The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia (Part 2)

North Korea’s conventional military capabilities have eroded significantly over the past 10-15 years due to persistent food shortages, poor economic conditions, inability to replace aging weapons inventories, reduced training, and increased diversion of the military to infrastructure support. Therefore, Pyongyang increasingly relies on its nuclear program to deter external attacks on the state and to its regime. Although there are other reasons for the North to pursue its nuclear program, redressing conventional weaknesses is a major factor and one that Kim and his likely successors will not easily dismiss.

Nevertheless, the [Korean People’s Army (“KPA”) remains a large and formidable force capable of defending the North. Also, as demonstrated by DPRK attacks on the South Korean ship Cheonan in March 2010 and Yeongpyong Island in November, North Korea is capable of conducting military operations that could potentially threaten regional stability. These operations provide Pyongyang with what the regime may see as a means to attain political goals through coercion.

The DPRK also has long emphasized irregular warfare, low level attacks and covert operations, and large Special Forces. It is ground and missile “heavy” compared to the ROK, and puts far more emphasis on force quantity or mass, while the ROK has emphasized land and air technology and force quality. The DPRK has long built up large stocks of chemical weapons, may have biological weapons and is an emerging nuclear power that may add nuclear warheads to a large force forcer of long range missiles. The ROK is just beginning to develop longer-range missile forces, and has not pursued nuclear weapons. It is, however, acquiring missile defenses.

It is important to note, however, that the DPRK may well face serous limits on its conventional capabilities that Clapper does not address, and this could seriously affect its ability to exploit its apparent conventional strength. Some experts feel that the DPRK’s recurrent economic crises have affected its ability to upgrade its major weapons and modernize its combat and service support forces as well as seriously limited its logistic stocks and capabilities.

This may affect the quality and quantity of basic military stocks like artillery ammunition, and there are reports that the DPRK even lacks the national fuel stocks to carry out a major conventional offensive. Other reports question its level of and realism in training, in addition to the readiness and size of its capability to sustain offensive operations. These reports cannot be confirmed at the unclassified level, but they also cannot be ignored. They present further reasons why the DPRK might choose scenarios or attack models that do not seem predictable. Such limits could encourage it to rely on asymmetric or nuclear options, depending on the scenario and cause of any fighting. They might also force it seek a sudden, surprise conventional victory in any all-out conventional attack.

Much would depend on the conditions that led to a confrontation or actual fighting. Total forces and orders of battle may or may not be relevant measures in a given crisis or conflict. Pyongyang might conduct a major conventional buildup to pressure the ROK, Japan, and/or the US. It might do so to deal with internal unrest by trying to focus the nation on a foreign enemy. It might launch a limited war for the same reasons, or engage in limited provocations – like those in 2010 – to which it expects to receive a limited ROK response and little punishment or censure from the international community.

It is doubtful that the ROK would initiate such a conflict. The ROK cannot be sure what level of escalation would follow any response to a limited incident or DPRK action of the kind Pyongyang initiated by sinking the ROK ship Cheonan on March 26, 2010 and by firing artillery on the populated ROK island of Yeonpyeong on November 23, 2010, killing four people. The ROK might also be confronted with a DPRK succession crisis or massive suppression of the population – creating a strong incentive for some form of decisive ROK military action.

As Sun Tzu pointed out centuries ago, wars do not have to involve conflict if military force can be used politically in the equivalent of “wars of intimidation.” The DPRK has found that one way to both mobilize support for the regime and put pressure on its neighbors and the US is to militarily pressure them, especially in the context of some self-generated crisis. It has learned that one rational tactic for a power with limited resources but large military forces is to appear “irrational” and then compromise. Within limits it has been able to count on the ROK and the US showing restraint, the Chinese being forced to largely stand aside or support its “buffer” state,” Japan and other Asian state pressing for some form of compromise that the DPRK can exploit, and Russia largely standing aside.

No one, however, can be certain that the DPRK is not going to escalate its future threats and actions in ways which lead to serious conventional conflicts. The DPRK can threaten the ROK’s capital, raid across the DMZ in strength, provoke large-scale maritime clashes, provoke major artillery strikes, or raise the political ante with a new set of attacks on the ROK’s leaders. This can lead to escalation at a level neither side wants and serious miscalculations that raise the level of conflict. It can provoke a cycle of challenge and response neither side can easily end. The DPRK’s manipulation of a large artificial threat of ROK and US invasion can be manipulated to win popular support, and some experts fear that any internal power struggle in the DPRK might lead its leadership to provoke a war to retain power.

If the DPRK and ROK do go to war with “conventional” forces, the perceptions of risk and capability may be so different on each side – and involve such different mixes of the use and threatened use of asymmetric, conventional, nuclear, and long-range missile forces – that each side might make a major miscalculation, and a conflict might escalate in unpredictable ways that neither side could control.

