Harmony & Chaos: The Principles of China’s Unrestricted Warfare

I. The Century of Asia

Last year in a speech at George Washington University, the former Director of National Intelligence, Admiral McConell spoke about how the world will look in 20-25 years. The Admiral was direct in his prediction: “the summary line is, it’s the Century of Asia. The number one economy in the world will be China.”[1] Assuming this assessment proves to be accurate, the US will continue to see a gradual transition of economic, military and political power from Washington to Beijing.

The US faces this decline in comprehensive national power (CNP), at a particularly inopportune time, with the war in Afghanistan ramping up, the ongoing commitment in Iraq and a painful recession resources are spread thin.[2] The combination of these factors has left little time for careful consideration of what the Century of Asia may hold for the future of the US A recent Australian Defense White Paper cites China’s expanded defense budget, and suggests the outcome of China’s rise will largely be determined by the bilateral relationship between the US and China.[3] The relationship between US and China was coined the “G-2” by the Council on Foreign Relations to highlight the significance of this relationship.[4] President Obama went further when announcing the new Ambassador to China, stating “I can think of no more important assignment than creating the kinds of bridges between our two countries that will determine the wellbeing not just of Americans and Chinese, but also the future of the world.”[5]

There are lively debates about whether China will choose a peaceful rise or come into its own through a more confrontational nationalism. The standard logic of a rising power is that it reaches critical mass by engaging in a regional or international conflict. [6] These debates often cite the rise of European powers in an age untouched by the Information Revolution in Military Affairs. The instruments of national power in the 18th, 19th and 20th century were far different from the broad array of tools available to China in the 21st century. The information revolution in military affairs has changed how nations engage in competition.

Perhaps the most significant difference between the emergence of superpowers in the past and China is the degree to which irregular warfare is capable of accelerating the pace of strategic gains against international rivals. One example of the danger posed is economic warfare in the form of industrial espionage. Mr. James Olson, the former chief of CIA counterintelligence has stated that China’s economic warfare program is the “most pervasive,” of more than 26 nations that conduct industrial espionage against the US.[7] Economic warfare is not new to the US or to the UK. In 1940 after Paris fell to Germany, Churchill famously instructed the Minister of Economic Warfare, Mr. Hugo Dalton to “set Europe ablaze.” [8] The difference between the wartime economic warfare of World-War II and modern economic warfare is the political and technological environment permeating the international economy, which make an actual declaration of war unnecessary. Inflicting massive economic harm on a competing national power or the world economy is now possible without declaring war. Just last year MI-5 warned that China was spying on industries inside the UK.[9] Outside of industry, foreign governments are reportedly targeting our national infrastructure. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that foreign governments have penetrated the US electric grid. [10] With no prescribed method of either tracing or deterring such intrusions, elements of US infrastructure are at the mercy of nations capable of penetrating so deeply into our national boundaries.

Experts in Chinese information and irregular warfare cite “Unrestricted Warfare” by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (URW) as a turning point in how China views 21st century warfare.[11] As the title of the book implies, URW suggests a range of operations that go far beyond what the US defense and intelligence communities would put under any singular conceptual framework. URW incorporates components of information operations, irregular warfare, cyberwarfare, terrorism, economic warfare, lawfare, espionage and elements of foreign relations to advocate for a form of warfare that “breaks ideology,” and moves in a completely new direction. The breadth of operations discussed in URW, make it a difficult book to discuss using US terminology. Rather than forcing the tactics, strategies and operations discussed in URW into US parlance, I have found it helpful to use a new term, sufficiently broad, to cover the operations discussed in the book. I use the term “offensive peacetime operations” or (OPTO) to cite the range of operations, tools and strategies that are employed individually or in conjunction with one another, short of open warfare, to influence, degrade or attack the components of a nation’s comprehensive national power. This term enables us to consider the strategic implications of competing with a foreign nation whose strategy is focused on winning without fighting.

Before getting into the content of URW, it’s important to consider how and why OPTO presents both an ideological and strategic threat to the international legal order as well as US national security. The strategic challenge to the US spelled out in URW is this: Can the US win a long-term, strategic campaign in diverse, seemingly disconnected fields of competition during peacetime, or is US power so focused on conventional capabilities and advanced weapon systems that it will be surpassed by China as the primary political, financial and strategic influence over the next century?

In a conventional war there are explicit thresholds and boundaries between nations. If an enemy fleet or army approaches a nation’s geographic border, the nation being attacked has both a warning and a legal right to self-defense. The challenge with OPTO is that the operations, while offensive in nature, often fail to trigger any thresholds that would lead to political, legal or military reaction on the part of the nation being targeted. URW advocates for combining various components of OPTO that accumulate strategic victories over time, avoiding any head-on confrontation that would trigger a conventional military response. While OPTO has always been a part of warfare, the degree of our nations vulnerability has greatly expanded in the 21st century.

Returning to the legal considerations, the word “offensive,” (in OPTO) raises some questions about whether or not these operations reach the legal threshold of “an attack,” as defined by the law of war and the United Nations Charter. The lack of clarity regarding operations short of open war have already encouraged General Chilton, the Commanding Officer of US Strategic Command to suggest military force may be used in response to cyber-attacks. [12] The difficulty in analyzing the legality of OPTO is in large part due to the fact that international law seeking to restrict and deter acts of war is imbedded in a conception of warfare native to its own century. The U.N. Charter views warfare as a primarily kinetic enterprise where one nation invades the geographic territory of another.[13] While some effort has gone into defining new national boundaries, unconstrained by geographic conceptions and based in national cyber, network, media or cultural boundaries, these theories often seek to fit 21st century developments into 17th century ideas dating back to the treaty of Westphalia, rather than seeking to create new conceptual frameworks for the new conditions.[14]

The 21st century is the virtual century. As the great philosopher Hegel predicted over a century ago, “actuality” (as a static, steady conception of reality) has “lost out” to the revolutionized world of ideas. What Hegel could not have realized as he watched the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, is that it would take the advance of science and technology (now embodied in cyberspace and the electromagnetic field) to tip the balance of human experience from one based on limited epistemological experience to one supplemented and increasingly supplanted by the virtual world of ideas. The virtual century led to the arrival of virtual warfare. Modern war can no longer be separated from virtual reality. In prior centuries information was a tool used to report on kinetic events that were primarily significant due to the weight or the “gravitas” of the event in itself. In our virtual century individuals, governments and businesses have harnessed information, subordinating it as a tool, a weapon and a means of influence.

Virtual reality consists of more than man-made electromagnetic tools of communication (cyberspace/cell phones/ TV/Radio). Our virtual reality is a hybrid virtual constellation that embodies both our man-made tools of perceiving reality and the symbolic, virtual and ideological space enunciated and given structure by human networks (and best explored by Jacques Lacan, Georg Hegel and Carl Jung). Politics and national interest can no longer be accurately defined as strictly local, regional or national; the interpenetration of virtual constellations defies those outdated models with a networked structure that is limited only by our own psychological limitations and human creativity. The relevance of physical national boundaries will continue their slide into history; though it is unlikely they will go quietly or peacefully.

Earlier this year, a private Canadian security group called SecDev publicized their findings of a large-scale cyber-espionage network that reached over a hundred nations.[15] According to the report, the network successfully penetrated foreign affairs ministries in Iran, Bangladesh, Latvia, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Barbados and the Bhutan. The report indicates that over 103 nations were penetrated. While the group was able to trace the intrusions back to China, they maintain that there is no way to attribute the intrusions to the Chinese government. While the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) has suggested some methods to resolve the problems of attribution in cyber-attacks, the geographic origin of an attack is, alone, insufficient to presume a government’s involvement.[16] Nor should nations rule out the prospect of nongovernmental groups or terrorists launching cyber or other OPTO without government sponsorship or complicity.

Given the interconnectedness of the information age, re-establishing sovereign boundaries between states has become as complex a task as defining the digital, economic and political currents that interpenetrate them. China’s 21st century OPTO exploits the openness of the global society that fuels it, and eliminates boundaries that separate war and non-war elements of national power.

This is because many tools of OPTO particularly those given emphasis in URW as “super-weapons,” such as economic and media warfare often occur without leaving any trace and because both slowly accumulate strategic advantage by deliberately avoiding “trip-wires.” [17] The twin problems of a lack of applicable laws, and an inability to attribute certain forms of attack, have created a widening problem for the US The US defense community is primarily organized to respond to conventional attacks in defined spheres of geographic and strategic interest. URW advocates for combining means and functions of warfare in such a way that conceptions of ground, air or land warfare are set aside, opening the space for new OPTO that do an end run around our armed forces and our conceptions of how war is waged. The US cannot hope to win wars in a virtual century it has yet to fully comprehend and prepare for.

II. Defning Offensive Peacetime Operations: The ingredients of 21st Century Warfare

The authors of URW introduce some types of warfare that can be used to “compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.” The authors list the means and methods, as including:

1. Conventional Warfare

2. Space Warfare

3. Diplomatic warfare

4. Bio-Chemical Warfare

5. Sanction Warfare

6. Terrorist Warfare

7. Electronic Warfare

8. Smuggling Warfare (throwing markets into confusion and attacking economic order);

9. Regulatory Warfare

10. Guerilla Warfare

11. Virtual Warfare

12. Ideological Warfare

13. Psychological warfare (spreading rumors to intimidate the enemy and break down his will);

14. Media warfare (manipulating what people see and hear in order to lead public opinion along);

15. Drug warfare (obtaining sudden and huge illicit profits by spreading disaster in other countries);

16. Network warfare (venturing out in secret and concealing one’s identity in a type of warfare that is virtually impossible to guard against);

