Russia's Shiny New Weapons
15 Jan 2014
By Mark Galeotti for openDemocracy
‘Drones are not toys,’ external pagesayscall_made Vladimir Putin, and ‘we are not going to operate them as other countries do. It is not a video game.’ Maybe so, but Russia’s ambition to field a powerful military, at a time of demographic pressure, is tempting it towards leapfrogging forward into drone and robot warfare. This already seems to be the idea, reflecting the external pageinternal security agencies’ enthusiastic adoptioncall_made of these remote little helpers, although it remains to be seen if the Russian budget and Russian technology are up to the task.
The thin green line
Although claims of an imminent external pagedemographic disastercall_made are external pageoverblowncall_made, for the near future Russia will have to cope with a shortage of draft-age young men. Efforts to make up the shortfall—and the qualitative problems caused by a reduction of national service to just one year—by recruiting more volunteers are also making little headway. Although the ambition is to raise the total numbers of these kontraktniki [contract soldiers] by 50,000 a year, from external page2013’s 241,000 to 420,000 by 2017call_made, it is clear that Russia has a long way to go: even external pagethis year’s recruitment talliescall_made are falling short, especially given that most either refuse or are refused re-enlistment after their first three-year term. Ironically, the prospect of a future economic slowdown might make a military career a little more appealing, but for the present, the lifestyle, prestige and pay simply fail to attract and retain enough Russians with the right skills and attributes needed.
As a result, Russia’s military is at only external page82 percentcall_made of its proper establishment strength. An obvious response to quantitative inadequacy (although that raises the wider question of whether the county needs or could afford the million-man-army that appears to be the Kremlin’s absolute and totemic necessity) is qualitative improvement. Ideally, this would mean increasing the skills of regular soldiers, introducing a corps of seasoned non-commissioned officers—their role as the backbone of Western armies is as real as it is a cliché—and improving the training and professionalism of an officer corps that, at its best is extraordinarily good, but at its worst terrifyingly bad.
There certainly are efforts to make such changes within the context of the wider military external pagemodernisation planscall_made. Indeed, there have been for years, which perhaps is testament enough to just how difficult and slow the process can be. The brutal hazing of raw recruits or external pagededovshchninacall_made is still endemic, most NCOs are still conscripts, and the country’s one and only aircraft carrier is so prone to mechanical problems, it has to travel with an external pageescort of tugscall_made, just in case.
The tempting alternative to quantitative improvement is to buy newer, bigger, shinier weapons and equipment. This tends to appeal to a variety of constituencies: the generals enjoy the gung-ho thrill of ordering and deploying these exciting symbols of martial virility; politicians get dynamic photo shoots in external pageaircraft cockpitscall_made and external pagefiring rangescall_made; and, perhaps most important of all, the mighty military industrial complex gets a continued stream of orders needed to keep its factories running (and with them the cities depending on these subsidised conglomerates). No surprise, then, that the workers at tank producer Uralvagonzavod were Putin’s external pageultimate partisanscall_made when he began to face protests in the streets.
The massive procurement budgets earmarked for the military— external page$650 billioncall_made in the period to 2020—inevitably means a buying spree of new weapons and equipment. Many of these items are, indeed, overdue and needed. Individual soldiers’ personal equipment and armour lags behind Western counterparts in many ways, and the external pageRatnikcall_made ‘future soldier’ complex of uniform and equipment would indeed be a great step forward. Many others, however, betray a Russian tendency to prioritise firepower over protection and reliability, such as the mighty external pageBMPTcall_made (Boyevaya Mashina Podderzhki Tankov, Tank Support Fighting Vehicle), a tank chassis loaded with two automatic cannons, four missile launchers, two automatic grenade launchers and a machine gun.
Droning on
One response in particular to the manpower shrinkage of the military is a renewed interest in drones and robotic weapons systems. In an external pageaddresscall_made to the Duma, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin — whose portfolio includes the defence industries — listed robotic weaponry, drones and advanced automated combat management systems as priorities for the new state arms procurement programme for 2016-25. He wants to see a rapid expansion of Russia’s use of military drones on land, sea and air. Defence minister Sergei Shoigu seems to agree: he has ordered a external pagedoubling of the speedcall_made of the research and procurement of drones.
Russia has external pagelaggedcall_made behind the United States and even countries such as Israel and Italy in developing and deploying Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Only in 2012 did the Defence Ministry external pageform a divisioncall_made to manage drone research and development. This explains why, in the Chechen war, while Pchela-1T and Stroi-P drones helped helicopters and artillery fire on rebels, their success was limited by crude sensors; and they had the advantage of fighting enemies with no anti-air capability beyond just shooting into the skies. Russian-made drones certainly proved relatively ineffective in the external page2008 Georgian Warcall_made.
