The PSC and ECOWAS

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Introduction

The framework guiding the relationship between the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs) is the Protocol on Relations between the African Union and Regional Economic Communities adopted in July 2007 in Accra, Ghana. Collaboration and coordination of peace and security policies are articulated in Chapter 2, Article 7, paragraph 2(b) and Article 30.[1] These relevant sections outline the establishment of a committee that shall be responsible for coordinating and harmonising policies on governance, peace and security, among other issues. The membership of these committees will be drawn from relevant departments of the AU and the RECs.

In addition, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) provides the legal and institutional parameters of the PSC’s relationship with regional mechanisms (RMs) for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Specifically, Article 16, paragraph 1(b) notes that the PSC shall ‘work closely with Regional Mechanisms to ensure effective partnership in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability’. [2] Furthermore, paragraph 3, of Article 16, calls for close harmonisation and coordination of activities between the AU’s PSC and RMs. In furtherance of these normative provisions, a Memorandum of Understanding on conflict prevention, management and resolution was signed between the AU and the RECs. Article 7, paragraph 4 states that, ‘where conflicts have occurred, the parties shall cooperate in peacemaking and peace-building activities to resolve these conflicts and prevent their recurrence, including through good offices, mediation, conciliation, enquiry and the deployment of peace support missions, as provided for in the PSC Protocol and other relevant regional instruments’. [3]

By referring to the AU and the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) collaborative interventions in Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry, between 2008 and 2010, this chapter argues that interventionism[4] has emerged as a norm of necessity in the behaviour of states in the international system. This chapter attempts an assessment of successes and challenges emerging from the AU PSC/ECOWAS intervention in our two case studies and concludes with an assessment of the prospects for future collaborations between the PSC and RECs.

Understanding Intervention – Contending Theories [5]

There are two main contending theories of international order that provide normative frameworks on how the international system should operate. First are the pluralists, who maintain that sovereignty demands minimal rules of coexistence, in particular that of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. The pluralist concern as it affects international intervention is that ‘in the absence of an international consensus on the rules governing practice of unilateral humanitarian intervention, states will act on their own moral principles, thereby weakening international order’. [6] The second group is the solidarists, who contend that ‘sovereignty is conditional and that the existence of an international society requires us to determine both the ends to which, in principle, all states, nations and peoples should be committed, and the means by which international order should be upheld’.[7]

The normative framework that best articulates the solidarist idea of liberal humanitarianism or a humanist theory of international order is the emerging norm of the ‘responsibility to protect’. In December 2001, the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was published, and outlined the broad framework of the responsibility to protect (R2P). In September 2003, the UN General Assembly adopted the report and in April 2006 the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1674, which re-affirmed the R2P. The report’s core basic principle, which speaks to the theory of humanitarianism, is worth reiterating in full:

State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.[8]

One could argue that the UN was established on firm pluralist principles. Specifically, Article 2 paragraph 7 of the UN Charter of 1942 states that the UN may not ‘intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. Similarly, Article 3 paragraph 2 of the OAU Charter of 1963 essentially borrowed from the UN Charter and Article 2(7) in particular. However, whereas the UN Charter’s Article 2(7) has a caveat that allows the organisation to intervene in internal matters of member states, when acting under Chapter VII and the rubric of humanitarian intervention, the OAU Charter did not establish such a provision.

The AU Constitutive Act, the successor to the OAU Charter, has included a provision in Article 4(h) that authorises intervention. [9] Additionally, the AU’s Constitutive Act, signed in Lomé, Togo, in 2000, has provisions for promoting democratic governance and proscribes the acquisition of power by unconstitutional means. ECOWAS has also taken the lead in managing conflicts within its region. Since intervening in Liberia in August 1991 for the first time in its history, ECOWAS has subsequently played a major role in peace, security and governance issues in the sub-region. ECOWAS has also developed a range of normative frameworks to uphold democratic principles, constitutionality and the rule of law.[10]

The Two Guineas – Security/Political Systems in Historical Context

The roots of West Africa’s governance dilemma are deeply entrenched in the region’s historical experience that dates back to European colonialism. The lack of effective democratic governance was subsequently exacerbated during a post-colonial period that was characterised by the machinations of the bi-polar geo-strategic imperatives of the Cold War. The then superpowers, the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) intervened overtly and covertly in the affairs of African countries to advance their ideological agendas, with no regard for the domestic conduct of regimes in power. This allowed a permissive environment of bad governance to flourish and authoritarian and dictatorial regimes to run roughshod over the fundamental human rights of their peoples.

