The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia (Part 1)

Executive Summary

The tensions between the Koreas – and the potential involvement of the People’s Republic of China (China or PRC), Japan, Russia, and the United States of America (US) – create a nearly open-ended spectrum of possible conflicts. These range from posturing and threats – “wars of intimidation” – to a major conventional conflict on the Korean Peninsula to intervention by outside powers like the US and China to the extreme of nuclear conflict.

The Korean balance is also sharply affected by the uncertain mix of cooperation and competition between the United States and China. The US rebalancing of its forces to Asia and the steady modernization of Chinese forces, in particular the growth of Chinese sea-air-missile capabilities to carry out precision conventional and nuclear strikes deep into the Pacific, affect the balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia. They also raise the possibility of far more intense conflicts and ones that could extend far beyond the boundaries of the Koreas.

There are powerful deterrents to such conflicts. The Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) has emerged as a major economic power, one that is important to the economies of the US, Japan, and China – as well as to the world. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is one of the world’s most heavily militarized states, but it is still a relatively small military power by US and Chinese standards. It remains vulnerable to US aid, missile power, and precision strike capability, and runs a serious risk of being isolated if it provokes or escalates a conflict without Chinese support.

Both the US and China have every reason to prevent and contain a conflict in the Koreas and Northeast Asia. Both are dependent on the ROK and Japan for critical aspects of their trade and economies, and both are dependent on the overall stability of a global economy that is heavily driven by the stability of Northeast Asia. Neither can “win” any conflict between them at a cost approaching the benefits of avoiding a conflict, neither has an incentive to becoming locked into an arms race that extends beyond basic national security concerns, and neither can “win” a limited clash or conflict without triggering a far deeper, lasting process of competition that may lead to far more serious wars.

Japan is another player in this process and one that has virtually the same reasons to avoid intensifying its present military efforts or becoming involved in a conflict if it can. Japan cannot, however, stand aside from the Koreas and the overall balance of forces in Northeast Asia. Japan, too, must assess its security position in terms of the DPRK’s expanding missile and nuclear capabilities and the outcome of both the rebalancing of US forces and China’s pace of military modernization. It, too, faces a “worst case” that could push it into creating far larger military forces and even offensive missile and nuclear forces.

The fact remains that no one can dismiss the risk of a serious clash or war between the Koreas that escalates to involve the powers outside it. This is particularly true if one considers the number of times that war has resulted from unpredictable incidents and patterns of escalation. The historical reality is that the likelihood of less-probable forms of war actually occurring has been consistently higher than what seemed in peacetime to be the most probable contingencies and the patterns of escalation that seemed most likely from the viewpoint of a “rational bargainer.”

The Balance of Different Perceptions

This report focuses on the strategies, resources, and patterns of modernization that shape the balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia as well as the broader balance in the Pacific region. It is a three volume series that assesses the balance of forces that shape the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula in the full range of conflicts that could occur in the region. It focuses on the forces of the ROK and DPRK, but looks at outside powers as well. It also addresses the complex and constantly shifting mix of conventional, asymmetric, and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) capabilities that shape the balance.

The report also examines these interrelated “balances” using a range of different sources – emphasizing the official language used in DPRK, ROK, US, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian sources where possible. These sources seem to present the best view of what countries think about their own forces and the threats they face, although many clearly are designed as at least partial exercises in strategic communications and propaganda. They do, however, include US Department of Defense reports which provide a unique unclassified picture of US intelligence estimates and analysis.

The detailed contents of each chapter consistently reveal just how different the perceptions and values of each side are and how great the risk is of miscalculation based on different values. North Korea is, to put it mildly, a strategic outlier in virtually all of its statements and actions – differing sharply from China as well as South Korea, the US, and Japan.

Even when given sides appear to share the same values, it may be more a matter of rhetoric and propaganda, and the political, ideological, and strategic differences between major actors are compounded by major differences in the estimates of given sources, both in terms of data on given military forces and as to how the balance should be assessed. It is clear that any model of deterrence, scenarios, and escalation ladders – as well as arms control options – would present the need for research and negotiations over basic data, similar to past experiences.

