Spacepower in Warfare

(Continued from Part 2)

The purpose of security spacepower is to provide capabilities to assist in achieving political and military objectives. It is an independent form of power that can be used alone or in concert with other forms of power to achieve desired ends. Space is a place where humans live and place uninhabited systems that help resolve problems. It begins above the Earth's surface at the lowest altitude where a satellite can sustain a circular orbit, albeit briefly, at approximately 93 miles and extends outward to infinity—excluding heavenly bodies.(36) Eventually, humanity will extend its interests fully across cislunar space and beyond, especially for economic development. Security spacepower will protect those interests, just as navies protect passage and commerce on the seas. Someday in the future, populations and their political entities will likely migrate into space as well. For now, however, humans live on the surface of the Earth, and contemporary spacepower in this context refers to the struggles occurring there, but this will evolve over time to include the cislunar region and the Moon.

The reason for going to near-Earth space for security purposes is to gain access to regions of the Earth where terrestrial forces either cannot go or cannot loiter as economically as some satellites. A relatively small number of similar satellites spread out in orbital space can survey the entire Earth's surface, which gives space-based constellations the ability to perform missions on a global scale. States perform many missions in space. In the opening years of the 21st century, these missions are primarily informational—that is, providing command, control, communications, and computer (C4) support; positioning, navigation, and timing; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and weather support to terrestrial forces, among others. Air, land, and sea forces also perform missions like these, but only space systems (and some terrestrial cyber networks) perform them continuously on a global scale. These space networks create a global infrastructure that links together expeditionary forces deployed anywhere in the world and connects these forces with each other in all media, and with their leadership.

When War Prevention Fails

Five terms are presented below that may seem familiar to anyone who has read US Air Force doctrine regarding space: space control, space support, space denial, space logistics, and space attack. However, these terms are used differently here, because the driving concepts are pulled apart and analyzed more closely to reveal greater nuances that have much further-reaching strategic implications than the relatively simple and coarse definitions offered in current doctrine.

Space control.The primary mission of space forces at all times is assuring relative space control, which means securing the space medium to provide freedom of access to space and freedom of action in space for all lawful and nonhostile spacefaring activities.Space control is that which provides security when freedom of access or action in space is contested.

Space control is not only for military purposes. It allows civil, commercial, and other space activities to continue uninterrupted around the globe. It provides the benign environment that is a necessary precondition for most spacefaring activities. The importance of ensuring uninterrupted space commerce cannot be overstated. All states are increasingly reliant on space systems for all matters critical to their economic well being.

Space control efforts must minimize disruptions to the flow of the global economy. During war, every effort should be made to limit the effects only to the belligerents. This minimizes the risk of a war expanding by drawing in other states seeking to protect their interests by force. Space control also requires preventing the creation of space debris, which becomes a hazard to spacefaring activities and denies freedom of action in space to all actors in the vicinity of debris fields. Such is the negative aim.

Achieving the negative aim of space control requires passively or actively defending space systems under attack. This may require attacks to suppress or destroy the adversary's offensive space weapons, which may be based in the air, on land, at sea, or in space. It may be necessary to drive a hostile foe all the way to offensive culmination in space to arrive at the security required to assure free passage of commerce and other activities. The policy, strategy, and situation will dictate the degree of offensive space control that is used. Factors to consider will be the time and place where space control must be gained, how rapidly it is needed, what parts of the adversary space system(s) are vulnerable, the possibility of collateral damage, how long space control must be sustained, and the desired level of negation (for example, destruction, degradation, denial, disruption, deception). Space control does not need to be total in order to be effective. In fact, attempting to exact total space control over an adversary, to include dominating all decisive points and the equatorial chokepoint, would be counterproductive as preparations to do so would drain the budget and be highly wasteful.(37)

Space control also has a positive aim, which is to sustain the requisite degree of freedom of action to enable friendly space forces to continue or expand the missions of space support to friendly forces, space denial of adversary space capabilities (if required), and space logistics to sustain friendly operations on orbit, and it someday may include the mission of space attack of striking adversary targets from space. Each of these missions will have a priority dictated by the policy and strategy they support.

