The Economic Diplomacy of Kenya’s Regional Interests (Excerpt)

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Introduction

The Republic of Kenya is the regional hub for trade and finance in East Africa. Its economy, however, is constrained by effects of corruption and an overdependence on low-priced primary agricultural goods in world markets.[1] Its foreign policy is actively directed toward the region through economic diplomacy in pursuit of its domestic development goals. As set out in Kenya Vision 2030: a Globally Competitive and Prosperous Country (‘Vision 2030’), the country seeks to achieve those targets within the next 18 years. [2] Through a comprehensive analysis of its global competitiveness, Kenya has identified six important sectors to deliver the 10% annual economic growth rate regarded as a central to its economic development policy.

This has necessitated co-operation with neighbouring states to mould regional organisations into more viable economic blocs in an increasingly liberal economic environment.[3] The country’s susceptibility to political shocks, exemplified by post-election violence in late 2007 and early 2008, is its main challenge. Kenya is headed for a general election in 2013 under a new constitution that is being implemented by the current ‘grand coalition’ government. Meanwhile, uncertainty persists over outcomes of cases currently before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Charges against three high-level Kenyan officials and a journalist of alleged crimes against humanity in connection with the violence have been confirmed for hearing.[4]

Against this background, this study examines the nature of Kenya’s economic diplomacy in East Africa. It will particularly scrutinise the role of foreign policy in advancing Kenya’s commercial interests, offering a perspective on the country’s contribution to the region’s development and economic stability. The assessment explores how this form of diplomacy has become a mainstay of its foreign policy; how Kenya co-operates with neighbouring states within the framework of the new common market; its regional trade policy and the political risks it faces while pursuing its national vision. [5]

Kenyan foreign policy in East Africa

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Kenya’s foreign policy began to centre on East Africa. The general aim is to maintain peaceful co-existence with other nations; while promoting regionalism. Kenya seeks integration and co-operation as a way to advance its own economic prosperity within the framework of international co-operation and multilateralism. Economic development through increased market access and enhanced technology has become a high priority. For instance, Kenya is increasingly investing in renewable energy to improve power generation, so as to give small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) greater access to electricity.[6] It is also investing heavily in the information, communication and technology sector (ICT).[7]

Regional integration forms a major component of its foreign policy and is pursued through various regional initiatives, such as the East African Community (EAC); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa), African Caribbean and Pacific-European Union (ACP-EU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation.[8] This position reflects realisation that Kenya’s development is tied to that of its regional neighbours, as well as that of the global economic system.

Its regional initiatives are critical to Kenya’s economic diplomacy.[9] As pointed out by former secretary general of the EAC, Ambassador Juma Mwapachu, regional economic communities (RECs) have become an increasingly desirable developmental path. Liberalised trade is a major component of RECs and a key driver of investment because an economic region becomes attractive to investors only if its economy allows free movement of goods and services; the real motivation for trade, therefore, are large markets, which is why regional integration is of such importance to Kenya.[10] RECs such as the EAC are working towards opening large internal markets governed by free trade. It is only by generating such large internal markets that a country such as Kenya can attract the right kind of investments and attain sizeable markets for its products.

The shared frontiers of states in the region, their cultural affinity; common colonial history; interdependence; and a potential market of close to 130 million people, together make the EAC a feasible scheme.[11] More recent developments aside, East African countries are also committed to integration through their agreements under the 1982 Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980–2000. Other drivers include the example of integration by the EU and the re-emergence of South Africa as a possible continental economic hegemony, against the background of the declining fortunes of East African economies, particularly that of Kenya.[12]

Compared with its neighbours, Kenya enjoyed a good deal of political stability prior to the violence that followed the 2007 elections, and nationals from the region came to view Kenya as a safe haven from different forms or degrees of instability in their own countries. [13] Kenya has participated in prominent regional diplomatic initiatives and provided leadership in solving regional conflicts, as it did during the Sudan peace process that culminated in the formation of the new state of South Sudan and the establishment of a transitional national government – later the transitional federal government – in Somalia. The country also has high diplomatic standing arising from its hosting some of the largest diplomatic missions and international agencies in sub-Saharan Africa,[14] while maintaining a moderate profile in international politics by adopting a posture of ‘silent diplomacy’. In most international controversies or crises, Kenya employs a ‘wait and see’ posture in accordance with its principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. [15] Although the need for it to assume an overtly hegemonic position in the region is routine speculation in media and academic circles, the government instead opts for friendly relations to promote the expansion of its business interests across the region; [16] a stance taken especially since the increased involvement of the private sector under the national economic recovery strategy (ERS) reforms for Employment and Weath Creation of 2003–2007. This friendly posture has been aimed mainly at assuaging persistent fears attending negative sentiments – particularly from Tanzania – towards Kenya following the collapse of the original EAC in 1977.