Such an assessment is critical to shaping a strategy that can deter and defend against North Korea as well as for negotiations and planning responses to a variety of potential situations on the Peninsula and Northeast Asia, and that involve critical Chinese and American choices between cooperation and competition. At the same time, the assessment shows there is no one way of assessing the Korean military balance that can be used for policy planning, strategic assessments, or arms control negotiations. The unclassified information available is often too uncertain, national perceptions differ too much, and different combinations of forces may be relevant in different situations.

At this point, there is only a limited common base of perceptions and data to build upon. The analysis attempts to deal with these problems by drawing the primary statistical data on the military balance from reporting by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and supplementing each section with a range of data taken from US, Japanese, Chinese, Russian, ROK, and DPRK official sources, other NGOs, and defense reporting by sources like IHS Jane’s. However, similar data are not available in meaningful detail from unclassified DPRK – and to a lesser extent, Chinese – sources, and there are too few unclassified data on exercises, tactics, and doctrine that are detailed enough to try to interpret just how much declared statements differ from underlying values and perceptions.

Security Strategies

The security strategies that shape the Korean balance are driven by the DPRK’s aggressive ness and militarization, long history of confrontation with the ROK, the legacy of the Korean and Cold Wars, and the US presence in the ROK and Japan. At the same time, they are increasingly drive by the emergence of China as a great power in Asia and the Pacfic, and the broader strategic competition between the US and China.

The DPRK

In practice, the DPRK’s grand strategy consists of enhancing the cult of the “dear leader,” and regime survival are the DPRK’s grand strategy. Its militarism, provocations of South Korea, and exaggerated threats are all means to this end. As for ideology, the DPRK has never shown any evidence it cares about Marxism or its people in another meaningful sense. In practice, its now hereditary “great leaders” owe more to the emperors of ancient Korea’s Goguryeo kingdom, and the divinity they claimed through their Jumong foundation myth. than Marx, Lenin, or Mao.

The PRK has use a mix of threats and sporadic attacks, decades of military build-up, and endless propaganda campaigns about foreign threats and invasions to justify its dictatorship, and devoting the bulk of its resources to military forces. It has used such foreign threats to manipulate its people, while it has used its military build-up and covert or limited attacks in an effort to extort foreign outside aid and enhance its status and negotiating leverage.

In his February 2012 Senate testimony, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. stated,[1]

… the primary goals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are preserving its current system of government, improving its poor economy, and building national confidence and support for Kim Jong Un – youngest son of the late Kim Jong Il and North Korea's new "Great Leader." North Korea's leadership is emphasizing policy continuity under Kim Jong Un which DIA anticipates will include continued pursuit of nuclear and missile capabilities for strategic deterrence and international prestige, as well as to gain economic and political concessions.

The following year, Director of National Intelligence James R, Clapper reported to the Senate,[2] Kim Jong Un has quickly consolidated power since taking over as leader of North Korea when his father, Kim Jong Il, died in December 2011. Kim has publicly focused on improving the country’s troubled economy and the livelihood of the North Korean people, but we have yet to see any signs of serious economic reform.

North Korea maintains a large, conventional military force held in check by the more powerful South Korean-US military alliance. Nevertheless, the North Korean military is well postured to conduct limited attacks with little or no warning, such as the 2010 sinking of a South Korean warship and the artillery 23 bombardment of a South Korean island along the Northern Limit Line.

At the same time, these assessments reflect the DPRK’s emergence as one of the most militarized nations in the world and a very real and growing threat to regional stability that has begun to take the form of nuclear threats that extend to point of launching a nuclear war against the United States. The DPRK has worked to expand its military capacity since the mid-1970s, valuing quantity over quality and focusing on conventional means. Despite economic troubles, the DPRK has continued its efforts to modernize its arms and pursue strategic WMD, with the ultimate goal of building a prosperous and strong nation.[3]

Performance-wise, various weapons found in North Korea’s ground forces, including T-62 tanks, M-1973 armored vehicles, various self-propelled guns, multiple rocket launchers, AT-3/4 anti-tank missiles and modified SCUD missiles, are modernized weaponry. North Korea is currently making concentrated efforts to modernize its military equipment by building Pokpung-ho (“Storm Tiger”) tanks, which are reproduced designs of Soviet-made T-72s, along with introducing, manufacturing and deploying 23mm antiaircraft guns.

