The Future of the Middle East and North Africa

Can you briefly summarize the key trends (be they social, economic, political, demographic or other) that have the potential to influence the political and security landscape of the MENA region over the course of the next five years and beyond?

Despite its many socio-economic problems, the region had been, almost paradoxically, remarkably stable for decades, with regimes virtually ossified in power. The uprisings of the last two years and a half changed this dynamic and the end results of these processes are still to be seen. But a key trend visible throughout the region is that citizens have gained confidence in their ability to actively shape their countries’ destinies. The popular passivity that allowed the old regimes to stay in power despite their corruption and incompetence is a memory of the past.

But this increased political involvement of the masses, which is coupled with increased—and, in many cases, unrealistic— expectations, comes at a time when the region is faced with unprecedented difficulties. With the exception of the oil-rich kingdoms and emirates of the Gulf, all of the region’s countries are faced with economic stagnation, a youth bulge that is complicated by widespread unemployment and severe environmental degradation. These and many other issues have been well documented and analyzed by the United Nations’ Arab Human Development Reports, which make an excellent but quite depressing read.

The situation in Egypt is, in this regard, emblematic. Over the last two years the Egyptian economy has entered a tailspin that seems difficult to reverse. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has decreased from nearly 6% to below 2%, with unemployment up from 9% to over 13%. Foreign exchange reserves have dwindled from $35 billion to just under $15 billion and the budget deficit has more than doubled. Demographically, the country is growing by 1.9% every year, which means that there are almost one million new Egyptians every 6 months. Unsurprisingly, youth unemployment is at 24.8%, and many more young people are underemployed and underpaid. Adding to this explosive situation is the fast desertification of large areas of Egyptian territory. Tellingly, the vast majority of Egypt’s population is concentrated in less than 5 percent of the country’s land, mostly the fertile areas around the Nile and the Mediterranean coast. No matter what the political future of Egypt, its leaders will have to deal with tremendous challenges.

Do you expect governments across the region to find and implement long-lasting solutions to the challenges posed by economic stagnation, high unemployment, and other problems that are widely regarded as causes of the Arab uprisings?

Every country should be analyzed individually, as political and economic circumstances vary significantly from one country to another. Yet, overall, it seems difficult to envision a government that can implement the kind of structural reforms that virtually all countries in the region need. One of the main anchors keeping the economies of the region back is the massive involvement of the state in the economy. Yet any regime seeking to change this dynamic would be confronted with resistance from powerful interest groups, such as militaries, entrenched bureaucracies and financial elites. Many regimes would not be able to withstand this pressure.

By the same token, it is obvious - as the International Monetary Fund has highlighted in loan negotiations with various MENA countries - the region’s economies cannot survive the massive bureaucracies and entitlement systems that they have created. In Egypt, for example, over a quarter of the state’s budget goes into subsidies to the poor and the middle class—an unsustainable dynamic. Yet what regime would be able to withstand the backlash from the population if it were to fire thousands of public employees or cut subsidies on food or gas? These perverse mechanisms have been used for decades by the regimes to buy political support, build patronage networks and appease the masses. But dismantling them would inevitably trigger a wave of discontent that few regimes could contain.

Seeking to be optimistic, one can hypothesize that countries blessed with natural resources, like Algeria or Iraq, could use the proceeds of their gas and oil exports to create a more sustainable economic system. But it is difficult to be optimistic about the economic prospects of countries like Egypt or Yemen for the near future.

Overall, it appears that the risk of conflict in the MENA region has risen considerably since the start of the uprisings. Do you see this as a transitory phenomenon, and do you expect more countries in the MENA region to follow the negative example of Syria in the not too distant future ?

Once again, each country should be analyzed individually. In Syria, as in Libya, things took a turn for the worst largely because the regime against which the population rose up was firmly in control of the military. Moreover, peculiar sectarian and tribal factors respectively were important factors in triggering the civil wars that engulfed both countries. In Egypt and Tunisia, on the other hand, the military sided with the population, making those revolutions relatively bloodless. And in countries like Morocco and Jordan, for example, dialogue and concessions have so far sufficed to avoid a head-on confrontation.

It is difficult to foresee what trajectory each of these countries will follow. At the moment all eyes are on the standoff between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military in Egypt. Will the Brotherhood opt for an all-out confrontation or will it eventually back down? I suspect its leadership will take the latter route, particularly if the military and the new government will have the political wisdom of leaving the door open for a political role for the Brothers. But it is not unreasonable to imagine that segments of the Brotherhood or other Islamist constituencies might embark on the path of violence.

Another country that worries me is Lebanon. So far somewhat immune to the tumults of the Arab Spring, it is increasingly suffering the reverberations of the conflict in neighboring Syria. It is not far-fetched to fear that what has become a largely sectarian conflict might spill over into Lebanon, a country where sectarian divisions could not be more accentuated.

Complicating the picture is the al Qaeda factor. Several jihadist outfits linked to the group have benefited enormously from the lawlessness and instability that has plagued many Arab countries over the last two years. Occasionally jihadist groups can pose an existential threat to some of the region’s countries, as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb did to Mali in 2012. In most cases they can pose a serious security challenge and potentially trigger sectarian tensions (in Iraq, for example), ignite cross-border conflicts (between Israel and Egypt in Sinai), or discourage foreign investors (as in Algeria).

To conclude, are you personally positive about the short- to mid-term future of the MENA region?

I am not going to deny that my answers above betray pessimism. Despite the initial optimism, the political transition in the countries where the Arab Spring has brought about a regime change has been imperfect at best. That is neither surprising nor particularly worrisome per se, as it is somewhat normal for countries transitioning from a long period of authoritarian rule to a first encounter with democracy to experience some bumps on the road. But what is particularly concerning is that in many countries this troubled transition is taking place against the abovementioned backdrop of economic collapse and demographic boom. As said, I find it difficult to imagine regimes capable of finding short- let alone mid- and long- term fixes to these problems.

At the same time I am heartened by the newly found sense of empowerment and involvement in political life of the Arab masses. The Arab Spring has brought Arabs an understanding that they can control their destiny and for most of them that has to take place through the democratic process. Yet the absorption of democratic principles is not something that happens overnight. Many in the region still have to make theirs the concept that democracy means more than elections. The experiences of the last two years have shown that not all understand that accepting electoral results, respecting the rights of minorities and oppositions, tolerating criticism and safeguarding free speech are fundamental aspects of democratic life. It is a learning process that hopefully will not take too long.