17. Technological warfare (creating monopolies by setting standards independently);

18. Fabrication warfare (presenting a counterfeit appearance of real strength before the eyes of the enemy);

19. Resources warfare (grabbing riches by plundering stores of resources);

20. Economic aid warfare (bestowing favor in the open and contriving to control matters in secret);

21. Cultural warfare (leading cultural trends along in order to assimilate those with different views);

22. Ecological warfare: Ecological war refers to a new type of non-military warfare in which modern technology is employed to influence the natural state of rivers, oceans, the crust of the earth, the polar ice sheets, the air circulating in the atmosphere, and the ozone layer.[18]

23. Financial warfare: defeat on the economic front precipitates a near collapse of the social and political order. The casualties resulting from the constant chaos are no less than those resulting from a regional war, and the injury done to the living social organism even exceeds the injury inflicted by a regional war. [19] Today, when nuclear weapons have already become frightening mantelpiece decorations that are losing their real operational value with each passing day, financial war has become a “hyperstrategic” weapon that is attracting the attention of the world. This is because financial war is easily manipulated and allows for concealed actions, and is also highly destructive. [20]

24. International law warfare (seizing the earliest opportunity to set up regulations);

25. Cocktail Warfare: “If we confine ourselves to warfare in the narrow sense on the traditional battlefield now, it will very difficult for us to regain our foothold in the future. Any war that breaks out tomorrow or further down the road will be characterized by warfare in the broad sense—a cocktail mixture of warfare prosecuted through the force of arms and warfare that is prosecuted by means other than the force of arms.” [21]

26. “In addition, there are other types of non-military warfare which are too numerous to mention.”[22]

URW suggests that each of these forms of warfare be deployed in various combinations to generate the desired effect. The authors quote Yue Fei, a military strategist from the Song Dynasty in China, stating: “the subtle excellence of application lies in one-mindedness.” The best operations are considered those where the myriad methods converge into one.[23] This convergence is seen as a dynamic process that is constantly adjusted to maintain flexibility.[24]

III. War Without Limits: The Functions of Modern Warfare

“. . . we have turned the entire world into a battlefield in the broad sense. On this battlefield, people still fight, plunder, and kill each other as before, but the weapons are more advanced and the means more sophisticated, so while it is somewhat less bloody, it is still just as brutal. [25]”

The authors of URW state, “that war itself has now been changed.”[26] Going further, the authors declare an end to the “might make right,” mentality of the 20th century, and announce the beginning of a “new period.” [27] It is worth noting that President Obama recently stated in his speech at West Point that this era will be an era where “right makes might.” The authors of URW suggest this new era will require a strategy that surpasses national boundaries and perceives no limit to its operations. This new period is said to require a strategy that surpasses national boundaries, and perceives no limit to its operations. RAND noted this feature of Chinese strategy as, “feixianxing zuozhan,” or a war without a front line.[28] URW suggests that this concept applies to China’s geographic region, as it does with the reach of information warfare. URW states that “national security based on regionalism is already outdated,” and that threats against one nations security are no longer limited to the “natural space” that the nation occupies. [29]

Citing the observations of German strategist Erich Ludendorff, URW suggests implementation of a “total war” theory, where battlefield and non-battle field elements are combined into an organic whole.[30] This theory explains in part, why exerting pressure and influence on a competitor’s population at home, is seen as a key component of OPTO. Implementing psychological warfare against the wife and family of a soldier deployed overseas, in conjunction with lobbying, targeted assassination, media warfare and turning another country’s newspapers and television stations into tools of media warfare “may” all be necessary.[31] The breadth of targets explains in part why the primary change in 21st century warfare is not in the instruments, modes, or forms of war, but rather it’s function. [32] Rejecting reliance on conventional military forces, URW states that war will no longer be carried out in ways with which we are familiar.[33]Citing the use of soldiers as the “hardware,” of warfare and “purposefulness,” as its software, the authors discard these conventional separations declaring an end to the age of clearly drawn sides. [34]

The content of URW, taken on a whole suggests several possible new “functions,” for warfare. The most strategically significant of these is the implementation of indirect strategies to attain one’s goals, sublimating the need for what would be considered a conventional military victory.35 [35]

The authors present a view of OPTO that is “by no means second to that of a war,” and refer to unrestricted warfare as the embryonic form of another kind of warfare.[36] It is here that the authors explicitly suggest that war has moved from the kinetic battlefields into the relatively hidden domains of irregular and virtual warfare.

