system of patronage and clientelism. The establishment of a separate center of power in the south, the SPLM-led GoSS in Juba, did change the configuration of external pageSudan’s political marketplacecall_made, but democratic transformation was minimal. It is not surprising therefore that the majority of external pagesouthern Sudanese say that they will vote for independencecall_made in the referendum.

The CPA was more successful with its first aim: making peace between the north and the south. For the most part, the NCP-SPLM pact has held, and, despite external pageescalating tribal fighting in southern Sudancall_made, the security situation in the south and the transitional areas has improved significantly compared to the pre-CPA period. To sum up, the CPA has brought relative stability without transformation to Sudan. The upcoming elections mirror this scenario. Postponed twice, the elections are set to take place in the second week of April 2010. Sudan's intensive focus on elections can be explained by the different but converging interests of the CPA partners. The NCP sees the elections as an opportunity to legitimize President al-Bashir who has been indicted by the external pageInternational Criminal Courtcall_made. The SPLM fears that delaying the elections could jeopardize the self-determination referendum scheduled for January 2011.

The elections will not be the democratic moment envisaged by the CPA. The preparatory process was dominated by the NCP, which looks set to win the presidency as well the majority of seats in the National Assembly. One reason for this is that the political opposition in the north is divided and unsure whether they should boycott the elections – and if they do, at what level. The SPLM concentrated its campaign on the south and has not seriously challenged the NCP in the north. Another factor is that the voter registration and constituency demarcation processes were contentious, particularly in Darfur. It appears that most of external pageDarfur’s 2.6 million internally displaced peoplecall_made have not been registered to vote. The difficult political context is compounded by a highly complicated external pageelectoral systemcall_made– southerners have to fill out 12, northerners eight different ballots – which is not conducive to effective external pagepolitical accommodationcall_madebetween the various parties and constituencies in Sudan. The immense logistical challenge of organizing elections in a country as vast and underdeveloped as Sudan is another complicating element.

Preserving the CPA

The elections may lead to small improvements for the Sudanese people, for example by fostering the accountability of politicians at the local level and by bringing more women into the political system (25 percent of seats in national and state parliaments are reserved for female candidates.) However, the elections are unlikely to fundamentally change the status quo of Sudanese politics in keeping with the transformational spirit of the CPA. Some external pageadvocacy groupscall_made have called for refusing to recognize the outcome of the elections if the NCP wins. Of course, it will be important to evaluate the process and take into account the verdict of international election observers. However, unless election day itself is fatally flawed, international rejection of the results is potentially counter-productive. It could inflame the NCP, embolden opposition groups and further complicate the already tense SPLM-NCP relationship. This is dangerous insofar as it risks derailing the CPA, which, in Sudan’s “external pagecritical yearcall_made,” would have disastrous consequences.

Sudan’s moment of truth is the south's independence referendum in 2011. The process and outcome of the referendum will have far-reaching implications for the political future of Sudan and for the stability of the greater Horn of Africa region. To prevent violence, it is imperative that the referendum be conducted in an orderly manner. This will only be possible if the CPA is upheld and a space is preserved for the NCP and the SPLM to negotiate a number of outstanding issues, such as border demarcation, post-referendum wealth-sharing, and treatment of each other’s citizens, in particular the many southerners residing in the north. If the CPA collapses, there is a strong likelihood of a external pagereturn to civil war between the north and the southcall_made.

Despite the disappointed hopes for democratic transformation, the CPA still has value. The main concern should now be to preserve its legacy of peacemaking between the north and south and to ensure that it continues beyond the referendum, whether Sudan remains a single state or becomes two. Western governments have already made clear that their priority is to hold the elections, while criticizing their flaws and striving to limit them, and getting safely to the referendum. Barring major new developments, the international community is choosing to be pragmatic about an imperfect election in Sudan.