The Local Corporatist State and NGO Relations in China

Introduction

Since the 1980s, the Chinese state has gradually withdrawn from the delivery of welfare and social services, creating space for a numerical growth of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In the span of nearly three decades, approximately 440,000 officially registered NGOs – alongside a greater number of unregistered ones – have emerged.[1] The numerical increase of NGOs have to a large extent mirrored the rising social challenges caused, in part, by economic liberalization – with problems ranging from environmental damages to unsafe foods becoming an everyday reality that NGOs have sought to address.

Suffice to say, NGOs have increasingly become a significant factor in the changing social landscape in China. Whereby, NGOs are slowly receiving recognition for their positive social contributions to society, ranging from supplementing the state’s role in providing social services to educating the public about various social issues. In fact, local state actors are being motivated to become engaged with NGOs due to such activities. For instance, the proceedings from the Thirteenth National Civil Affairs meeting in March 2012, illustrated the central state’s desire to encourage greater participation of social organizations in a range of activities, in tandem with the local state’s efforts to improve its social assistance system to low-income households. [2]

In this vein, while the role of the central state in influencing NGO activities have been commented upon extensively, [3] this study will primarily place the analytical framework at the local state level. Specifically, the study seeks to understand the development of NGOs by employing a local corporatist state framework, and utilizing the NGO sector in Shanghai as a case for analysis. At the heart of this article is an attempt to understand how local authorities have adopted and adapted corporatist measures in their engagement with NGOs. The article will suggest that corporatist measures continue to be employed by local authorities as an effective means of ensuring the potency and relevance of the local state in a rapidly changing sector. Notwithstanding, there is noticeable adaptation of corporatist measures – namely, the local state is utilizing subtle or tacit forms of approval to manage the sector.

The selection of Shanghai is a testament to the emerging vibrant NGO sector in the city. The municipality has one of the strongest revenue streams in China, and in principle, has the capacity to devote state resources to social issues without the strong involvement of NGOs. [4]

Notwithstanding, the Shanghai government has increasingly encouraged the contracting of social services to NGOs and thus, presents an interesting case to understand how state and NGOs will respond to the changes within the sector. [5] The eight NGOs interviewed in Shanghai vary in size, budget, and operate in a wide array of issues, providing a large representation of the scale, financial resources, and scope of work NGOs engage in. Representatives of the NGOs were interviewed in 2007 and again, in late 2011[6]. While the interviews do not offer a national representation of the NGO sector, they do provide a depiction of the increasing involvement of the local state in the work and environs of NGOs. What develops from the cases are the collaborative role of the local state at various levels – particularly at the municipal and district level – in pursuing the objectives and operational development of NGOs. In short, how these collaborations evolve and the subsequent impact on state-NGO relationship is a salient subject of interest.

The Local Corporatist State

The use of corporatism highlights not only how NGOs are governed and treated, but it also emphasizes some of the key strategies adopted by both state and NGO in their interactions with one another. In using this framework, corporatist arrangements, irrespective of whether they are authoritarian or the societal variety, do not define any political system anywhere. Instead, they are institutional mechanisms in the service of government.[7] To further this notion of corporatism as a process, consider Cawson’s definition: [8]

Corporatism is a specific socio-political process in which organizations representing monopolistic functional interests engage in political exchange with state agencies over public policy outputs which involves those organizations in a role that combines interest representation and policy implementation through delegated self-enforcement.

Some have questioned the utility of corporatism to understand China’s state-society relations; others have preferred to emphasize the growth of civil society and thus, offer socially determined explanations for state-society relations.[9] Gilley argues that ‘concepts such as ‘local state corporatism’ are not an accurate reflection of state-society relationships even in the limited context of local China [because it is] limited in its explanatory breadth’.[10] In using this framework, it is not to suggest that this is an uncontested concept and should be applied without reflection. Rather, it is to acknowledge that the use of local state corporatism will highlight certain aspects of state-society relations and simultaneously challenge the totality of Gilley’s conclusion: ‘Yet the dominant Leninist state has persisted precisely by crowding out competing visions for organizing politics’.[11] Hurst furthers the assault on corporatism labeling it as ‘illfitting’. [12] Hurst advocates that we ought to study the nuances and subtlety of state-society interactions, in so far as to consider ‘that associations are essentially government fists in civilian gloves, or that new forms of citizens’ organizations truly represent societal interests in ways that can work against, rather than in tandem with, government objectives’. For Yep, the corporatist framework assumes that there is coherence and strong internal solidarity among social organizations and thus would perform as an effective communication channel for members to the state, but neither of which existed in his study of business associations. [13] Clearly, there is not disagreement with the call to examine the nuances of state-society interactions as it is one of the primary goals of the article. But, Goodman articulates the benefits of a local state corporatist framework because there is ‘strong evidence that social and economic interests are equally desirous of a state corporatism that accommodates their presence in politics’. [14] These social and economic interests as demonstrated in this article are indeed working closely with the local authorities, to the extent, where co-optation is not uncommon; for many NGOs co-optation is neither negative nor positive, but treated as a matter-of-fact to ensure their presence remains in the local authorities’ consciousness.