“But whatever you call them, they cannot make us more optimistic than in the past. We have no reason for optimism. This is because the reduction of the functions of warfare in a pure sense does not mean at all that war has ended. Even in the so-called post-modern, post-industrial age, warfare will not be totally dismantled. It has only re-invaded human society in a more complex, more extensive, more concealed, and more subtle manner.” [37]

This change in warfare has led to what the authors note as a “relative reduction in military violence,” while leading to an increase in “political, economic, and technological violence.”[38] This transition from military violence, to “soft” violence is by no means seen as a reduction in the amount of damage that can be inflicted on an enemy state. Nor is the possibility of combining OPTO with actual military operations excluded from the books strategy.

“If we acknowledge that the new principles of war are no longer “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will,” but rather are “using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and nonlethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”[39]

The authors use the metaphor of a “charm” to ask who will have the power to control the rise and expansion of information technology. [40] Technological development, it is predicted, may result in one of two possibilities. The first is a rampant “barbarism of technology,” where people lose their way and seek ever more convenient solutions to their problems. The second possibility is that the “unique features of exchanging and sharing represent the light of intelligence,” will lead mankind out of barbarism. [41]

The proposed solution for technological barbarism is the use of a “bonding agent,” lent to governments by the development of information technology, which can “lightly penetrate the layers of barriers between technologies and link various technologies which appear to be totally unrelated.” [42] The term “bonding” likely refers to some of the PRC’s policy of “harmonizing,” political and religious dissidents within China.[43] Both the “bonding” power of information warfare and the authors’ reference to China as “all under heaven,” correspond to deep cultural traditions in Chinese culture that favor a highly controlled state. [44] With URW, the use of OPTO is seen as an equalizer that can level the playing field to Beijing’s benefit.

IV. Combination Warfare or Modern Combined War that Goes Beyond Limits

Modified combined warfare is a theory focused on the power of combining and linking means and methods together to achieve superior effects. This principle appears to be the primary operational component of URW. The key principle of this form of warfare is “to blend together more means to resolve a problem in a range wider than the problem itself.”[45]

The first metaphor used is that of the “Cocktail in the Great Master’s Cup.” This metaphor cites the victories of King Wu of the Zhou Dynasty and Alexander the Great, suggesting that they were “adept at ingeniously combining two or more battlefield factors together, throwing them into battle, and gaining victories. 1+1 is the most elementary and also the most ancient combination method.”[46] The use of any individual weapon system or capability is considered to be less important than “whether or not the weapons have good characteristics for linking and matching them with other weapons.”[47] URW also suggests combining or blurring the distinctions between each level of strategic action to avoid triggering thresholds that would require direct military confrontation. This concept is referred to as “omni-directionality,” harmonizing different levels and forms of combat towards one aim. Omnidirectionality is said to apply to all levels of “beyond-limits combined war” and is broken down to each level of warfare below:[48]

· At the war policy level, it applies to the combined use of a nation’s entire combat power, up to supra-national combat power, in an intercontinental or worldwide confrontation.

· At the strategic level, it applies to the combined use in warfare of national resources, which relate to military objectives.

· At the operational level, it applies to the combined use on a designated battlefield of various kinds of measures, and mainly an army or force of that scale, to achieve campaign objectives.

· And at the tactical level, it applies to the combined use of various kinds of weapons, equipment, and combat methods, and mainly one unit or a force of that scale, to execute a designated mission in a battle.

· It must be kept in mind that all of the above combinations must also include intersecting combinations among the respective levels.

There is more complexity in this principle, than the straightforward 1+1 formula suggests. URW states that the key is “whether or not one understands what goes with what to implement combinations, and how to combine.”[49] It is the accumulation of effects over a range of different operations that generates strategic gains. Utilizing any one indirect strategy is seen as outdated. The goal of URW is to execute tactical, operational and strategic gains by harmonizing the efforts towards a singular end. URW suggest combinations of offensives in fields as diverse as stealth aircraft, financial wars, terrorist attacks and deterrence.

“…combining the battlefield and non-battlefield, warfare and non-warfare, military and non-military which is more specifically combining stealth aircraft and cruise missiles with network killers, combining nuclear deterrence, financial wars and terrorist attacks, or simply combining Schwartzkopf + Soros + Xiaomolisi [transliteration 1420 5459 6849 2448] + bin Laden. This then is our real hand of cards.” [50]

While the benefits of combination are seen as critical to a successful strategy, combination alone is considered insufficient. URW suggests that all of the methods of operation be focused upon a singular specific target.[51] When the goal is reached or target eliminated then the method of operation also loses its remaining value. The authors invoke the metaphor of an “empty basket,” in order to convey the idea of “utilizing the non-changing to deal with the myriad of changes”[52] and suggests that in the modern era, the overt and covert goals of war are two different matters.[53]

In considering practical applications of these metaphors, we can first note that both the great master’s cup, and the empty basket – are “empty,” before a specific target or goal is determined.[54] In terms of OPTO, this suggests that each specific target of a given operation is chosen specifically and approached with uniquely tailored “combinations,” and that the deployment of pre-established tactics is limited. This principle suggests that China’s 21st century OPTO may be more focused on human targets, including national leaders and populations, than on military hardware. This also suggests that each operation would be (on a relative scale) quite small, and that each operation would vary its methods based upon the unique characteristics of the target. An ability to alternate the means employed to attain the objective, also suggest that OPTO may seek to acquire target information from the easiest route, or to reach desired targets through indirect means. In a widely reported incident, China was recently accused of hacking into Lockheed Martin to steal information regarding the advanced F-35 fighter.[55] Incidents like these suggest corporations may be easier to target than governments.

