Bahrain’s Fractured Ruling Bargain: Political Mobilization, Regime Responses, and the New Sectarianism

In the context of the Arab uprisings of 2011 and 2012, Bahrain’s tenuous and controversial ruling bargain came under intense pressure and rapidly evolved into a high-stakes political standoff, punctuated by periods of unilateral political decision-making and multilateral demonstrations of force. Although Bahrain has long seen political polarization between the ruling Sunni elite and the dominantly Shi‘a opposition, the events of 2011-12 stand out because of the intensity of the popular mobilization, the state’s reliance on violent repression, and the increasing shift from economic and political grievances to sectarian religious conflict. While Bahrain’s ruling authorities remained in power during a period in which other Arab leaders were not as fortunate, both the remarkable levels of popular mobilization and the sectarian framing of the conflict in 2011-12 have dramatically altered the character of the underlying ruling bargain in Bahrain.

Bahrain’s contentious ruling bargain underwent a seismic shift in the context of broader regional political activity, for several reasons. First, Bahrain’s history of compounding social and religious cleavages primed the population for mass mobilization against the existing regime, as the costs of collective action decreased. This led to dramatic levels of popular mobilization, including the highest per capita levels of popular protest in the Arab world. Second, experiments with political reform in the previous decade created an institutional and ideational framework through which popular demands against the ruling elite could be framed, while failing to allow for the effective communication and resolution of grievances through state institutions. This created unmet expectations for political dialogue that would lead some to reject the ruling bargain outright. Third, the regime played a mixed strategy of concession and repression, which simultaneously accelerated popular expectations and amplified social and political grievances. Strategic inconsistencies within the ruling elite’s behavior failed to create popular confidence that the normal rules of Bahraini politics were still applicable. Finally, Bahrain’s small size and strategic position between rival Sunni and Shi‘a power centers further stimulated mass political participation and increased the perceived political stakes of what would otherwise be considered a local fight.

For much of the period since the uprising began, the Bahraini regime has used a mixed strategy of both repression and concession to contain the challenge of mass popular mobilization. The regime rather systematically repressed the opposition (muzzling the media, making widespread arrests, preventing protests, and using violence against political activists), but it also made a number of limited concessions (release of political prisoners, establishment of an independent inquiry, and calls for dialogue) that indicated the government’s desire to return to some form of ruling bargain that is based on popular consent rather than repression. This disproportionately repressive but overall mixed regime strategy in Bahrain has had two principal effects on the Bahraini opposition. It has led to a major rupture between the government and opposition forces—one that is qualitatively different from previous conflicts between the regime and its opponents. Likewise, it has divided the opposition between those who benefit the most from regime concessions (primarily the Sunni opposition) and those who suffer the worst from regime repression (the major Shi‘a opposition groups).

The political contest in Bahrain has thus taken on an increasingly sectarian character over time, despite the explicit desire of the principal opposition groups to frame the conflict in political rather than sectarian religious terms. Some of the reasons for this increased sectarianism are structural, while others are based in strategic choices by members of the ruling elite. Structural causes include the dominantly Sunni character of the Bahraini security forces, including the presence of many originally foreign but naturalized Sunnis, who are greatly resented by many in the Bahraini Shi‘a community. The context of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has also played a role in framing the conflict as a sectarian one. Although the early protestors avoided references to broader Shi‘a identity, the regional rivalry between the two powers over Bahrain has led some participants to understand Bahrain’s conflict within this larger context.

Importantly, the Bahraini regime itself has sought to portray the popular mobilization as an Iranian-inspired threat to Sunni hegemony in the region. One effect of the sectarian framing of the conflict has been a decisive split in the original protest coalition, with Shi‘a groups losing many of their original Sunni allies. This has facilitated the regime staying in power in the short run, but has led to a longer-term rupture in the ruling bargain that will be very difficult to mend. A systematic reinforcing of the sectarian divide over the course of 2011 prevented the Bahraini opposition from building the coalition necessary to force the regime to capitulate, as eventually occurred in Tunisia and Egypt. Even among Shi‘a groups, the opposition has fragmented over whether the ruling family has forever discredited itself through its support for violent repression, or whether there should be an ongoing role for the al-Khalifa in governance. The degree of fragmentation across the opposition has made a negotiated solution increasingly difficult to achieve, and has enabled the regime to maintain power under conditions of a tense stalemate. Despite continued popular pressure, divisions in the opposition allowed the regime to avoid any clear moves toward a negotiated resolution.

The Bahraini Monarchy has so far survived the remarkable popular challenge against the prevailing ruling bargain, but it has done so by making short-term decisions (to repress and divide the opposition) that will make it very difficult to sustain the traditional ruling bargain over the longer term. By increasing popular levels of both anger and fear, the regime’s response to the uprising has deepened the social divisions within Bahrain, making the long-standing Bahraini social and political challenges more severe than they have ever been before. The use of repression has also backed the king into a corner, from where he cannot now turn to a dominantly conciliatory strategy and still preserve the ruling family’s perceived interests. Because the events of 2011-12 have hardened popular feelings against the monarchy, truly opening up the political system will inevitably put severe and unwelcome demands on the monarchical system. Ultimately, a path forward in Bahrain will require difficult political compromises if it is to be jointly created through the actions of domestic stakeholders. If this does not happen through domestic political leadership, it is likely that international stakeholders will be necessary to define the terms of a political resolution.