There are also major uncertainties to the outcome of any such conflict. A battle near the DMZ, directed at a target like Seoul, could rapidly escalate to the point that it threatened the ROK’s entire economy – even if no major invasion took place. DPRK missile, rocket, and artillery fire would be met in kind, but also by precision air strikes with an uncertain ability to suppress DPRK forces; the losses the ROK air forces would take are also uncertain. The ROK might well respond with strikes deep into the DPRK, attacking countervalue targets like key economic and infrastructure facilities, but again, the exchange rates in terms of casualties and tactical outcomes would not be predictable before such a war occurred.

Similar problems drive any assessment of the outcome of a major DPRK invasion of the ROK even if one only focuses on DPRK-ROK forces. The DPRK has far larger ground forces, but the outcome of what would today be an air-land battle driven heavily by the overall mobility of DPRK land forces and their ability to concentrate along given lines of advance relative to the attrition technically superior ROK land and air forces could inflict is impossible to calculate with any confidence, as is the actual mix of forces both sides could deploy in a given area in a given scenario. It may be possible to simulate with advanced war gaming models and classified data, but it is unclear what level of confidence would result.

More broadly, the DPRK and ROK exist in a security environment in which the US and China share a common interest in avoiding any serious conflict, and both the US and China have a reason to cooperate in deterring any use of force by the DPRK as well as the escalation of any conflict that does occur. This common interest tends to limit the scope of any potential conventional war.

Nevertheless, the balance of DPRK and ROK “conventional” forces cannot be separated from the role US forces would play in a conflict, from Japan’s willingness to support US basing and staging into Korea, and from the role China would play in trying to limit any threat to the DPRK as a buffer state. It seems likely that US airpower, seapower, cruise missiles, stealth, precision strike capability missile defenses, and ISR assets would be used to support the ROK immediately after any serious DPRK attack.

Moreover, the DPRK’s ideological hostility to the US could lead Pyongyang to escalate in ways that are unpredictable and make a “rational bargainer” approach to scenario planning and escalation prediction highly uncertain, because the perceptions of both sides can differ so much in any given scenario.

The same applies to external actors. For example, a US and Japanese role in support of the ROK – coupled with any ROK success that threatened the existence of the DPRK – would confront China with the risk of losing a key buffer state. China might or might not choose to intervene at any stage in such a conflict – either to limit or deter any action against the DPRK or to ensure that ROK and US forces did not “occupy” part of the DPRK.

Either side might try to use strategic air and/or missile power in support of its tactical forces, particularly if it appeared to be losing a more conventional conflict or came under serious military pressure from the opposing side. It is possible that a conflict could escalate to conventional fighting affecting Chinese bases as well as US bases and carrier task forces, including those as far away as Guam and the “outer island chain,” which the US may use to base long-range bombers and stealth aircraft. Moreover, China might put pressure on Taiwan as a means of indirectly pressuring the US.

The naval dimension of a new Korean War is also unpredictable. Pyongyang could use its submarines, smart mines, and longer-range anti-ship missiles in a wide variety of ways, including covert or asymmetric attacks on shipping, possibly even outside Korean waters. It might perceive a naval war, including some kind of attack or seizure of a US ship, as a safer way of exerting pressure. China might or might not become involved, and Japan would have to decide on its naval posture.

Finally, the DPRK’s unique ideological extremism and reliance on the cult of the leader may interact with the fact it has not had any serious military experience since the cease-fire in the Korean War. Its complex mix of regular and internal security forces and massive bureaucracy may interact with ideology and reliance on the leader in ways that make its military operations both inefficient and unpredictable and help lead to unexpected levels of escalation or tactical and strategic behavior.

Furthermore, the DPRK’s economic weaknesses may impose problems in terms of readiness and sustainability that may lead to military actions that are more desperate, or at least different, from what might be expected based on the size of its order of battle and the deployment of its forces. This further highlights the risk of relying on “rational bargainer” behavior and scenarios in a conventional – or any other form of – conflict.

The Asymmetric or Irregular Warfare Balance

As has already been noted, the distinction between conventional and asymmetric warfare is inherently artificial. Virtually all wars involve a mix of regular military forces and political, civilian, and insurgent or “resistance” elements. They involve new technologies, tactics, force mixes, and civil-military structure – often bringing in covert operations.

The DPRK and ROK have long competed in creating effective special and paramilitary forces. Pyongyang has also developed major capabilities for unconventional warfare in the border/DMZ area to attack deep into the ROK. The DPRK has mixed attacks by covert and Special Forces with limited naval and artillery strikes, while using missile and nuclear tests to obtain asymmetric leverage.

According to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense:[19]

The North has been strengthening its special warfare capabilities by deploying light infantry divisions to the frontline corps and adding an infantry regiment to the frontline. The number of special force troops is estimated to reach approximately 200,000. It is assumed that these troops have been trained to conduct composite operations, such as major target strikes, assassination of important figures, and disruption of rear areas, after infiltrating the rear areas of the South through either underground tunnels or AN-2 planes.

