Israel’s Security Situation, Requirements and Policies

ISN:  Has Israel’s political and security outlook vis-a-vis the Palestinians remained consistent since 1948?

Tova Norlen: This question is difficult to answer because it implies that Israeli political attitudes towards the Palestinians are inherently tied to the extent to which Palestinians are also seen as a security concern. While this may be true on a very simple level (if threat goes up, suspicion of the “other” also does), it hides a much more complex reality where the “security outlook” may be the result not only of political necessity and regional changes, but also of a deliberate political campaign where it has been used as an instrument to justify domestic policy choices that in turn exacerbate the security situation. The answer also depends on whether we are speaking about Palestinian Arabs as a whole (those who originated from the former British mandate regardless of where they now live) or about Israeli Arabs (Palestinians who remained in Israel and are now Israeli citizens) or West Bank and Gaza Palestinians (who have been under Israeli occupation since 1967).

Because the Israeli relationship with Palestinians who live within the borders of Israel is no longer primarily driven by security concerns, I am focusing on the context that began in 1967 when Israel found itself in control of more than a million additional Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. While East Jerusalem residents were granted Israeli residency almost immediately, West Bank and Gaza Palestinians remained non-citizens under a complex set of military rules while the territory (of the West Bank) came under Israeli jurisdiction. Both West Bank and Gaza Palestinians originally gained economically from this arrangement, as they had almost full access to the low end of the Israeli labor market.

Initially, the Israeli government used security arguments to justify holding on to the territories rather than allowing them to revert to Jordanian rule or to self-government. However, the argument that the territories were indispensable for the defense of the rest of Israel, and that they were needed as a buffer zone against Jordan, was soon made obsolete by the obvious Israeli military advantage against all of its neighboring states and the absence of any direct Jordanian threat. In addition, quick Israeli civilian settlement into all of the occupied territories (including Gaza) strengthened the impression that the security argument was used as an excuse by individuals and officials with ideological and nationalist objectives whose primary goal was to gain control over the historic places of Jewish heritage.

Israeli settlement (and the confiscation of land that Palestinians believed was part of their heritage) together with the lack of political freedom under the military occupation finally led to the breakout of the first intifada in 1987, which significantly changed the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. Terrorism and continued violence, and later, the breakdown of the Oslo Accord, led to military security measures being put back on the Israeli agenda with regard to its approach to the Palestinian population and the territories. The Separation fence was constructed out of a necessity to keep terrorists out of Israel, a purpose for which it has been largely successful. Interestingly however, for the Palestinians such a fence would have been largely accepted (and would presumably also have led to enhanced security for Israel) had it been built closer to the original 1967 lines.

Perhaps the biggest security challenge for Israel with regard to the Palestinian population in the future has to do with the viability of the present status quo. Demographically, the Palestinians population between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea (including Gaza) outnumbered Israeli Jews in 2012. Israel’s security debate will have to be reoriented towards questions that address how a democratic country can continue to deny citizenship and voting rights to more than half of the population under its control while insisting on controlling the territory on which they live. Israel may find that much of the country’s security focus will have to be shifted to questions about how such an unbalanced society can be maintained.

How is the current Israeli government attempting to manage its relations with the Palestinian territories?

Even though the new coalition agreement that was concluded on March 15th included a clause saying that Israel would pursue a peace agreement with the Palestinians with the goal of reaching a diplomatic accord to end the conflict, Prime Minister Netanyahu also pointed out that any agreement signed with the Palestinians would be subject to approval both in the cabinet and the Knesset, and possibly also to a national referendum.

The fact that Tzipi Livni was given the title of chief negotiator and handed the Ministry of Justice, was an auspicious sign. However, only a quick glance at the allocation of the rest of the ministries in the new coalition shows that peace will most not likely be a priority on the new government’s agenda. This is because some of the major government ministries with influence over key government decisions regarding settlements are now directly in the hands of Naftali Bennet’s HaBayit HaYehudi, a party that is directly opposed to the peace process and supports the expansion of settlements. While it may have been expected that the prime minister himself would set policy towards the West Bank, most routine decisions regarding the construction of housing and infrastructure fall directly under the control of the Ministry of Housing, a position that has been filled with HaBayit HaYehudi’s number two, Uri Ariel. Ariel, a former secretary general of both the settler organization Amana and the Yesha Council, was ranked as the most effective right-wing member of the Knesset in 2011 by a external pagestudycall_made that rewarded MK’s for their “nationalist” achievements.

