Envisioning a Regional Security Community

Conceptual Framework

South Asia has been experiencing very low levels of economic and political integration and it remains stubbornly slow in enhancing levels of regional cooperation. With the help of regional security community theory, this paper examines the problem and tries to find a relevance of the concept in the region. It seems that perhaps it will take time to really see the theory unfolding in practically but if one takes a more flexible approach to the theoretical construct, and looks to issues which attend the nascent phase of the development of such communities, one may outline possible strategies that can help to bring about changes in the region’s approach towards collective security and development.

War and large scale violence become an unlikely reality in a security community. Security community as a term was coined by Karl Deutsch in 1957. Deutsch defined a security community as “a group of people” believing “that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’”.[1] People in a security community are also bound by the “sense of community”, the mutual sympathy, trust, and common interest. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett redefined the security community by shared identities, values, and meanings, many-sided direct interactions, and reciprocal long-term interest.[2] Integration leads to a pluralistic security community, in which states retain their sovereignty. The United States with Canada is an example of a pluralistic security community. Both countries are politically independent, but they do not expect to have future military confrontations, in spite of having had some in the past.

Adler and Barnett described the typical evolution of a security community from nascent to ascendant to mature. A nascent security community meets the basic expectations of peaceful change, while a mature security community is also characterized by some collective security mechanisms and supranational or transnational elements. Adler and Barnett further divided the mature security communities into “tightly” and “loosely coupled”, depending on the level of their integration.[3] Raimo Väyrynen and Andrej Tusicisny differentiated between inter-state security communities (where war between states is unlikely) and comprehendsive security communities (where both interstate conflicts and civil wars are seen as unthinkable.[4] Western Europe is a classic example of a comprehensive security community, while South East Asia is usually seen as an interstate security community.

Defining a Region

Scholars have been defining regions in various ways and there have been debates on the definition of ‘region’. Is it just a piece of neighboring territory or more than that? According to Buzan, a region must have some history or connections between the states. He writes, ‘In security terms, ‘‘region’’ means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other’.[5] Hyde Price says that the European Security situation existing in Europe during the development of the EU (post-cold war) has been ‘balanced multi-polarity’, so perhaps we could extrapolate that this is the best condition required for other regions too.[6]

Regional Security Community Theory

The theoretical understanding of the concept of regional security community is very important for the purpose of analysis. Buzan and Wæver have defined regional security complexes as follows: “The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones, security interdependence is normally into regionally based clusters: security complexes. […] Process of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and outside of it.” [7]

Based on the definition, the regional security complexes can be seen as a group of security dilemmas concentrated into certain geographical area, where essential threat perceptions by states (or other actors) are so interlinked and create such strong Structure of the Security Complex. Structure of the security complex can change as a result of changes in the regional balance of power or as a result of change in historical amity and enmity patterns.

Regional Security Dilemma in South Asia

South Asia, particularly, Afghanistan and Pakistan are suffering from deeply rooted breakdowns in the ability of the state to maintain law and order. According to Dr. Akbar S Ahmed[8], this has created a situation where not only is physical security of citizens uncertain in many places, but the inability of the central governments to effectively provide social services also has left the leadership of both countries with tenuous popular support. Another major issue is a breakdown in inter-ethnic trust and dialogue between India and Pakistan. Inter-ethnic and inter-religious respect and tolerance are very low in the region. This has created an atmosphere where a sense of hopelessness has taken over, where religious differences are viewed on both sides as intractable. When it comes to general well-being of the people of the region, it is quite a dismal situation, there is a breakdown in the sense of control average people feel they have over their lives, the growth in mutual distrust and the uncertain physical security in Afghanistan and Pakistan have left many feeling that they have no control over their lives. With rampant mistrust between different religious and ethnic groups, many have turned to religion to regain a sense of control for coping with the difficulties of their everyday lives and this helps religious groups and militants to exploit the situation.

The Contributing Factors

1- Porous borders

The idea of common security would always be considered an impractical goal as long as the practice of each state offering sanctuary to the other’s opponents would continue. It has created bitterness and mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan sheltered Baloch nationalists in the 1970s while Pakistan extended refuge and training to the Mujahedeen in the 1980s and then later supported the Afghani Taliban. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan’s then military dictator Zia-ul-Haq promoted the jihad in Afghanistan, funded thousands of Islamic madrassas, armed domestic Islamist organizations, and in the process “militarized and radicalized” the border region. By supporting Islamist militias among the Pashtun, Pakistan government has tried to neutralize Baloch and Pashtun nationalism within its borders. Small-scale armed clashes on the Pak-Afghan border have become a routine matter. The complex influx of Taliban has also its impact on bilateral relationships of both states thus making the Durand Line an issue of concern.

