Managing Central Asia: Russia’s Approach

“Are the Central Asian Republics more important for Russian foreign and security policy now than they were than in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union?”

Yes. When the Soviet Union was disbanded the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia (CAR) were not a priority for Russia. This situation has now changed. Since Putin’s first term as President, there has been an attempt to develop new regional integration frameworks, which have had a strong focus on Central Asia. By the end of the 1990s, Moscow considered the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to be hamstrung by the resistance to the idea of post-Soviet integration from several important member states. Notably, this included Ukraine and Georgia, which were seeking to explore their possibilities to develop closer cooperation with the EU and NATO. Putin thus turned to those states more willing to cooperate with Russia in multilateral frameworks, due to their existing interdependence with, and reliance on, Moscow. Several of the CARs are within this grouping of states.

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have come to form an important part of Russia’s regional policy. Kazakhstan is one of Russia’s closest and most important ally’s, and is a participant in the Single Economic Space (SES), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of both the CSTO and EurAsEC, and have proclaimed their desire to join the SES. Both states are heavily dependent on their bilateral security and economic relations with Russia. The other two post-Soviet CARs have a different relationships vis-à-vis Russian-led multilateral frameworks and Russia in general. Uzbekistan has had a turbulent relationship with Russia, with Tashkent joining both the CSTO and EurAsEC in the mid-2000s. However, due to disagreements over their role and Russia’s use of these institutional mechanisms, Uzbekistan has suspended its memberships in both – CSTO in 2012 and EurAsEC in 2008. Turkmenistan’s stance of “positive neutrality” has successfully detached it from collaborative arrangements with the other CARs, and to a certain degree, Russia.

Although they do not always perceive Moscow in a positive light, several of the CARs have nonetheless thrown their lot in with Russian-led regional frameworks. And in this way, the CARs have gone from peripheral importance to a place in the first order of Russian foreign policy interests.

And how is Moscow viewed by the Central Asian Republics? Is Russia still regarded as an important regional actor, or have extra-regional powers such as China, India and the United States become more influential?

During the Soviet Union it was often said that “all roads led to Moscow”. For the CARs in the 2010s, all roads still go to Moscow, but there are now a number of turn-offs along the way, mainly eastwards towards China. Over the last 10-15 years, Central Asia has seen the arrival of a number of other external players, most notably China as part of its “good neighborhood policy” and the US in connection with its operations in Afghanistan. China has a growing economic presence, and is valued as a source of loans for large-scale infrastructural development projects. The US has become important as a source of income for several CARs by way of the rents it provides for leasing military bases. To lesser extents, India, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey have also increased their role in the region via economic and cultural programs.

In spite of this crowded landscape, for the moment past experience and a common legacy means that the Central Asian leaderships still tend to consider Russia as their primary focal point, especially in terms of security. This is, however, a pragmatic, rather than dogmatic decision. The Central Asia elites often look at Russia as the most viable and reliable sponsor of their regimes, and as a provider of the security and economic support necessary to maintain their states. At the same time, they see Moscow as a sponsor on whom you must not become overly dependent otherwise it will seek to take advantage of the situation to control your domestic affairs according to its own agenda. Thus, the CARs very often seek to use the interest of Russia and the other external powers in developing their influence in Central Asia to their advantage, playing Russia off against other external actors. In other words, while Russian remains very important for the CARs, they have no qualms, and often no difficulty, in balancing their relationships with Moscow against other players. Indeed, with the world’s two largest economies now involved in Central Asia alongside Russia, it is, to a certain degree, a buyer’s market, whereby the CARs can seek concessions and discounts from each.

Given this environment, what are Russia’s core foreign policy objectives for the Central Asia region?