Changes in the DPRK’s leadership are also having an impact on the extent to which the DPRK poses a military threat. The new leader, Kim Jong-un, was elected Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2010. Following the death of his father, he was elected Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army as well as Central Military Commission Chairman and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission in April 2012. These three steps established his control and consolidated his authority over the party, military, and state.

The DPRK has said often via state media that there would be no change in policy between Kim Jong-un and his father. For example, shortly after Kim Jong-il’s death, the media stated that “foolish politicians around the world, including in South Korea, should not expect any changes from us.” [4]There have been no indications that Kim Jong-un is disposed to taking measures that could reduce regional frictions or improve the daily lives of North Korean citizens. Several factors make it likely that the DPRK’s political system – a concentrated, one-man dictatorship – will continue without significant reform.

Senior North Korean officials do speak about military policy and strategy in broad terms. At the fifth Plenum of the fourth Korean Workers’ Party’s Central Committee in 1962, the DPRK adopted the military concept of ‘Four Military Guidelines’: extensive training for all soldiers, fortifying the whole country, modernization of the armed forces, and arming the entire population. Since then, the DPRK has been building its military capabilities in accordance with these guidelines.

The DPRK has said it bases its military policy on a Four-point Military Guideline that promotes such objectives. The DPRK’s constitution states that “on the basis of politically and ideologically arming the military and populace, the state shall realize a self-defensive military force built on the following objectives: (1) a cadre-based army, (2) modernization, (3) militarization of the populace, and (4) a stronghold-based fortified nation.” [5]

The DPRK promotes two main policies or ideologies in its government propaganda. The primary state ideology is juche (“self-reliance”) – meaning that the focus of DPRK efforts is always on making North Korea a strong, independent nation, not reliant on any other nation for anything, including security. Juche promotes the idea of the collective identity as an organic whole, with the supreme leader at the top of this unified system. The DPRK leaders’ personality cults reinforce popular support for the system.

Secondly, the DPRK follows a songun policy (“military first”), presented as deriving from and reinterpreting juche, in order to construct a strong socialist state politically, economically, ideologically, and militarily. According to the DPRK communist party newspaper, songun is “a unique mode of politics that dedicates maximum effort to reinforcing the KPA [Korean People’s Army], in which military power becomes the basis that propels general tasks in the vanguard of the socialist revolution and construction of a socialist nation.”[6]

According to the South Korean government, “The North continues to pursue its military-first policy and address the KPA as revolutionary armed forces. This indicates that the regime, which maintains its power base in the military, has not abandoned its desire to take over by force and unify the Korean peninsula under communism.”[7]

The ROK

The ROK has sought to establish better relations with the DPRK with consistently uncertain results. Over the last half century, North Korea has made over 2,660 military provocations against South Korea. This has not, however, prevented the ROK from taking repeated initiatives for better relations.

Kim Dae-jung (President 1998-2002) adopted the “Sunshine Policy” in dealing with North Korea, emphasizing increased communication, assistance, and exchanges with the DPRK while delaying political settlement and reunification to a future time. His successor, Roh Moo-hyun (President 2003-2007) followed a similar policy, entitled “peace and prosperity policy.”

During these two liberal presidencies, the ROK pursued large-scale economic engagement with the DPRK for a decade, believing that they had to convince the DPRK’s leadership that its external environment was benign. Through economic engagement, the ROK attempted to both pacify the DPRK’s belligerence and initiate slow reform in the DPRK itself. In turn, these goals would avoid any collapse of the DPRK and the so-called “hard landing” unification scenario. When Kim Jong-il responded to the ROK’s unilateral offers of assistance, these two Presidents felt validated that their policies were successfully working. However, the DPRK was simply accepting ROK assistance and calling it “gifts” to its Great Leaders from the weaker ROK.