The DPRK has been increasingly belligerent throughout 2012 and early 2013, significantly escalating tensions on the Peninsula. In 2012, in addition to two missile tests, the DPRK also jammed aircraft and naval GPS functionality using 50-100km range Soviet vehicle-mounted radar systems. The DPRK continued denial of service cyber attacks on ROK institutions, including government agencies and the military.

The DPRK also has the world’s third-largest chemical weapons arsenal, the world’s largest Special Forces, a fleet of mini-submarines, and a significant artillery capability arrayed against Seoul and other key ROK locations.[20]

The ROK has responded by creating its own Special Forces, paramilitary elements, and “conventional forces” tailored to dealing the DPRK’s asymmetric warfare capabilities. US Special Forces and other elements of US forces have done the same, and China could potentially add new asymmetric capabilities if it chose to intervene.

As a result, the sheer size and variety of each side’s capabilities to conduct irregular or asymmetric warfare, and the DPRK’s aggressiveness in threats and limited attacks, can be destabilizing and lead to miscalculation and escalation. Such forces also present a problem for any potential arms control agreement, since they give the DPRK a potential advantage in threatening and attacking the ROK that would be enhanced by any general reductions in conventional forces.

Changes in civil technology are also altering the mix of asymmetric capabilities. Cyber warfare is becoming steadily more critical and affects civilian operations as well as war fighting. It is important to note that the ROK is probably more dependent on the Internet than any other nation in the world.

The DPRK has repeatedly challenged the ROK using low-level covert operations and asymmetric attacks, using these incidents to put pressure on both the ROK and the US. The DPRK has also deployed large amounts of its force structure for the same purpose, keeping the ROK under constant pressure. It has created a special balance in the border area by creating tunnel systems and deploying large amounts of artillery in caves and sheltered positions within range of Seoul.

The historical record shows that there was nothing new about the DPRK’s use of such attacks in 2010 and that the DPRK’s actions do not always follow the same kind of strategic calculations made by other states. Pyongyang’s willingness – and inventiveness – in using the threat and reality of such attacks was so consistent between 1950 and 2007 that it led the Congressional Research Service to prepare a 36-page chronology that covered 164 examples of armed invasion; border violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism (including assassination and bombing); threats/intimidation against political leaders, media personnel, and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the ROK government; actions undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations; and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. [21]

As the report from the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes,[22]

The most intense phase of the provocations was in the latter half of the 1960s, when North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) staged a series of limited armed actions against South Korean and US security interests. Infiltration of armed agents into South Korea was the most frequently mentioned type of provocation, followed by kidnapping and terrorism (actual and threatened).

From 1954 to 1992, North Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of 3,693-armed agents into ROK, with 1967 and 1968 accounting for 20% of the total. Instances of terrorism were far fewer in number, but they seemed to have had a continuing negative impact on relations between the two Koreas. Not counting the DPRK’s invasion of South Korea that triggered the Korean War (1950–1953), the DPRK’s major terrorist involvement includes attempted assassinations of President Park Chung Hee in 1968 and 1974; a 1983 attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan’s life in a bombing incident in Rangoon, Burma (Myanmar); and a mid-air sabotage bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707 passenger plane in 1987.

Reported provocations have continued intermittently in recent years, in the form of armed incursions, kidnappings, and occasional threats to turn the South Korean capital of Seoul into “a sea of fire” and to silence or tame South Korean critics of North Korea.

The DPRK may well have its own list of charges and complaints, but its public statements are largely political in character. An open source analysis of such material does not seem to be available.

Asymmetric warfare, however, is also a key area in US and Chinese force developments, and is expanding to include new areas of conflict like cyberwarfare. US Special Forces would be involved in any conflict in the Koreas, and US space warfare and ISR capabilities would act as a form of asymmetric warfare in providing capabilities that both the DPRK and ROK lack. At the same time, the changing balance of US and Chinese space and counter-space warfare capabilities could add yet another dimension of “asymmetric forces” if China became deeply involved in a conflict in the Koreas.

US Forces in the ROK and Pacific

US forces serve a variety of roles in aiding the ROK. The US plays a critical role in a wide range of scenarios ranging from limited DPRK probes to all-out war. In peacetime, they act as a tripwire in case of DPRK aggression. The ROK military also relies heavily on US capabilities in several areas, such as military intelligence – in particular, signals and imagery intelligence and analysis. US presence allows the ROK to counterbalance pressure and deter potential military intervention from nearby major powers, such as China or Japan, in the event of DPRK collapse and/or Korean reunification. Finally, US forces have also contributed to ROK economic development by reassuring foreign countries and investors that the ROK is a stable country. The US can also offer the ROK extended deterrence in the face of DPRK nuclear and missile threat.

US forces can also play a critical role in wide range of scenarios ranging from limited DPRK probes to all-out war. The US can also offer the ROK extended deterrence in the face of DPRK nuclear and missile threat. The US Forces Korea (USFK) described their mission as follows in a 2010 report, [23]

Our mission remains to deter North Korean provocations and aggression and, if deterrence fails, to fight and win. We accomplish our mission with forward-stationed, agile, well-trained forces on the Korean peninsula, ready to fight tonight and defeat aggression side by side with our Korean allies…. Should our deterrence options fail, we are prepared to defeat any aggression against the ROK.