In Nepal and India, Maoist and Communist organizations have developed strong ties with each other, and their influence is growing in bordering towns. Although the Maoist Movement played a major role in changing the course of history in Nepal, at the same time the separatist movement in Tarai is also active with the same radical ideology. Apart from the radical Maoist movement in the region, Hindu extremist groups are as well making their space in Nepal’s bordering towns. The radicalization of the separatist movements not only makes the border disputes complex but also starts shifting inside the countries. Talibanization in Pakistan, Islamization in Bangladesh, Maoist and Naxalite nexus in India, Hindu radicalism in Nepal and the sectarian and separatist threat in Iran cannot be countered without proper internal strategies, joint resolute mechanisms and inter- state cooperation.

The South Asian states have been using the options of “force” and “politics” to resolve the disputes but the ethnic and religious movements, divided along the borders make it difficult for a state to resolve the issues single-handed, especially, when states have failed addressing their economic and social grievances.

2- Governance issues

One of the weaknesses of democracy in South Asian countries is that their differing needs, interests, and aspirations are ignored. Almost every state in the region is multilingual, multiethnic, multi-religious, and multicul- tural. Yet these diversities within our borders are not addressed properly at any level of governance, and so identity politics is increasingly a cause of conflict in the region. The post-colonial states failed to perform their fundamental functions of the state, i.e. ensuring justice, social development, rule of law and order, security and safety of the individuals, human freedoms, constitutional values and institutions. In addition, social and economic forces also play a vital role in radicalizing South Asian countries.

3-Inept Political and Social Approach

Political and Religious violence that is affecting the South Asian region primarily rejects existing means of political participation and finds existing social economic and political institutions inadequate to address the problems facing the society in general and some of its sections in particular. In the South Asian context, we find both demand for new ideas or structural changes rejecting the old order like the popular uprising in Nepal, or calling for the old order that represented an ideal model of an Islamic state, Islamist radicalism in Pakistan and Bangladesh or Hindutva radicalism in India. It popularizes their ideologies and questions the legitimacy and relevance of existing ideologies. Exploiting the basic grievances of the masses, extremist ideology tries to gain ground by influencing the minds of people looking for spiritual solace to avoid the effects of economic frustration and political instability. South Asian governments have not paid attention to a social approach to solve the socio-economic problems.

4-Political and Economic Discontent

The deteriorating economic conditions, unemployment and lack of freedom of expression in a society are all pertinent factors responsible for extremism, with or without state patronage. Lack of political infrastructure and political participation to marginalized communities gives the way to different groups to establish their power base. These groups are usually well-resourced and well-equipped with modern weapons, hence no dearth of people joining them and challenging the state.

The above mentioned contributing factors explain that South Asia not just faces traditional security dilemma but new forms of conflict as well, i.e. asymmetric wars that are in fact aimed at other states. The failure of the state in providing good governance and security encourages the non-state actors to exploit the gaps that exist in the societies.

Common Regional Security and Fight against Terrorism in South Asia

Any discourse on common regional security cannot be complete without a discussion on terrorism. Though SAARC realized the importance of regional anti-terrorism initiatives way back in late 1980s, it has not been able to implement nor were the states able to employ those in their respective countries.

SAARC Anti-Terrorism Initiatives[9]

The SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism which was signed on 4th November 1987 came into force on 22nd August 1988 following its ratification by all Member States. No progress was made in more than a decade. It was only after 9/11, that the SAARC Standing Committee at its Twenty Eighth Session (Kathmandu, 19-20 August 2002)[10] recommended that Legal Advisers of SAARC Member States prepare a draft of an Additional Protocol to the SAARC Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

This is in recognition of the need to update the Convention on account of the obligations devolving on Member States in terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and the International Convention for Suppression of Financing of Terrorism. Given the priority accorded by the SAARC Heads of State/Government at the Eleventh Summit to global initiatives to combat terrorism and organized criminal activities, the Standing Committee recommended that a Ministerial level meeting be convened to deal with the issues. Finally in 2004, during the Twelfth SAARC Summit (Islamabad, 4-6 January 2004) [11] the Council of Ministers signed the Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism.[12]

The purpose of this Additional Protocol is to strengthen the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, particularly by criminalizing the provision, collection or acquisition of funds for the purpose of committing terrorist acts and taking further measures to prevent and suppress financing of such acts. Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism came into force on 12th January 2006 following its ratification by all Member states.

To materialize what they had been negotiating, the eight South Asian countries adopted a regional anti-terrorism cooperation agreement in 2008. The anti-terrorism agreement calls for freezing funds that might be used for terrorist activities, regular meetings between security chiefs, the exchange of intelligence, and training of personnel dealing with terrorism and drug offences.