However, after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island attacks in 2010 in which the ROK military failed to respond effectively to North Korean provocations, the ROK started promoting a new strategy, called “active deterrence” or “proactive deterrence.” This policy emphasized enhanced offensive capabilities in order to ensure deterrence of the DPRK, enabling the ROK military to immediately retaliate in the event of any further DPRK provocations. The ROK Army has deployed short-range missiles and other weapons systems to border areas in order to increase rapidity of response. This also increases the potential for miscalculation or accidental escalation – for example, ROK troops, wishing to implement the new strategic doctrine, accidentally shot at an Asiana civilian airliner in 2012.

President Park Geun-hye was virtually forced to strongly denounce the DPRK’s third nuclear test, saying it undermined trust-building and posed a significant threat to the Korean Peninsula and international peace. At the same time, Park indicated that such DPRK actions were anticipated, and thus her approach to the DPRK would not significantly change – she will work to separate humanitarian assistance from the broader political issues on the Peninsula.

In her inauguration speech, she stated that “North Korea’s recent nuclear test is a challenge to the survival and future of the Korean people, and there should be no mistake that the biggest victim will be none other than North Korea itself.” She urged the DPRK to abandon its nuclear ambitions, “instead of wasting its resources on nuclear and missile development and continuing to turn its back to the world in self-imposed isolation.” [8]

The US

The US has remained firmly committed to the security of the ROK ever since the Korean War. Thomas Donilan, the National Security Advisor to President Obama, stated in a March 2013 speech that that the overarching objective of the Obama Administration’s Asia policy was to “sustain a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights of freedom.” The policy was based on several key considerations:[9]

This reflected a recognition of the critical role that the United States has played in Asia for decades, providing the stabilizing foundation for the region’s unprecedented social and economic development. Beyond this, our guiding insight was that Asia’s future and the future of the United States are deeply and increasingly linked. Economically, Asia already accounts for more than one-quarter of global GDP. Over the next five years, nearly half of all growth outside the United States is expected to come from Asia. This growth is fueling powerful geopolitical forces that are reshaping the region: China’s ascent, Japan’s resilience, and the rise of a “Global Korea,” an eastward-looking India and Southeast Asian nations more interconnected and prosperous than ever before.

At the same time, the balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia is driven by much broader changes in the strategies and force postures of the United State and China. Current US policy calls for a rebalancing of US strategy in Asia composed of five strategic pillars: strengthening alliances, forging deeper partnerships with emerging powers, building a constructive relationship with China, strengthening regional institutions, and building an economic architecture to increase the benefits of trade and growth for countries in the Asia-Pacific region and the US – such as through the US-ROK FTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Furthermore, there is currently a period of significant transition in Asia, especially in Northeast Asia – a new DPRK leader at the end of 2011, a Japanese leadership change at the end of 2012, and leadership transitions in both the ROK and China in early 2013.

The US alliances with Japan and the ROK remain the foundations of the US regional security and economic strategy; polls in both countries show approximately 80% support for their alliances with the US. Greater trilateral cooperation is envisioned as key to maintain security. Militarily, the rebalance involves:[10]

… in the coming years a higher proportion of our military assets will be in the Pacific. Sixty percent of our naval fleet will be based in the Pacific by 2020. Our Air Force is also shifting its weight to the pacific over the next five years. We are adding capacity from both the Army and the Marines. The Pentagon is working to prioritize the Pacific Command for our most modern capabilities – including submarines, Fifth- Generation fighters such as F-22s and F-35s, and reconnaissance platforms. And we are working with allies to make rapid progress in expanding radar and missile defense systems to protect against the most immediate threat facing our allies and the entire region: the dangerous, destabilizing behavior of North Korea.

In terms of the China-US relationship, US strategy indicates that both cooperation and competition will continue, though the US policy has consistently been “to improve the quality and quantity of our cooperation; promote healthy economic competition; and manage disagreements to ensure that U.S. interests are protected and that universal rights and values are respected…. the United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, prosperous China.” In order to achieve these goals, communication channels must be improved and practical cooperation on important issues demonstrated. [11]

China

China has steadily improved its military capabilities for well over a decade and is increasingly projecting power throughout the East Asian region. These trends began along with China’s emergence as a major economic power, and have increasingly led to tension with the US – as well as a number of China’s neighbors.