Where Gilley, Hurst and Yep lament at the failure of local corporatist framework, others have called for a more thorough investigation of the social stakeholders involved in affecting state-society relations. Lin’s investigation into China’s anti-dam movements, in particular the Three Gorges Dam and Nujiang movements, confidently observes that ‘society’s ability to challenge the state has intensified’. [15] In a different realm, Read’s assessment of homeowners’ association in China illustrates that these localized actions of contention is one reason to give credence the civil society framework because civic participation gives people the opportunity and experience to organize, resist and pressure the government.[16] Contemporary state-society relations are much more negotiated, with the local state seeking to co-opt certain NGOs as a means of extending the institutional reach of the state within society. Other authors have sought to explain changes to state-society relations by analyzing the state as one of many actors, in the tradition of Migdal’s state-in-society approach.[17] Authors such as Fulda, Li and Song believe state-in-society captures the conflict that often occurs between state agencies and thereby leading to changes.[18] For Alpermann, Migdal’s framework may best be utilized to comprehend the fragmentation of the state: ‘The state itself is pulled into different directions, and while parts of it form ties with one section of society, other state actors join forces with different societal actors’. [19] The state-in-society approach may emphasize alterations to the state, and subsequently impact on society, but this would suggest the Chinese state’s power is receding which is not the case.[20] Despite the problems with more socially-determined approaches, insofar as they do not adequately account for the state, one aspect of an agreed congruence is the focus on the local level.

The need to account for local discourses of the Chinese state is made ever more pertinent by China’s decentralization. Local states are given and expected to make a wide-range of decisions, as well as take on responsibilities, including the delivery of social welfare needs. Goodman notes that the discourse on localism is now widely accepted in China, which is, reflected not only in economic terms, but also culturally; that is, local cultural identification. [21] Case studies of the local state are therefore critical to providing a more detailed perspective on their interactions with societal actors and consequently, changes to policy outputs, at the local level.

At the local level, the literature that emerged on the local corporatist Chinese state throughout the 1990s largely conceived the local corporatist state as an economic actor particularly in the rural areas. Jean Oi’s extensive analysis of rural industrialization firmly places the local state as a business corporation.[22] Local officials are portrayed as entrepreneurs fostering business opportunities, mobilizing resources, and other agencies within the local state to nurture selected business enterprises. Fiscal reforms provided incentives to local officials to actively promote local industry and economic development of their region since they had residual claimant rights over the profits of enterprise (although national regulations stipulated no more than twenty percent of after tax profits could be claimed by the local government).[23] Similarly, Walder conceives the local state as private firms driven by private interests. [24] Within the local corporatist state structure, there is an intimate relationship between banks, finance and tax offices, township and village authorities, whereby each would assist the other to maximize revenues. While the local state may be actively involved in promoting economic activity, Blecher and Shue have framed the local state within the developmental state model, in which the local authorities lead the development process by picking strategic ‘winners’ of certain industries to back.[25] While the pursuit of individual gain on the part of the local officials is inherent in all these analysis, and the potential for local officials to be rent-seekers and predatory, Duckett shows that the local state can be entrepreneurial and productive in facilitating economic reform. [26] Nonetheless, Unger in his assessment of local business associations concludes that although these organizations may appear to be corporatist on paper, the pursuit of their individual interests and agenda outside of the national goal suggests that the variations of the local state are still important to consider.[27]