The major US force elements now stationed in Korea include the Eighth US Army, US Air Forces Korea (Seventh external pageAir Forcecall_made), and US Naval Forces Korea. At one point the US occupied some 85 active installations in the ROK, but it has cut its total military manning by over a third from about 44,200 personnel in 1990 and 36,300 personnel in 2000 to the current agreed force level of 28,500. The only combat formation remaining in the ROK is the 2nd Infantry Division, with one infantry Brigade Combat Team and an aviation brigade.[24]

More broadly, a USPACOM estimate as of February 2013 summarized the overall force strength in the Pacific as follows: [25]

U.S. military and civilian personnel assigned to USPACOM number approximately 325,000, or about one- fifth of total U.S. military strength. U.S. Pacific Fleet includes six aircraft carrier strike groups, approximately 180 ships, 1,500 aircraft and 100,000 personnel. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific possesses about two-thirds of U.S. Marine Corps combat strength, includes two Marine Expeditionary Forces and about 85,000 personnel assigned. U.S. Pacific Air Forces is comprised of approximately 40,000 airmen and more than 300 aircraft, with about 100 additional aircraft deployed to Guam. U.S. Army Pacific has more than 60,000 personnel assigned, including five Stryker brigades. Of note, component command personnel numbers include more than 1,200 Special Operations personnel. Department of Defense Civilians and Contractors in the Pacific Command AOR number about 40,000. Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard, which frequently supports U.S. military forces in the region, has approximately 27,000 personnel in its Pacific Area.

As has been noted earlier, these forces are being restructured as part of a major US effort to “rebalance” its overall force posture to provide more capabilities in Asia and better support its partnerships with its Asian allies. US statements and forces plans that support this rebalancing will significantly improve US air and sea capabilities in the Pacific and US ability to reinforce the ROK in a wide range of scenarios.

Moreover, these restructuring and modernization efforts will be closely linked to US ability and willingness to fund the Department of Defense’s plans and to the ongoing adjustments the US will make in response to the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs and the changes in China’s strategy, forces, and military capabilities. Current US forces and plans are certain to evolve even over the next five years. The questions are how much and in what ways?

The Nuclear and CBRN Balance in the Koreas

Nuclear forces are becoming a critical part of the Korean balance. The DPRK’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range missiles have been the source of concern and negotiations for more than a decade.

The DPRK’s programs also cannot be separated from the impact of US and Chinese nuclear weapons on the balance, or the need to evaluate the impact of chemical, biological, and precision-guided weapons. Moreover, “defensive weapons” such as effective air and missile defenses offset at least part of the opposing side’s missile and WMD capabilities. There is often no easy distinction between “offensive” and “defensive” weapons.

It is also important to note that all these elements of the DPRK’s forces are rapidly evolving. It has conducted three low-yield nuclear tests and has effectively ended its past agreements to limit the production of nuclear materials and its missile tests. While unclassified estimates are to some extent sophisticated guesswork, Pyongyang may have obtained enough plutonium from its power reactors to have 4 to 13 nuclear weapons, even allowing for the material used in its three tests.

Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, reported that, on a November 2010 visit to the DPRK’s Yongbyon nuclear facility, he saw a small, sophisticated facility with some 2,000 centrifuges that were “P-2” advanced designs. Furthermore, North Korea publically stated in April 2013 that it was going to refuel its 5 MWe reactor at Yongbyon and was also building a new 50-100 MWe at Yongbyon and a 200 MWe reactor at Taechon. Thus, the DPRK may have – or may soon have – significant stocks of enriched uranium as well as plutonium. At a minimum, this means that the DPRK’s future production of weapons-grade material is impossible to accurately forecast, and that both targeting and arms control are far more difficult because of the inability to predict how many dispersed centrifuge facilities Pyongyang may have.

The official view of the US intelligence community is that North Korea has not yet been successful in getting high yields from its fission devices. Its initial tests produced only very low yields. It seems clear that it does not have boosted or thermonuclear weapons production capabilities, but there is no way to predict when or if it might acquire these.

North Korea has started talking about nuclear strikes on the US long before it even has a credible capability to launch them and makes no secret of the threat it poses to its neighbors. It also clearly is set on a course where it will steadily deploy nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft with progressively longer ranges, higher yields, and more accuracy and reliability over time. It will exploit any failure to match these forces, and there is no clear way to estimate how a mature and survivable nuclear force would affect North Korean uses of force at lower levels or its perceptions of risk.

Similar uncertainties arise because of the inability to predict how sophisticated the DPRK’s weapons and warhead design capabilities are. US experts feel that Pyongyang has obtained some advanced missile warhead design data, a notion that was confirmed by the sale of some of these data by the A.Q. Khan network.