Space situational awareness is a most vital component of space control. Freedom of access to space and freedom of action in space require timely and reliable information about what is actually happening on orbit. It includes what could be called space traffic management and debris avoidance, in addition to characterization of threats and anomaly detection and attribution, as well as attack assessment. The ability to accurately characterize what is happening in space becomes more critical as the world becomes more space reliant, as the number and frequency of spacefaring activities increase, and as space weapons proliferate.

Competition for space control is not limited to warfare. Such competition also occurs during peacetime negotiations for treaties, laws, and rules of the road that in any way curtail the freedom of access to space or freedom of action in space. This is why some countries, such as the United States, are very cautious about entering into such negotiations. The long-term implications of various forms of agreements are difficult to anticipate. There is little doubt, however, that additional treaties, laws, and rules of the road are warranted to codify the appropriate and inappropriate behaviors of spacefaring actors. This will soon be critical to accommodate the rapidly increasing number of satellites on orbit, space tourism, space hotels, and lunar and asteroid resource development.

Space support. This includes all of the space force enhancements and information services that modern militaries have become accustomed to. The negative aim of space support includes providing all of the space services associated with the surveillance strike complex, which includes all those space sensors, communications links, and other space capabilities that allow terrestrial forces to defend friendly interests. It encompasses such things as warnings, tip-offs, indications, cueing, and assessments of attack by air, land, sea, or space forces. It includes all of those space systems used in any way to integrate passive and active defensive measures. An example is the missile warning network, which detects missile launches by satellite, routes the data into the fire control system of missile defense batteries, and sends it to commanders via communications satellites.

The positive aim of space support includes providing all the space services associated with the reconnaissance strike complex. The reconnaissance strike complex encompasses all those space sensors, communications links, and other space capabilities that allow terrestrial forces to attack the enemy. It includes the entire space-enabled ability to find, fix, track, target, engage, negate, and assess enemy targets. An example is a reconnaissance satellite finding an enemy tank, routing this data to a strike aircraft via communications satellite, and guiding the aircraft's munition to target via the global positioning system, while observing battle damage indications and other assessments from space.

The surveillance and reconnaissance strike complexes of most actors have many space-related elements in common. The global positioning system, for example, provides data that is typically critical to both complexes. Of particular note is the blending of commercial assets, such as communications satellite services, into the strike complexes of states and nonstate actors. Commercial space systems used by the enemy to advance its war effort, including the satellites on orbit, are valid military targets. Their likelihood of being attacked is directly related to the intensity of the war aims of the belligerents and their ability to strike the relevant commercial systems.

Here a moral dilemma arises. Is it better to attack a ground station with a high probability of killing human beings, or is it better to attack a satellite with no possibility of human death? No answer can be given here, for the answer is entirely dependent on the policy and strategy, both formed in the unique context of the situation.

Space denial. Denial of adversary space forces is as important as space control. Its essence is the use of space weapons to negate adversary space systems. Its negative aim is to defend friendly interests by negating the enemy's space systems associated with their reconnaissance strike complex, thereby increasing the fog and friction inherent to the enemy's offensive efforts to hasten its offensive culmination.

Space denial can be used for two positive aims. The first includes space denial attacks against adversary space systems associated with their surveillance strike complex to facilitate other attacks against them and to hasten their defensive culmination.

The second positive aim of space denial has received little attention. It involves negating adversary space systems simply to raise their costs in the war effort, in an attempt to coerce them into accepting terms. This can be done as part of an overall punishment strategy or risk strategy of imposing costs on the enemy with the promise of imposing even greater costs in the future.An interesting twist to this strategy might be limiting strikes only to satellites in orbit. Nobody dies, but there are tangible costs imposed. It might be possible to coerce a state that is heavily reliant on space services into accepting modest terms by negating only their satellites in orbit. Such prospects heighten the need for effective space defenses for highly reliant states. States that do not find themselves as dependent on space have far less of a need for space defenses and may become concerned when others merely discuss defensive systems, since the line between offense and defense is so easily blurred.

It is important to remember that an adversary's satellites are global assets. It may be politically untenable for a number of reasons to permanently damage an adversary's satellite. For example, while an imagery satellite may threaten to disclose friendly troop movements in one region, that same satellite might perform treaty verification on the opposite side of the globe or other missions that there is a friendly interest in preserving. In many scenarios, space denial might best be limited to very localized and temporary effects.

