The Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy: Chapter 2

According to Eze (2010; 7), security policy deals with the broad issues of the management of the multiple threats to the core and context-specific values in the international system. It is in this context that the national security policy of Nigeria provides the framework with which the calculation of instrumental responses (military, economic, social, health, etc.,) to these multiple threats must proceed.

Geo-strategic and endowment advantages give Nigeria a leadership role in West African security policy. Nigeria is rich in solid mineral, oil and gas. Its land is suitable for agricultural production of a variety of food and cash crops. The nation earns huge revenue from oil export, which still an equally great potential for the export of gas, solid minerals and agricultural products. As shown in the Table above, Nigeria has the largest, best equipped and trained armed forces in the sub-region. Accordingly, one of the realities of the political landscape of West Africa is the clear unquestionable and transparent preponderance of Nigeria as the leading and hegemonic local actor in the sub-region (Akindele; 2003).

Nigeria has a national role conception, which has determined Nigeria’s role and has thus recommended activist involvement in African issues generally. That activism led to great contribution by Nigeria towards national liberation and the anti-apartheid struggles particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, becoming a member of the ‘Frontline States’ in the process. The doctrine of a “Pax Nigeriana”, the aspiration to lead Africa, first mooted in 1970 by Akinyemi, a realist scholar, who believed that Nigeria was meant to provide leadership for Africa and Africans in the world at large (Adebajo; 2003), manifests itself most eloquently in West Africa.

The 1975 Adedeji Report on the review of Nigerian foreign policy led the country to the adoption of a policy platform that seeks to make the safeguarding of the territorial integrity of all African states a national policy objective and led in part to the idea of Africa as centre-piece of the nation’s foreign policy. Indeed, the nation exhibited what Adebajo (2010) described as missionary zeal in assuming the role of a benevolent ‘older brother’ responsible for protecting younger siblings, immediate neighbours, fellow African and black people in the African diaspora.

As argued by Imobighe (1987), Nigerian’s ambition to be the leader of Africa has driven the idea to concentrate on the defence of the physical territory from external aggression or intervention in the nation’s affairs and invariably implies huge investment in developing appropriate military capability. The consequence is the aggressive investment and modernization to improve the nation’s military power including composition, equipment, leadership and doctrine (Bassey, 1993). According to Abbass (2012), Under-Secretary of African Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was interviewed for this study, the capability of Nigeria concerning the military and economic spheres, define in a critical sense the role it plays in regional security policy. Another source of Nigeria’s role is its high income from export of oil which allows it to fund its efforts to drive defence policy and provide leadership in security matters in West Africa, usually in the form of economic assistance to other members of ECOWAS. Nigeria has been using money as an instrument of its foreign policy since the Gowon era and the practice has become established and diversified since the Babangida era.

The adoption of the Concentric Circle Model for the nation’s foreign policy in the mid-1980s tried to prioritize foreign policy objectives but still putting emphasis on West Africa (MFA;2011). However, under President Obasanjo, since 1999, Nigeria shifted from concentricism to globalism following the argument by Lamido Sanusi, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1999-2003) that Nigeria stands to benefit from globalism as thrust of its foreign policy. Another foreign minister, Ambassador Adeniji argued that the Concentric Circle Model should be constructive and beneficial, and be predicated on a tripod of complementary strategies: articulation of Nigeria’s interests within a given concentric circle, articulation of appropriate techniques for promoting and defining such interests within that concentric circle and evolving techniques that will make the Nigerian people the first beneficiaries of such a foreign policy (Akinterinwa; 2004:454).

Adebajo has described Nigeria’s role in West Africa as hegemonic, which has been questioned again and again by other members of ECOWAS states including even those which have benefitted from its generosity (Adebajo, 2002), and that they only grudgingly accept its leadership (Adebajo; 2008: 3). There are also other problems with Nigeria’s hegemonic position. Sesay, in a discussion with the author ( 2011) observed, that even though from time to time, Nigeria gives the image of an hegemonic power, in reality, it is a “statistical hegemon,” Its influence, he argues, derives more from the statistics in its favour relative to other members of ECOWAS than any proactive strategic engagement of security policy. He observed further that Nigeria faces critical housekeeping challenges which cannot allow it to protect its obvious hegemonic advantages effectively. Nigeria cannot provide effective sub-regional leadership when it has not done so in the area of leadership at home. According to Nwoke (2004:138) the collective self-reliance which regional integration aims to attain will be ridiculed if the regional leader is suffering from external dependence. (Nwoke; 2004:138) In the same vein, Sanda ( 2011) argued that though Nigeria is a regional hegemon because of its endowments, lack of effective leadership at home does not allow it to be seen as a deliberate leader in West Africa.

