What Are Our Alternative Nuclear Futures?

If you had to specify three alternative nuclear futures (best case, worst case, and one between the two poles), what would each scenario look like?

In the best case scenario, the United States and Russia would conclude their next disarmament accord soon - let’s say within the 2014 timeframe. Both sides would reduce their deployed nuclear arsenals to not more than 1000 warheads each. Washington and Moscow would then invite additional nuclear powers such as China, France and the United Kingdom as well as India and Pakistan to nuclear reduction talks. At the same time, Israel (whose nuclear arsenal is still undeclared) would engage in a special forum with the aim of establishing a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. These significant nuclear reductions would convince non-nuclear states and aspiring nuclear powers to accept more intrusive inspections to make sure that their civilian nuclear programs would not be misused for military purposes. Moreover, dual-use technologies such as uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing would be internationalized. Eventually, all nuclear weapons would be abandoned and initiatives aimed at preventing future re-armament will be developed and implemented.

In the worst case scenario, no further nuclear reductions would take place. India and Pakistan would engage in a nuclear arms race that might run out of control. China would also continue to increase and modernize its nuclear arsenal. Iran would test a nuclear device. This would prompt Saudi-Arabia to ask Pakistan to deploy some of its nuclear arsenal on Saudi territory in order to deter Iran. Egypt and Turkey would also engage in nuclear weapons programs. The nuclear non-proliferation regime would eventually collapse, with the likes of Brazil (and maybe South Africa) arguing that it needs nuclear weapons for prestige purposes. Japan would no longer rely upon the United States’ guarantees of security and develop its own nuclear weapons, as would South Korea and Taiwan. The danger of miscalculation would increase and nuclear war would become much more likely.

The most likely scenario for the years to come is likely to consist of: continuing dialogue between the United States and Russia without early results; on-going discussions regarding the nature of the Iranian nuclear program; and a nuclear non-proliferation regime that would not be significantly enhanced.

What factors will be crucial in determining which of these possible futures will become reality?

As far as the US and Russia are concerned, they need to reach a compromise over missile defense. Only then would they be in a position to agree to make further reductions to their stockpile of nuclear weapons. Such reductions would be a necessary pre-condition to convince other states that nuclear weapons are not hard currency in terms of defense and foreign policy. And without such disarmament steps by the two leading protagonists of the Cold War, other nuclear powers with much smaller arsenals such as France, the UK or China - let alone Pakistan or India - would not be willing to participate in reduction talks. Regarding the danger of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, it is essential that Iran is prevented from ‘going nuclear’. Only then would it become possible to engage Israel in a political process in which the country would bring its nuclear capabilities to the negotiation table. Moreover, Israel will only be willing to discuss its nuclear program after all regional conflicts have been resolved.

Is the current non-proliferation regime robust enough to make the best case scenario more likely than the other ones – what are its strengths and weaknesses?

The current non-proliferation regime is strong to the extent that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that entered into force in 1970 includes almost all states. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards nuclear installations for peaceful purposes so that transparency is guaranteed. However, the safeguards introduced in the 1970s suffer from a number of weaknesses. In particular, they concentrate on accounting for fissile material and do not cover all aspects of any given nuclear program. For instance, it was possible for Saddam Hussein throughout the 1980s to develop a clandestine nuclear weapons program at non-declared nuclear sites, while IAEA inspectors visited declared sites in Iraq that were not relevant to the military program.

The IAEA eventually learned its lessons and by the 1990s had enhanced the effectiveness of the safeguards agreement. The model additional protocol provides for more detailed declaration formats that include all aspects of a nuclear program such as research and development, and provides for more intrusive inspections including the right for inspectors to conduct environmental sampling at any place of their choice in an inspected country. This procedure is important to make sure that hidden uranium enrichment facilities do not go unnoticed. Today, about half of the NPT members have agreed upon the additional protocol on a voluntary basis. Those members that abstain have a small to non-existent nuclear infrastructure. Others, like Iran, possibly have something to hide or, in the case of Brazil, argue that they would be willing to implement more intrusive verification procedures only if nuclear weapons states agree on more substantial disarmament steps.

Uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing facilities represent the Achilles heel of the NPT. These technologies are permitted under the NPT and can be part of a legitimate complete fuel cycle for civilian purposes. At the same time, these technologies can easily be misused for weapons programs. Uranium enrichment is a classic dual-use technology. It can either be used to produce low-enriched uranium (3-5%) for light-water reactors, or it can be used to produce highly enriched uranium to build a nuclear bomb. The same is true for reprocessing. This technology can be used to not only reprocess nuclear waste for use in civilian reactors but also to separate bomb-grade plutonium. Today, only a few countries possess uranium enrichment or reprocessing technologies. Most of them are at the same time nuclear weapons countries. Those countries that have access to enrichment but are non-nuclear weapons states include Germany and the Netherlands. They are part of the trilateral URENCO consortium together with the UK. Currently Japan, Iran and Brazil are the only non-nuclear weapons states running enrichment programs under national control.

The IAEA has been discussing the reform of the nuclear cycle for many years and a number of proposals have been brought to the table. The main idea is to guarantee that all countries that run a civilian nuclear program have access to nuclear fuel for their light-water reactors so that they do not feel the need to install their own uranium enrichment facilities.

Some countries that plan to build light water reactors for the first time, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have agreed to renounce uranium enrichment. The UAE relies upon those countries that possess uranium enrichment facilities to deliver fuel for use in their reactors. However, there are other states that are not willing to renounce enrichment even if they do not have current plans to build such facilities. This group of states, that includes countries such as Turkey and Vietnam, wants to keep all options open and not become dependent upon uranium delivered by industrial powers.

The basic cleavage amongst NPT members today is that Western countries want to enhance verification, while many non-Western states ask for more nuclear disarmament first. Moreover, those countries are frustrated because nuclear weapons states exist outside of the NPT, such as India, Pakistan and Israel. (North Korea is a special case, as it has withdrawn from the NPT – a decision that was not recognized by all NPT members). The last NPT Review Conference in 2010 could only agree upon a final document because another conference was set to take place in 2012 on the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. Whether this conference will take place and what final outcomes may be reached remains an open question. If the organizers of this event fail to attract all Middle Eastern states to the conference, the next NPT Review Conference to be held in 2015 is doomed to fail.

What can be done to strengthen the current non-proliferation regime and help the international community to succeed in managing nuclear risks in the future?

I believe that US President Barack Obama’s ‘global zero’ initiative could be helpful. The main advantage of this initiative is that the United States accepts that there is a relationship between nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of the nuclear-non-proliferation regime. However, I would clearly not go so far as to argue that Iran or North Korea would be willing to abandon their nuclear weapons programs once the US, Russia and others have made further reductions to their nuclear arsenals. Next, the US needs to come to grips with Russia on missile defense and enact further missile reductions. Finally, the Iranian nuclear issue needs to be resolved through diplomacy. Only against the backdrop of such positive developments would it become possible to enhance verification and internationalize the nuclear fuel cycle. And who knows, maybe at some point in the future global zero may become reality, although, as President Obama asserted, “Perhaps not in my lifetime”.