EAC stakeholders remain anxious over the failure of previous regional initiatives during the early post-independence period, as a result of an underlying pessimism widespread at that time. Scholars such as Agrippah T. Mugomba[17] noted that previous integration initiatives took place at the height of the Cold War; hence the collapse of 1977 can be attributed mainly to ideological differences: the right-and left-wing ideological positions taken at the time by Kenya and Tanzania respectively and the ideological somersaults performed by Uganda, that undermined unity of purpose needed for the EAC to work. Mugomba also points to a number of other factors that led to the collapse: long harboured fears of one or the other partner; resentment by Kenya of the need to ‘carry’ poorer members; longstanding strained relations between Uganda and Tanzania resulting from Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere’s refusal to recognise Idi Amin’s regime; markedly different foreign policy concerns and approaches; and the concentration of foreign capital in Kenya, the industrial and commercial ‘core’, which threatened to turn the two ‘peripheral’ states of Tanzania and Uganda into economic satellites and principle victims of Kenyan ‘sub-imperialism’.[18]

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[1] CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), ‘Kenya’, in The World Factbook. Washington: CIA, 2011.

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html.

[2] Kenya, Ministry of Planning and National Development, Vision 2030: A Globally Competitive

and Prosperous Country, Popular Version. Nairobi, 2007, http://www.vision2030.go.ke/

Popular%20Version.pdf.

[3] Kenya, Ministry for Information and Communication, Kenya Year Book 2010: A New Dawn for

Kenya. Nairobi: Kenya Year Book Editorial Board, 2010.

[4] AEO (African Economic Outlook), Kenya. Tunis: African Development Bank, 2011, p. 3, http://

www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/Country_Notes/2011/Full/Kenya.pdf

[5] The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Barack Ndegwa Integration Secretary at the

Ministry of East African Community (MEAC), Dr. Godwin Siundu of the University of Nairobi,

Jacob Akech of the Society for International Development (SID-EA) and Justus Nam and Wahu

Karanja, interns at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in conducting this study. Lavender

Chaparadza assisted with initial proof reading and Hayzel Serem in later research.

[6] By 2016 the first phase of the Geothermal Development Corporation’s (GDC) Menengai

Geothermal Development Project (Menengai project) will generate 400 MW of power, enough

to light 500 000 households and run 300 000 small businesses. On completion in 2030

capacity will be 600 MW.

[7] Kenya, ICTB (Information, Communication and Technology Board), Home, http://www.ict.

go.ke/.

[8] A New Dawn for Kenya, op. cit., p. 697.

[9] This is an adjustment to the emergence of regional economic blocs after the cold war. The

realisation of increasing global interdependence prompted Kenya’s actions in leading the

revival of the EAC.

[10] Zarro A, ‘Back to the Future: SID President Ambassador Juma V. Mwapachu interviewed’,

http://www.sidint.net/content/back-future-sid-president-amb-juma-v-mwapachu-interviewed.

[11] The EAC comprises Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

[12] Akech J, ‘The East African Community: Miracle or Mirage?’ in East African Scenarios Project,

Research Compendium, Society for International Development (SID), Nairobi, 2007, pp. 86–87.

Akech cites Alden C & M Soko, ‘South Africa’s Economic Relations With Africa: Hegemony and its Discontents’, Journal of Modern African Studies 43, 3, pp. 367–392, on the economic

impact of the rise of a democratic South Africa in its relations with the continent.

[13] At various times large numbers of Somalis, South Sudanese, Ugandans, Ethiopians, Congolese

and Burundians have taken refuge in Kenya.

[14] The US embassy is the largest in sub- Saharan Africa and the UN headquarters is the main

office in Africa for UN agencies such as UN-Habitat, UN-Environmental Programme (UNEP)

among others. Kenya also hosts large missions from the UK, EU, China, Canada, Belgium,

Russia, India, Iran, Brazil, and Pakistan.

[15] Kenyoru AN, Kenya’s Foreign Service and Export Trade Promotion. Milton Keynes: AuthorHouse,

2009, p. 20.

[16] Wanjohi K, ‘When Kenya Sneezes…’ New African, May 2009, p. 65.

[17] Mugomba is a former Director for the Center for Black Studies at the University of California,

Santa Barbara.

[18] See Mugomba AT, Regional Organisations and African Underdevelopment: The Collapse of the

East African Community, Journal of Modern African Studies, 16, 2, pp. 261–272.