The best way to deny an adversary access to space is to destroy their space launch facilities, but we must also be aware that the adversary may contract their spacelift with other countries where they may have satellites in storage. The best way to deny space support to an adversary is to directly negate the satellites they use. While some satellite systems may be particularly susceptible to the destruction of their ground stations, this may have only limited effect on other satellite systems that may degrade gracefully in the absence of ground control. It is also likely that an adversary will employ mobile ground stations for tactically important space systems that require frequent ground contact. This not only makes targeting ground stations more difficult, but it also highlights the need to negate an adversary's satellites on orbit. It is also possible to attack the users of space support by jamming their receivers through a variety of techniques. This has the benefit of localized and temporary effects. In many scenarios, it is likely that a combination of attacks on all three segments of a space system (ground stations, satellites on orbit, and user equipment), as well as their linkages, will be required to achieve the desired effect.

Space control and space denial efforts will be complicated if an adversary is using third-party launch facilities, satellites, or ground control systems provided by commercial vendors, international consortia, or an ally. Diplomatic efforts will likely be required to eliminate third-party support to adversaries, but if the political will exists, friendly forces must be ready to expand the conflict by striking wherever adversaries receive space support. If diplomatic efforts fail and policy does not allow expansion of the conflict to strike third-party targets, then the adversary has a sanctuary they will likely exploit.

Space logistics. Space logistics are those activities to sustain satellites and their capabilities on orbit. It includes launching satellites to orbit, on-orbit check-out, maintenance, refueling, repair, and the like. With regard to wartime space logistics, it is imperative for spacefaring states to repair or replace lost satellite capabilities on orbit. The goal is to rapidly restore capabilities before they affect political, economic, and combat operations. Activating on-orbit spares, leasing commercial satellite services, launching new satellites to replace those lost through attrition, or gaining access to an ally's satellite services may do this. It is also essential to repair or replace lost satellite ground control systems. Methods for doing this may include transferring ground control responsibility to another location (fixed or mobile), leasing commercial support, or obtaining ground support from an allied state.

A word of caution is warranted regarding the launch of new satellites to replace those lost to enemy attack. Unless there is complete certainty that the adversary is offensively culminated and all adversary space weapons have been accounted for and successfully negated, launching a satellite of the same design into the same orbit will be like throwing skeet in front of a shooter. In practice, there is no way to be absolutely certain that the threat is completely removed.

Space attack. It is possible that someone will put weapons on orbit that can attack terrestrial targets. Space attack could have a negative aim of striking an adversary's advancing forces or offensive systems as a matter of defending friendly interests and hastening the enemy's offensive culmination. Space attack could also have two positive aims. The first could be striking adversary forces or their defensive systems to expedite their defensive culmination. The next could be attacking their centers of gravity directly as part of the war-winning effort.

There are many good reasons for not putting weapons in space for the purpose of space attack. Among them are the enormous expenses of putting them in space and their vulnerability once there if they are left undefended. But there is a paradoxical logic to warfare that increases the likelihood of someone actually doing it: Because there are many good reasons not to put weapons in space, putting weapons in space makes little sense; no one is expecting weapons in space; therefore, an actor achieves the element of surprise by putting weapons in space!

Situational awareness has always been critical in diplomacy and warfare, but in the new era of precision targeting, situational awareness must be equally precise—a bomb is only as accurate as the coordinates used by the planner, the warfighter, and the munition itself. Precision targeting is well understood, but the need for precision surveillance and reconnaissance is not.

Multitudes of ISR sensors in all media characterize the modern battlespace. Some collect signals intelligence, while others collect photoreconnaissance data. Still others collect radar information. These sensors and their operators not only attempt to identify targets, but also try to determine each target's precise coordinates. The ability of different sensors to determine the precise coordinates of targets varies, but in general, terrestrial sensors are much better at this than space-based sensors for several reasons. First, space systems are typically much farther away from the targets. Second, satellites in the lowest orbits are moving very fast in relation to targets and have relatively short dwell times on targets compared to terrestrial systems, and satellites in higher orbits are much more distant and are generally less able to refine target coordinates as precisely. Third, satellite sensors degrade over time, and there currently is no effort under way to perform physical maintenance on them to keep them in prime condition. Finally, given the relatively few ISR satellites in low Earth orbit, continuous coverage of areas of interest from space with the most precise space-based sensors is currently impossible.

In sum, aircraft have several distinct advantages over spacecraft in regard to theater ISR collection, but space-derived surveillance and reconnaissance information is critical to diplomatic and military operations because it provides a "first look" into denied areas and at the battlespace and assists planners in finding and coarsely geolocating many targets before terrestrial forces move into the region. As a rule of thumb, today's space-derived surveillance and reconnaissance is useful in finding 80 percent of the targets and is able to determine their location to roughly 80 percent of the accuracy required to conduct precision strikes. In some cases, space systems do better than 80 percent in finding and fixing targets, and in other cases, they do worse. What is important is the tremendous advantage space systems provide politicians and commanders by giving them a high-quality first look into the situation they face. With this information, they are able to make decisions about how to employ their limited terrestrial surveillance and reconnaissance assets (aircraft, ships, submarines, reconnaissance ground forces, etc.) more efficiently to refine the surveillance and reconnaissance picture to the quality they desire for the operations they are considering. In some cases, the first look from space may suffice, but usually terrestrial surveillance and reconnaissance assets are required. During combat operations, space-based surveillance and reconnaissance sensors continue to provide data, filling gaps in coverage by theater assets. Space-based surveillance and reconnaissance sensors also frequently cue terrestrially based sensors, as was the case during the Gulf War with missile warning satellites cueing Patriot batteries to intercept Iraq's inbound Scud missiles.

Perhaps most important of all, day in and day out, during war and peace, spacepower provides the 80 percent first look on a global scale. It allows analysts to watch the world and report tip-offs, warnings, and indications that give political and military leaders the freedom to employ their terrestrial forces more expeditiously and with greater confidence that another threat is not more pressing. Spacepower literally watches the backs of terrestrial forces to make sure no threat is sneaking up behind them. This allows greater concentration of terrestrial forces in theaters of combat operations because space-based surveillance and reconnaissance assets are sufficient to act as a kind of global sentry. This sort of mission is ideally suited to space systems because they have unimpeded access around the globe and relatively few assets are required to sustain surveillance and reconnaissance missions on a global scale.

Much more is possible. By increasing the number of low Earth orbiting sensors, continuously improving the quality of the sensors, and developing the means to service and repair them (either on orbit or by recovery and relaunch), the 80 percent rule of thumb will creep closer toward the 100 percent solution, despite the warfighter's demand for ever-increasing precision. As space systems becomes more capable, is it likely that they will replace terrestrial forms of surveillance and reconnaissance collection? No. Aerial reconnaissance did not eliminate the need for land and sea forces to conduct reconnaissance of their own. There is no reason to believe that space-based reconnaissance will replace any other form of reconnaissance either.

Spacepower does not usurp missions from other forces. Spacepower assets give a state new core competencies for its military order of battle. The ability to do anything continuously on a global scale is a new contribution to warfare made possible by spacepower. The various C4ISR capabilities, including weather observation, missile warning, and navigation and timing broadcasts, give space-enabled forces a distinct asymmetric advantage over adversaries in the opening days of the 21st century. This advantage will evaporate over time as other actors on the world stage develop, lease, or borrow similar capabilities.

Space forces do not compete with terrestrial forces for roles and missions. Airpower, land power, seapower, spacepower, and now cyberpower bring different capabilities to modern warfare. The armed forces of many nations train their warfighters in highly specialized ways with the objective of being able to dominate operations within their respective media. Operations in each media require centralized control by practitioners of that form of power, in close coordination with the other warfighters, to ensure the optimum management of resources and integration of efforts to achieve the objectives of strategy.

A great fallacy resulting from the prevalent budget-driven integration mindset is the oft-cited statement that "missions will migrate to space when it becomes reasonable to do so." This presumes that commanders in forward areas are willing to trade highly flexible organic terrestrial assets for less flexible (and often less capable) space systems that another commander will likely manage as global assets. Economic considerations may force such a compromise, but a more prudent approach is to develop robust space capabilities in addition to airpower, land power, seapower, and cyberpower assets. Remember, the difference between space systems and terrestrial systems is that space systems provide global access and global presence during both war and peace.

