Toward an Arab-Style Uprising in Central Asia?

Despite significant differences, some countries in the Middle East and Central Asia share risk factors that make them inherently unstable and prone to social and political turmoil. Authoritarianism, corruption and poverty have long reigned supreme in both regions. High inflation and unemployment levels, especially among the predominantly younger populations, have further heightened social strain and economic deprivation in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Soaring energy and food prices in the wake of the global financial crisis have exacerbated social and economic pressures even more in both regions. The recent food security reports by the UN and World Bank have warned of the negative socio-political consequences for the Middle East and Central Asia unless genuine and effective reforms are introduced in the stagnant economic and political systems of regional countries.

As post-colonial states with artificial borders, both Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries struggle with the challenge of nation-building. They also lack intra- and extra-regional cooperation and are poorly integrated into the global economic system. However, abundant energy resources have enabled some Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries, such as Libya, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, to position themselves as major energy exporters. Some analysts argue that energy export revenues have in turn helped local regimes stay in power, not least by allowing them to keep any possible domestic opposition in check.

Closed political systems in most of these countries have essentially ensured that opposition is either marginalized, as in the Middle East, or is virtually non-existent, as in Central Asia. This partially explains the emergence of Islamist opposition and terrorist groups calling for radical reforms or the wholesale overthrow of regimes that have propped themselves up by a combination of 'sticks and carrots' for decades. The Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in the Middle East and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Central Asia are some examples.

Homegrown protests in Central Asia

Harsh socio-economic and political conditions are the key causes of popular protests and grievances in Central Asia and the Middle East. In the early part of the 21^st century, protests and regime overthrows in Central Asia actually preceded those in the Middle East. In the post-Soviet space, so-called 'color revolutions' have ousted governments in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. The two government downfalls in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010 are especially notable. But these popular protests or uprisings were not the only ones in the region.

Protests in the Uzbek city of Andijan took place in May 2005, two months after the uprising in Kyrgyzstan had swept the country's first President Askar Akaev from power. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, these protests ended as quickly as they started, and with much bloodletting, reducing the likelihood of similar developments in Uzbekistan thereafter. There were also riots in China's Xinjiang province in 2009, where Muslim and Turkic-speaking Uighurs attempted to assert their cultural and religious autonomy. This uprising was met with a considerable military response. The Chinese government thus demonstrated its determination to consolidate the country's rising power and its still shaky territorial integrity.

The Middle East's impact on Central Asia

The events in the Middle East would therefore appear to be an auxiliary rather than a causal factor in case of any popular protests in Central Asia - making a strictly Middle Eastern scenario in the region highly unlikely. This is primarily because of the equally homegrown socio-economic and political conditions in Central Asia that were grounds for the above mentioned regional protests and uprisings. Nevertheless, the features of the protests that have already occurred in both regions offer insights on the possible developments in Central Asia in the future.

For instance, social media played an important role during the protests in the Middle East, where the opposition is arguably more vibrant. Whether such instruments can play a similar role in Central Asia is dubious, given the arguably stronger media censorship in the region. Unlike in Uzbekistan, the military in Egypt did not intervene to save ousted President Hosni Mubarak's crumbling power during the January-February protests. In Kyrgyzstan, the security forces were in many ways crippled during the uprisings and the two government overthrows, while in Libya, the security forces have fought tenaciously during the country's ongoing civil war.

Furthermore, no strong, influential democracies exist in either the Middle East or Central Asia. In Central Asia, moreover, any potential democracy would be surrounded by influential neighbors keen on preventing popular protests, uprisings or regime changes in the region or at home. Opposition groups' varying degrees of isolation in the two regions is yet another factor, as discussed above.

Nevertheless, the Middle East protests can spur the Central Asian regimes to become more oppressive and/or push for some reforms in order to prevent public unrest, especially during the warm season. Spring in Central Asia has been celebrated for centuries with a seasonal holiday called Nooruz. But unlike the "Arab Spring" that for some heralds the beginning of a democratic Middle East, spring in Central Asia for many today is also associated with fears of turmoil in light of previous events in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Some analysts already view the prematurely held presidential elections in Kazakhstan as a move designed to secure the power of the incumbent regime amidst domestic socio-economic pressures and turbulent dynamics unfolding in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and in the Middle East.

The outcome of protests in the Middle East and pro-democratic efforts in Kyrgyzstan will affect the prospects for popular protests and broader democratization in Central Asia and the Middle East. The difficult situations in Libya and Kyrgyzstan are important factors in this regard. The former is torn by the ongoing civil war, while the latter experienced Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes two months after the government ouster last April, and has yet to attain much-needed political and social consolidation.

Therefore, should protests erupt across Central Asia, they would be driven internally - by harsh domestic conditions that have been exacerbated by fallout from the global financial crisis - rather than by external events in the Middle East. Fear of repression will decrease the possibility of protests in Central Asia's most authoritarian states, while anger and hope may yet bring people to the streets in the region's relatively more open countries. The way in which the socio-economic and political situations unfold in Central Asia and the Middle East will show whether the forces of change can prevail over those of stagnation without much bloodshed.