International Law, Sovereignty, and World Order Revisited

We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.

—President George H. W. Bush

An earlier version of this chapter entitled “International Law and the New World Order: Re­defining Sovereignty,” first published in 2004, [1] analyzed the nature of contemporary international order and the impact of democratization, international organizations, and international law on the Westphalian[2] system that has shaped international relations since 1648. It concluded that sover­eignty of individual states remained the organizing principle of international relations, but that state sovereignty was increasingly challenged in practice by international organizations, interna­tional agreements, and a concerted agenda advancing human rights at the expense of states.

The major theme of the chapter was the triumph of the liberal western democracies, led by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), over the Soviet Union and its partners in the Cold War. It discussed conditions for the expansion of democracy and economic opportunity under a rule of law sustained and nurtured by western military power. Key develop­ments included the formation of the United Nations (UN) following World War II and leadership by the UN, regional organizations such as NATO, and ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” in interna­tional interventions seeking to repel aggression, enforce stability, and protect human rights.[3] These developments coincided with the spread of globalization and international agreements governing many aspects of modern global life including arms control, human rights, war crimes, the environ­ment, finance, and communications. States were, the chapter concluded, increasingly constrained in the exercise of their sovereign rights, or acted as if they were.

Events over the past decade compel us to reexamine these conclusions. Strategic leaders must constantly reassess forces shaping the global environment. These forces are both enduring and dynamic, representing continuity and change. Strategists need to understand which are which and make decisions as to how to proceed, continually reassessing ends, ways, and means. The theory is simple, but the application is not. A strategy based on false, outdated, or erroneous assumptions and conclusions about how the world works is doomed to failure.

Sovereignty, it appears, is amazingly (and stubbornly) resilient. The “new world order” envi­sioned by President George H. W. Bush, Francis Fukuyama, and Thomas Friedman, among others, has not developed as expected.[4] Traditional forces of religion, nationalism, and culture continue to shape and define international order today in ways not foreseen a decade ago.[5] Chaos and uncertainty, not stability, more accurately describe our contemporary world. The difficulty of the United States and its western allies in transplanting democracy abroad, the decline of American military hegemony, and the lingering recession in western economies, cast doubt on the vital­ity and validity of the liberal world order previously ascendant. We cannot assume that world order’s inevitability. Rogue states such as North Korea and Iran defy accepted diplomatic and political norms with relative impunity. Even acknowledged powers, such as China and Russia, unabashedly pursue their national interests independent of the United States and the established international power structure. Rising powers such as India and China do not consider themselves constrained by western, i.e., “foreign” norms and institutions. They steer independent courses in finance, trade, and even military relations when it suits their purposes.[6]

This chapter will examine how these developments shape contemporary events, how the in­ternational system currently operates, strategy and policy options available to American leaders, and possible future outcomes. First, however, it is important to look back at historical events that helped create the world we inhabit today.

Organizing principles: sovereignty, law, and foundations of order

Sovereignty and international law are not new concepts. They merge common experiences and ideas that date to ancient times. Humans seek order, meaning, and purpose to life, and have usu­ally looked to religion and social institutions to provide them. Families evolved into tribes, cities, states, and empires. With social order came security and predictability. Order promoted prosper­ity and growth—both individual and collective. At the same time, order discouraged destructive social behavior and competition for scarce resources.[7] However, order required some degree of cooperation, even sacrifice, and by implication some inherent limitation on individual freedoms and on the right of states to do as they pleased.

Cooperation can be imposed externally or internally, but it is usually some political process that determines societal norms and mores. Law facilitates and supports this process. Our ancestors created many forms of government: rule by kings, queens, tribal elders, religious elites, emper­ors, and even citizens. Yet the international system remained largely unstructured, even anarchic. States competed for land, power, populations, and resources. Some states sought dominance, or hegemony, over their neighbors. National interests drove state behavior. International politics was and remains a “ruthless and dangerous business . . . [t]his situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic.” [8]

On occasion, hegemonic powers imposed order and stability over wide areas. Examples include the Roman Empire, the British Empire at its height in the 19th century, and, many would argue, the United States since 1945. Historians, political scientists, and international relations specialists have theories that attempt to describe and predict how the international system works. One model focuses on the dynamics of international order, e.g., balance of power, bipolar, or hegemonic sys­tems; another focuses on the nature of state actors, e.g., democracies act one way, dictatorships another way.

Rule of law helps promote order, typically in conjunction with Westphalian principles of state sovereignty. President George W. Bush, in his first National Security Strategy of the United States, told us that the “nonnegotiable demands of human dignity [include] the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women, religious tolerance; and respect for private property.” [9] We have seen determined resistance to international efforts to establish rule of law and promote individual freedoms in Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iran. Some would say that China too resists such outside influences, [10] which il­lustrates an unresolved tension between international law and sovereignty that we will examine in greater detail.