In terms of the Koreas, China maintains the “Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty” that it signed in 1961. The two countries have traditionally been described has “blood brothers” or “closer than lips and teeth,” although the PRC-DPRK relationship has been rocky over the past 60 years, and China has sought to moderate the DPRK’s behavior and move it towards economic reform based on the Chinese model.

China does not formally allocate military forces for the defense of the DPRK and does not forward deploy military forces in that country. It also has recently stepped up its efforts persuade the DPRK to restrain its aggressiveness and nuclear and missiles efforts. China did, however, save the DPRK from total defeat in the Korean War, and it sees the DPRK as a critical buffer that ensure ROK and US forces remain away from its borders, as well as a counterbalance to Japan. No one can dismiss the possibility that Chinese forces might intervene if the DPRK again was threatened with defeat, or if any form of regime collapse threatened to create a US presence in the DPRK or deploy ROK forces near the Chinese border.

More broadly, US and Chinese strategy regarding the Koreas cannot be separated from their broader strategic interests in Northeast Asia, in Asia as a whole and the Pacific. Whether the US chooses to formally state it or not, its “rebalancing” of its force posture and military modernization efforts in Asia is driven in large part by China’s military modernization and growing power projection capabilities. China in turn is doing far more than creating a “blue water” navy and modernizing key elements of its forces. Its strategy involves the creation of new joint warfare, power projection, and sea-air-missile-nuclear capabilities that affect any confrontation ort conflict in the Koreas and northeast Asia at least as much as any struggle that affects Taiwan of US base and forces deeper in the Pacific up to the “second island chain.”

The Economic Balance

In spite of these uncertainties in the data, it is clear that the ROK has a far greater capacity to develop and support its forces than the DPRK. The CIA estimated in April 2013 that the DPRK had a GDP that worth roughly $40 billion in 2011 (ranking 103rd in the world), while the ROK’s GDP in 2012 was worth some $1.62 trillion (ranking 13th in the world), or roughly 40 times that of that of the DPRK. It also estimated that the DPRK had a GDP per capita of about $1,800 (ranking 197th in the world), while the ROK’s GDP per capita was approximately $32,400 (ranking 40th in the world), or 18 times of that of the DPRK.[12] Over the past decade, the DPRK’s rankings in GDP and GDP per capita have been decreasing, while those of the ROK have been steadily increasing.

The CIA also estimated that the DPRK had a total population of 24.6 million in 2012, while the ROK’s population is 48.8 million, or more than 2.1 times that of the DPRK. It estimated the median age of the DPRK’s population at 33 years, and that of the ROK at 39 years. Finally it estimated that the DPRK had 6.5 million males available for military service and 207,737 young men entering military age each year, while the ROK had 13.2 million available males and 365,760 males entering military age annually.[13]

All of these data show that the ROK has far more resources to use in supporting its national security structure than the DPRK, and that overall trends will remain significantly in the ROK’s favor.

The World Bank and UN make somewhat different estimates of the size of the DPRK and ROK’s resources, but all agree that the ROK has a vastly larger economy, far better income distribution and personal wealth, and far more personnel that can be devoted to military service. The ROK’s disadvantages are that its population has much higher expectations, it must pay far more for manpower, it must price military investment in market rather than command terms, and it finds it harder to command popular sacrifices in the name of enhanced security.

The ROK is limited largely by its perceptions and the military expenditures it chooses to make. It has the economic capacity to easily spend far more than it does today, a much stronger technology and manufacturing base, and access to the best weapons and military systems in US inventory.

Efforts to compare data between state-controlled and market economies raise major questions as to the comparability of costs. This not only affects investment, but every aspect of manpower and readiness. The DPRK, for example, can command any amount of manpower it wants at any price it wants; the ROK cannot.

At the same time, it is clear that the DPRK has steadily declined as an economic power and in every aspect of competitiveness with the ROK. While it is impossible to quantify the impact of the DPRK’s economic issues on its military capabilities and readiness, the fact remains that it has major problems in providing adequate stocks of basic commodities such as fuel.

There have been some reports that the DPRK’s economic problems are serious enough to limit its training and production of basic military supplies like artillery ammunition. Such reports cannot be confirmed, but the DPRK’s economic weaknesses may overshadow any benefits gained from its ability to allocate economic resources without regard to popular and market demands.