Moreover, the DPRK’s ambitious missile programs are still largely in development and their capabilities are impossible to predict until the nature of their nuclear warheads is known and there have been enough tests of the DPRK’s longer-range missiles to provide a clear picture of their performance.

The range of uncertainties in this list raises two key issues for both strategic and force planning as well as for arms control. One is the “diversion effect”: the risk that nuclear controls can drive states even further toward advanced biological and chemical weapons. Advances in biotechnology have made control regimes virtually impossible as well as vastly increased the potential lethality of biological weapons to levels beyond that of even boosted and thermonuclear weapons.

The second is the so-called Nth weapon paradox. It may be possible to reduce a nation’s nuclear weapons, but it is probably impossible to be certain it does not retain at least a few. The problem for arms control is that the smaller the stockpile, the more it has to be used in ways that threaten critical targets like major population centers rather than a given military target. Arms reductions can easily escalate targeting.

Nuclear weapons are also only one part of the DPRK-ROK “CBRN balance.” The DPRK is a major chemical weapons state, and probably has advanced chemical warheads and bombs. China may have stocks of chemical weapons. There is no way to estimate the size, type, and lethality/effectiveness of their relative stockpiles, or doctrine and plans for using them. It should be noted, however, that relatively crude mustard gas weapons played a decisive role in area denial and disruption of Iranian forces in the final phase of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and that stocks of persistent nerve gas and so-called 4th generation chemical weapons are possible. Although the ROK neither confirms nor denies the existence of a CW program, it is suspected of maintaining a chemical weapons program and may have covert stocks of chemical weapons.

The DPRK is suspected to have a biological weapons program and may have stocks of such weapons. These could range from basic to genetically modified types. China’s program is not discussed in unclassified official statements. It should be noted that China, Japan, the DPRK, the ROK, and the US all have advanced civil biological, food processing, chemical processing, and pharmaceutical facilities that can be adapted to both chemical and biological weapons development and production. All have significant capability for genetic engineering of biological weapons. All would have to develop advanced biological weapons for test purposes to conduct an effective biological defense program.

No public details are available on the efforts of any power to develop small or specialized chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons for covert delivery or potential transfer to non-state actors and third countries.

DPRK and ROK Missile Forces

Assessing and counting weapons and the missile delivery systems that can affect the Korean balance is as challenging as dealing with any other aspect of the balance, and again highlights the reality that there is no meaningful separation of “conventional” and “asymmetric” forces even at the highest levels of warfare.

This aspect of the balance is current dominated by DPRK missile forces, although the ROK is extending the range and size of its missile forces, US cruise missiles can play a major role in an exchange, outside strategic missile forces play a role in deterrence and any extreme form of conflict, and missile defenses are beginning to alter the balance.

The DPRK’s ambitious missile programs are still largely in development and their capabilities are impossible to predict until the nature of their nuclear warheads is known and there have been enough tests of the DPRK’s longer-range missiles to provide a clear picture of their performance.

The DPRK’s longer-range Nodong (also known as the Rodong) Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM; 700-1,500 kg warhead and 1,000-1,500 km range) is still developmental and would require large numbers of additional, full-range tests to become a mature program. The Japanese Defense White Paper for 2012 reports that Japan believes tests were limited to a possible launch into the Sea of Japan in late May 1993, a mix of Scud and Nodong launches in July 2006, and a mix of launches that might have involved some Nodongs in July 2009.

Some experts feel that the DPRK’s larger Taepodong-1 MRBM (1,000-1,500 kg warhead and 1,500-2,500 km range) has never been launched, except as a Space Launch Vehicle (SLV). The Japanese Defense White Paper for 2010 reports one successful launch occurring on August 31, 1998.

Similarly, some experts believe the Taepodong-2 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) (500-1,500 kg warhead and 4,500-8,000 km range) has never been launched, except as a SLV. The Japanese Defense White Paper for 2012 reports one failed launch in July 2006, and a second failed launch on April 5, 2009, when the DPRK fired a missile that is likely to have been a modified Taepodong-2 into the sea at a range over 3,000 kilometers. The DPRK claimed to be using the carrier rocket, called the Unha-2, to put a satellite into space.

In April 2012, the DPRK tested the Unha-3 in an attempt to put another satellite into space; this test failed after approximately 80 seconds. On December 12, 2012, the DPRK attempted a further launch of the Unha-3, successfully putting a satellite into orbit. However, many scientists doubt that the satellite is operational, though it may remain in orbit for years. The success of this missile test means that this rocket could potentially deliver a nuclear payload after slight modifications.

Furthermore, on April 15, 2012, the DPRK displayed six new missiles, known as KN-08s, in a military parade; they are likely to be mock-ups and not operational. They were displayed on trucks of Chinese origin, leading to speculation that China had, under UN Security Council Resolution 1718 sanctions, illegally sold such technology to the DPRK.

Another system, the DPRK’s Musudan Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) (650-1,000 kg warhead and 2,500-3,200 km range), may be a copy or modification of the Russian R-27/BM- 25 series. It may have been launched at very short ranges for test purposes but is not believed to be operational. These uncertainties make it impossible to estimate any of these missiles’ reliability and accuracy, or whether the DPRK has anything approaching some form of terminal guidance technology.