Law prescribes norms of proper behavior or, as Blackstone says in his Commentaries, “a rule of civil conduct, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.”[11] The sovereign pre­scribes rules, but they are typically rooted in religious, cultural, and moral values. As such, law de­pends on voluntary compliance or social pressure to conform. Sanctions may be imposed in cases where individuals will not or cannot comply. Others feel that laws by definition require sanctions: “It is essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands, which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice.”[12] Law provides a foundation for order, stability, and predictability, and enjoys general acceptance by the population at large. Laws that conflict with widely-held beliefs or community morals are often ignored and prove particularly difficult to enforce.[13] Finally, law, like society, constantly changes and evolves over time.

Does international law operate by the same principles? International law has been defined as “the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another.”[14] Critics question whether international law can be “binding” and also question its efficacy outside its Western European incubator—the so-called “civilized” states. In practice, international law plays an essential role in global commerce, regulating disputes, compensation, and banking. It regulates sea and air routes, privileges and immunities, and claims for loss or damage.[15] International treaties establish standards for the sciences, health, and the environment.[16]

In order of precedence, there are four recognized sources of international law: (1) conventions and treaties; (2) customary international law; (3) principles of law recognized by major states; and (4) judicial opinions and scholarly writings.[17] Conventions and treaties include the UN Charter, the Law of the Sea Treaty, and other international agreements. These represent contractual relation­ships between sovereign states.[18] Customary international law is the practice of states, reflecting their behavior over time in accordance with what they believe to be the dominant rules of interna­tional order. Customary law is evolutionary and independent of treaty law, although treaty law in­fluences customary law.[19] Next are principles of law recognized by the leading states. International politics and municipal law help define these principles.[20] The final source of international law con­sists of judicial decisions and writings of jurists and scholars. These include opinions issued by the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and International Criminal Tribunals. Writings of scholars supplement these decisions, illustrating and explaining the state of the law based on their experience and study. Changes in the law are often preceded by debate among jurists and scholars over what the law should be, but their authority is persuasive only.[21]

The law of war is a branch of public international law regulating armed conflict between states and within states experiencing civil war or internal conflict. Sources of the law of war include treaties, customs, and judicial opinions. The Hague and Geneva Conventions are key components of the law of war. They provided the foundation for the war crimes tribunals at Nuremberg, Ger­many, and Tokyo, Japan, following World War II and for international tribunals to adjudicate war crimes and crimes against humanity in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In 1998, the Rome Statute estab­lished the International Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent tribunal for war crimes and crimes against humanity whose jurisdiction is theoretically unlimited, but whose effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated.[22] U.S. forces, by policy, comply with the law of war in all overseas military op­erations, and war crimes by soldiers are prosecuted as violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice while civilians are tried in U.S. Courts. [23]

In general, international law serves the same purposes as domestic or municipal law and shares common attributes. It provides a foundation for order; is founded on religious, cultural, and moral values; provides stability and predictability; and enjoys general acceptance among the internation­al community. International law protects the rights of states and individuals alike. It differs from municipal law in one important particular—it lacks a guaranteed sanction for noncompliance and a higher authority to impose penalties outside the politicized processes of the UN Security Coun­cil and the ICC. There are consequences for violations of the law of war, but compared to most domestic criminal justice systems, those consequences are much less well defined (or certain). International law has no table of minimum or maximum punishments.[24]

Elements of modern international law existed before creation of the Westphalian system in 1648. Ancient philosophers in Greece and Rome articulated a concept of “natural law,” a higher law of nature that controls human endeavors and to which all are bound, even kings. An expression of this concept is found in the term jus gentium (law of nations), meaning a principle of universal application that all follow because it has been independently discovered by application of reason, a “natural law.” Our contemporary use of the phrase “human rights” examined in this context is a form of natural law or jus gentium and remains a fundamental principle of international law.[25]

Concluding the European religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, the Treaty of Westpha­lia in 1648 reestablished order, stabilized borders, and defined relationships. Kings could dictate any religion they wished within their borders, but foreswore any rights to interfere in the religious affairs of other sovereign states. This principle was occasionally violated for political reasons, but the treaty achieved its purpose. Sovereign states had to find a way to interact on a basis of nominal equality. Five basic principles came to guide international relations. States have the right (1) to make laws, (2) to act independently in international affairs, (3) to control their territory and people, (4) to issue currency, and (5) to use the resources of the state. Sovereignty became the organizing element of modern history, but sovereignty had limits.

