(Part 3)

Making the new sanctions monitoring arrangements work

Building an effective international monitoring mechanism could not be accomplished overnight. Yet arrangements were made quickly to send survey teams out to each of the frontline states. These assessment teams were composed of knowledge- able border control, customs and foreign office (or, in the case of the United States, State Department) officials drawn principally from the United States and Great Britain, but also including members from Germany, Austria and Italy. They were asked to determine the personnel and resources that would be needed to staff an effective local monitoring system. They also identified many of the major sanctions-busting routes that needed to be plugged.

A special meeting was convened at the CSCE (OSCE) headquarters in Vienna on September 28, 1992, to collate the findings of the assessment missions and determine an initial monitoring deployment plan. The first countries identified for such missions were Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania and Hungary, and a recruitment call to staff the missions with seasoned customs and border control officers was put out to all OSCE members.

Despite the limited availability of trained personnel and needed resources, it was agreed that SAM teams should be deployed immediately while further recruitment was proceeding. Lead countries were also selected for each frontline state and were given responsibility to gather the necessary resources and recruits to man the missions. Germany took the lead in Bulgaria, Canada in Macedonia, Italy in Albania, the United Kingdom in Hungary, and the United States in Romania. The first teams arrived in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in October 1992, and by January 1993, SAM teams were up and running in all the frontline states. These were small teams, ranging in size from five to 15 members. These numbers fell considerably short of the numbers needed to monitor the major border crossings effectively. Therefore, the teams initially used roving patrol tactics visiting border crossings on a staggered basis, but as frequently as possible.

While the SAM teams had no direct authority to enforce the sanctions measures, they were able to report suspected sanctions violations directly to SAMCOM in Brussels via a secure voice and facsimile communications system. They were also able to advise local customs officers concerning potential violations, for example, which cargoes should be stopped for inspection. The local customs officers were fully aware that laxness on their part might well be reported back to their own headquarter superiors.

While the overall effectiveness of these initial SAM operations was seriously constrained by their small size and lack of resources, they were, nevertheless, able to demonstrate the value of the approach. As of January 28, 1993, some 772 suspected sanctions violations had been reported to SAMCOM and 1173 requests had been forwarded by SAMCOM to suspected origin countries for investigation.

The reports generated by these initial SAM teams underscored and clarified the need for further action to curtail ongoing trade with Serbia, including the flow of oil, gas and other petroleum products vital to Serbia’s industry and economic activity. Their reports provided the evidence needed to seek a new Security Council resolution to deal with this problem. They indicated that Serbia was taking full advantage of the resolution’s transit provisions to channel its own exports and imports to and from Bulgaria and Macedonia via road and rail, or via ships in and out of the ports of Bar and Kotor. Commodities, including oil, were also being brought in by ships and tankers, by barge traffic up the Danube, and by rail and tanker truck from Bulgaria or across Macedonia from the port of Thessalonica, Greece.

U.N. Security Council resolution 787: increasing the pressure

It was clear that a new U.N. Security Council resolution would be needed to close these major loopholes. It was also clear that much more was necessary to enhance the SAMs and related sanctions cutoff activities.

Based on the information provided by the SAMs, the Security Council adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 787 on November 16, 1992.

The resolution imposed new restrictions on cargo transiting Serbia and Montenegro, requiring that commodities such as iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber tires, vehicles, aircraft and motors, coal, oil, gas and petroleum products could only be transshipped through Serbia and Montenegro with the specific authorization of the U.N. sanctions committee. Such approval would only be granted on a case-by-case basis, and a special sanctions committee license would have to accompany the shipment.

The resolution also authorized: “States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary … to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargo and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the [sanctions].”external page⁶call_made Similar authority was also given to Danube riparian states to halt, inspect and detain suspect barge traffic.$

Recalling that Resolution 757 had previously directed that no dealings be permitted with FRY flagged vessels, the new resolution further clarified that “any vessel in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or under- taking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be considered … a vessel of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia … regardless of the flag under which the vessel sails.”

Serbia now began to find itself increasingly cut off from European and other markets and from the financial and technical assistance upon which it previously heavily depended. Serbian companies also found it increasingly difficult to make deals with overseas companies or to enter into financial transactions. Serbia’s access to spare parts and raw materials was also more restricted. By December 1992, despite the continuing flaws in the sanctions, the Serbian economy was beginning to feel the pinch.

The perspective in Washington

On his return from the London Conference, Eagleburger established a special team of senior State Department officials under the direction of Ambassador Warren Zimmerman to monitor the Yugoslav situation and determine steps to deal with Serbia and with the growing catastrophe in Bosnia.