Recently, the ROK has deployed a series of cruise missiles, the maximum range of which is 1500 km – capable of reaching as far as Beijing and Tokyo. In addition to their cruise missile program, the ROK has successfully launched a series of communication satellites in the last decade; while it does not possess a known ballistic missile program, it likely possesses the know-how to produce a ballistic missile.

In 1975, the ROK successfully reverse-engineered the US Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, which could also be used in a surface-to-surface capacity. Named the NHK-1 (also known as the Paekkom-1, Baekkom-1, and Hyunmu-1), it had a range of only 150 km (93 miles). Development of the NHK-1 continued into the late 1970s with a successful test in September 1978.

Under pressure from the US, the ROK agreed in 1979 to restrict its missile range to 180 km with a 500 kg max payload in return for US technical support for ROK missile systems. In 1983, the ROK developed the NHK-2, incorporating improved technology and a range of 180 km (112 miles), which could be easily extended to 250 km (155 miles).

The US backed the ROK’s joining of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in March 2001, a regime that supersedes the 1979 US agreement. As a result, the ROK began focusing on the development of cruise missiles such as the Hyunmu-3 series, capable of delivering payloads below 500 kg to targets deep within the DPRK and beyond. Developed indigenously in the ROK, the Hyunmu-3 system is reportedly similar in structure and guidance technology to the US Tomahawk but with a shorter range.

The Hyunmu-3A deployed in 2006 with a range of 500 km and is capable of striking Pyongyang – but not the DPRK’s long-range missile sites, including the Musudan-ri site in North Hamgyeong Province, located more than 300 km from Seoul. In early 2009, the ROK deployed the Hyunmu-3B, an improvement of the 3A model, which has a range of 1000 km, capable of reaching as far as Beijing and Tokyo as well as hitting key targets throughout the DPRK.

The most advanced missile in the ROK arsenal is the Hyunmu-3C, which has supposedly just entered into the production phase. In July 2010, it was reported that the ROK had begun manufacturing the Hyunmu-3C with a range of up to 1,500 km (937 miles), capable of reaching parts of China, Japan, and Russia.

Conventionally-armed, precision-guided weapons can also be used to threaten or attack critical targets. It is unclear how accurate the DPRK’s missiles are, whether Pyongyang has a real-world terminal guidance capability to use in combination with ballistic missiles, or whether the DPRK can develop such systems for cruise missiles. As long as the DPRK does not have such “smart” warheads, conventionally-armed missiles are largely terror weapons that can produce limited casualties and damage to targets as large as cities or military facilities as large as airfields.

Once the DPRK does have a real-world terminal guidance capability, however, such missiles may become “weapons of mass effectiveness” that can destroy high-value and critical infrastructure targets with conventional warheads. This could lead to new patterns of escalation in which the US and ROK use or threaten to use precision-guided air-to-surface, surface-to- surface, and cruise missiles to destroy critical DPRK targets in an effort to halt or deter a DPRK conventional attack.

The DPRK’s nuclear developments have already begun to provoke a South Korean response that may eventually lead to a renewal of the ROK’s nuclear program, as well. In October 2012, South Korea announced, in conjunction with the US, that it was extending the range of its missile systems.

South Korea has already strengthened its missile defense forces, as has the US, creating plans for deploying reinforcements. The new missile and nuclear tests that North Korea carried out in later 2012 and early 2013 have reinforced ROK, Japanese and US interests in creating theater-wide missile defense systems, while the DPRK’s satellite launches raise the issue it might develop anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as well as new IRBMs and ICBMs. Any use of ASAT weapons could also have a massive impact on US battle management and ISR systems.

Moreover, the fact so many missile and precision air strike systems are being deployed has turned “defensive” weapons, such as ballistic missile defenses and surface-to-air missile forces, into “offensive” forces. The comparative ability to defend also equates to the ability to reduce the risk in escalating to offensive missile, air, and stealth attacks.

The Balance of US and Chinese Missile and Precision Strike Forces

It is unclear that China and the US will ever directly confront each other in a conflict in the Koreas, but both countries are developing a mix of new conventional missile, precision strike, nuclear-armed missile, nuclear weapon, and space warfare capabilities that have a major impact on the balance in the Koreas, Northeast Asia, and the entire Pacific region.

The US has long been a power with extensive conventional precision-strike, space-based, and nuclear capabilities. China, however, is rapidly modernizing and expanding its capabilities in all these areas. Chinese military analysts publicly explore a wide range of innovative strategies designed to use missile and precision strike forces to deter or limit US military capabilities in the region, although many now are deployed in ways that focus on Taiwan. China already has conventionally-armed missiles with terminal guidance systems, and has improved such systems under development, including ballistic anti-ship missiles that pose a long-range strategic threat to US carrier task forces.