Common Regional Security: Limitations and Potentials

The cross-border dimension of many of the internal, often interrelated, security crises that affect South Asian states highlights the importance of developing an effective, broad-based regional response to the threat. Despite declarations regarding the need for greater collaboration among states on issues related to border security, mutual legal assistance, suppression of terrorism and law enforcement, cooperation has been slow to materialize in South Asia.

Despite the existence of the regional instruments and mechanisms, the mutual distrust and suspicion among states in the region and the ongoing processes of consolidating independent political identities, have influenced states’ reluctance to fully cooperate in the field of common security by providing each other required assistance. This has proved a fundamental obstacle to SAARC.

To focus on some specific doable examples, SAARC secretariat could be more effectively utilized if there was increased political will among SAARC members. At the more operational level, SAARC countries have also called for the creation of an “INTERPOL-like” SAARC agency to increase the regional capacity of police forces throughout the region. Sub-regional bodies in East, West, and Southern Africa, for example, have proved effective in strengthening practical cooperation among police chiefs and in building support for the expansion of the organization’s 24/7 communications network beyond capitals.

SAARC leaders approved the SAARC Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) at the fifteenth SAARC summit in August 2008 [13]. Among other objectives, it aims to eliminate the need for separate bilateral agreements by harmonizing the domestic legal systems of member countries. Once it enters into force, SAARC countries may find it easier to cooperate on counter-terrorism investigations and the prosecution or extradition of terrorist suspects, assuming again that countries can agree on which individuals and groups should be the target of such cooperation. Although the adoption of the 2008 MLAT is a positive sign, the tensions between India and Pakistan in South Asia proves to be the biggest hurdle.

The idea of Pakistan, India, Iran, and Afghanistan jointly managing their conflicts has both merits and demerits. One of the major hurdles is the trust deficit between the countries of the region, i.e. India-Pakistan conflict particularly the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict over the Durand Line, Pakistan-Iran disagreement over Baluchistan vulnerability and sectarian problem and between India and Bangladesh the border problem, Nepal’s unstable government, and Sri Lanka’s recent experience with a harsh and brutal war with the LTTE. In such a situation the idea of joint mechanism to establish both inter-state and regional security appears as wishful thinking.

However, the same “demerits” can work in favour of joining hands to eliminate this menace from the region. The above mentioned political/ territorial disputes have prompted the South Asian states to wage proxy wars in each other’s country. They have also diverted them from focusing on developmental issues in their countries and bringing about economic change. Owing to this lack of economic and developmental approach, these neglected areas became a safe haven for terrorists in the region. It is not just about the FATA region which is out of government control in Pakistan; the border areas between India and Bangladesh have been used for cross-border movement of a huge number of people.

The political instability in Afghanistan over the past two decades has had a significant impact on the region's overall stability — affecting not only the politics of neighbouring Iran and Pakistan, but even India- Pakistani relations as well. In present circumstance when it is fighting a war against terrorism, the best bet would be to become a part of the collective effort to combat terrorism to enjoy the benefit of economic prosperity by focusing on mutual economic interests rather than continuing with the policy of confrontation. Accommodative policy based on peaceful coexistence is the only option left with the countries of South Asia. There is a dire need to invest in re-framing and projecting a balanced image of one another. This in turn, requires political will backed by institutional will to break from the “zero-sum” mentality in perceiving and pursuing ones security policy.

Given the state of vulnerability of the South Asian state, except India where democratic tradition is very strong, the main risk for democratic consolidation in the region is that citizens themselves may end up accepting the return to an authoritarian regime perceived as more able to put an end to internal violence and criminality. In such case, Nathan questions the credibility of the concept of "security community" when applied to regions suffering from internal instability and violence like the countries in South Asia.[14] He focuses on the negative impact that internal violence can have on inter-state relations. If this was to happen, the interstate mistrust would reappear and the dream of a security community would vanish. Even if the internal and transnational threats to human security did not have any negative impact on inter-state relations, it would still be incorrect to describe a region as a security community while it is wracked by different forms of violence both internally and externally.

Conclusion

In the current climate of inter-state confrontation in South Asia, the development of security cooperation may appear unlikely. While a common security sector for South Asia is not possible in the short-term, past mistakes could be avoided if today's democratic governments were to seek understanding one another's security sectors and share knowledge of governance procedures and lessons learnt. Formulating a concept of cooperative security should emphasize human security, and could be a first step towards joint security coordination.

To develop the habit of interacting and managing disputes with others peacefully, the Deutschian model which focuses on transaction flows, the spread of transnational values, and development of shared under- standings and generation of state interactions to reach interdependence can be followed as it is the interplay of institutions, norms and identities contributing to social construction of security communities.