From Westphalia to Sarajevo

Early models of sovereignty were based on the prevailing form of government in 17th-century Europe—monarchies ruled by hereditary dynasties of kings or emperors. Consistent with histori­cal practice, individuals were subordinate to the state, represented by the king. Alternative models existed going back to classical Greece and its democratic ideals,[26] but prevailing norms made kings absolute rulers of their states, and they often exercised their authority with little regard for the sensibilities of their subjects.

Contemporary writers described the nature of this relationship. Jean Bodin wrote in 1576 that law comes from the king, who was not bound by his own laws but was not beyond the law of nature.[27] Thomas Hobbes wrote in Leviathan, “It appeareth plainly that the sovereign power . . . is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it.”[28] Louis XIV of France, the “Sun King,” epitomized the classic sovereign—not merely the head of the state, but its embodiment anointed by God to rule. Subjects owed unquestioning loyalty to the king, whose interests were the state’s interests. The dynastic wars of Louis XIV, waged to expand the glory of France, and of Louis XVI, were the business of the king and his advisors, not the people of France. As characterized in popu­lar culture: “It’s good to be the King!” [29]

Not everyone regarded sovereignty this way. Hugo de Groot, or Grotius, is called the father of international law for his treatises on international law and the law of war. Grotius was a pro­ponent of natural law and reason. He saw excesses in unbridled sovereignty. “I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a license in making war of which even barbarous nations should be ashamed; men resorting to arms for trivial or for no reasons at all . . . exactly as if a single edict had released a madness driving men to all kinds of crime.”[30]

In the 18th century, scholars and popular writers rediscovered the classical writings, combin­ing them with Christian philosophy and natural law into the doctrine of Enlightenment. Locke, Rousseau, and Jefferson, among others, emphasized individual rights and the obligations of sov­ereigns toward their citizens.[31] Their beliefs were incorporated in the Declaration of Independence and fueled the American and French Revolutions. The established order did not change, but re­gime change in America and France was a harbinger of things to come. It advanced the idea that sovereignty was vested in the people rather than in the government or the ruler and demonstrated the strength of ideas and of a higher law. These themes would resurface periodically in the 19th century and explode in the 20th. International agreements and treaties began to recognize that individuals as well as states have rights.[32]

Following their defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte’s imperial ambitions in 1815, the major powers of Europe sought to reestablish international order. The politicians who met in Vienna, Austria, created a system grounded in sovereignty and designed to preclude the return of revolution or hegemony. Under the leadership of Prince Metternich of Austria and Lord Castlereagh of Great Britain, they established a framework for peace called the “Concert of Europe” that survived es­sentially intact for 100 years.[33]

Other influences shaped the 19th century. Charles Darwin’s work on evolution stimulated a social philosophy known as social Darwinism, extrapolating Darwin’s theories of natural selection and survival of the fittest species into international politics. Those nations that were strongest were most likely and best suited to survive. Social Darwinism heavily influenced political leaders such as Otto von Bismarck and Theodore Roosevelt. [34] States exerted a robust rivalry in their interna­tional relations, demonstrating their superiority by economic growth and territorial acquisition. The last great era of colonialism was the result, as France, Great Britain, and Germany competed to acquire overseas colonies. The United States, too, acquired overseas interests in Hawaii, the Philippines, Cuba, and Panama, among others. [35] The sovereign rights of underdeveloped, militar­ily weak states counted for little in this environment.

Facilitating economic expansion in an era of relative peace were the modern technologies of steamships, railroads, and telegraphs. The speed of communication and transportation caused the world to “shrink” as commerce and banking connected the continents, creating the first era of “globalization.” The modern unified industrial state came into its own as the United States, Germany, and Italy consolidated their territorial boundaries and joined the ranks of the great pow­ers.[36] In many regards, it was the apogee of sovereignty. Yet the Concert of Europe maintained a precarious peace.

Other largely unseen developments reflected the dark side of the modern industrial state and hinted at issues that would rise to prominence in the 20th century. The Industrial Revolution prompted upward mobility and increased the size of the middle class in Western nations, yet it also created a new urban underclass with associated problems of disease, pollution, family breakup, and child labor. Visible disparity in wealth and power caused socialism to flourish, creating revo­lutionary pressures that threatened the established order. Karl Marx promulgated his economic theories preaching class warfare. Modest political reform helped to defuse tensions and postpone the final accounting for at least another generation. [37]