When space forces eventually obtain systems that can create physical effects at any location on the surface of the Earth (for example, conventional bombing), this will not replace the standing requirement for aircraft and missiles to be able to do the same thing, just as the bomber did not replace artillery. Space operations are expensive, and economic considerations may require air delivery of munitions. Exceptions include times when cost is not a consideration, such as combat in areas where aircraft are denied access, when aircraft cannot respond to a time-critical situation as quickly as spacecraft, when only a specialized weapon delivered from space will have the desired probability of killing a target, and when surprise is of the utmost importance.

There is unquestionably some overlap between the capabilities of spacepower and other forms of power, but this is a source of strength, not waste. Just as the triad of bombers, submarines, and missiles during the Cold War prevented either adversary from gaining a significant advantage should their opponent successfully counter one set of capabilities, today's redundancy prevents an adversary from gaining a significant advantage should they successfully counter space-based systems or other terrestrial forces. There will be some adjustments in force structures as space capabilities become more robust, but no mission in any service should ever move entirely to space. Under no circumstances should all of the eggs ever be placed in the space basket. Instead, there should be an integrated combined arms approach.

During time of peace, spacepower assets monitor the globe, helping to identify and characterize potential threats. When a threat emerges, political and military leaders may opt to send terrestrially based surveillance and reconnaissance sensors into the area of interest to get a closer look. Should hostilities break out, space forces will gain whatever degree of space control is required and will contribute whatever they can to help friendly forces in theater in terms of space support to the surveillance and reconnaissance strike complexes, but they still must watch the rest of the world, in every other theater, looking for tip-offs, warnings, and indications of other threats.

Space attack will take many different forms, but it seems likely that space-based weapons will fill specific niches, ideal for only a handful of missions during certain phases of operations. No claim is made that spacepower by itself can be decisive in general conventional warfare, but in certain circumstances, it may help set the conditions for victory by friendly forces. Conversely, if space forces are defeated, this may turn the tide of the war against friendly forces and contribute to defeat. There may be certain forms of limited warfare where the coercive application of space systems may achieve the political and military aims of an operation. If this defines decision, then so be it.

Conclusion

The primary value of spacepower is war prevention, not support to warfighters. It does this by providing transparency into observable human activities around the globe and into space that removes uncertainties and security concerns or allows them to be addressed with a better approximation of the facts. Space also provides opportunities for cooperative ventures on spacefaring activities across all sectors. These ventures can become the framework of better international relationships and confidence-building maneuvers between potential adversaries. Powerful spacefaring states may be able to use martial space strength in traditional ways, such as providing assurances and using dissuasive and deterrent strategies, to prevent wars.

If history serves as a template for the future in space, then space will become a warfighting medium. It is already heavily militarized, with powerful spacefaring states using the medium to enable their surveillance and reconnaissance strike complexes in ways that accelerate the scale, timing, and tempo of combat operations exponentially beyond non-spacefaring actors' ability to cope. Weak actors are likely to employ space weapons in an attempt to counter the advantage space confers on powerful states. The most dangerous situation, however, occurs if two powerful spacefaring states go to war with each other. If the motives are intense, it is likely that they will be forced to counter each other's space systems in the very early stages. At present, there are inadequate defenses for space systems, but defense is possible. Space denial strategies of warfare are likely to evolve, wherein a belligerent merely attacks an adversary's space systems to inflict costs or to induce strategic paralysis on the enemy before offering terms. Finally, space is very much part of the military mix of all actors, state and nonstate, and it must be recognized that spacepower is not a replacement for terrestrial forces, but an additional set of tools that delivers unique capabilities.

(36) There is no universally agreed definition of where space begins and ends, but for this discussion, the author is only talking about space in terms of in Earth orbit and beyond. For a fuller discussion of debate of where space begins and ends, see M.V. Smith, Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press) 4, 38.
(37) This point was brought out by Mahan with regard to command of the sea; total control is not necessary. This point is developed in relation to spacefaring activities in Dolman, 34.