Naftali Bennet himself will be in charge of the Economy and Trade Ministry (formerly the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor), a cabinet position that will most likely give him substantial control over the promotion of economic growth and regional economic development in Israel. While this may not seem like an important post for someone whose primary concern is the promotion and expansion of settlements, it is in fact one of the major quiet battlegrounds where the ideological struggle over resource allocation to settlements is played out. The ministry determines where economic and industrial support is allocated, including whether or not economic growth is allowed and encouraged in the West Bank. In addition, because he will be in charge of the export market, he will have powers over how West Bank products are marketed and sold in the rest of the world, something that is becoming increasingly important as the international divestment campaign against settlement products is gaining ground.

As his defense minister (in charge of security on the West Bank), Netanyahu picked former general and deputy prime minister, Moshe Ya’alon, explaining that at a time when the "region all around us is stormy," Israel needed an experienced person in this position. Ya’alon, who came in fifth in the 2011 ranking of the most right-wing MKs, is well known for his hard-line views towards the Palestinians and his hawkish views towards Iran. However, Ya’alon should not be dismissed as a one-dimensional character. While his roots are in Labor Zionism and he originally supported negotiating with the Palestinians and the signing of the Oslo Accords, like many Israelis he became disenchanted when the results were unsuccessful. Instead, Ya’alon external pagearguescall_made for a “bottom up” rather than top-down approach to peace, where Palestinians first must recognize Israel as a Jewish state, then prove themselves economically and politically, before gaining the right to statehood.

During his previous term Netanyahu did little to improve Israel’s relationship with the Palestinian leadership in a way that would be understood as meaningful in the eyes of the Palestinians. Given the makeup of the new coalition, no significant change can be expected in the near future. The previous Netanyahu administration pushed a tough settlement policy and continued construction and even expansion of new areas in the West Bank. These policies were again cloaked in a security argument, which posits that as long as there is no reliable Palestinian partner for peace Israel has to manage the status quo and minimize its own insecurity. However, the logic of settlement-building and continued land expropriation flies in the face of such an argument, as it seems quite evident that Israel is getting less secure and more threatened as a result.

Similarly, as the Arab Spring broke out Netanyahu argued that peace with the Palestinians would be risky in such an unstable environment. The conclusion by many experts is that Netanyahu is not interested in a peace that involves conceding territory, and that he believes that time is clearly on Israel’s side.

Does Israeli public opinion generally support its government’s current policy outlook?

The polls conducted shortly before the February elections predicted that Israel would be moving further to the right. However, the election results showed a much more complicated picture. While Netanyahu’s Likud-Beiteinu coalition lost seats to the national religious Yisrael Beyteinu party, the biggest surprise of the elections was probably the resurgence of the center-left block, with the newcomer Yair Lapid and his Yesh Atid party. Israelis thus showed some movement to the extremes as well as to the center, while clearly demonstrating dissatisfaction with the Netanyahu leadership, especially on social and economic issues.

However, while they may not have been happy with the Netanyahu government’s domestic policies, a majority of Israelis seem to share Netanyahu’s skepticism about a resumption of the peace process with the Palestinians. Polls in December showed that 67% of Israelis believed that Israel was not to blame for the current standstill and that there was no chance of progress in the foreseeable future. The same poll also showed that about half of the Jewish public affirmed that Israel should follow the policy of the Netanyahu government even at the cost of a confrontation with the US administration.

While there is still general support among Israelis (60%) for a peace agreement based on some sort of two-state-for-two-people solution, a slight majority (51%) also holds the opinion that Israelis settlements should not be dismantled under any circumstances. However, if given a choice between a Jewish majority within a smaller territory that does include the West Bank and a state for both Jews and Arabs in the entire land, a clear majority of Israelis (71%) prefer a Jewish majority over the retention of the territories. A quarter of Israelis, many of them from the radical and religious right, do not see a contradiction between liberal democratic values and ruling over a majority Arab population without political rights.

Thus, Israelis are fairly comfortable with the present status quo and there is virtually no debate at all about alternative scenarios or practical solutions that could be introduced, short of an Oslo-type two-state solution. Most of the alternatives that are mentioned (bi-national state, one-state solution, or federation) are rejected out of hand by Israelis who assert that the two-state solution as envisaged by the international community and demanded by the Palestinians (based on resolutions 242 and 338), is no longer a viable or acceptable option. This can partly be explained by the fact that Israelis have managed to insulate themselves quite successfully from the Palestinians in the West Bank after the construction of the security fence and thus, the question no longer has much relevance to their daily lives. But it is also a reflection of how sharply polarized ideological (and religious) opinions are among Israeli Jews about what the future of the West Bank should look like. This polarization, which exists all the way up to the level of Netanyahu’s cabinet, drives policy into a deadlock, and reinforces the territorial status quo.