Catch up
Russia is trying to catch up: some dozen or so external pageZala-421call_made and external pageGorizont-Air-S100call_made drones will be deployed in the skies over Sochi during February’s external pageWinter Olympicscall_made. However, many of these systems are relatively simple or else foreign-built or –designed. For advanced designs, Moscow has had to look abroad. Russia bought Israeli Bird Eye-400, I-View Mk. 150 and Searcher Mk. 2 UAVs, for example, following the effectiveness of these designs when used in the Georgian War; and in 2012 Rogozin external pagediscussedcall_made a Russo-Israeli joint venture to produce new models. In 2012, the Russian navy ordered eight external pageTeledyne Gaviacall_made submarine drones from Iceland; and in 2014, Moscow is apparently planning to trial UAE-built external pageUnited 40 Block 5call_made long-range reconnaissance UAVs.
However, Rogozin is an outspoken nationalist who has made much of the need for the Russian military to external pagebuy Russian weaponscall_made, so he is also pushing the country’s domestic robot and drone sector. A wide range of new designs are emerging, from the wheeled Kompas external pageRURS Reconnaissance and Strike Robotcall_made, able to patrol areas autonomously, through to the external pageAltius-Mcall_made attack drone, Russia’s answer to the missile-armed US MQ-9 Reaper. In between, is a design based on the Berkut VL superlight two-seat helicopter, in partnership with the UAE; and the external pageEleron-3SVcall_made scout drone (with thirty-four on order for 2014), while dwarfing them all is the 20-tonne combat UAV being planned, based on the Sukhoi external pageT-50/PAK FAcall_made fifth-generation fighter. Given that the T-50 is still in external pagetestingcall_made, it remains to be seen whether it will indeed be in the air by external page2018call_made, as promised.
The age of the drone
Russian drone technology is far behind that of the United States—according to some, perhaps by external pagetwenty yearscall_made. However, Rogozin is looking to the long term, and Shoigu seems to share his enthusiasm for drones. A specialised military Bezpilotniy Letayuschiy Apparat [Pilotless Flying Equipment, the Russian for UAV] external pageoperator training centrecall_made has been opened on the outskirts of Moscow. The external pageMiG Skatcall_made (‘Stingray’) stealth drone is also now under development. By 2040, Moscow may be deploying massive, external pagelong-range nuclear drone bomberscall_made, although Rogozin has cast doubts about the survivability of such weapons.
Of course, this is the external pageage of the dronecall_made, and Moscow must be wanting to achieve parity with its rivals, especially as China is not only developing its own drones: it is has even, provocatively, external pagedemonstratedcall_made its maritime attack Blue Shark in simulated action against Russian (or at least Russian-built) ships. Back in 2012, Putin external pageacknowledgedcall_made that ‘unpiloted aircraft are being used more and more actively in armed conflicts; and I must say, they are being used effectively’ and so ‘we need the full line, including automated strike aircraft, reconnaissance drones and other systems… It is imperative to involve best engineering and science bureaus and centres in this effort.’ To this end, more that 400 billion rubles ($12.2 billion) were allocated toward this through 2020.
Not enough
This might sound like a lot, some $1.5 billion a year, but the US military has been spending some external page$4 billioncall_made on drone research, operation and procurement. Neither does the allocation of resources guarantee results. In 2009, Moscow had spent more than external page$3 billioncall_made on the Bulava submarine-launched nuclear missile programme; today, the weapon still has not been perfected, and estimates of the total project cost are rising towards the $5 billion mark.
Ironically, the Soviets were ahead of the drone game, back in the 1960s and 1970s, now, there are serious concerns about Russia’s near- and medium-term capabilities. Vladimir Anokhin, vice president of the Russian Academy of Geopolitical Issues, has external pagesaidcall_made that while Russia has ‘wonderful teams that have spent decades working on this… we do not have enough hands. We do not have the industrial base, we do not have skilled workers who could produce a massive amount of those drones that we need so much now.’
Even if Russia can build or buy these drones, they require highly skilled technicians and operators to use them to their full potential. Thus, while the potential force multiplier effects of drones and robotic systems might seem a tempting answer to the inevitable dwindling of Russian military manpower, they are not a panacea, certainly not while the generals and political elite remain resistant to external pagerecruiting women to combat rolescall_made, and external pageunhappy about large numbers of conscripts from the North Caucasuscall_made.
Putin says that, for Russia, drone warfare is not a video game; he has to hope that’s true.
For additional reading on this topic please see:
Russian Military Reforms: An Evaluation
Russian Army Justifies Its Reforms
The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe