Organized Crime - Above, Beyond and With the State

ISN: Are there any parts of the world where organized criminal gangs have become genuinely more powerful than the state?

Prem Mahadevan: The best answer is that there are many parts of the world where organized criminal gangs already are the state. This does not require a street-level drug dealer to occupy a presidential seat (even absurdity has its limits). Rather, it requires that the final payoffs for official tolerance of criminal activity extend to the highest levels of government. West Africa and Central Asia are two examples that immediately come to mind. If one wanted to look at a case where criminal gangs have operated in defiance of a weak or incapacitated state, then Somali piracy is an example. Pirate attacks have been trending down not because the Somali state has become stronger, but because targets – merchant vessels – have been hardened by private security firms. Patrols by international navies off the Somali coast have also made a difference.

Confusion arises from using the word ‘gangs’ when discussing the phenomenon of organized crime. Such usage conjures up an image of societal rejects – a kind of underclass. In fact, in many emerging markets, new economic opportunities bring tremendous scope for corruption and criminality. The most lucrative prospects are cornered by people with the deepest pockets - reputable businessmen with expensive lawyers who can spot loopholes in existing laws. Street gangs get the leftovers - those sectors of the local economy which are not worth having as far as the big players are concerned. It is when the policing system is not strong or credible enough to suppress inter-gang fighting over turf and resources that violent criminality manifests itself on the streets. So, it is not the strength of criminal gangs per se, but the weakness of the government that is often the cause of the problem.

If so, have any of these groups transcended typical stereotypes and become a force for good?

There is always a small (and usually localized) constituency that supports organized crime groups, partly out of fear and partly because these groups invest in keeping up benign facades. The Sinaloa cartel in Mexico is a good example: although involved in atrocious acts of violence, it has built a counterintelligence web of what might very loosely be called ‘popular support’ in areas where it is a territorial entity. Generally, it seems that criminal groups build a rapport with marginalized communities that also provide them with recruits. The slums of Mumbai are another illustration of this point. Smugglers in the city have sought to ensure, through a variety of illegal means, that they retain a bare minimum of local support by providing services that the Indian state ideally should be responsible for. Be it water or electricity connections, or legal disputes that have no prospect of being speedily resolved in the formal court system, slumlords in Mumbai try to fill a governance gap left by an overwhelmed and under-resourced state machinery. Recognizing this does not mean that the smugglers are anything more than ordinary criminals with a canny sense of PR.

Can this phenomenon be traced in any way to the re-emergence of powerful cities? Where once we talked about ‘rogue states’, could we soon be talking about ‘rogue cities’?

This is really the heart of the matter. We are used to thinking of states as the principal actors in the international system. But when it comes to organized crime, it is the city that ought to be the main unit of analysis. All crime, whether organized or not, is ultimately local. Even if it is called ‘transnational organized crime’ the individuals participating in such activity are grounded in a certain community or neighborhood. They might be scattered across several countries, but each of them is a local player, operating on behalf of a larger network.

The expression ‘rogue cities’ aptly captures the variegated nature of organized crime. Coming back to Mexico, while the north of the country is prone to drug-related violence, other parts are relatively calm. The drug trafficking organizations have their logistics networks across the whole country of course, and indeed, much of Latin America. However, very high levels of violence are primarily associated with a few crossing-over points like Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez and Nuevo Laredo. These cities are fought over because they represent the final barrier for drugs that are about to enter the United States. Their value is highest at this point – enough to kill large numbers of competitors for.

At the moment, the world’s biggest hotspot on the ‘rogue’ city map would probably be Karachi, Pakistan. Its population has nearly doubled in the last decade. The city already had a severe crime problem from at least the late 1980s onwards, which has steadily grown worse, with sporadic eruptions of civil war-style fighting. Much of this has to do with the Afghan heroin trade, 40% of which passes through Karachi. Complicity from local intelligence agencies is crucial to the survivability of drug traffickers. Add to this the fact that many political parties in the city also moonlight as trafficking organizations and welfare providers, and you have a criminal insurgency that is rooted in structural failings of the Pakistani state apparatus.

Are any of these organized criminal gangs militarily more powerful than the state?

That depends on the context. In Mali, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) commander who also doubled as a smuggling kingpin, was strong enough to destabilize the Malian state to the point of near-collapse during 2012. Of course, he had plenty of help from insurgent groups within the country. It really comes down to whether the local security apparatus has already been corroded by years of corruption, political misuse, capacity shortfalls and the like. Generally, criminal gangs are strong enough to resist the best efforts of the police, and smart enough to avoid getting into a head-on clash with the military. This has been borne out in Brazil. The authorities have invested considerable effort during the last three years in taking control of slums across Rio de Janeiro, in the run-up to the 2014 World Cup. Many believe that this is merely a show of force. Although of extended duration, it is unlikely to have upset the local drug traffickers too much, since they can gradually adjust to the new operational rhythm of the security forces. Without precise intelligence that can help neutralize the traffickers in their hideouts, superiority in numbers and firepower does not confer the state with a tactical-level advantage.