Attacking multiple sources to attain information is suggested in URW, where attacks are to be used in “synchrony” with one another occurring simultaneously.[56] This operational stage combines different actions within different spaces operating towards the same objective.[57] That is not to suggest that all objectives are pursued with all means, available, rather specific means are tailored to specific targets, and those means are intended to operate simultaneously toward a single goal.

Rather than seeking to accomplish ambitious, or difficult goals, URW suggests a rule: “objectives must always be smaller than the measures.” [58] The strategic reason for limiting the measures taken is based on URW’s perspective of victory as an accumulation of smaller, and seemingly disparate operations that accumulate gradually.[59] The authors warn against “craving great successes,” and instead advocate for consciously pursuing limited objectives, because “every objective which is achievable is limited.”[60] Taking care to pursue smaller objectives is viewed as critical to avoid “disastrous consequences.”[61]

The relative humility in the selection of objectives suggests a strategic preference for combining and deploying the tools of URW in OPTO without being detected. The flexibility in choosing the means, and the caution in choosing the ends, suggest a strategy that maximizes strategic gain in each realm, while maintaining plausible deniability.

V. Technology or Wisdom: Dangerous Asymmetry

The authors of URW view US obsession with technology as a strategic vulnerability, that is alone incapable of guaranteeing a strategic upper hand.[62] The authors suggest the key to victory is in “courage, wisdom and strategy.” [63] The strategic perspective proposed in URW views the US as relying solely on “one pillar,” (the strength of conventional military forces) as being insufficient to maintain its strategic edge.[64] URW suggests that the emphasis of the US military on preparing to win a “major war,” is an obsession employed by the military to justify their own existence, and a “holdover” from the Cold War.[65] Some aspects of URW appear to be outdated. For instance, URW refers to West Point Military Academy as a “beast barracks style of training” that produces blood and iron warriors, unsuited for modern warfare. [66] The authors would be wise to note the four days of West Point cyber war gaming that occurred last May. Army cadets stood guard over a network around the clock while hackers from the National Security Agency attempted to hack into a network setup for the simulation.[67]

While the US military is working to adapt to irregular threats, the authors of URW believe that superior strategy and OPTO are capable of overcoming US advantages.

“As for determining the outcome of war, it is now very difficult for anyone to occupy an unmatched position. It may be leading, but it will not be alone, much less never-changing.”[68]

Noting the generation gaps that exist between two opposing forces, the authors observe that it’s “…difficult for high-tech troops to deal with unconventional warfare.”[69]

The advancements of information warfare and 21st century technology are seen as creating “mutual helplessness,” between nations, helplessness that the authors note the US must share. [70]There is an even greater vulnerability on the part of the US, which the authors perceive as fearful of sustaining any casualties.[71] 21st century warfare is seen as being capable of ending the unipolar world. This is in part because, the means of engaging in OPTO are considerably less expensive than confronting a super-power on the conventional battlefield. Information as a strategic national asset opens opportunities for exploitation, manipulation and theft. [72]

The authors of URW note the “theoretical blind spots,” and “thought errors,” that exist in the US military due to rivalry and “long-standing sectarianism,” between US military services.[73] Quoting US Marine Corps criticism of Department of Defense “joint doctrine,” as possibly leading to the end of “distinctiveness,” in the US armed forces,[74] the authors of URW suggest that DoD joint doctrine fails to comprehend the degree to which “joint” can be applied to all of the realms in which humans can produce confrontational behavior.”[75] This concept of “joint” may parallel “whole of government” efforts that combine different elements of US national power towards accomplishing policy objectives.

VI. The Virtual Century: Harmonizing Chaos

“. . . [the indirect approach] was seen to be the key to practical achievement in dealing with any problem where the human factor predominates, and a conflict of wills tends to spring from an underlying concern for interests. In all such cases, the direct assault of new ideas provokes a stubborn resistance, thus intensifying the difficulty of producing a change of outlook. Conversion is achieved more easily and rapidly by unsuspected infiltration of a different idea or by an argument that turns the flank of instinctive opposition.” [76]

The National Intelligence Council predicts that by 2020, “China will continue to strengthen its military through developing and acquiring modern weapons, including advanced fighter aircraft, sophisticated submarines and increasing numbers of ballistic missiles.” [77] As China’s conventional arsenal continues its modernization, there is some question as to whether or not China will continue to employ the principles of URW as a cornerstone of its grand strategy. The recent discovery of GhostNet, as well as calls for dumping the US dollar as a reserve currency suggest that China may actually become more bold in its employment of OPTO as it becomes more confident in its conventional armed forces.