The dilemma for Nigeria consists of the fact that West African states are not prepared to replace the colonial yoke with the Nigerian burden. Babangida, as pointed out by Fawole (2000), had declared that Nigeria was one country every other country in West Africa and Africa in general looks up to, to provide the necessary leadership. Thus, the francophone states in particular, and other states in the sub-region in general, view Nigeria with suspicion. They therefore enter into some other form of security arrangement for their self-pride and protection ( Danjuma; 2003). Hence, the view expressed by Adebajo (2003) that Nigeria’s leadership position has become a kind of affliction and the fear and suspicion that Nigeria has some imperialist design on its neighbours seem to be another difficult challenge in Nigeria’s West African policy (Akindele; 2003: 287).

However, considering all the problems facing West African states, there is a need to establish a security regime in the area if the sub-region and the component states are to develop. Importantly, a hegemon is required to propel the security regime and Nigeria fits into that description ( Danjuma; 2003). But there are still other problems because Nigeria is yet to develop the capacity and legitimacy to influence the subregion and fail sometimes to convince other states to follow its lead on vital political and security and economic issues. Of course, it is not as simple as that because there are other forces, for example regional bargainers, such as Sénégal, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and others, and even extra-sub-regional interests competing for influence in West Africa.

According to Zabadi (2011), even though the world treats Nigeria as a regional and sub-regional leader and listens to her opinion on African and even world issues, there is a contradiction, because Nigeria is an underperformer in domestic affairs, with poor representation in international fora and poorly coordinated positions on many issues. There is also clumsiness in the nation’s intervention in security matters in West Africa because some of the officials are sometimes lackadaisical and casual about issues. Hence “Nigeria’s goals are faltering.” This is an echo of Adebayo Adedeji, (2004: 46) who noted that:

“No country that is confronted with a long period of political instability, stagnation and regression, and is reputed to be one of the most corrupt societies in the world, has a moral basis to lead others. If it tries to, it will be resisted.”

Generally however, by whatever yardstick, sub-regional leadership is measured; Nigeria is a core state, defined as state whose economic size is sufficiently large to be capable of successfully forge ahead industrialisation and economic development. Its population, natural resource endowments, market size and intensity make an economy of significant scale realizable and it is recognized by its neighbours as the economic, financial and diplomatic centre for the sub-region (Akindele; 2003: 282).

Nevertheless, Nigeria’s role is determined by its interests which are strategic in nature. The interests are also linked to the fact that a sizable number of its citizens reside in other African states. Nigeria is protecting the lives of her nationals anywhere as part of her defence policy objectives since regional crises impact directly on Nigeria and on “No country that is confronted with a long period of political instability, stagnation and regression, and is reputed to be one of the most corrupt societies in the world, has a moral basis to lead others. If it tries to, it will be resisted.” Nigerians. But there are also social and economic interests, which include the resources it has invested in maintaining peace (Adedeji;2007: 199). Ironically, in identifying Nigeria’s security interest in Africa, the 2008 NIIA/MFA conference, in urged its Communiqué for a closer focus on the Gulf of Guinea, considered as a future key battle ground for extra-African interests. Even as the US, other NATO countries and the emerging Asian powers of China and India are scrambling for influence in the region, Nigeria should provide leadership for the development of a sustainable security framework for the area (Eze, Anigbo and Dokubo;2010).

Nigeria’s security, according to Maduakwe, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, is therefore inexorably linked to a more secure Africa, a continent that is peaceful and prosperous, a continent that is respected and courted, not just for its previous contributions to world civilisation but to the advancement of mankind in the 21st Century and beyond (2010:6). Hence, Nigeria could find justification to not only contribute but also provide leadership for efforts, including the use of its military to control any instability in the sub-region, as a way of protecting her interests.

It thus became imperative for Nigeria to organise and develop an effective diplomatic and military backbone, taking into account the risks with which to support its national objectives (NNDP, 2006:3). As part of this commitment to sub-regional solidarity, Nigeria created the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa (MCIA) in 1999 with a Department of Collective Defence and Security and Department of Regional Economic Integration. The MCIA was also made the focal point for ECOWAS thus showing the high level of the nation’s commitment to West African integration. This has allowed even for more attention to ECOWAS matters than it used to be the case. However, in 2007, as part of the civil service reforms, President Obasanjo merged the MCIA with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Nigeria’s geo-strategic location also plays a role in defining the nation’s security focus. Situated in a region of comparatively much smaller and weaker states, in terms of size, human and material resources, Nigeria’s security focus could be said to have been pre-determined. Hence, successive Nigerian leaders have come to accept that the nation has geostrategic interests that has to do with the political instability within some of the neighbouring countries, for example Chad, Benin, Niger and Togo (Imobighe, 2003: 41), and increasingly in the Gulf of Guinea. This is why Nigeria has invested in Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) along with countries like Chad and Niger and has been pushing to involve even a reluctant Cameroon that is bordering the country to the East.