Guinea-Conakry

In Guinea-Conakry, under the yoke of its authoritarian ruler Sekou Toure, the security forces were not obligated to operate under democratic norms and principles. Human rights in the country were systematically undermined and political prisoners perished behind bars. After Sekou Toure’s death, Lassana Conte, then a colonel in the Guinean army, took power in a coup d’état and remained in power for 24 years. Conte presided over the massive deterioration of public infrastructure and economic mismanagement characterised by large-scale official state kleptocracy. This was punctuated by the definitive collapse in the provision of education, health and other social services; inevitably all of this culminated in the creation of alienated, marginalised and frustrated populations. In December 2008, following Conte’s death from a protracted illness, a group of army offi cers led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara announced the dissolution of the Constitution and took control of the government. Calling themselves the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD), the soldiers promised to fight Guinea’s widespread corruption and its drug trafficking industry. While there was a collective condemnation from the international community, Guineans exhausted from decades of dictatorship and misrule openly celebrated on the streets of Conakry and across the country.

This celebration was unfortunately short-lived, as two events transpired to expose the negative intentions of Camara’s regime. Firstly, Camara reneged on an understanding that he would not contest the presidency as a civilian, which would in effect extend his rule. This exposed the military strongman’s intention to continue the negative practices of previous regimes and reversed his acceptance and popularity amongst Guineans. In response to Camara’s plans to contest the presidential poll, a demonstration was convened at Conakry’s main stadium on 28 September 2009. The junta deemed the demonstration illegal and responded with force. Soldiers opened fi re on innocent civilians, killing at least 160, injuring 1 700 and brutally raping over 100 women. [11] On 3 December 2009, Camara was shot by his aide-de-camp, Aboubacar Diakiti, ostensibly because the junta leader wanted to attribute sole responsibility for the atrocities to him. These events left Guinea in a very precarious situation while Camara was evacuated to Morocco for treatment, and subsequently to Burkina Faso to recuperate.

The junta’s defence minister, Sekouba Konate, became the interim leader and has since established a transitional government, which is tasked with guiding the country through elections. On 27 June 2010, a first round of voting in the presidential elections was convened. Subsequently, a run-off was convened on 7 November 2010 between former Prime Minister Cellou Dalein Diallo and the veteran opposition leader Alpha Conde. Conde won the run-off with 52,52 per cent of votes cast against 47,48 per cent for Diallo. President Conde was sworn in on 22 December 2010.

Guinea-Bissau

In Guinea-Bissau the historical emergence of a military dictatorship was directly linked to the dysfunctional security sector that was dominated by the liberation army after independence.[12] The position of the founding leader of the country, Amilcar Cabral, was undermined and made untenable owing to his leadership struggle with General Joao Bernardo Vieira. Vieira was one of the key military strategists during the liberation war but subsequently emerged as Principal Commissioner (Prime Minister) and Army Commander after independence. Being at the head of a military that had emerged from a liberation war and did not appreciate subservience to a civilian Commander-in-Chief, Vieira had no difficulty in deposing Cabral in a coup d’état on 14 November 1980. Vieira shored up his position and amid the Cold War divide of the time established a stable but brutal military dictatorship.[13]

Military rivalry and ethnic fractionalisation, among other factors, culminated in a civil war between June 1998 and May 1999. Vieira, who was ousted in 1999, returned triumphantly to win elections in 2005. Unfortunately continuing rivalry with the top military hierarchy and intermittent violence culminated in Vieira’s assassination by soldiers on 2 March 2009.[14]

Apart from political and historical legacies that have shaped the relationship between the political ruling class and the populations of the two Guineas, other factors of consequential note include:

■ The crisis-ridden political environment in which decision making takes place

■ The prominence of particularistic agendas in the public sector

■ A critical lack of institutional capacity to ensure the effective functioning of the countries’ service sectors

These are the features that define the dysfunctional governance dilemma that has afflicted the two Guineas. [15]

The Phenomenon of 'Special Democracies'

