China Prepares for Future South African Government

South African national oil company PetroSA announced May 21 that it would partner with China Petroleum & Chemical Corp. (Sinopec) to build a crude oil refining complex in the impoverished Eastern Cape province, the traditional heartland of South Africa's ethnic Xhosa. Known as the Coega facility, the refinery could produce up to 400,000 barrels of oil per day. The two sides have yet to finalize an agreement, but at a cost of roughly $10 billion dollars, the project likely would have foundered without Chinese backing.

South Africa's first two post-apartheid presidents, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, were ethnic Xhosa, and while current President Jacob Zuma is from the Zulu ethnic group, the Xhosa are once again considered an ascendant political force. In fact, the Xhosa are positioning themselves to succeed Zuma's Zulu-dominated administration when the president's term expires in the coming years. Greatly interested in South Africa's natural resource industry, China has been ingratiating itself with the Xhosa -- as the Coega project illustrates. With the refinery, China is hoping to curry favor with the Xhosa and safeguard its interests in case the ethnic group eventually reclaims the presidency.

Analysis

The Xhosa rival the Zulu for size and influence in South Africa, and the two collectively dominate South African politics. Xhosa votes are highly coveted for the country's next generation of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) leadership. Indeed, several ANC officials recently have been courting the Xhosa ahead of the party leadership elections in December. In January, Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe visited Eastern Cape province and made promises to reform education. Then in April, Public Enterprises Minister Malusi Gigaba, a rising Zulu ANC official and former president of the ANC Youth League who frequently is sent to promote or defend the Zuma administration, visited the province to promote foreign investment and to support the Coega project. As recently as May 14, presidential hopeful and Human Settlements Minister Tokyo Sexwale appealed to the Xhosa by making promises of housing reform.

Despite this outreach by his rivals, Zuma remains in line to win a second five-year term as ANC president in the December elections. That position will make him the ANC's presidential candidate for a second five-year term in the April 2014 election. Zuma has enough support, momentum and political savvy to win both elections. Moreover, support for his two main rivals, Sexwale and Motlanthe, is split between a shared ethnic group, the Northern Sotho.

With his probable re-election, Zuma will remain president until his term ends in 2019. (There is no official term limit on the ANC presidency, but recent trends show that a South African ANC president sits only two terms, so Zuma's term at that post likely will expire in 2017.) Reaching out to the Xhosa is thus a long-term strategy for ANC presidential aspirants. Sexwale and Motlanthe cannot win the presidency simply by securing the Northern Sotho vote; they must reach out to other constituencies. Winning the Xhosa vote would compensate for their otherwise diminutive core of support. For its part, the Xhosa will meanwhile focus on consolidating their power for a return to the ANC presidency in 2017 and the national presidency after 2019. Currently there is no singular Xhosa leader, but the group has several years to put forth a viable presidential candidate.

China's Entrance

Until recently, internal ANC rivals have maneuvered in preparation for an eventual leadership transition. With the Coega project, the Chinese, who have cultivated close relations with the ANC and its various constituent groups, likewise appear to have begun preparations for an eventual Xhosa transition.

The construction of the oil refinery carries an obvious benefit for the Xhosa: It will enhance their oil-production capability and generate well-paying jobs and a local tax base in their impoverished community. But the benefit to China is twofold. Endearing itself to the Xhosa this far in advance will give Beijing ample opportunity to appeal to and help shape the interests and activities of the Xhosa elite. Moreover, China will profit financially from refined crude oil sales in the southern African market -- all while leveraging its investments to underwrite Xhosa interests. Favor with any government in Pretoria will give China continued access to South Africa's natural resources.

With the Coega project, China may earn the favor of the Xhosa elite, co-opting many South Africans who are already starting to mobilize and reach out to the Xhosa for the next term. No side is actively trying to undermine the Zuma administration; rather, they are being mindful of what comes after 2017 and 2019.

For additional reading on this topic please see:

From BRIC to BRICS: Developments in the Cooperation of Emerging Economies
Africa's Business and Development Relationship with China
Sources of State Legitimacy in Contemporary South Africa