The DPRK’s industrial base is largely obsolete, and it lags a decade or more behind in key areas of technology like computerization, modern communications, and other key technical elements of the “revolution in military affairs,” which make up key elements of modern battle management, targeting systems, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities – though it has been significantly increasing its cyber capabilities in recent years.

The Military Spending and Arms Import Balance

North Korea does everything possible to conceal its true level of military spending, and there are no reliable estimates of how many resources it devotes to its forces. All outside sources agree, however, that it is one of the most militarized countries in the world.

The ROK’s state-run Korean Institute of Defense Analyses reported that while the DPRK officially said it spent $570 million on its military in 2009, calculating based on PPP, the real amount was $8.77 billion – 13 to 15 times greater than announced. The total gross national income of the DPRK in 2009 was approximately $25 billion, meaning that the DPRK spent about a third of its national income on its military. According to DPRK figures, military spending was $470 million in 2006, $510 million in 2007, and $540 million in 2008.

The 2012 Japanese Defense White Paper noted that,[14]

Although North Korea has been facing serious economic difficulties and has depended on the international community for food and other resources, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2012, the proportion of the defense budget in FY2011’s national budget was 15.8%, but it is believed that this represents only a portion of real defense expenditures.

The ROK is far less militarized than the DPRK, but it has had to respond to the steady build-up of the DPRK’s military forces. The ROK’s military expenditures in 2011 amounted to $28.3 billion, or approximately 2.7% of the country’s GDP. The ROK’s FY2012 defense budget showed an increase of approximately 5% over the previous year, the 13th consecutive year-on- year rise. The 2012 budget totaled 32.9 trillion won, accounting for 14.8% of the government budget and 2.4% of ROK GDP. This was the fourth largest national spending category, after healthcare, welfare and labor; general public administration; and education.

An expert at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses explained the 2012 budget’s force maintenance and force improvement projects in detail ,[15]

In order to foster a “combat-oriented” military, the Force Maintenance budget for the year 2012 prioritizes maximizing war-fighting capability by tightening military operation and watch systems on the front line and expanding scientific combat training equipment and personal combat equipment. It also focuses on improving the working and living conditions for military service members as well as boosting their morale and welfare by advancing military medical services and improving their living quarters. Consequently, the expenses for military uniforms, military service member health and welfare enhancement, military personnel management, and training and education show a rapid year-on-year increase of more than 10 percent.

The budget for dispatching ROK Forces overseas was set at KRW 22.6 billion, with 21.6 billion allotted for sending troops to multi-national forces (MNF) and 1 billion for PKO activities. Meanwhile, the cost for defense cost-sharing under the Special Measures Agreement on Defense Cost-sharing from 2009 to 2013 amounts to KRW 746.1 billion, taking into account past budget execution results and the estimated size of future spending.

The IISS describes the trends in the ROK’s military spending as follows:[16]

The 2012 defence budget amounted to US$29bn or 14.8% of the central government budget and 2.5% of GDP. There is a growing consensus that defence spending should increase to at least 2.7% of GDP. The ‘Mid-Term Defense Plan 2013–17’ called for increased spending on capabilities including surface-to- surface missiles, stand-off precision-guided weapons and airborne electronic-attack systems. However, additional outlays will be constrained by annual growth rates that, due to the country’s maturing economy, will likely hover around 2–3%, as well as by calls for increased social-welfare spending by presidential election candidates.

As for outside powers, the US still leads the world in terms of total military spending, but it has only limited deployments in Korea and Asia. At the same time, China is not only an emerging military power, but also has major forces in the areas near its border with the DPRK. Japan is able to afford significant forces in spite of the fact it spends no more than one percent of its GDP on defense, but does not currently plan for missions that affect the Korean balance. Russia is another major military power in the region that has a major stake in Northeast Asia, but it is more likely to exert political pressure and influence than use military force.

The Modernization Balance

Modernization efforts are another key variable in assessing the balance in the Korean Peninsula. The modernization trends of all the countries involved in the region have great significance in determining what type of engagements potentially can fought there and what types of equipment and systems would be needed to counter any provocations by the DPRK – potentially including its allies. Conversely, the modernization of US allies’ militaries also affects the course of any engagement as well as how much and what types of capacities the US would need to commit to the region, both in times of peace and in times of tension.