Like most members of the UN, Nigeria subscribes to the ideals of “collective security” at the global, continental and sub-regional levels. Accordingly, Nigeria believes that West African security can only be guaranteed by policies of cooperation, economic integration and adoption of consensus (Ajibewa; 2007: 18).

Justifying Nigeria’s involvement in Peace Support Operations (PSO) and in regional security policy, Gambari ( 2010) observed that:

“...in Africa, lack of sustainable development has been linked directly to the proliferation and intensity of conflict situations and war which in turn have hampered development efforts… threats to peace in a neighbouring country, if not carefully managed and resolved could lead to massive exodus of refugees, weapons proliferation and trans-border crimes and general insecurity that could threaten other stable polities and compromise national economies.”

Thus, Nigeria could be appropriately considered a driver of security policy in West Africa. This is because of, as argued by Adedeji (2007: 198), the loosely structured defence system, for which only Nigeria has the size, experience and logistic resources to serve as the core of an ECOWAS rapid deployment force. The role in this regard is quite broad, including conflict resolution through peace-keeping and peace support operations and mediation of political crises in the sub-region.

Personal diplomatic efforts of Nigeria’s military Heads of State, particularly from Generals Yakubu Gowon, Olusegun Obasanjo, Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha and Abubakar Abdusalam, have been quite significant. As civilian President (1999-2007), Obasanjo was an activist in these conflict resolution efforts. Presidents Umar Yar’Adua tried to remain visible on the African stage, following Nigeria’s traditional role and at the same time, through, what his Foreign Minister, Ojo Maduekwe, called Citizen diplomacy, but with a more audacious rendition of the perspective, designed to bring the benefit of the nation’s international exertions on peace and security to the average Nigerian citizen, guided by a diplomacy of consequence, which means reciprocity (Akinterinwa, 2010). President Goodluck Jonathan has also continued to shoulder this self-imposed responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in West Africa, but anchored on what his Foreign Minister Olugbenga Ashiru described as Economic Diplomacy. Therefore, Nigeria under President Jonathan is attempting a readjustment of foreign policy focus, and at the same time retaining elements of its traditional commitment to West African solidarity and security.

The general direction of Nigerian involvement is informed by broadly defined foreign policy objectives, built on a specific perception of its national role, as articulated and documented in the National Defence Policy (2006), informed by conventional perspective about security threats, and by the capacity for rapid response and deployment (Bamali;2009: 96). On this basis, a national defence architecture has been put in place, again informed by the philosophy and doctrine in line with conventional thinking developed largely by the military establishment.

Main features of Nigeria’s West African policy both from the African Centre-piece perspective (Adedeji, 1975; Garba, 1988) and the Concentric Circle model (Gambari, 1989) and Beneficial Concentricism (Akinterinwa, 2006; Adeniji, 2006) are as follows:

a) Anti-colonialism, anti-apartheid and anti-racism;

b) Cooperation with immediate neighbours;

c) Cooperation with other ECOWAS states;

d) Promotion of peace and security in the sub-region and across the world.

The 1999 Constitution, in Section 19, projects a dynamic foreign policy for Nigeria, through the promotion of economic development, integration and unity, peace and security in Africa and the world. Accordingly, Nigeria’s involvement in West African security affairs and any role it might have played in the past few decades have been the result of strongly help opinion by its successive leaderships, generally a role about the nation’s responsibility for Africa, and which the public has come to accept, even though with reservation over the years. This was the basis for Babangida’s famous declaration in a 1985 speech, as quoted by Ajulo (2009; 18) that “Africa’s problems and their solution, should constitute the premise of Nigeria’s foreign policy.” This idea was also echoed by President Jonathan, who, while declaring open a National Conference on the Review of Nigerian Foreign Policy organized by the Presidential Advisory Council (PAC) in August, 2011, President Jonathan ( 2011) noted that:

“In the era of globalization, at a time of grave challenges to national and international security such as we face from terrorism and transnational criminal networks, our commitment to regional and international peace and security must remain as strong as ever”.

In line with this, the Federal government vision 2020 prescribes an elaborate mandate for the Nigerian Foreign Service including ensuring that Nigeria’s leading role in Africa and in the West African sub-region is sustained and safeguarded.”

Ironically, the establishment of ECOWAS remains one of the greatest achievements of Nigerian diplomacy up till 1990 and has remained the embodiment of “Pax Nigeriana” (Adebajo; 2008: 1). Equally significant is the fact that Nigeria’s critical role in the establishment of ECOMOG and in ensuring its effectiveness during many interventions has become a good example and paradigm for other sub-regional organisations and regional leaders.