The cultural traditions of China, as well as its preference for indirect strategies suggest that URW and OPTO will likely continue to play a role in China’s grand strategy throughout the 21st century. URW cites British strategist Liddell Hardt’s timeless advocacy for using indirect means to obtain both military and political objectives.[78] Looking forward there are specific types of disputes that the authors of URW consider as possible catalysts for expanded confrontations or disputes. These areas include conflicts ranging from ideology to market shares.[79]

More conventional flash points, between the US and China include possible conflicts over the independence of Taiwan, the legal status of the South China Sea, oil drilling rights surrounding Japan, satellite weapons and any open war on the Korean peninsula. Whether these areas of potential conflict reach the point of open war or not, the US should anticipate and plan to defend against aggressive OPTO. The 21st century, as the “virtual century” requires the US to combine elements of URW, OPTO and conventional warfare together into integrated systems, tools and strategies, both to defend our nation and our allies and to maintain our comprehensive national power. It’s worth noting that OPTO exploits unregulated spheres of connectivity where our strategic awareness or ability to influence is limited. Beginning a dialogue about these areas of mutual concern (such as cyber and economic warfare) could lessen our vulnerability to the strategies proposed in URW. There is a historic example of using strategic dialogue to decrease mutual vulnerability. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (commonly known as “SALT”) between the US and former Soviet Union, were initially viewed as a useless political gesture, but eventually grew to be the most strategically useful dialogue between the two super-powers.[80] Establishing common definitions and setting boundaries could help both nations avoid passing unspoken thresholds leading to un-intended escalations.

Unfortunately not every component of OPTO lends itself to strategic dialogue. While there is ample evidence that both nations engage in unregulated cyber warfare, other spheres of OPTO remain more difficult to define. URW explicitly advocates for strategies and tactics where plausible deniability can be maintained. Meaningful bilateral negotiations would require both China and the US to have the courage (Yung) and integrity to negotiate in good faith and from a perspective of mutual respect and responsibility. The US is late in laying the groundwork for confronting China’s new approach to warfare. URW was published ten years ago, and we need to consider what new forms of OPTO have been developed during this period. While URW changed the course of China’s strategic endeavors, the principles of URW suggest agility is the key to victory. The most substantive threats posed by URW accumulate over time. Ignoring the threats and risks posed by URW, enables the synergy between these methods to gradually erode our strategic assets. The US needs to move beyond playing catch up with OPTO and re-orient its strategic vision of how 21st century war is waged. Learning from the principles of URW, the US should accelerate efforts to engage in combination warfare and OPTO that can shape the strategic landscape of the 21st century.

The author would like to thank Mr. Tim Thomas, of the Foreign Military Studies Office, both for his ongoing work on China’s Unrestricted Warfare, and for his assistance.

[1] See: Remarks by the Director of National Intelligence, Mr. Mike Mc-Connell, May 17, 2008.

[2] The third war, the “global war on terrorism,” also remains a high priority, while the definition, scope and means of carrying out this campaign are still transitioning since the election of President Obama.

[3] See: “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, p. 33, stating: “The crucial relationship in the region, but also globally, will be that between the United States and China.”

[4] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to the potential for co­operation between China and the U.S. by noting that “the opportunities for us to work together are unmatched anywhere in the world.” See: May/June Foreign Affairs at: external pagehttp://www.cfr.org/publication/19209/g2_mirage.htmlcall_made

[5] See: New York Times, May 16, 2009 “Utah Governor to Become Ambassador to China.”

[6] See: Foreign Affairs Magazine, “The China Challenge,” Sep./Oct. 2005.

[7] See: “Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying,” James M. Olson, 2006. P. 177-178.

[8] See: BBC: “Peoples War; Bedfordshires Secret War,” available at: external pagehttp://www.bbc.co.uk/threecounties/content/articles/2008/03/19/beds_ pw_secret_war_feature.shtmlcall_made.

[9] See: “China is Spying on UK business, warns MI5,” Nov. 30 2007 at: external pagehttp://www.computing.co.uk/computing/news/2204756/people­liberation-army-spyingcall_made.

[10] See: Wall Street Journal, “Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated by Spies,” Apr. 08 2009 at: external pagehttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914805204099085.htmlcall_made.

[11] See: Mr. Timothy Thomas, Foreign Military Studies Office in comments made at “InfoWarCon 2009.” Unrestricted Warfare, 1999 Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999.

[12] See: Times of India, “US Threatens Military Force Against Hackers.” 09 May 2009.