The US DoD put heavy emphasis on these “anti-access” and “area denial” (A2AD) capabilities – and their potential impact on US power projection capabilities in the Koreas and Northeast Asia – in its report on Military and Security Developments Affecting the People’s Republic of China for 2011 and for 2013.[26]

The Second Artillery controls China’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles. It is developing and testing several new classes and variants of offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, upgrading older missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. (p. 5-6)

By December 2012, the Second Artillery’s inventory of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) deployed to units opposite Taiwan stood at more than 1,100. This number reflects the delivery of additional missiles and the fielding of new systems. To improve the lethality of this force, the PLA is also introducing new SRBM variants with improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads.

China is fielding a limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The DF-21D is based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and gives the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead. (p. 5-6)

The Second Artillery continues to modernize its nuclear forces by enhancing its silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and adding more survivable mobile delivery systems. In recent years, the road- mobile, solid-propellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A) intercontinental-range ballistic missiles have entered service. The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of 11,200 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States. China may also be developing a new road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV). (p. 5-6)

Land-Based Platforms. China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of approximately 50-75 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 (DF-5); the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mods 1 and 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the more limited range CSS-3 (DF-4). This force is complemented by liquid-fueled CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles and road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 (DF-21) MRBMs for regional deterrence missions. By 2015, China’s nuclear forces will include additional CSS-10 Mod 2 and enhanced CSS-4 ICBMs. (p. 31)

Sea-Based Platforms. China continues to produce the JIN-class SSBN, with three already delivered and as many as two more in various stages of construction. The JIN-class SSBNs will eventually carry the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile with an estimated range of 7,400 km. The JIN-class and the JL-2 will give the PLA Navy its first long-range, sea-based nuclear capability. After a round of successful testing in 2012, the JL-2 appears ready to reach initial operational capability in 2013. JIN-class SSBNs based at Hainan Island in the South China Sea would then be able to conduct nuclear deterrence patrols. (p.31-32)

…PLA Underground Facilities

China maintains a technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) program protecting all aspects of

its military forces, including C2, logistics, missile, and naval forces. Given China’s NFU nuclear policy, China has assumed it may need to absorb an initial nuclear blow while ensuring leadership and strategic assets survive. (p. 31)

China determined it needed to update and expand its military UGF program in the mid to late 1980s. This modernization effort took on a renewed urgency following China’s observation of U.S. and NATO air operations in Operation Allied Force and of U.S. military capabilities during the 1991 Gulf War. A new emphasis on “winning hi-tech battles” in the future precipitated research into advanced tunneling and construction methods. These military campaigns convinced China it needed to build more survivable, deeply-buried facilities, resulting in the widespread UGF construction effort detected throughout China for the last decade. (p. 31)

…Future Efforts. China is working on a range of technologies to attempt to counter U.S. and other countries’ ballistic missile defense systems, including maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs), MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. China’s official media also cite numerous Second Artillery training exercises featuring maneuver, camouflage, and launch operations under simulated combat conditions, which are intended to increase survivability. Together with the increased mobility and survivability of the new training enhancements strengthen China’s nuclear force and enhance its strategic strike capabilities. Further increases in the number of mobile ICBMs and the beginning of SSBN deterrence patrols will force the PLA to implement more sophisticated command and control systems and processes that safeguard the integrity of nuclear release authority for a larger, more dispersed force. (p. 32)

These developments show that China is acquiring the ability to project conventional missile power deep into the Pacific in ways that make the traditional discussion of “blue water” navies steadily less relevant. The issue today is the overall mix of sea-air-missile-space capabilities and how they interact with both conventional forces and asymmetric forces, including new forms of conflict like cyberwarfare. One can only speculate on the pace of change that these shifts will trigger in US, Chinese, and other regional powers over the coming decades, but they already are a major new aspect of the balance.

Moreover, China’s emerging missile capabilities include both conventional and nuclear strike capabilities in ways that interact even if China and the US never openly threaten to use nuclear forces. Chinese nuclear capabilities can deter or limit the US response to China’s use of conventionally armed missiles, and even a worst case escalation to the use of nuclear-armed missiles may still lead China to use conventionally-armed precision strike systems against US or politically-sensitive targets in ways intended to limit or shape the process of escalation.

The US, in contrast, does not discuss the use of missile warfare in Asia in detail in its unclassified military literature and has not made this a major part of its discussion of rebalancing its force in Asia. It is clear, however, that conventional and nuclear missile capabilities are as important to the US side of the sea-air-missile-space balance as they are to China and the Koreas, that they sharply affect the land balance in terms of joint warfare, and that the degree of future US and Chinese cooperation or competition will affect every aspect of the Korean, Northeast Asian, and Pacific balances.

The US has large numbers of precision-guided, long-range cruise missiles for air and sea launch, and precision-guided, long-range multiple rocket launchers. The ROK is also developing an advanced cruise missile program of its own, capable of accurately hitting targets in the North.