In furtherance of its security management capabilities, Nigeria has finally developed what is considered a comprehensive national defence policy. The High powered Committee on national defence policy, headed by late General Joe Garba, Director General of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies was empanelled in 2000 by General T.Y. Danjuma, then Defence Minister. Though work on the Nigeria National Defence Policy (NNDP) started immediately, it was only finally adopted in 2006.

The NNDP enunciates general guidelines for the employment of the Armed Forces in particular and national resources in general to maintain the country’s territorial integrity and protect it from external aggression. It aims at providing compact, flexible, and, above all, battle-winning armed forces. It provides direction for the development of defence organisation, together with other elements of power for the security of Nigeria ( NNDP; 2006: 2). Importantly, an effective national defence policy is one in which all elements of national power are well integrated and managed to serve national security objectives in response to perceived threats. Thus, the NNDP is anchored on “six inter-related principles: prevention, protection, deterrence, rapid force mobilization, projection and cooperation with allies”

In this regard, by building military capability to avoid war, through diplomacy and deterrence, the nation will ensure that the armed forces possess the capability to successfully defend Nigeria’s territory and people relying on military fire power to deter potential adversaries ( FGN; 2006: 24).

As stated in the document, the specific objectives of the NNDP are:

a) protection of Nigeria’s sovereignty, citizens, values, culture, interests, resources and territory against external threats;

b) provision of defences as well as strategic advice and information to government;

c) promotion of security consciousness among Nigerians;

d) response to requests for aid to civil authority;

e) participation in disaster operations both at home and abroad;

f) assistance to government agencies and levels of government in achieving national goals; g) protection of Nigerians wherever they may reside;

h) ensuring security and stability in the West African subregion through collective security; i) participation in bilateral and multi-lateral operations; and

j) contributing to international peace and security.

Items e, i, and j are clear indications about the nation’s commitment to sub-regional security and peace, using the nation’s defence capabilities and considering that most of the concerns are security and not defence related. But there is now only a military defence policy with an operational structure designed in line with its objectives.

The Nigerian Constitution, in the Third Schedule (G) provides for an advisory body on defence, the National Defence Council, made up of the President, Vice President and the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff and the Service Chiefs and others with powers “to advise the President on matters relating to the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria.” The same Third Schedule of the Constitution, Section (K) provides for a National Security Council, with powers “to advise the President on matters relating to public security including matters relating to any organisation or agencies established by law for ensuring the security of the Federation.”

However, there is no evidence these bodies have been involved in the management of the nation’s security policies on peacekeeping and other security related assignments.

The Security Advisory Board created by the Shagari Administration became the Joint Intelligence Board in 1986 under General Babangida and has since remain a key component of the nation’s security architecture involving all security agencies and ministries dealing with all internal and transnational security issues (Yoroms;2010: 277).

Also critically, an objective security policy should include both military and non-military components to be able to address the complex set of socio-economic and political problems posing security challenges. But the fragmentation of defence and security policy undermines effectiveness of security management (Sanda; 2011).

Notwithstanding what Nigeria may have put in place, there are institutional weaknesses within ECOWAS including inadequate resources and lack of administrative and military capability which militate against and indeed undermine Nigeria’s leadership role. While it appears that the military components are being progressively addressed, the non-military components have not been properly articulated in a manner that is responsive to the emerging security challenges at home and in the sub-region and application of socio-economic and political engineering to address defence and security matters since the use of militarism to address security matters is no longer appropriate for the kind of security challenges being faced domestically and in the subregion as a whole.

Meanwhile, Nigeria’s role in sub-regional security is highly personalised, driven by the President rather than a well-articulated strategic vision. This is a phenomenon which started under the Babangida military regime and its policy on the Liberian conflict. This tendency has continued under the democratically elected regime of President Obasanjo, who put his personal stamp on foreign policy as well as on defence and security policy. Presidents Yar’Adua and Jonathan have also largely defined the content of Nigeria’s security policy in the sub-region according to their image.

At the same time, as noted by Sanda, since Nigeria still has no single focused and comprehensive security policy, every security agency has its own security policy that drives its operations. With this comes a lack of effective coordination among the different security and government agencies and the ensuing inter-agency rivalry.

However, Nigeria’s leadership role in the sub-regional security policy could be seen through its peace-keeping and peace-support, peacebuilding and mediation activities; and through efforts aimed at curbing cross-border criminal activities, piracy; consolidation of democratic rule and support for economic development, and importantly, through the strategic security training it offers to the armed forces of many member states of ECOWAS.

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