Maritime Insecurity in East Asia (continued)

(continued)

No easy or lasting multilateral solution

Although tensions can be managed to prevent a sudden outbreak of hostilities, it is difficult to see how maritime disputes in East Asia can be permanently resolved. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not provide specific guidelines on how to deal with disputes where land features are either very small or submerged. As a result, its provisions can be interpreted in a variety of ways. China, for instance, has argued that Japanese claims to an expanded EEZ in the East China Sea are not valid, since they are based on the presence of small, uninhabited islands. However, by this logic China’s own claims in the South China Sea would be question-able. Beijing is not concerned about the contradiction, because it sees it-self as having an exceptional historical right over the Sea and its resources.

Even without this vagueness, UNC-LOS cannot be applied without the consent of all parties to a dispute. China rejects the convention’s arbitration mechanism, and prefers to deal with rival claimants bilaterally. This is not an arrangement that China’s smaller neighbours are comfortable with, and they are seeking to draw in other stakeholders. Vietnam has been most active in this regard, inviting foreign companies to bid for oil exploration contracts within its EEZ. China has responded by threatening to shut down these companies’ operations in its own territory, if they go ahead and partner with Vietnam.

Divided ASEAN

The biggest disappointment of all is the failure of China, ASEAN and Japan to come to a workable arrangement among themselves. Expanding trade has not brought a lowering of tensions. Even as China-Japan trade reached a new high in 2011, public hostility between them grew more pronounced over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. The expected peace dividend has not materialised in South East Asia, either. Even countries with a history of friendly ties with Beijing, such as Malaysia, are discreetly upgrading their security cooperation with the United States. Although the risk of conflict with China is minimal, Malaysian analysts speculate that Chinese benevolence is more tactical than enduring: Beijing does not want to face hostility on too many fronts until it has dealt with the most pressing maritime disputes.

In this situation, the United States can work to lower tensions by nudging Beijing and ASEAN to adopt a legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea. China has so far resisted this course of action, but the possibility of even further American involvement in East Asia under the ‘rebalancing’ initiative might alter its strategic calculus. There has been a precedent whereby China takes a more conciliatory posture when faced by a united ASEAN: In 2002, it agreed to adopt a non-binding commitment to abjure the use of force in maritime disputes. If ASE-AN states can work out a common position among themselves, China would find it hard to resist being drawn into a cooperative security framework.

At the moment, Beijing is playing upon differences between ASEAN member states. In July 2012, it successfully prevailed upon Cambodia to block references to maritime disputes in the Annual ASEAN Meeting joint statement. After acrimonious discussions, the summit ended without a statement being issued, for the first time in ASEAN’s 45-year history. Given China’s economic importance and close ties to many ASEAN states, it would be quite easy for Beijing to exploit differences of opinion across political elites to its advantage.

Another option might be to bring in other stakeholders to the South China Sea, who can partner both with Beijing and the ASEAN claimants in oil exploration. Russia and India are both interested in exploring the Sea’s energy reserves. As non-Western powers, their involvement might be less politically sensitive than the presence of companies seen to be legitimising a US-dominated set of norms regarding conflict management. However, this scenario is a non-starter if China persists with its stance that most of the South China Sea is ‘Chinese territory’ and that foreign military vessels need to seek its permission before entering these waters. Such a stance is unsupported by international law, and having ratified UNCLOS Beijing cannot escape the requirement of adhering to the convention’s provisions. To grant China an exceptional status would not only jeopardise the existing set of rules that govern maritime disputes, but also open the way for more such disputes. For the foreseeable future, it does not look as though East Asia will get to en-joy its much-awaited peace dividend.

Security in Asia: A two-level conflict

The security situation in East Asia needs to be understood on two levels: the regional and the global. Regionally, China is seeking to alter the status quo vis-à-vis its neighbours by leveraging its superior military and policing capacity to gain control over disputed waters. Globally, Beijing and Washington are being drawn into a posture of mutual suspicion, due to the Taiwan issue and differing perceptions of what constitutes a ‘fair’ international regime. Both these trends come together in the form of the ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ policy being pursued by the US. This policy currently enjoys the support of China’s neighbours, but it is too early to say whether it will help stabilise the region. While there is limited scope for open hostilities, maritime clashes between Chinese and other East Asian police vessels and an overall increase in regional defence spending can be expected. Against this backdrop, the US can be expected to further entrench itself in Asia.

Strategic Trends 2013 is now available on the CSS website.