US Policy Toward LRA Short on Details

In the waning days of last year's lame-duck session of Congress, US President Barack Obama presented a "Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord's Resistance Army". The President was mandated by external pagethe Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009call_made, a bill signed into law in May 2010, to develop and submit to Congress a strategic guidance for US efforts aiming to improve stability in the region of northern Uganda, southern Sudan, the northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and southeastern Central African Republic (CAR). The bill allocated $10 million for humanitarian assistance in the region in fiscal year 2011, and $10 million annually for reconciliation and transitional justice efforts in 2011-2013.

Obama's plan supports regional and multilateral efforts to defeat the LRA and bring durable peace and stability to the region. There are four main external pagepriorities specified in the plancall_made: to improve protection of and access to humanitarian aid for civilians; apprehend rebel leader Joseph Kony along with his senior commanders and bring them to justice; all while encouraging low-level LRA fighters to defect and disarm. The plan seems to be a more organized and detailed version of the strategy employed by several US agencies independently of each other since 2008, also delivering a framework for coordinated political, military, economic and intelligence support by USAID, Department of State, Department of Defense and the intelligence community.

The good

Enforcement of Obama's strategy, particularly if it came with the additional funding requested, would be a strong indicator of the US government's commitment to the issue. Obama is external pagethe first US presidentcall_madeto develop a strategy toward the long-running conflict. This likely reflects the fact that instability caused by the LRA is becoming a more significant threat. Kony is believed external pageto be currently in Darfurcall_made, and could be renewing relations with the Sudanese government. With the ongoing ethnic conflict and the recent independence referendum, LRA could stir conflict in the region.

Human rights' activists, most notably Resolve Uganda, the Enough Project and Invisible Children, who had lobbied for months for larger US involvement in the region, welcomed the development with enthusiasm. Bringing LRA's commanders to justice would demonstrate that in spite of problems with the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US could still resort to external pagehumanitarian use of forcecall_made if necessary.

Obama's strategy looks more like a framework to guide US involvement, rather than a specific plan of action. The strategy's lack of details could enhance its adaptability to changing realities on the ground. Flexibility of the plan - coupled with US support for multilateral and/or local initiatives which would acknowledge the significance of political will in the region - could be what fits the problem best. Inclusion of both military (i.e. protection of civilians) and non-military (i.e. establishment of telecommunication infrastructure in remote villages) elements is a strong advantage of the strategy, further proving its elasticity.

The bad

Some voices claim that the strategic external pageplan will not make a differencecall_made, as it will not result in military involvement of US forces and has already been rejected by the leaders of northern Uganda. The plan's critics also point out that it focuses on elimination of the rebel group, while largely ignoring the political and social causes of the original conflict. Removing Kony seems to be the cornerstone of the plan, but it is questionable whether capturing him would bring peace to the region. external pageIt is possiblecall_made that his removal would only result in the shuffling of the LRA's political and military leadership.

While Obama's plan recognizes the unique threat posed by the LRA, foreign leaders have underestimated the group's strength. Contrary to popular opinion, the external pageLRA fighterscall_made are a disciplined and effective force, using high-tech communications equipment. The removal of Kony would be a complex military operation, requiring a vast amount of preparation and planning. It is doubtful whether the Ugandan military is capable of accomplishing such a task.

This leads to another weak point in the strategy - its reliance on the Ugandan military force, which has led the regional efforts so far, and lack of alternatives in case the army continues to fail. The Ugandan military, with a questionable human rights record, has been largely ineffective for the last 20 years in destroying LRA. Despite estimates that suggest the LRA is composed of merely 200-400 trained combatants and several hundred abductees, Uganda's authorities lack sophisticated equipment, expert and timely intelligence, and special forces with a rapid deployment capability. While recognizing the role of the local militaries, the strategy fails to come up with alternatives, such as peacekeepers or specially trained forces.

Apart from offering support to the Ugandan army, Obama foresees assistance to regional partners, which likely include the militaries of the DRC, CAR and southern Sudan. All these are either dysfunctional or preoccupied with priorities at home, and none are able to eliminate the LRA. Perhaps seeking a multilateral mandate including involvement of the UN Security Council or the African Union together with the regional armies to accomplish that task would be more successful.

The strategy underlines the necessity of bringing the senior leadership of the LRA to justice. Given their outstanding ICC arrest warrants, external pageKony and his commanders will not negotiatecall_madeor turn themselves in, leaving forceful arrest as the only option. At the same time, child soldiers, usually brainwashed and intimidated, are afraid to go back to communities where they committed horrific crimes, rendering attempts to encourage disarmament and defection among LRA's low-level fighters likely unsuccessful.

Lastly, the strategy lacks details on how disarmament or protection of civilians will be enhanced. While on the one hand this could be interpreted as flexibility of the plan, on the other, it may prove too vague and generalized to provide guidance for a way forward or add much value to what is already known.

The ugly?

A number of activists, despite expressing enthusiasm about the plan, agree that external pagedefeating the rebel groupcall_made is a complex and difficult problem. Introducing stability to the region will likely continue to be challenging. Several attempts to eliminate the LRA and introduce security to northern Uganda have failed over the last two decades.

The US supported a number of ineffective external pagemilitary operationscall_made, which were directed against the LRA in the region of Uganda, DRC and Sudan. During the operation external pageLightning Thundercall_made, which began in December 2008, the US supported the Ugandan and DRC's armed forces with financial aid and intelligence in the unsuccessful effort to eliminate rebel group from the Garamba National Park in DRC. Uganda's president likely hopes that Obama's plan will translate into military support. It is unlikely though, that the US would send its troops to fight in the bush, especially with US forces already operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.

While Obama made it clear that peace in Uganda is in the US' national interest - likely because it would free Ugandan troops to deploy in Somalia to fight the jihadist Shahab - no major success should be expected soon. While acknowledging the threat it poses, it seems that the US administration continues to underestimate the strength of the LRA. Obama's plan outlines priorities, which need to be fulfilled in order to bring stability to the region but any meaningful effort with a potential to make a change would require Congress to allocate additional funding; a true test of political will and commitment. This, however, is unlikely, due to already overstretched budgets.

Obama's plan is a step in the right direction, providing a blueprint for action, but a number of additional steps must be taken before it translates into a significant difference on the ground. The coming months will show whether the plan's implementation is progressing and producing results. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is due to report on the developments made this year by 24 November. If no noteworthy progress is made by then, the action of last resort might be seeking a UNSC resolution, creating a multilateral mandate tasked with the mission of eradicating the LRA once and for all.