SAARC should continue to flexibly adapt it to changing situations. This does not mean that it needs to reform radically, but there should be constant efforts to make sure that we are in line with current challenges and that the structures reflect what is needed at any point in time. It should be encouraged not for its own sake but to make sure that in the way it operates, it reflects the current environment and ability to respond to challenges. At the same time, we need to be careful not to undermine the core values and principles which must remain the very foundation of the SAARC comprehensive approach to security.

We cannot ignore the fact that in an increasingly globalized world, there has been a significant evolution in the nature of security threats. Terrorism, organized crime, weapons smuggling, cyber crime: these are threats of a global nature and we need to develop tools that are different from the ones we had in the past. We need to find ways to help each other to identify common approaches to combating these challenges. A renewed attempt to create a genuine, cooperative, South Asian security community is needed. Its objective must be a fair and enduring peace order for the SAARC region.

Common security is based on mutual trust and trust is generated by engaging in practical cooperation. We must be prepared to adopt new approaches. And it requires us to overcome mindsets lingering on from the 20th century. We need to leave behind outdated thinking in terms of confrontation, spheres of influence and zero sum games. Security in the 21st century is more than the absence of war or the threat of war. Increasingly it means: the security of our societies, our infrastructure, and our energy supply. South Asian Common Security policy should rely more on civilian resources, and it must have a cooperative approach if it is also to be effective against the new asymmetric security threats.

Besides the aforementioned elements, there are some internal reforms that are needed in the states of the region before any move towards common security mechanism. Mohammed Ayoob states that a comprehensive security community can be best achieved when “territorial satiation, societal cohesion, and political stability” prevail within states as is the case in most industrialized countries. The absence of these internal traits, i.e., effective statehood, often leads, in turn, also to inter-state violence.[15] This view tends to lead to the conclusion that the inter-state security dilemma is less due to the uncertainty of the state actors about the defensive vs. offensive intentions by the others. Rather, it is related to the prevalence of malign and predatory motives of the governments trying to stabilize their internal and external position.

We have to open up our civil societies as well as our economies and encourage them to forge closer links. This should be a core SAARC concern. The intention here is to advance economic modernization and establish new and comprehensive free trade areas within the region. The better we succeed in creating a South Asian economic space, the more secure peace will be in South Asia. Security can only be realized if we uphold fundamental values: human rights, democracy and the rule of law. A South Asian security community will only function in the long term if it sees itself as a community of values based on cooperation and mutual trust.

[1] Deutsch, Karl W.; et al. (1957). Political community and the North Atlantic area; international organization in the light of historical experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press

[2] Adler, Emanuel; Michael Barnett (1998). Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[3] Ibid

[4] Väyrynen, Raimo (2000). "Stable Peace Through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building" (PDF). Occasional Paper # 18:OP:3. The Joan B. Kroc Institute For International Peace Studies and usicisny, Andrej (2007). "Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously" (PDF). International Political Science Review 28 (4): 425-449

[5] Buzan, Barry, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in Post Cold war Era (Harvester Wheatsheaf: Hertfordshire, 1991)- p. 188

[6] Hyde-Price, A. European security in the twenty-first century: the challenge of multipolarity. London: Routledge (2007)

[7] Buzan B. Weaver, O., De Wilde, J, Security : a new framework for analysis, (London, 1998, p. 7.)

[8] Akbar S. Ahmed’s comments at “Religious Extremism and Governance in South Asia: Internal and External Pressures" — a Current Issues Briefing held at the U.S. Institute of Peace, 15 May 2003.

[9] Countering Terrorism: Building a common Approach in SAARC, Consortium of South Asian Think Tanks (COSATT), New Delhi, April 12, 2010

[10] SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and its Additional Protocol available at http://www.saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/ detail.php? activity_id=21

[11] Twelfth SAARC Summit, http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/Summit% 20Declarations/12%20-%20Islamabad%20-12th%20SAARC%20Summit,%204- 6%20January%202004.pdf

[12] Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, SAARC/SUMMIT. 12/SC.29/27 ANNEX-III

[13] Eric Rosand, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, and Jason Ipe, Countering Terrorism in South Asia: Strengthening Multilateral Engagement, Center for Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, May 2009 http://www.globalct.org/ images/ content/pdf/reports/south_asia.pdf

[14] Laurie, Nathan, Domestic Instability and Security Communities, European Journal of International Relations, June 2006 vol. 12 no. 2275-299

[15] Ayoob, Mohammed. "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective." in Keith Krause, and Michael C. William (eds) Critical Security Studies. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) Pp. 121-46