Developments in international law began to play a small role in international affairs. Henri Dunant founded the International Red Cross in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1863 to mitigate the de­structive effect of modern war.[38] In that same year, The Lieber Code[39] promulgated laws of war for Union armies in the American Civil War. The First Geneva Convention covering treatment of sick and wounded on the battlefield was signed in 1864.[40] The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907[41] prescribed norms, means, and methods of warfare consistent with existing humanitarian prin­ciples, incorporating many provisions of the Lieber Code. In recent conflicts, American Soldiers have fought enemy combatants who used civilian hostages, fought from protected places such as hospitals or mosques, and did not wear military uniforms—all prohibited by the Hague Conven­tions. [42]

Sarajevo 1914 to Sarajevo 1994

In many ways, the 20th century started and ended in Sarajevo. It was a period marked by inter­state conflict on a scale not previously envisioned. The best and the worst of human nature were on public display, often at the same time. It featured three major world wars, two hot and one cold, and the clash of powerful ideologies. Socialism, communism, nazism, and fascism emerged fully grown on the world stage, competing with democracy for primacy in the hearts and minds of na­tions. Tentative steps to form world government were taken. Natural law resurfaced in the guise of anti-colonialism, self-determination, the human rights movement, and demands for equality by the non-Western world. Change accelerated development, redefining political and cultural priori­ties. The second great era of globalization and progress brought the world closer, yet left others even farther behind.

World War I created conditions that would define the 20th century. The war all but destroyed the established order. Choices made by the Allied powers in Versailles, France, and over the next decade dictated the course of events for the remainder of the century. International law emerged as a key component of international politics. The victorious allies attempted to address several prob­lems at Versailles in 1919. First, the scale of destruction between 1914 and 1918 and its resulting trauma prompted calls for vengeance, war reparations to be paid by the losers, and trials of those responsible for the conflict. Second was the collapse of major empires—the German, Austrian-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires on the losing side, and the Russian Empire in 1917 on the Allied side—and the emergence of the United States as the predominant military and economic power.[43] The third problem was the creation of new nation-states out of the former empires. Lastly, a lack of consensus concerning the results of the war and what the Allies had won plagued the peace and designs for international order.

Revolutionary efforts in 1919 to create a world government fell short—the League of Nations was a start but insufficient. President Woodrow Wilson’s visions for the postwar order clashed with the national interests of the Allies and frustrated effective unified action. The Versailles Trea­ty became a compromise. Complicating matters, Wilson failed to persuade the American public or the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty creating the League of Nations, and without American par­ticipation, the League proved too weak to enforce Wilson’s vision of collective security—peace through rule of law supported by military force.[44] Wilson’s vision would be revived in 1945 and again in 1990 with relatively greater success. Attempts to try the Kaiser and others for war crimes encountered similar problems. The Allies could not agree, and the Germans would not cooperate. Ambitious plans drawn up at the Paris Peace Conference in 1920 called for some 900 war criminals to be tried, but Allied disunity and German recalcitrance prevailed. As a compromise, 12 German soldiers ranging in rank from private to lieutenant general were tried in German courts; six were convicted, but none received a sentence in excess of 4 years.[45]

One major development at Versailles was public debate over rule of law and ethics as con­straints on national interests and international politics. The conflict between these poles of inter­national order would continue throughout the 20th century. We still struggle with this question today. As Henry Kissinger characterizes it, “At the end of the First World War, the age-old de­bate about the relative roles of morality and interest in international affairs seemed to have been resolved in favor of the dominance of law and ethics. Under the shock of the cataclysm, many hoped for a better world as free as possible from the kind of Realpolitik which, in their view, had decimated the youth of a generation.” [46] Efforts to enforce peace through rule of law continued for over a decade following Versailles. Arms control agreements took the place of serious collective security enforcement. The Naval Conferences at Washington, DC, in 1922 and London, England, in 1930 regulated the number and size of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, then considered the major strategic weapons of the great powers. [47] In the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, the signatory parties agreed to renounce war as an instrument of national policy.[48]

In the end, sovereignty and national interests proved too strong for the Wilsonians. Interna­tional law became just another diplomatic tool as the great powers rearmed for World War II. For­mer President Theodore Roosevelt, who lived until 1919 and remained a keen observer of world events, captured the essence of prevailing international power politics: “As yet there is no likeli­hood of establishing any kind of international power . . . which can effectively check wrong-doing . . . I regard . . . trusting to fantastic peace treaties, to impossible promises, to all kinds of scraps of paper without any backing in efficient force, as abhorrent.”[49]

The world got a second chance to recreate international order in 1945. The unprecedented dev­astation of the second major war in a generation dwarfed that of 1914-18 and brought modern war to the home front. Millions of noncombatants became casualties of war. The discovery of nuclear fission at the end of the war threatened even greater destruction in any future conflict. Sovereignty had to be checked, and international law was applied to the task. One study neatly defined the problem. “A sovereign state at the present time claims the power to judge its own controversies, to enforce its own conception of its rights, to increase its armaments without limit, to treat its own nationals as it sees fit, and to regulate its economic life without regard to the effect of such regula­tions upon its neighbors. These attributes of sovereignty must be limited.”[50]

The creation of the United Nations in 1945 and the proceedings of the Nuremberg Tribunal immediately following were watershed events that permanently altered the nature of the debate regarding a state’s right to wage war and mistreat its citizens. Together they sent the message that aggressive war would no longer be tolerated, and that individuals who commit aggression and crimes against humanity would be held criminally responsible for their acts. It was a sincere effort and a good start that enjoyed almost universal support. One of the early UN proclamations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, [51] outlined fundamental human rights in terms reminis­cent of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, setting a common standard for “all peoples and all nations.”[52] Although aspirational in tone and lacking any enforcement mechanism, it has served for more than 60 years as a beacon for people in search of freedom and justice. Over the following decades, international agreements outlawing genocide, recognizing the rights of minorities, and emphasizing humanitarian concerns consistently advanced individual rights at the expense of state sovereignty.[53]

Collective security acquired new life after World War II with the creation of the UN, NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS), and other international and regional organizations. Although the Cold War provided the initial impetus for NATO, it survives today as a viable, productive organization. It was NATO that intervened in the Balkan Wars following the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early-1990s, and later in Kosovo. With expanded membership and new mis­sions, NATO today provides collective security and promotes democracy to the nations of Eastern Europe and further afield in Afghanistan—developments unimagined a generation ago. NATO advanced the concept of international humanitarian intervention over the past 2 decades in Soma­lia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sudan, and more recently Libya. International humanitarian intervention remains an emerging, if controversial, concept that demands attention although it is not recog­nized as customary international law. Lively debate on the subject tends to redefine how we view sovereignty. [54] Such argument advances values articulated by Wilson at Versailles almost a century ago. The principles of the American and French revolutions have become universal, but more than a few states (most notably China) reject in principle that individual rights supersede the welfare of the state. Sovereignty, as we will see, is resilient and has devoted followers.

Sovereignty in the new millennium: the resurgence of national self-interest

Two distinct periods have dominated international relations in the first 2 decades of the post-Cold War era. The first, from roughly 1991 until 2003, featured the aggressive use of international institutions and military intervention to defeat or constrain despots and protect civilians caught up in civil wars. The objective was to expand freedom, peace, stability, and economic prosperity. It was an optimistic era dominated by liberal democratic values, ideals, and belief that concerted effort could and would make the world a better place.[55] The second, from 2003 until the present, has been dominated by states pursuing their own national interests in the face of international pressure and overcoming minimal resistance from international organizations and other actors opposing them. It is a pessimistic era dominated by realist concerns about threats to their own national security, the practical limits of enforcing international law, and the risks that accompany outside intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states.[56]

As a practical matter, the UN, other international organizations (IOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play important roles in maintaining peace and economic stability,[57] but they struggle to make rogue regimes comply with their guidelines and wishes. Treaties regulate nucle­ar and conventional weapons and have effectively eliminated chemical and biological weapons, [58] but treaties alone cannot defeat terrorists, rebel groups, or even global warming. The ICC seeks to bring international war criminals, despots, and others to justice when their governments will not or cannot do so. [59] Yet, the ICC lacks jurisdiction over terrorism and piracy, two major threats facing global society in the 21st century. Leading powers including the United States, Russia, and China are not signatories to the ICC, weakening its authority and influence. Despite Security Council resolutions and international sanctions, Iran’s nuclear program continues.[60] Pakistan and North Korea developed nuclear weapons outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and Iran may soon join them. That these states were able to thumb their noses at international institutions and treaties with relative impunity demonstrates the weakness of international law when confronted with stubborn, relatively well-armed sovereign states that refuse to play by the rules of globaliza­tion.[61]

Disregarding for the moment the relative merits of recent international interventions, the legal basis for humanitarian intervention remains suspect after 2 decades of experimentation. Interna­tional law recognizes the authority of the UN Security Council to address threats to peace and acts of aggression and to decide how “to maintain or restore international peace and security.”[62] The UN recognizes the right of states individually and collectively to act in self-defense. However, the UN Charter does not provide a third option. The UN was designed to maintain international peace, promote friendly relations among states, and achieve international cooperation, but it “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”[63] States are reasserting that principle. One might ask why the UN has never suspended or expelled states that fail to live up to UN principles or comply with UN resolutions, but that subject is best left for another time and place. [64]