Russia’s objectives in Central Asia are connected to a variety of wider foreign policy aims. Aside from the actual benefits provided by cooperation within the CSTO, EurAsEC and SES, Russia’s promotion of these frameworks is an important component of its strategy for asserting its status as both the preeminent actor in what it deems its “region” and as a “great power” on a global scale due in part to its leading role in post-Soviet integration. As Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and, during previous periods, Uzbekistan form the base of these organisations, Central Asia is by extension significant for Russia’s wider foreign policy. As such, the presence of numerous other external powers in Central Asia is viewed by the Kremlin as potentially upsetting this strategy by drawing the CARs away from both Moscow’s orbit and a post-Soviet identity. Hence, Russia aims to encourage the development of these multilateral structures as a way to lock the CARs into close relationships with them, and by virtue of their post-Soviet nature keep the other external powers from developing their relationships with the CARs to the same level. Central Asia will thus inevitably be of integral importance should Putin’s vision of a Eurasian Union come to fruition.

In addition, Central Asia is also considered by Moscow as an important part of its grand energy strategy. During the boom years of the early and mid-2000s, the Russian economy was propelled by souring energy prices. Part of this equation was that Russia would buy Central Asian energy cheaply, using it to supply its domestic market, while selling its own energy resources as exports to drive economic growth. Russia is thus keen to ensure that pipelines in the region continue to run to, and through, its territory, and thus that Central Asian energy resources are not diverted elsewhere.

Central Asia also has significance for Russia as a source of security threats. The activities of insurgents and extremists groups in Central Asia are seen as having links to groups in the Russian North Caucasus, which has proven a seemingly unsolvable problem for Russian internal security. Also, Central Asia is the prime transit route for the illegal narcotic trade that reaches Russia, and then Europe. Over the last decade, the number of drug addicts in Russia has soared. Therefore, Russia’s engagement with the CARs in both bilateral and multilateral forums is centered on developing coordinated approaches to tackling such problems. This often revolves around supplying the CARs with the resources to address these problems in the hope that they will in turn prevent their transit into the Russian domestic space. These concerns are strongly connected to Afghanistan, and with the 2014 deadline for US and NATO withdrawal fast approaching, Russia hopes to develop arrangements with the CARs to prevent any spillover effect from Afghanistan into Central Asia and by extension Russia.

How does Moscow plan to achieve these objectives?

As outlined, Central Asia is important for Russia in terms of both its wider geopolitical agenda and in certain key areas of policy coordination. Given this, and the growing number of attractive alternative options available to the CARs, Russia’s prime objective is to lock as many of the CARs into close relationships with them as possible, via both favorable bilateral agreements and the promotion of the CSTO, EurAsEC and SES. In so doing Moscow aims to tie the Central Asian Republics into a structured relationship that serves to ward off the challenges of other external actors to their preeminent role as the main security and economic sponsor of the CARs. This has had mixed results, as shown by Uzbekistan’s whims in participating and withdrawing from these frameworks, joining largely because the options elsewhere were unfavourable, and leaving once the pastures appear greener somewhere else. At the same time, it seems to have been relatively effective in ensuring Russia remains a key partner for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Although Russia is being muscled out by the sheer economic strength of China, in terms of security Russia and the multilateral frameworks it leads remain more significant. Indeed, Moscow and Beijing’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is seen by many as framed by an unwritten agreement, whereby Beijing does not challenge Russia’s preeminent role in security affairs, if Moscow does not object to China’s increasingly economic profile in Central Asia. An important element of this has been Moscow’s insistence on maintaining the CSTO and EurAsEC as post-Soviet Russian-led frameworks alongside the SCO, even though to certain extent, they replicate the functions of the SCO. From the Kremlin’s perspective, these parallel frameworks ensure their continued position as the primary security sponsor of several of the CARs.

Indeed, a sign of Moscow perception that this strategy is working is Putin’s Eurasian Union concept. While this has yet to be fleshed out, it can be seen as an attempt to lure Ukraine, which Russia sees as the most attractive potential partner among the post-Soviet states, into the network of Russian-led regional frameworks.