US stealth aircraft can deliver precision-guided weapons at standoff ranges from most Chinese and DPRK surface-to-air missiles with the exception of the S300/S400 series. China is developing long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles that can strike large surface ships like US carriers at long distances. These potentially are “weapons of mass effectiveness” that can be launched in devastating strikes against critical facilities and infrastructure without the use of WMD warheads.

Conventionally-armed, precision-guided weapons can also be used to threaten or attack critical targets. It is unclear how accurate the DPRK’s missiles are, whether Pyongyang has a real-world terminal guidance capability to use in combination with ballistic missiles, or whether the DPRK can develop such systems for cruise missiles. As long as the DPRK does not have such “smart” warheads, conventionally-armed missiles are largely terror weapons that can produce limited casualties and damage to targets as large as cities or military facilities as large as airfields.

Once the DPRK does have a real-world terminal guidance capability, however, such missiles may become “weapons of mass effectiveness” that can destroy high-value and critical infrastructure targets with conventional warheads. This could lead to new patterns of escalation in which the US and ROK use or threaten to use precision-guided air-to-surface, surface-to- surface, and cruise missiles to destroy critical DPRK targets in an effort to halt or deter a DPRK conventional attack.

Missile defenses add another dimension. The US, Japan, and the ROK have some ballistic missile defense capabilities and are working together to develop wide-area theater ballistic missile defense systems. China has the Russian S300/S400 series of advanced surface-to-air missile defenses and is almost certainly seeking more advanced missile defense capabilities. The DPRK lacks such capabilities but is almost certainly seeking them. The balance of air and missile defense capabilities plays a critical role in limiting the offensive capabilities of the opposite side and reducing the risk in using one’s own missiles. This makes air and missile defenses the equivalent of a major offensive weapon.

China, the US, the ROK, and possibly the DPRK all have advanced cyber warfare capabilities. China has some anti-satellite capability and possibly some form of EMP weapon. These too are potential “weapons of mass effectiveness” that can be used to launch devastating strikes against critical facilities and infrastructure without the use of WMD warheads.

South Korea has already strengthened its missile defense forces, as has the US, and it is creating new plans for deploying reinforcements. The new missile and nuclear tests that North Korea carried out in late 2012 and early 2013 have reinforced ROK, Japanese, and US interests in creating theater-wide missile defense systems, while the DPRK’s satellite launches raise the issue it might develop anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as well as new IRBMs and ICBMs. Any use of ASAT weapons could also have a massive impact on US battle management and ISR systems.

Chinese and US Nuclear Weapons

There is no way to assess the exact probability that the US or China would make threats to use their nuclear weapons in a Korean conflict, or ever escalate to their actual use, but the probability they would even make explicit threats seems extremely low. Each side’s nuclear weapons have a deterrent impact in restraining the other’s behavior without such threats, and even raising the possibility of an actual nuclear exchange would threaten the stability of Asia, the global economy, and the US and Chinese economies in ways in which the end result could not be calculated. Both sides seem likely to calculate that moving beyond the tacit threat posed by the existence of the other’s nuclear forces and would almost certainly be so destructive as to be more costly than any strategic or military gains in a limited war could ever be worth.

It is also unclear that numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems would be meaningful unless events forced the US or China into a major nuclear engagement. The US might “win” in terms of the most strike and damage, but the US has a much smaller target base. Nevertheless, the US and China are major nuclear powers with boosted and thermonuclear weapons. While neither is likely to use nuclear weapons, they have that capability, and – at a minimum – their possession of nuclear weapons plays a major role in the balance of deterrence and in shaping the risks of asymmetric escalation.

Both China and the US have every strategic and economic reason to show restraint, negotiate, and avoid such worst cases. Cooperation will not be easy, but the following analyses make it all too clear that every effort needs to be made to avoid repeating the mistakes that drove the US and China into the Korean War and the “worst case” miscalculations that led to World War I and World War II. Even some Asian repetition of the Cold War, and even one limited to conventional air and missile combat, would be a costly tragedy of incredible proportions.

Nevertheless, any assessment of the balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia must consider just how important it is to emphasize Chinese and US cooperation that will avoid any confrontation or conflict that could escalate to the use of such forces. It must also consider the potential impact that a DPRK-ROK use of missile and WMD forces could have on Chinese and US tension and escalation and the reality of the impact that US rebalancing and Chinese emphasis on sea-air- missile capabilities for A2AD can have under worst case conditions.

[19] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, p. 30.

[20] IISS, Military Modernization 2013, p. 270.

[21] Hannah Fischer, North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950–2007, Congressional Research Service, RL30004, April 20, 2007.

[22] Hannah Fischer, North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950–2007, Congressional Research Service, RL30004, April 20, 2007.

[23] US Forces Korea, The New Korea: Strategic Digest, October 2010.

[24] IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: South Korea,” IHS Jane’s, November 27, 2012. external pagehttp://www.janes.comcall_made.

[25] “USPACOM Facts: Headquarters, US Pacific Command,” USPACOM, accessed February 22, 2013. external pagehttp://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/facts.shtmlcall_made.

[26] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 6, 2013 .