Once again, there are serious limits to the unclassified data available for comparisons of Northeast Asian military modernization – especially for China and the DPRK. Unclassified sources do not include many smart munitions, they only cover a limited amount of other weaponry, and they do not reflect investments in logistics and transport. They also often do not include battle management, ISR, or Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) assets. These are becoming steadily more critical aspects of military modernization.

The Korean balance is a case where any meaningful assessment requires a full examination of all the complex issues and uncertainties involved, and one that looks at the overall pattern of military change in the US, China and Japan – not simply modernization as it affects forces in the Korean Peninsula. Any assessment of modernization trends requires a detailed examination by key force element and service, and must then be assessed in terms of overall impact on the force structures examined in Volume II of this report.

The DPRK has focused its resources on expanding and further developing its asymmetrical capabilities, including WMD, special operations forces, ballistic missiles, and electronic/information warfare. For the DPRK leadership, these capabilities can project a greater threat at a smaller cost than conventional capabilities. Asymmetric capabilities will be discussed further in the latter chapters of this report.

The ROK has modernized more rapidly with more advanced equipment than the DPRK, while the DPRK has focused on force expansion. The ROK has almost achieved a massive lead in modern aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. The analysis shows that the ROK has an effective plan for force modernization through 2020 – a plan it has upgraded since 2005 to reflect the increase in DPRK provocations over the past few years.

The DPRK pursued an asymmetric strategy to enhance its long-range strike capability against civilian and military targets in order to compensate for declining conventional capabilities. Specific attention has been focused on self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and ballistic missiles. More reliance has also been given to the Special Forces, tasked with stealthy infiltration of the ROK rear. Most sources agree that DPRK Special Forces have been augmented to a 200,000 end-strength, up from 180,000 in 2008.

The ROK is committed to significant future defense reforms, especially in light of increased DPRK provocations over the past several years, and especially in terms of military hardware. It has gathered additional stealth air-to-surface missiles and advanced cluster bombs, in addition to development of deep-penetrating ‘bunker-buster’ bombs capable of destroying fortified artillery – in case the DPRK initiates a new artillery shelling attack, like at Yeonpyeong Island.

Current modernization plans focus on three priority areas: increasing the integrity of the ROK armed forces through military restructuring, ensuring active deterrence capabilities, and maximizing the efficiency of the national defense administration and force structure. Early warning and surveillance capabilities, include increasing the number of UAVs, were also emphasized. Furthermore, current plans focuses on eight priority issues: [17]

(1) Reorganization of the armed forces’ chain-of-command,

(2) Establishment of an island defense command for the northwest (Yellow Sea),

(3) Improvement of the national defense training structure,

(4) Organization of a priority order for strengthening military power,

(5) Response to North Korea’s special forces and cyber threats,

(6) Enhancement of mental strength and assistance for educating national citizens about security,

(7) Improvement of the national defense personnel management system, and

(8) Bettering the efficiency of the national budget.

The US is working with the ROK as part of its force rebalance to support its allies in Asia. In spite of cuts in the US defense budget, the US is still carrying out major modernization activities, building up its air-sea power projection capabilities and Special Forces, and enhancing key aspects of its stealth and ISR capabilities.

US efforts must, however, be assessed in terms of the steady modernization of Chinese forces and Chinese ability to deter or intervene in a conflict in the Koreas. Both the US and China are modernizing their forces in ways that will radically change the balance of deterrence and military capabilities in the Koreas, Northeast Asia, and the Pacific.

The US is focusing on a limited “rebalancing” of its forces that will lead to some redeployment from Europe and the Atlantic to Asia and the Pacific. It is also focusing its force modernization in ways that will enhance the capability of all its forces in Asia and its power projection capabilities. As yet, it has no clear plans to make such changes and its efforts are being affected by an internal financial crisis and growing defense budget cuts.