The variation in local states is an understudied concept, but Remick has embraced the idea, providing a suitable springboard to analyze the differences between the local state in Shanghai, and its engagement with NGOs.[28] In understanding the variations of the local state, the subtleties of state-society relations are brought to the fore. Remick writes: ‘Local state structure is defined as the organization of local government, and local state practice is defined as the way local governments implement central policy and make and implement their own policy in the absence of higher-level guidance’.[29] In an article looking at migrant NGOs, Hsu concludes that there is analytical merit and reward in studying the local state: ‘Analyzing the different layers of the urban state in their interactions with migrant NGOs has unveiled different informal strategies adopted by the local state to ensure its own relevance within a rapidly changing social environment’. [30] As the intermediaries between the central state and the local population, local states are vital to the effectiveness and successful implementation of central state’s policies. Thus, by privileging the local state in the analysis of state-society relationship one can uncover the different factors that shape the development of NGOs, and why some NGOs are more effective than others. Of course, the question that will be inevitably posed at this juncture is: where is the CCP in the analysis of state-society relations? Granted the CCP is still apposite in central level policies and the overall direction of the nation, discussion of the Party and ensuing ideology elicits barely a whisper, particularly in the interviews with NGO representatives for this study. ‘While the CCP is much in evidence when matters of PRC policy or strategic direction are being discussed centrally or provincially, in the examination of case studies in specific localities the CCP often has either no or only a shadowy existence’. [31]

Given the importance of the local state – and the central state in terms of policy measures governing NGOs – how do we best theorize state-NGO interactions in the context of China? One can reasonably suggest that the process of economic liberalization has modified the tools the state has adopted to manage the economy and society, moving from an over-reliance on tools of coercion and propaganda, to the current strategy of developing stronger ties with social organizations to enable the state to organize societal interests along the lines of reform. Using the corporatist framework as defined by Cawson, and Unger and Chan, and incorporating Schmitter’s oft-quoted definition,[32] it is necessary to develop a more flexible application of corporatism to analyze state-NGO interactions in China.

The Chinese state has moved away from the tactics of the days past to compel individuals and organizations. The former strategy of coercion and propaganda falls under the guise of overt sanctioning; that is, the state uses overt measures to manage social organizations. In present day China, both central and local states are more adept in managing interests that may potentially be detrimental to the state. Hence, from this behavior, corporatist measures are taking form. Thus, underlying the corporatist institutional framework is a distinct tacit sanctioning behavior. Tacit sanctioning behavior is delineated as follows: (1) the state creates and maintains the relationship; (2) select organizations and groups are granted the privilege to mediate interests on behalf of their constituents to the state; and, (3) these organizations and groups must adhere to the rules and regulations established by the state. In other words, the groups and organizations within the corporatist relationship are considered as a substitute control mechanism for the state. The three types of behavior are reminiscent of the government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) and the mass organizations that are regarded as the social arm of the Party-state. For example, the All-China Women’s Federation or the Communist Youth League, where the state has actively created these organizations to ensure a bridge between state and society. The created organizations are to represent the interests of their constituents while at the same time given the privilege to bring these concerns to the state. These organizations must also abide by the rules set forth by the state. Tacit sanctioning in the context of state-NGO relations is therefore, useful to understand how the local state has modified corporatist mechanisms vis-à-vis social responsibilities and the increasing activism of NGOs. The idea of tacit sanctioning suggests the interactions between local state and NGO is conditioned upon an implicit understanding between the two stakeholders. Nonetheless, as the following sections will demonstrate, the implicit agreement is subject to the NGOs active attempts at engaging with the local state. The local state tempers the NGO’s pro-activeness by adopting tacit sanctioning.

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[1] Pumin Yin, “A New Dawn for NGOs: Registration Requirements Relaxed for Charity Work,” Beijing Review, August 4, 2011, accessed June 20, 2012, external pagehttp://www.bjreview.com/nation/txt/2011-08/01/content_380902.htmcall_made. According to Yin, the 440,000 registered groups are disaggregated as follows: 243,000 social groups, 195,000 private non-enterprise units, and more than 2,600 foundations. Xu Ying and Zhao Litao (“China’s Rapidly Growing Non-Governmental Organizations” EAI Background Briefing No. 514., 2010, p. i) estimate that the number of unregistered groups can be as large as ten times more than the number of officially registered groups.

[2] People’s Daily Online “Top leaders meet civil affairs staff, urge progress,” March 20, 2012, accessed May 7, 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90785/7763003.html

[3] See for example, Qiusha Ma, ‘The Governance of NGOs in China Since 1978: How Much Autonomy?’ Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 31(3), (2002), pp. 305-328; and Karla Simon, ‘Reform of China’s Laws for NPOs – A Discussion Related to Shiye Danwei Reform’, International Journal for Civil Society Law, 3(3), (2005), pp.71-89.

[4] As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, this situation is unlike areas such as Yunnan where the local coffers are frequently empty, and there is often little choice but to invite NGOs to help provide services the local state previously provided.

[5] See Jessica Teets, ‘Civil Society Participation in Local Governance: Outsourcing Migrant Education in Shanghai’, in China’s Search for Good Governance, eds. Z. Deng and S. Guo (NY: Palgrave Macmillan); Ruojing Chen, Understand Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship using Shanghai Public Service Bidding As an Example (MA diss., Lund University, 2012).

[6] Note, the authors endeavored to interview the same NGO representatives in 2007 and 2011. In the event that this was not feasible, an interview was conducted with a representative at the same position and level of responsibilities.

[7] Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, ‘China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model’, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 33, (1995), p. 37.

[8] Alan Cawson, Organised Interests and the State: Studies in Meso-Corporatism (Bristol: Sage, 1985), p. 8.

[9] See for example, The-chang Lin, ‘Environmental NGOs and the Anti-Dam Movements: A Social Movement with Chinese Characteristics’, Issues and Studies, 43(4), (2007), pp. 149-184; and Yongnian Zheng, ‘China in 2011: Anger, Political Consciousness, Anxiety, and Uncertainty’, Asian Survey ,52(1), (2011), pp. 28-41.

[10] Bruce Gilley, ‘Paradigms of Chinese Politics: kicking society back out’, Journal of Contemporary China, 20(70),

(2011), p. 525.

[11] Gilley, ‘Paradigms of Chinese Politics: kicking society back out’, p. 532.

[12] William Hurst, ‘The City as the Focus: The Analysis of Contemporary Chinese Urban Politics’, China

Information, 20(30), (2007), p. 467.

[13] Ray Yep, ‘The Limitation of Corporatism for Understanding Reforming China: an empirical analysis in a rural

county’, Journal of Contemporary China, 9(25), (2000), pp.547-566.

[14] David S.G. Goodman, ‘Foreword’, in The Chinese Corporatist State: Adaption, Survival and Resistance, eds.

J.Y.J. Hsu and R. Hasmath (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. xvi-xvii.

[15] Lin, ‘Environmental NGOs and the Anti-Dam Movements: A Social Movement with Chinese Characteristics’, p.

178.

[16] Benjamin L. Read, ‘Assessing Variation in Civil Society Organizations: China’s Homeowners’ Association in a

Comparative Perspective’, Comparative Political Studies, 41(9), (2008), pp. 1240-1265.

[17] Joel Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[18] Andreas Fulda, Yanyan Li and Qinghua Song, ‘New Strategies of Civil Society in China: A Case Study of the

Network Governance Approach’, Journal of Contemporary China, 21(76), (2012), pp. 675-693.

[19] Bjorn Alpermann, ‘State and Society in China’s Environmental Politics’, in China’s Environmental Crisis:

Domestic and Global Political Impacts and Responses, eds. J.J. Kassiola and S. Guo (New York: Palgrave, 2010), p. 145.

[20] Gilley, ‘Paradigms of Chinese Politics: kicking society back out’.

[21] David S.G. Goodman, ‘Structuring Local Identity: Nation, Province and County in Shanxi During the 1990s’, The China Quarterly, 172 (2002), pp.837-862.

[22] Jean Oi, ‘Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China’, World Politics,

45(1), (1992),pp.99-126; and ‘The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy’, The China Quarterly

144, (1995), pp.1132-1149.

[23] Oi, ‘Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China’, p. 111.

[24] Andrew Walder, ‘The County Government as an Industrial Corporation’, in Zouping in Transition: The Process of Reform in Rural North China, ed. A. Walder (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 62-85.

[25] Marc Blecher and Vivienne Shue, ‘Into Leather: State-led Development and the Private Sector in Xinji’, The

China Quarterly, 166, (2001), pp. 368-393.

[26] Jane Duckett, The Entrepreneurial State in China: Real Estate and Commerce Departments in Reform Era Tianjin (London: Routledge, 1998).

[27] Jonathan Unger, ‘Bridges: Private Business, the Chinese Government and the Rise of New Associations’, The

China Quarterly, 147, (1996), pp.795-819.

[28] Elizabeth Remick, ‘The Significance of Variation in Local States: The Case of Twentieth Century China’,

Comparative Politics, 34(4), (2002), pp.399-418.

[29] Ibid, p. 399.

[30] Jennifer Hsu, ‘Layers of the Urban State: Migrant Organisations and the Chinese State’, Urban Studies, 49(16), (2012), p. 3527.

[31] David S.G. Goodman, ‘Sixty Years of the People’s Republic: Local Perspectives on the Evolution of the State in

China’, The Pacific Review, 22(4), (2009), p. 443.

[32] Philippe Schmitter’s (‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’ The Review of Politics 36(1), (1974), pp. 93-94)

definition of corporatism: ‘Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports’.