States and organizations inclined toward intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states must think twice about the relative costs and benefits of their actions in light of history and recent events. Intervention may succeed in instances where the oppressor lacks serious capability to op­pose the effort or inflict broader damage. The Libyan intervention by NATO in 2011 represents a recent case in point, although what kind of government replaces that of Moammar Khadafy remains to be seen. Intervention is not an option in the case of North Korea, despite the fact that the regime has oppressed or killed millions of its own citizens and threatened its neighbors. In­tervention is off the table because it would likely kill or injure millions more. After the UN failed in 1992 and 1993, NATO intervened in Bosnia in 1995. NATO encountered little or no opposition from Serbia or ethnic Serbs but never resolved the underlying socio-political issues.[65] Similarly, following a brief bombing campaign against Serbia, NATO forces and the UN peacefully entered Kosovo in 1999.[66] U.S.-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the difficulty of establishing stability, much less democracy, in larger states where significant armed opposition exists. Another consideration is that some interventions over the past 2 decades failed to create prosperity or democracy, leaving instability in their wake. Finally, intervention must take into account the possibility of wider conflict. Several of these factors apply to Iran today, counseling caution. Interstate conflict may be at a historic low, but that is always subject to change. Trying to define a norm governing humanitarian intervention is difficult. The answer appears to be that the UN Security Council acts when it can pass a resolution without veto; individual states and coali­tions act when they consider the costs and risks affordable. In practice, only weaker states need worry.

Recent economic setbacks remind us that globalization has a dark side. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund appeared largely impotent in the face of a global crisis in bank­ing and finance.[67] Bad economic times seem to bring out latent tribal and nationalist sentiments and make us suspicious of outsiders. Some states capitalize on opportunities to benefit at another state’s expense. Ruling elites in Russia and in China successfully invoke nationalism as cover for pursuing their strategic objectives, while shirking what others perceive to be their responsibili­ties as global powers, such as supporting sanctions against Iran.[68] The United States, a leader in promoting and shaping international law for almost 2 centuries, shares responsibility for the cur­rent environment. The United States and the United Kingdom (UK) invaded Iraq in 2003 despite international objections (or outright opposition), without formal endorsement by the UN Security Council, and against the advice of key allies such as France and Germany. Powerful or even not-so-powerful sovereign states, once committed to a course of action, are difficult to restrain, and are acting in their own interest with increasing regularity.[69] Even relatively weak states such as North Korea, Myanmar, and Sudan, not to mention Somalia—by most accounts a failed state and a haven for terrorists and pirates—have managed to survive as international outlaws. Political scientist John Mearsheimer reminded us that great powers behave as their interests dictate.[70] Sovereignty is alive and well after all; reports of its death are greatly exaggerated. [71]

Based on the foregoing discussion, we can draw several conclusions about contemporary inter­national relations. First, international institutions, shared principles, and an interlocking network of international agreements remain important tools for solving today’s world problems. These include a stagnant global economy, intrastate conflict, environmental degradation, terrorism, and transnational crime.[72] Global problems require global solutions; sovereign states cannot solve them, although they can address symptoms within their borders. Most will eventually require international cooperation. As former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said, contemporary in­ternational law is “more readily seen as the reflection of a collective juridical conscience and as a response to the social necessities of States organized as a community.” [73] According to Annan, state sovereignty has been redefined. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples and not vice versa.[74] Annan was a practical politician, not a revolutionary; his language evokes Jefferson’s in the Declaration of Independence: “That to secure these rights, Gov­ernments are instituted among Men, deriving their just power from the consent of the governed.” Our founding fathers believed that states exist to promote and protect individual freedoms. The challenge for leaders today is to discover what action to take as part of an international community when states deliberately and systematically violate the human rights of their citizens.[75] It is easy to say it is not our problem unless our citizens or interests are directly threatened, but it is more complicated than that.

The second conclusion we can draw is that unilateral action by states acting in their national interests can sometimes achieve equal or better results than international efforts. Competition is not inherently negative and does not preclude cooperation on important matters. European states competed for trade, military parity, and overseas empires throughout the 19th century, but co­operated enough to maintain European peace from 1815 to 1914. [76] The United States spent huge amounts on the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe for both selfish and humanitarian reasons, and it turned out to be a great bargain.[77] Determined American resistance to Soviet threats from 1945 to 1990, encompassing wars in Korea and Vietnam and continual Cold War, drew frequent criticism at the UN and occasionally from our allies, but it appeared brilliant in hindsight after the Berlin Wall fell. Israel acted unilaterally to destroy an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007 when international initiatives would have failed.[78] Even if these attacks violated international law as some maintain, most commentators would probably applaud the outcomes.