Although there are certain commonalities across the sub-region,[16] West African states are characterised by distinctive trajectories in their transition from military and authoritarian rule. The countries are at different stages of political transition so one cannot impose a wholesale generalisation on the conditions in the region.[17] On the one hand there are some countries, such as Ghana, that have demonstrated that they are making progress in the process of political transition, and are striving to engender some level of security, development and peaceful coexistence. On the other hand there is a bleak picture of countries where transition is either in a state of flux or has not yet begun. These countries are smokescreen democracies, or what ECOWAS informally refers to as ‘special democracies’, [18] where on the surface some semblance of stability exists but where the foundations are characterised by rampant abuse of human rights and the suppression of all forms and manners of dissent from the media and opposition. In these countries elections are stage managed, and haplessly rigged in favour of the incumbent ruling party or personality.

It is within the context of the ‘special democracies phenomenon’ that events in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry should be understood. The two Guineas were on the verge of major internal crises after the demise of their heads of government because political transition had either only partially taken place or not begun at all.

AU PSC-ECOWAS Collaboration in the Two Guineas – Seeking a Coherent Response

The reactions and responses from the AU PSC and the ECOWAS Commission to the events in Guinea-Conakry in December 2008 demonstrated some elements of coherence, particularly owing to the fact that the two organisations responded on the basis of their existing norms and protocols. This was important because in such circumstances it is vital for key stakeholders such as the AU PSC and ECOWAS to articulate a common position, otherwise the target country can easily play one organisation off against the other. The AU and ECOWAS have articulated norms and principles which reject attempts by military juntas or any other groups to engage in the unconstitutional takeover of the reins of power. This message has to remain clear and consistent from all stakeholders. The response of the AU PSC and ECOWAS to the coup in Guinea-Conakry was quite nuanced. For instance, a reading of the AU PSC Communiqué of its 165th meeting, held on 29 December 2008, reveals a legal and a political perspective.[19] The legal perspective is found in the early paragraphs of the Communiqué, where the PSC, recognising the contravention of AU norms and principles,

… reiterates its firm condemnation of the coup d’état … which is a flagrant violation of the constitution of Guinea and of the relevant AU instruments, as well as its demand for the return to constitutional order … [Paragraph 3 goes on to state that the PSC] decides to suspend Guinea in the activities of the AU until the return to constitutional order … in accordance with the relevant provisions of AU Constitutive Act and Lomé Declaration, of July 2000 ... [20]

As far as the case of legality and legitimacy goes, the Guinea coup was a contravention of the relevant provisions of the AU Constitutive Act and the Lomé Declaration of July 2000. The two documents condemn the unconstitutional and undemocratic takeover of power in all member states of the Union. However, this argument was nuanced by a political statement, with the AU PSC in the same communiqué stating that it

welcomes the present coordination between the AU and ECOWAS and urges the Chairperson of the Commission to pursue in close coordination with the countries of the region, the efforts he has already initiated including the contacts with the perpetrators of the coup d’état, for rapid return to constitutional order, and promised to work with the new authorities in collaboration with ECOWAS.[21]

While the AU PSC condemned the coup, in accordance with the proverbial saying of ‘not throwing the baby out with the bath water’, the need for and importance of engaging the coup perpetrators to assist the country in returning to constitutional rule as soon as was practicable was clearly emphasised.

On its part ECOWAS responded to Camara’s coup with a strongly worded communiqué read by then ECOWAS President Mohamed Ibn Chambas after an Extraordinary Summit of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in Abuja, Nigeria, on 10 January 2009. The Heads of Government suspended Guinea from all its meetings until constitutional order was restored in the country. The Heads of Government also strongly condemned the coup d’état in conformity with the provisions of Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance.[22] When Vieira and his Army Chief were assassinated, the sub-regional body was one of the first to respond, offering to mediate among the factions and multiple stakeholders in the country. The ECOWAS statement, among other things, stated that the assassinations were not just an assassination of a president or a chief of staff, but represented the assassination of democracy.[23] The AU PSC was also quick to condemn the assassinations; emerging from its 174th meeting on 3 March 2009 to condemn the assassinations, the PSC ‘noted the intentions of the Armed Forces to uphold the provisions of the constitution of the country relating to the succession to the presidency’.[24] Furthermore, the Council also welcomed the efforts that ECOWAS had been making over the years to engage the Guinean authorities and further welcomed the initiatives of the AU Chairperson, requesting him to continue to take all necessary steps in close consultation with the Chairperson of ECOWAS to resolve the crisis. [25] The fact that the reactions were prompt, coherent and not contradictory created the grounds for and framed, at the outset, the tone that the engagement and mediation would take. This was critical to the stabilisation of the crises in both countries.

Towards a Coordinated Engagement

The AU PSC and ECOWAS were coherent in their response, and engagement was sustained with high levels of collaboration. The focal point of the AU PSC/ ECOWAS engagement in Guinea-Conakry was the International Contact Group for Guinea (ICG-G). The ICG-G was established on 30 January 2009, to continue engagement, coordinate their efforts and monitor progress towards the restoration of constitutional rule in Guinea. [26] The Contact Group is co-chaired by the ECOWAS President and the Chairperson of the AU Commission. Other members included representatives of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the European Union (EU), the Mano River Union (MRU), the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), Organisation de la Francophonie (OIF), the UN, and the Chair of the AU PSC, as well as African members and permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC).

On 15 February 2009, the ICG-G held its first meeting in Conakry. Between February 2009 and January 2010 the Contact Group held ten meetings. On 26 January 2010, the 10th meeting was held on the margins of the AU Executive Council and the Assembly of the Union, in which the International Contact Group continued to engage the military regime in Conakry constructively.[27] Another important demonstration of coordination and collaborative engagement between the AU PSC and ECOWAS is found in the PSC’s Communiqué adopted after its 207th Meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 29 October 2009. This was after the brutal killings of and deliberate acts of violence against unarmed civilian demonstrators by armed units under the authority of the CNDD on 28 September 2009.[28] The PSC also threw its weight behind the mediation efforts undertaken by President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso on behalf of ECOWAS, and requested the AU Commission, in close collaboration with ECOWAS and members of the ICG-G,

to take all measures towards the implementation of targeted sanctions, including denial of visas, travel restrictions and freezing of assets, against the President and members of the CNDD … and any other civilian or military individual whose activities are aimed at maintaining the unconstitutional status quo in Guinea.[29]

In Guinea-Bissau, after the strong responses to the assassinations of early March 2009 referred to above and on 5 June 2009, [30] there were several levels of sustained engagement. At the level of the AU Commission, the Chairperson, with the support of the PSC through the relevant communiqués and also through the efforts of his then Special Envoy for Guinea-Bissau, Joao Bernardo de Miranda, was able to support the stabilisation process. The AU’s functioning in Guinea-Bissau and also in Guinea-Conakry was largely facilitated by the fact that ECOWAS had a physical presence in these countries, with expertise to acquire and provide on-the-spot analysis and situation reports. The presence and function of the ECOWAS liaison offices in critical zones of crisis mean that ECOWAS and the AU are well informed on all developments in crisis countries; this is important because it allows responses and engagements to proceed in a coherent and expedient manner.

The AU and ECOWAS’s unwavering and sustained engagement with and support for the crisis countries, in search of a peaceful resolution that conforms to the relevant protocols and decisions, are well captured in the communiqués of the 10th Meeting of the ICG-G held in Addis Ababa, 26 January 2010 and the 37th Ordinary Session of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government held in Abuja, 16 February 2010. The ECOWAS Summit, among other things, assured the new president of Guinea Bissau of its support in the implementation of measures to enhance good governance, and control impunity and drug trafficking. They also ‘hailed the signing of the Ouagadougou Joint Declaration of 15 January 2010 as a critical step in the effort to restore constitutional order and end the crisis in Guinea Conakry’.[31]

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE PSC AND ECOWAS FRAMEWORK OF COLLABORATION

The discussion above has briefly illustrated how the AU PSC and ECOWAS have coordinated their responses to contribute positively to the management of the crises affecting the two Guineas. However, there are areas where both organisations can improve their interventions and ensure that they have a more lasting effect. Firstly, the AU PSC needs to improve on the mechanisms for enforcing its decisions. Despite the fact that both organisations systematically issued a range of statements and directives, the regimes in the target countries, in this case the two Guineas, were essentially able to ignore these statements. As an illustration, despite all the efforts of the AU-ECOWAS collaboration in Guinea-Conakry, the significant breakthrough that culminated in the signing of the Ouagadougou Joint Declaration only came after the violence of an attempted assassination removed junta leader Camara from the seat of power. Although Camara’s attempted assassination triggered the progress, this would not have happened if the AU and ECOWAS had not been engaging with the deteriorating situation with sustained commitment and resolution.

