An Interview with Rohinton Medhora, President of the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
30 Nov 2013
CIGI's research and activities focus on a number of large questions about the future of global society. Can you elaborate on your mission and explain why 'international governance innovation' is at the center of your mandate?
Although the world is obviously becoming more globalized, the nation state remains its primary decision-making and implementation authority. Indeed, the levels above and below the nation state have always played a role in global governance, but they remain secondary. Given this truth, we have to recognize the inter-connectedness of our world and yet account for the continued power of localism.
The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), which is a non-partisan think tank founded in 2001, keeps this dual reality – globalism and localism – firmly in mind. Having said this, our primary purpose is to contribute to the development of multilateral global governance. We do this by building bridges ‘from knowledge to power’ – i.e., by providing viable solutions for both existing and emerging global problems. In practical terms, that means CIGI analysts and policy developers focus on four primary areas –Global Economy, Global Security, Environment and Energy, and Development. Earlier this fall, we unveiled a new program on international law that is not only designed to complement our preexisting work, but also to hone in on the legal dimensions of, and expertise that is required in, for example, better regimes for intellectual property rights and global environmental treaties.
So, in a nutshell, we are here to influence policy makers to innovate. We do this, as already noted, by performing interdisciplinary and idea-generating research, and by advancing policy debates amongst a network of policy, business and academic communities around the world.
Since you aim to develop ideas that ultimately influence policy maker’s decisions, can you provide us with an example of a CIGI project that has had a real policy impact?
I am very proud of the work CIGI has done in relation to the G-20, which began about ten years ago. If you recall, the group stood up in the wake of the East Asian and Russian financial crises of 1997-98 and initially included finance ministers and central bankers as its members. However, Paul Martin, who was Canada’s Finance Minister at the time and later became Prime Minister, was an early proponent – it should be said the early proponent – of extending this arrangement to the country leaders’ level, so that a broader array of global issues might be tackled in inclusive and effective ways. With great support from him, CIGI subsequently assessed how a G20 at the country leader level might function and how it might deliberate on a wider range of issues. (The results of this work may be found at external page www.l20.org.)
At first blush, it might then appear that our work played a seminal role in expanding the G20’s remit, but we have to be careful about the ‘impact’ think tanks have, including CIGI. It is very hard for any think tank to take sole credit for a policy shift. Indeed, reality is more nonlinear and therefore complicated than your question suggests. No one could pretend that the G20 at the country leader level came into being just because of CIGI’s work. But I do believe it was an integral part of the dynamic that ultimately led to the creation of the G20 we know today. And for this CIGI should be proud, just as it is about past and current work on a sensible system for sovereign debt restructuring and internet governance, to name two other topics on which CIGI is active.
Global power structures are shifting and while the West seems to be preoccupied with itself, other important economic and political players have emerged. How do you see these global power shifts impacting international governance, especially in the area of global security?
In my view, there are four broad trends that policy makers and scholars will need to keep track of in the coming decades.
First, integral to the rise of the South is the growth of a middle class the world over. According to a Brookings Institution estimate, the middle class numbered 1.8 billion in 2009, about 1 billion of whom lived in Europe and North America. Globally, the number is expected to rise to 3.3 billion in 2020 and 4.9 billion in 2030, with the entire growth occurring in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
At the same time, although inequality between countries is falling, inequality within countries – especially in successful growth stories such China and India – is rising.
As a result, and just like their counterparts in developed countries, policy makers in developing countries will become increasingly preoccupied with managing middle class vulnerabilities. Their challenge will be to fight inequality, rather than poverty, in order to preserve political stability.
Second, globalization will ensure that cross-border, regional and global spillovers and interactions will become as important as national policy. Ongoing trends in international migration, financial flows and climate change will warrant this, and each trend will have important security implications.
Third, the appropriate balance between government regulation and unfettered markets will remain a major focus in policy debates. A number of models for growth and development are now available for our consideration, and interested countries no longer need to look exclusively towards the U.S. or Western Europe for inspiration. Chile and South Africa, for example, have shown that it is possible to pursue a social democratic system in the aftermath of dictatorship, while China and India present interesting contrasts in economic and political systems that deliver consistently strong economic growth.
Finally, the South will assume rights and responsibilities in global governance. The tawdry stitch-up between the U.S. and Europe in the allocation of power and top jobs in key international financial institutions must yield to accommodate countries that now hold economic clout through their overseas investments and international reserves, and have foreign aid programs of their own. If money and ideas flow together, then the rise of Southern capital will inevitably come with its own precepts. This can only help in finding solutions to problems like climate change and regional conflict.
Finally, what role does Canada play in promoting innovative international governance and what more can it do, or just do better?
Noting the shift away from the West and the rise of new powers, this year’s UNDP Human Development Report calls for “coherent pluralism” in global governance. In our view, this is exactly the way forward. Whatever forms this pluralism will take, Canada has and will continue to have a role to play. Our history, position and capacity dictate this. By history I mean the internationalism Canada has embraced at least since 1945. Over the years, it has included a robust commitment to Pearsonian peacekeeping, the pursuit and adaption of NAFTA, the formalization of the ozone depletion and land mines treaties, a commitment to debt relief, the already mentioned expansion of the G20’s profile and agenda, and much more. Second, by position, I mean the manner in which Canada straddles different worlds – i.e., the various G’s (7, 8, and 20), the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and perhaps most important but under-appreciated, how it has used its federated system of government to create a prosperous technology-driven society built on a foundation of agriculture and resource extraction. Finally, by capacity I mean the country’s strong cadre of public servants, politicians, scholars and practitioners – and their respective institutions – who together provide Canada the voice and credibility it currently enjoys in foreign affairs.
But voices and credibility do not self-perpetuate. Canada’s domestic eco-system in global governance has to be actively preserved. Canada’s record so far is a fine one, but much depends on the comportment it has and what solutions it promotes for tomorrow’s global challenges, be it climate change, the impact of new technologies, or demographic shifts.
For additional information please see:
external page 'About CIGI'
CIGI Publications in the ISN Digital Library
external page CIGI Launches International Law Program
external page More about Rohinton Medhora