Third, recent events have shown the practical limits of collective action and American power. We live in a multipolar world where the United States may remain the single strongest and richest state, but it faces competition from the EU, China, India, and Japan, among others. [79] The United States faces military competition from China, Russia, and even North Korea and Iran. Humani­tarian intervention has a mixed record. Kosovo’s status remains unclear after more than a dozen years. Bosnia-Herzegovina is essentially two separate mini-states more than 16 years after the Dayton Accords. Haiti remains a failed state despite numerous interventions and continual inter­national assistance. Somalia is a basket case. Prospects for democracy and human rights in Iraq and Afghanistan after years of war and hundreds of billions of dollars in reconstruction costs are less than ideal. We need to choose our interventions carefully.[80]

The road ahead: déjà vu again

Whatever strategy the United States pursues in the contemporary environment, economic re­alities will reduce the American military to something approximating its size before September 11, 2001.[81] The volunteer Army (even with help from the Marine Corps) is not large enough for extended campaigns abroad, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown. Fielding sufficient forces for almost a decade of war has proven difficult and extremely expensive, and both the active and reserve forces are exhausted. Foreign intervention may become a limited commodity before this decade is over. At the same time, many would argue that vital American interests are not seri­ously threatened anywhere and some sort of “peace dividend” like the country took in the 1990s drawdown is in order.[82] At present, the U.S. military has no peer competitor. It spends close to 10 times as much as the next 10 countries combined, although some of that has gone to our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While other potential competitors such as China are modernizing and ex­panding their military capabilities, economic competition remains a more immediate threat to the United States than a military conflict. Flash points such as North Korea, Iran, and Taiwan remain, but for now patient vigilance rather than direct action is our most likely course of action.

The world looks much as it did before World War I or before the Axis powers rearmed in the 1930s. It is an era of interstate peace, not conflict. [83] Those conflicts that exist are intrastate and local­ized. Friendly, peaceful relations are the norm and “[w]ar between the great powers is unthink­able.”[84] At the same time, someone or some collection of states must address international security threats such as piracy and terrorism and protect the global commons. Global trade depends on freedom of navigation and open markets. Pirates and terrorists are bad for business. We face some tough questions. Can the United States, its allies, and friends maintain the security and prosperity we have enjoyed? Can the rule of law accommodate both the national interests of the great pow­ers and the interests of weaker states threatened by demagogues, genocide, civil war, and internal armed conflict? Sadly, international tribunals have been disappointing in their efforts to dispense justice.[85] A clear-eyed, realistic appraisal of our world is a good starting point. After that, we need to decide what issues are important enough to risk lives, treasure, reputation, and international peace to solve.

We cannot simply disregard international structures because they are “foreign” institutions and do not always do what we want them to do; many are useful, and there are limits to what sov­ereign states acting alone can accomplish. Failed states, corruption, economic disparity, and rising birthrates in poorer countries hold large segments of the world’s population hostage. International cooperation will be necessary to advance individual rights and enforce collective security. At pres­ent, however, championing freedom and democracy depends on the good will and determination of powerful sovereign states acting in concert. The United States took the lead in combating ter­rorists with global reach because no one else could or would. The American experience encour­ages internationalism in the promotion of democratic values, and we believe that the security of America is inseparable from the security of all the rest of mankind. However, it is a long way from there to what we might call the Woodrow Wilson-George W. Bush doctrine that it is therefore “America’s duty to oppose aggression everywhere.”[86]

Not every crisis requires international intervention or the use of military force. Though the threat posed by global terrorist networks is real, most international crises are local and have little impact on global security. Many of them, we need to remind ourselves, may be safely ignored or left to others to solve. There are regional organizations, UN agencies, and private agencies that routinely provide nonmilitary humanitarian assistance to people around the world. Unless inter­national stability is seriously threatened, mobilizing the international community and its resources might prove counterproductive. We have learned since the heady days of the Gulf War Coalition forged by President Bush in 1991 that the new world order promised by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has not come to pass, at least not in the way we imagined it. However, despite our collective mistakes, blunders, and miscalculations, we have survived some serious and unexpected threats to global order and come out in relatively good shape. It is a foun­dation on which we can build.

Notes:

[1] J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004. The chapter was reprinted in the 2nd Ed., 2006, the 3rd Ed., 2008, and the 4th Ed., 2010.

[2] Referring to the system of international relations predicated on the behavior of sovereign states that arose after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War, motivated in part by rulers seeking to impose their religion, either Catholicism or Protestantism, on other states.

[3] International interventions in Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, and Kosovo during the 1990s reflected an aggressive consensus on human rights, peacekeeping, and even peace enforcement when required.

[4] See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992; and Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999.