[13] See: Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, available at: external pagehttp://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/call_made.

[14] There have been some efforts to begin drafting international cyber-regulations. A 2005 United Nations report advocates for the formulation of national and international laws that would criminalize concealing ones identity online in order to commit a crime. See: “The Law of Cyberspace,” by Ahmad Kamal, published by the United Nations Institute of Training and Research. (Also available at: external pagehttp://www.cfr.org/publication/9161/law_of_cyberspace.html_/call_made)

[15] See: BBC “Major Spy Network Uncovered,” March 29, 2009. The “Information Warfare Monitor,” also assisted SecDev in their research.

[16] See: Institute for Defense Analysis: “Techniques for Cyber Attack Attribution,” Oct. 2003. See also: “CRS Report For congress: Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, Cyberwarfare capabilities and Related Policy Issues.” 05 June 2007.

[17] For more information on the difficulties associated with attribution see: Institute for Defense Analysis: “Techniques for Cyber Attack Attribution,” Oct. 2003. See also: “CRS Report For congress: Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, Cyberwarfare capabilities and Related Policy Issues.” 05 June 2007.

[18] URW P. 54.

[19] URW P. 51.

[20] URW P. 52.

[21] URW P. 56.

[22] URW P. 56. Ten additional Chinese IO/IW methods are listed by Tim Thomas, in his paper “Like Adding Wings to a Tiger,” these include: “planting information mines, conducting information reconnaissance, changing network data, releasing information bombs, dumping information garbage, disseminating propaganda, applying information deception, releasing clone information, organizing information defense, establishing network spy stations.” P. 4.

[23] URW P. 148.

[24] See: URW P. 215:“Warfare is a dynamic process full of randomness and creativity. Any attempt to tie a war to a set of ideas within a predetermined plan is little short of absurdity or naïveté. Therefore, it is necessary to have feedback and revisions throughout the entire course of a war while it is actually happening, in order to keep the initiative within one’s grasp. This is what is meant by “adjustment and control of the entire process.”

[25] URW P. 221.

[26] URW P. 4.

[27] URW P. 5

[28] See: “People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age,” RAND, National Security Research Division, supported by the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy and the U.S. Air Force, edited by James. C. Mulvenon and Richard Yang. P. 183-186.

[29] URW P. 117.

[30] URW P. 40.

[31] URW P. 191.

[32] URW P. 5. “A war which changed the world ultimately changed war itself. This is truly fantastic, yet it also causes people to ponder deeply. No, what we are referring to are not changes in the instruments of war, the technology of war, the modes of war, or the forms of war. What we are referring to is the function of warfare.” See also: P. 196, stating that wars need not progress “level by level to some fateful moment of destiny,” but rather by “continuously,” creating such moments of opportunity and by taking advantage of them.

[33] URW P. 5-6.

[34] URW P. 36.

[35] URW cites to British strategist Liddel Hart, and his work on Grand Strategy. P. 169.

[36] URW P. 6. The authors include: “financial attack by George Soros on East Asia; the “terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy by Usama Bin Laden; the gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the disciples of the Aum Shinri Kyo, and the havoc wreaked by the likes of Morris Jr. on the internet.”

[37] URW P. 6.

[38] URW P. 6.

[39] URW P. 7.

[40] URW, See Chapter 1, section 2.

[41] URW P. 9.

[42] URW P. 10.

[43] The Congressional Research Service described some of China’s efforts, stating that: “Empirical studies have found that China has one of the most sophisticated content-filtering Internet regimes in the world. The Chinese government employs increasingly sophisticated methods to limit content online, including a combination of legal regulation, surveillance, and punishment to promote self-censorship, as well as technical controls. U.S. government efforts to defeat Internet “jamming” include funding through the Broadcasting Board of Governors to provide counter-censorship software to Chinese Internet users to access Voice of America (VOA) and Radio FreeAsia (RFA) in China. CRS Report for Congress, “Internet Development and Information Control in the People’s Republic of China.” 10 February 2006.

[44] See: “The Chinese World Order,” John K. Fairbank, Harvard University Press.

[45] RW P. 182. See also p. 118, Where the range of issues considered in analyzing a target are called a “large strategic situation map: “The increased load of this type of large security view brings with it complications of the target as well as the means and methods for realizing the target. As a result, the national strategy for ensuring the realization of national security targets, namely, what is generally called grand strategy, also necessitates carrying out adjustments, which go beyond military strategies and even political strategies. Such a strategy takes all things into consideration that are involved in each aspect of the security index of the interests of the entire nation, as well as superimposes political (national will, values, and cohesion) and military factors on the economy, culture, foreign relations, technology, environment, natural resources, nationalities, and other parameters before one can draw out a complete “extended domain” which superposes both national interests and national security - a large strategic situation map.”

[46] URW P. 137.

[47] URW P. 21.

[48] URW P. 207

[49] URW P. 142.