Secondly, there is a need for effective communication of the PSC’s decisions, and an improvement in the coordination of international efforts and activities in crisis zones and countries. Crisis zones tend to attract a multiplicity of international actors, each with their own self-interest. The leading organisations, the AU and the relevant REC, need to lead international coordination in these regions because of their close proximity to the countries as well as their understanding of the political dynamics necessary for effective intervention. A relevant example is the duplication of security sector reform (SSR) support to Guinea-Bissau, where over 14 different countries and organisations were involved. This multiplication of international intervention enabled the target in-country institutions to avoid making any fundamental changes.[32]

Thirdly, the AU PSC needs to show more consistency in its early response to crisis situations. Whereas the AU PSC is quick to respond to situations where there is an unconstitutional takeover of government or where a political assassination takes place, as our case studies above demonstrate, there is a reluctance to engage with countries that have been embroiled with low-level conflicts and bad governance at an early stage. This allows situations to deteriorate to the point where violence erupts, at which point it becomes exponentially more difficult to resolve a dispute. The principle of sovereignty and non-intervention clearly continues to impose constraints on the ability of the AU and ECOWAS, and other intergovernmental organisations, to intervene at an early stage. However, there is a perceptible incremental increase in the propensity of the AU and ECOWAS and similar organisations to utilise the gamut of norms, protocols and mechanisms to intervene in the affairs of their member states.

Conclusion

Non-democratic means of ascending to power are condemned and are frowned upon by the norms and principles of both the AU and ECOWAS. [33] The permissive environment that enables so-called ‘special democracies’, which have not really undergone transition, to prevail created the context in which the recent experiences in Guinea-Conakry and Guinea-Bissau took place. This made it critical for the AU and ECOWAS not to ignore or dismiss the events in the two Guineas, but to use the opportunities generated to lay the foundations for stabilisation.[34] The collaborative efforts of the AU and ECOWAS in the two Guineas have illustrated the importance of intergovernmental organisations coordinating efforts to manage crises across the continent. The situation in both countries is far from stabilised but there is a platform on which to build. In Guinea-Bissau, despite the election of a new president, security sector governance remains a major challenge. The deep mistrust among political and military elites, coupled with Guinea-Bissau’s status as a major hub for the trafficking of narcotics, fosters transnational criminality, political instability and insecurity. As the authorities in Guinea-Conakry midwife the country hopefully towards an enduring democratic culture, coordinated international support is critical. If both countries are genuinely to move forward, domestic stakeholders will have to be persuaded to agree to and internalise reform. In the final analysis it is clear that the relationship between the AU and ECOWAS is evolving and, progressively, insights gained from joint interventions in countries like the two Guineas will provide useful insights for ongoing and future initiatives to promote peace and security in Africa.

[1] See The Protocol on Relations between the AU and RECS, July 2007, Accra-Ghana, http://www. afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/AU-RECs-Protocol.pdf (accessed 26 March 2010).

[2] See Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC Protocol), adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Durban, South Africa, on 9 July 2002, Article 16, item 1b, http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/organs/ psc/Protocol_peaceandsecurity.pdf (accessed 26 March 2010).

[3] See the AU-RECs Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and Security, Article VII, item 4. http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/AU-RECs-Protocol.pdf (accessed 26 March 2010).

[4] ‘Interventionism’ in this instance does not exclusively refer to robust enforcement. In the context of this chapter’s analysis, the activities of preventive diplomacy and mediation are also categorised as intervention.

[5] The ideas on and analysis of humanitarian intervention argued in this section are largely taken from an earlier paper by the author. See JT Lar, Making the case for humanitarian intervention: a threshold in African conflict prevention and management, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 17 (2008), 41–55.

[6] Nicholas J Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 29.

[7] James Mayall, Introduction, in M Berdal and S Economides (eds), United Nations Interventionism 1991–2004, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 4.