China is making far more rapid efforts to modernize key aspects of its land, air, and naval forces, it conventional precision strike capabilities, its joint warfare and battle management capabilities, its power projection capabilities, its space warfare capabilities, its missile and nuclear forces, and its capabilities for asymmetric warfare including new areas like cyberwarfare.

No one can as yet predict how the resulting balance of US and Chinese capabilities will evolve, but China may well emerge as a peer military power in Asia and even beyond. Combined with the DPRK’s missile and nuclear programs, this may lead to major changes in ROK and Japanese conventional, asymmetric, and nuclear military modernization efforts – issues explored in more depth in Chapters 4 and 9. At a minimum, it means that the balance in the Koreas will increasingly be determined by the outside changes in US and Chinese forces and their degree of strategic cooperation versus competition.

The “Conventional” Warfare Balance

There is no one conventional balance that is the most likely to shape any conflict between the Koreas. Much depends on the scenario used in making the count, and the term “conventional” does not apply to many credible scenarios. Asymmetric and nuclear forces are likely to play at least some role in the way any conflict develops.

For decades, the DPRK has shaped the military balance in the Koreas through periods of deliberate confrontation and military threats, threatening military movements and exercises, a steady military build-up, and sporadic acts of low-level violence ranging from assassination to artillery attacks and ship sinkings. It has focused on ROK targets but also consistently threatened the US.

Major uncertainties affect even the most basic counts of the regular military forces on each side. The Korean balance involves complex mixes of conventional, irregular, missile and WMD forces. As the analysis shows, the DPRK and ROK have very different force structures, deployments, and geography. In broad terms, however, the ROK has the advantage in “conventional force” quality and the DPRK has the advantage in force quantity. James R. Clapper, the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI), summarized the Korean conventional balance as follows on February 10, 2011: [18]

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[1] Ronald L Burgess, Jr., Annual Threat Assessment, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 16, 2012, p. 8

[2] James R Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 12, 2013, p. 22-3.

[3] Source: Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012, p. 127.

[4] Lucy Williamson, “Will North Korea change under Kim Jong-un?” BBC News, January 18, 2012.

[5] Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012, p. 107.

[6] Rodong Sinmun, October 9, 1998, quoted in: Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012, p. 106.

[7] Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012, p. 107.

[8] Choe Sang-hun, “New South Korean Leader Warns north Against Nuclear Pursuits,” The New York Times, February 25, 2013.

[9] Thomas Donilan, National Security Advisor to President Obama, speech at Asia Society New York, March 11, 2013.

[10] Thomas Donilan, National Security Advisor to President Obama, speech at Asia Society New York, March 11, 2013.

[11] Thomas Donilan, National Security Advisor to President Obama, speech at Asia Society New York, March 11, 2013.

[12] CIA, “World Factbook, [North Korea]” and “World Factbook [South Korea],” updated February 5, 2013, accessed February 22, 2013. external pagehttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.htmlcall_made; external pagehttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ns.htmlcall_made. GDP measured in purchasing power parity terms.

[13] CIA, “World Factbook, [North Korea]” and “World Factbook [South Korea],” updated February 5, 2013, accessed February 22, 2013. external pagehttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.htmlcall_made; external pagehttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ns.htmlcall_made.

[14] Japanese Defense Ministry, Japanese National Defense 2012, p. 15.

[15] Kim Kwang-woo, “Analysis of ROK Defense budget for 2012,” ROK Angle, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, January 16, 2012.

[16] IISS, Military Balance 2013, p. 271-2.

[17] Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, p. 24.

[18] James R. Clapper, US director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community Testimony, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 10, 2011.

[19] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, p. 30.

[20] IISS, Military Modernization 2013, p. 270.

[21] Hannah Fischer, North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950–2007, Congressional Research Service, RL30004, April 20, 2007.

[22] Hannah Fischer, North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950–2007, Congressional Research Service, RL30004, April 20, 2007.

[23] US Forces Korea, The New Korea: Strategic Digest, October 2010.

[24] IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: South Korea,” IHS Jane’s, November 27, 2012. external pagehttp://www.janes.comcall_made.

[25] “USPACOM Facts: Headquarters, US Pacific Command,” USPACOM, accessed February 22, 2013. external pagehttp://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/facts.shtmlcall_made.

[26] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 6, 2013 .