[50] URW P. 142.

[51] URW P. 147.

[52] “It is not the same as any of the very strongly directed methods of operation of the past, for only when the basket is filled with specific targets and contents does it begin to have directionality and aim. The key to whether or not victory is won in a war is nowhere else but in what things you are able to pack into this basket.” URW P. 147.

[53] “Only a handful of soldiers are likely to grasp a principle that every statesman already knows: that the biggest difference between contemporary wars and the wars of the past is that, in contemporary wars, the overt goal and the covert goal are often two different matters.” URW P. 39.

[54] This “emptiness,” is also referenced in URW when the authors discuss “breaking ideology,” and eliminating assumptions about the progression of warfare.

[55] See: The Air Force Times, “China denies hacking into F-35 Data,” April 23, 2009. external pagehttp://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/04/ap_f35_china_denies_hacking_042309/call_made

[56] URW suggests a synergistic effect can be had by the employment of multiple weapons, and multiple generations of weapons, towards the same goal, “If one can find a good point of agreement, which is to say, the most appropriate tactics, the pairing up and use of new and older generation weapons not only makes it possible to eliminate the weakness of uniform weaponry, it may also become a “multiplier” to increase the weapons’ effectiveness.” URW P. 20.

[57] URW P. 207.

[58] URW P. 208.

[59] “When setting objectives, one must overcome the mentality of craving great successes, and instead consciously pursue limited objectives and eliminate objectives which are beyond one’s abilities, even though they may be proper. This is because every objective which is achievable is limited. No matter what the reason, setting objectives which exceed allowable limits of the measures available will only lead to disastrous consequences. URW P. 196, see also P. 209.

[60] URW P. 196.

[61] URW P. 209.

[62] URW P. 95.

[63] URW P. 95.

[64] “The security vault of a modern national building is far from being able to be supported by the singular power of one pillar. The key to its standing erect and not collapsing lies in whether it can to a large extent form composite force in all aspects related to national interest.” URW P. 119. It is worth noting that China’s I-Ching, hexagram #26, Ta Ch’u or the “Taming power of the Great,” combines the principle of “emptiness” with that of heavenly virtue and “great correctness.”

[65] “ Given their state of mind of “looking around in the dark with daggers drawn,” the American soldiers who had lost their opponent due to the collapse of the former Soviet Union are vehemently searching for a reason not to allow themselves to be “unemployed.” This is because from the generals to the common soldiers, from the spear of attack to the shield of defense, from major strategies to minor methods of operation, everything that the American military does is done in preparation of gaining victory in a major war. It should not be said that as soon as there were no longer two armies facing off against each other that American military circles and even he American Congress would produce an empty feeling at having lost their goal. The result was that without an enemy, one still had to be created. Therefore, even if it is a tiny area such as Kosovo, they cannot pass up an opportunity to try out their frosty blades.” URW P. 127.

[66] URW P. 95.

[67] See: New York Times, “Cadets Trade the Trenches for Firewalls,” May 11, 2009.

[68] URW P. 18.

[69] URW P. 21.

[70] URW P. 19.

[71] “Reducing casualties and achieving war objectives have become the two equal weights on the American military scale. These common American soldiers who should be on the battlefield have now become the most costly security in war, like precious china bowls that people are afraid to break. All of the opponents who have engaged in battle with the American military have probably mastered the secret of success - if you have no way of defeating this force, you should kill its rank and file soldiers.” URW P. 93.

[72] See: “Sun Tzu & Information Warfare: Knowledge Strategies,” National Defense University p. 6-7, Lieutenant Colonel William Fast, U.S. Army.

[73] URW P. 84.

[74] URW P. 102.

[75] URW P. 103.

[76] “The Way to Win Wars,” Liddell Hart, preface p. 5.

[77] See: “Mapping the Global Future; Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project,” Dec. 2004, P. 49.

[78] “Moreover, philosophical, scientific, and artistic methods are also effective in supporting military wisdom and military action. This is why people often refer to military ideology, military theory, and military practice as military philosophy, military science, and military art. Liddell Hart [British officer and military theorist] defined the word strategy as “the art of using military means to achieve political objectives.” From this we can see that the concept of means covers a lot of territory, on numerous levels, with overlapping functions, and thus it is not an easy concept to grasp. Only by expanding our field of vision and our understanding of means, and grasping the principle that there is nothing which cannot be considered a means, can we avoid the predicament of being confronted with too many difficulties to tackle all at once and being at wit’s end when we employ means.” URW P. 193.

[79] URW P. 38, “Territory and resources, a dispute over religious beliefs, hatred stemming from tribal differences, a dispute over ideology, a dispute over market share, a dispute over the distribution of power and authority, a dispute over trade sanctions or a dispute stemming from financial unrest.”

[80] See: “From the Shadows,” Robert M. Gates, p. 44-49.