[8] The responsibility to protect , Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp, xi (accessed 10 November 2010).

[9] Article 4, paragraph H of the African Union Constitutive Act adopted in 2002 provides for ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.

[10] Key among these normative frameworks are the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).

[11] Francois Grignon, Africa peace-building agenda, ‘Guinea: the junta must leave,’ International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/text/index:cfm=6390 (accessed 26 March 2010).

[12] For more on this analysis, see JT Lar, The ECOWAS SSR agenda in West Africa: looking beyond normative frameworks, KAIPTC Occasional Paper, 24, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Ghana.

[13] Ibid., 105–107.

[14] Obituary: President Vieira of Guinea Bissau, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/ africa/7918462.stm (accessed 2 March 2009).

[15] Dylan Hendrickson, Understanding and supporting security sector reform, a DFID handbook on SSR, London: Conflict Security and Development Group (CSDG), King’s College, 2008, 8.

[16] This section is largely taken from an earlier paper by the author. See JT Lar, The ECOWAS SSR agenda in West Africa: looking beyond normative frameworks, 5–7.

[17] These two volumes are Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye, and Funmi Olonisakin (eds), Challenges of security sector governance in West Africa, DCAF, Lit Verlag, Münster, 2008, and Adedeji Ebo and Boubacar N’Diaye, (eds), Parliamentary oversight of the security sector in West Africa: opportunities and challenges, DCAF, 2008.

[18] This is a common way amongst ECOWAS staff of addressing member states that are still governed by idiosyncratic dictators who are presiding over anything but democratic regimes.

[19] Souaré explains this point effectively. See Issaka Souaré, Explaining the December 2008 military coup d’état in Guinea, Conflict Trends (1) (2009), 27–33, http://accord_explainingdecember- 2008militarycoupdetat_Guinea.pdf (accessed 26 March 2010).

[20] Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council, 165th Meeting, 29 December 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia http://www.africa-union.org/rppt/au/organs/165-Communique_Eng.pdf. (accessed 26 March 2010).

[21] Ibid.

[22] Authority of Heads of State and Government suspends Guinea, http://www.ecowas.int/publications/ en/communique_final10jan2009/comfinal (accessed 28 March 2010).

[23] Guinean President Shot Dead, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/Africa/ 7918061.stm (accessed 28 March 2010).

[24] Communiqué Peace and Security Council, 174th Meeting, 3 March 2009. PSC/PR/Comm (CLXXIV) http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PSC174COM.PDF (accessed 26 March 2010).

[25] Ibid.

[26] See Final Communiqué 1st Meeting of The International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G), Conakry, 15 February 2009, Communiqué final de la 1 Session du GIC-G Conakry 15-02-2009 Eng.pdf. (accessed 27 March 2010).

[27] See Final Communiqué of 10th Meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G) Addis Ababa, 26 January 2010. Communiqué final de la 10eme Session du GIC-G Addis Ababa 26-01-2010 Eng.pdf. (accessed 27 March 2010).

[28] Communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council, 207th Meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government, 29 October 2009, Abuja Nigeria, PSC/AHG/COMM.2(CCVII).

[29] Ibid.

[30] A presidential candidate, Baciro Dabo, and Helder Proenca, a former defence minister, were assassinated on 5 June 2009 in the build up to the presidential elections. This was strongly condemned by ECOWAS and the AU PSC at its 192nd meeting held on 10 June 2009.

[31] Communiqué of 37th Ordinary Meeting of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 16 January 2010, Ref.:CWW/HOSG/ABJ/37/Rev.1, http://www.ecowas.int/ publications/en/communique_final/comfinal.pdf (accessed 28 March 2010).

[32] International Crisis Group, Guinea Bissau: beyond the rule of the gun, Africa Briefing, 61 (25 June 2009). Some of the countries and organisations involved include Portugal, Nigeria, Spain, Brazil, France, UK, UNDP, EU, ECOWAS, and Angola. More recently the AU and ECOWAS have been mandated to lead the process, with support from the UN.

[33] The AU and RECs, like ECOWAS, have developed norms and protocols that uphold democratic principles and the rule of law; for example, ECOWAS has the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.

[34] Currently an international contact grouping led by ECOWAS is engaged in assisting and supporting Guinea towards a democratic transition.