Libya: The Revolution-Intervention Dynamic

 The overthrow of the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya - messy and incomplete though it external pageremainscall_made - represents a striking success for the Arab revolt which began only in December 2010. While the movements in Tunisia and Egypt achieved regime change through peaceful protest, that in external pageLibyacall_made has succeeded through armed rebellion, but this moment - awaited by most older Libyans for the forty-two years of Gaddafi’s rule - still belongs to the same wave (see " external pageThe global democratic revolution: a new stagecall_made", 7 March 2011).

This victory also represents an important shift in world politics. The synergies between anti-authoritarian movements in the non-western world and international (western and United Nations) governmental action - which were evident in theexternal page1990scall_made but disrupted by George W Bush’s external pagedisastrouscall_made regime change in Iraq, which substituted military intervention for local democratic action - have been partially restored by the successful Nato external pageinterventioncall_made in Libya.

These developments are accompanied by two misleading and confused criticisms. First, several observers point out that Nato’s campaign aimed not only at civilian protection (the manifest external pageUN mandatecall_made) but also at regime change - though this must be set against the reality that the civilian population had arisen precisely to achieve the latter, and that the threat of violence against them arose from that fact.

Second, it is further argued that there has been an “imperial hijacking” of the Libyan movement, which would never have succeeded without western bombing. The latter point is evidently correct; but more relevant is that the movement was inspired by the courageous external pageactionscall_madeof everyday Libyans, many of whom (unlike Nato’s leaders and airmen) have given their lives.

Until they began to external pageprotestcall_made in February 2011 - peacefully at first, and in Tripoli even before Benghazi - western governments (Britain and France prominently among them) were all too happy to sell arms, riot-control gear and anything else to the Libyan dictator (see Fred Halliday, " external pageLibya's regime at 40: a state of kleptocracycall_made", 8 September 2009).

Politics amid contradiction

These interpretations ignore the fact that international politics is often contradictory, a reality that revolutions tend to heighten. Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron may be unprincipled politicians, interested mainly in votes andexternal pagetradecall_made, but they nevertheless external pageplayedcall_made a progressive role in Libya: first in preventing the crushing of the revolt, and then in ensuring its success. The significance of their stand is not undermined even by, for example, their use of anti-immigrant politics (in Sarkozy's case, scaremongering together with external pageSilvio Berlusconicall_made about the new migrants the Libya revolt was external pageunleashingcall_made into the European Union); though the more discreet United States involvement was actually the most decisive international contribution.

The fact that some of the mix of external pageelementscall_made in the Libyan movement itself are less than attractive is part of this same messy reality. In a society where (unlikeexternal pageEgyptcall_made and external pageTunisiacall_made) no independent organisation was allowed, some ex-regime figures have partially dominated the movement (rather like inexternal pageRomaniacall_made after the fall of the external pageNicolae Ceausescucall_made regime in 1989). In the initially unequal military struggle, the rebels had to accept the aid of defecting Gaddafi commanders, which produced (inter alia) a conflict between the movement in Misrata and the National Transitional Council [external pageNTCcall_made]). Amidst exaggerated suspicions of the role of mercenaries in Gaddafi’s repression, external pageanti-blackcall_made racism has surfaced.

In addition, the civil war has clearly produced enormous human costs (as have several of the external pagewarscall_made of the last decade). The NTC estimates of 50,000 deaths may prove exaggerated - as many initial estimates tend to do - but large numbers of people have external pagediedcall_made in the fighting, as TV reports on the overflowing morgues of Tripoli have illustrated. The numbers of wounded and psychologically harmed will be even greater. In this sense the price paid by Libyan society is many times in excess of their co-revolutionaries elsewhere: the death-toll in Syria, which after months of violent repression has been external pageestimatedcall_made (in late August) at a little over 2,200, is an example.

The armed character of the Libyan external pagemovementcall_made is undoubtedly very significant for the future. There is proper attention on atrocities committed by rebel fighters, although the regime appears to be responsible for the worst such actions (including a reported external pagemassacrecall_made of over 100 men in Tripoli). As the rebels move to the exercise of state power, their conduct towards Sirte and other Gaddafiexternal pageoutpostscall_made will be a crucial indicator of their respect for the external pagelaws of warcall_made, and more generally of their ability to produce a viable settlement in Libyan society.

It must be of concern that the struggle has given to young men with weapons such an important role, and this will pose significant external pagechallengescall_made to the new Libyan government and to society. In the worst case, continuing challenges from Gaddafi-linked tribes or external pagedivisionscall_made among the rebels could produce ongoing civil war. However I remain unconvinced (as I argued in April) by easy comparisons with Afghanistan and Iraq (see " external pageLibya: popular revolt, military interventioncall_made", 7 April 2011). The high level of urbanisation of Libyan society and the degree of popular unity in supporting the overthrow of Gaddafi make this a significantly different situation.

The war’s accounting

There remain two crucial questions about the international significance of the Libyan outcome. The first concerns the kind of boost it will give to the emancipatory external pagemovementcall_made across the Arab world. Now that a band of three countries in north Africa has been liberated from dictatorship, the military-backedexternal pageAlgeriancall_made regime will be feeling nervous and even the “reformed” Moroccan external pagemonarchycall_made may wonder if it has gone far enough to stave off revolt. The fall of Gaddafi has already been welcomed by those external pagestrugglingcall_made peacefully against the Syrian dictatorship, and has emboldened those in the United States and Europe looking for (non-military) means of helping the protesters.

The second concerns the implications for international politics. Much has been written about the revival of “humanitarian intervention” in a new guise. In reality, Nato’s Libyan campaign is not so different from theexternal pageKosovocall_made campaign of external pageMarch-June 1999call_made; the main difference is that in Libya the alliance between Nato and the rebels has been more open.

Whether external pageLibyacall_made creates a new template depends partially on whether this Nato campaign, formally prosecuted in the cause of civilian protection, has actually produced a lower rate of civilian external pagecasualtiescall_made from aerial bombing than others. There have been no reports of Libyan wedding-parties being strafed with the regularity of those in external pageAfghanistancall_made, which may turn out to be significant. The credibly reported incidents of civilian deaths (including one in Zlitan where (according to the Gaddafi regime) eighty-five civilians died) have been relatively few; but as external pagePaul Rogerscall_made points out, Nato refuses to account for the casualties it has caused (see "external pageThe casualties of war: Libya and beyondcall_made", 7 July 2011). In any event, there will be an external pageaccountingcall_made - if not from Nato itself, then from independent NGOs or scholars.

I have argued that western bombing campaigns systematically external pagetransfer riskscall_made from aircrew to the civilians they are supposed to protect (see external pageAfghanistan and Iraq: western wars, genocidal riskscall_made", 24 July 2009). How far did this happen in Libya? It will be interesting to see if surveillance from UN Security Council members, concerned that Nato was overstepping its mandate, actually made a difference. In some other cases (bombing in Afghanistan, external pagedrone-warfarecall_made in Pakistan and elsewhere), it does seem that relative western indifference to civilian casualties is one of the causes of death. A serious lower civilian death-rate from the Libyan bombing may again raise the spectre of ultra-precise, “humane” intervention. But it will also raise awkward questions about the conduct of operations elsewhere.

For the moment, Nato’s success gives a boost to western governments, which have little else to celebrate as their economies stall. And it puts governments like the Russian and Chinese, which permitted the Libyan venture with some external pagereluctancecall_made, on the defensive. But Libya’s transformation may give new life to the Arab external pageupheavalscall_made, such as in Syria. There will then be more shocks on the way, and none of the world’s governments can be confident of its future in a world in which the people are once external pageagaincall_made on the march.