I was put in charge of monitoring and reporting to the group on sanctions related developments, and on the progress U.S. agencies were making in recruiting and stationing the sanctions assistance missions overseas. While these missions were not yet effective in stemming the flow of goods in and out of Serbia, they provided critical information on the problems faced and what steps remained necessary. A series of options were developed to deal with these issues. Nonetheless, the fall presidential elections and pending change of administration after the election of Bill Clinton in November 1992 put many of these new initiatives on hold.

President Clinton had raised Bosnia during his campaign and was committed to taking a number of new initiatives to deal with the crisis in his new administration. Incoming Secretary of State Warren Christopher presented the new administration’s six-step strategy in a speech delivered on February 10, 1993. Among other things, it called for new “actions to tighten the enforcement of economic sanctions, increase political pressure on Serbia, and deter Serbia from widening the war.”external page⁷call_made

The president called on Vice President Al Gore’s senior national security advisor, Leon Fuerth, to take charge of the sanctions and to turn them into an effective tool in dealing with Serbia. I was summoned to Fuerth’s office to discuss possible next steps for reaching this objective.

Establishment of the Serbia sanctions task force

After my meeting with Fuerth, I was assigned to prepare a paper detailing the steps necessary to put in place a stringent and effective series of sanctions measures against Serbia. The paper reviewed Serbia’s salient economic pressure points and vulnerabilities. It included a review of Serbia’s industrial and resource base, and its external trade activities and trading partners. It also recommended that we concentrate on identifying Milosevic’s principal support pillars and specially target their economic activities and overseas accounts. Fuerth accepted the paper and approach, and decided to establish an interagency task force to support these activities. He asked the secretary of state to set it up under State Department auspices and recommended me as its director.

The task force was formally established in the State Department’s operations center on February 12, 1992, and began operations immediately. Its staff included officers assigned from interested bureaus in the State Department (European and Eurasian Affairs, Political-Military Affairs, Economic and Business Affairs, International Organizations, and Intelligence and Research) and other departments and agencies including the Department of Defense, the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department, Customs and Border Protection, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. Their duties included providing real time agency/ bureau input to the work of the task force as well as liaison back to their agency or bureau to assure they were also fully informed concerning task force’s activities relevant to them. Officers were also brought in from additional agencies to handle specific issues, as necessary.

While the task force was based in the State Department, I reported directly to Fuerth. I was also empowered, under Fuerth’s authority, to bypass interbureau/interagency clearances for messages to the field, including instructions that dealt directly with sanctions-compliance issues. Fuerth and I met on a daily basis (either in his office or via secure teleconference) to discuss sanctions-related matters. We also received daily intelligence briefings, either together or separately. As expected, this format generated considerable interagency frictions. The more serious problems were kicked up to White House meetings of the deputies or principals. But Fuerth almost always got his way.

Fuerth and I worked out a two-track strategy to increase pressure on the Milosevic regime:

1. Channeling U.S. resources and influence to tighten the application and enforcement of the existing sanctions.

2. Identifying more stringent sanctions measures that could be applied through a new U.N. Security Council resolution, if and when it appeared likely that such a resolution could be adopted.

We recognized that Serbia and the Milosevic regime had to remain the main focus of our sanctions efforts since that was the principal moving force behind the Bosnian Serbs. In any event, sanctions focused against the Bosnian Serbs would have had relatively little impact given the conditions already prevailing within Bosnia. At one point in 1994, Milosevic sought to obtain sanctions relief by ostensibly imposing his own sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs. Those sanctions quickly proved to be nothing more than a façade, although they did earn Milosevic a few thousand barrels of oil, ostensibly for “humanitarian purposes.”

Our agreed strategy also recognized that our main task was to target the most severe application of the sanctions against those industries and sectors that represented the real support pillars of the Milosevic regime. We needed to threaten Milosevic’s own hold on power if we were going to truly influence him to bring his pressure to bear on the Bosnian Serb leadership.

Our efforts to increase the effectiveness of the existing sanctions focused on six specific objectives:

1. Expand of the sanctions assistance missions and increased technical assistance to the front- line states to improve border controls.

2. Cut off Serbia’s access to oil, gas and other industry essential commodities.

3. Hit Milosevic’s support mechanism in their own pocketbook by tightening implementation of the financial sanctions.

4. Deter violations through increased penalties, investigations and prosecutions.

5. Interdict all maritime traffic to and from the ports of Kotor and Bar.

6. Halt the movement of all maritime vessels thought to be flagged, owned or controlled by FRY entities.

The U.S./European Community/CSCE sanctions liaison group met at our behest in Vienna on March 5, 1993, and again on April 2, to approve a number of our proposals for enhancing sanctions enforcement.

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