[5] Other observers looked at the power vacuum left in Yugoslavia and the Middle East after the Cold War and forecasted more conflict, not more stability. See Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Over­population, Tribalism and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of our Planet,” The Atlantic Monthly, Feb­ruary 1994; and Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.

[6] Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2009, p. xxiii.

[7] Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991, p. 14.

[8] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001, pp. 2-3.

[9] George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002, p. 3.

[10] China adheres to its Communist hierarchy and government, while promoting free enterprise at home and abroad. Individual rights to worship, protest, and form other political parties are extremely restricted.

[11] William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book One, Chap. One, The Avalon Project, New Ha­ven, CT: Yale Law School, p. 118, available from www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/blackstone.

[12] J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th Ed., Oxford, UK: Oxford Press, 1991, p. 1.

[13] E.g., the prohibition of alcohol, U.S. Constitution, Amendment 18. It was repealed by the Twenty-First Amend­ment 14 years later.

[14] Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th Ed. p. 1.

[15] E.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, held in Chicago, IL, 1944; UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 1982.

[16] E.g., The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992; Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 11, 1997.

[17] Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38.

[18] The SS Lotus Case, Fr. v. Turk., Permanent Court of International Justice, 1927, Ser. A, No. 10, September 7, 2917, pp. 18-19: “The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in con­ventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law. . . .” International law scholars disagree on the fundamental nature of law. There are two distinct schools of thought. The Monist view holds that international law and municipal (state) law are simply parts of an integrated system. The focus is on the individual. Dualists believe that international law and municipal law are two distinct systems. The focus of domestic law is the individual; the focus of international law is on states. These views influence contemporary debate. See Levi, pp. 22-23.

[19] Levi, Contemporary International Law, n. 7, p. 35. Levi cites as an example the launching of Sputnik by the Soviet Union, which claimed that artificial satellites, like commercial airliners, could fly unimpeded over state territory, and the general acceptance of this proposition.

[20] Ibid., p. 5.

[21] Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th Ed., p. 66.

[22] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Diplomatic conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Estab­lishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998.

[23] Department of Defense Directive 2311.01E, May 9, 2006, para. 4.1: “It is DoD policy that . . . [m]embers of the DOD Components, including U.S. civilians and contractors assigned to or accompanying the armed forces] comply with the LOW during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.” See also Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01D, April 30, 2010; and The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941.

[24] Horace B. Robertson, Jr., “Contemporary International Law: Relevant to Today’s World?” John Norton Moore and Robert F. Turner, eds., U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies, Vol. 68, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995, p. 3. Consequences include UN Security Council sanctions, unilateral or coalition reprisals against offend­ers, loss of financial and other support, and adverse international opinion.

[25] Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th Ed., p. 17.

[26] Democracy in ancient Greece, notably Athens, was real and vibrant but limited by modern standards: only citizens could exercise political rights or hold land, women had few rights, and slavery was an essential institution. None of this, however, diminishes the power and influence of Greek thought on leaders of the Enlightenment. See William Y. Elliott and Neil A. McDonald, Western Political Heritage, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1955, pp. 63-74.

[27] Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th Ed., n. 12, p. 7. The idea that rulers were subject to the law of nature played an important part in later developments granting citizens political rights to participate in their governments, and ulti­mately to change those governments.

[28] Ibid., p. 13.

[29] Mel Brooks, Director, History of the World, Part I, Fox Films, 1981.

[30] Levi, Contemporary International Law, p. 10.

[31] Ibid., p. 8.

[32] Ibid, p. 9.

[33] Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: Touchstone, 1994, p. 78.

[34] Ibid., pp. 40, 127.

[35] See Fareed Zakaria, Chap. 5: “The New Diplomacy, 1889-1908,” From Wealth to Power, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Michael Bernhard, “The Leadership Secrets of Bismarck,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011, p. 150.

[38] Eric. S. Krauss and Mike O. Lacey: “Utilitarian vs. Humanitarian: The Battle Over the Law of War,” Parameters, Vol. 32, Summer 2002, pp. 73, 76.

[39] General Order (GO) No. 100, supra note 1. U.S. War Department, General Orders, GO, No. 100, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, April 24, 1863. The first comprehensive summary and codification of the humanitarian rules governing land warfare. Frequently called the “Lieber Code” after its author, Dr. Francis Lieber, G.O. No. 100 furnished inspiration for the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1929 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

[40] Krauss and Lacey. p. 76.

[41] The Hague Conventions of 1899 were largely incorporated in the Conventions of 1907, of which five are impor­tant: (1) Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, (2) Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Annex, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, (3) Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, (4) Conven­tion Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, and (5) Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of July 6, 1906, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371.

[42] Kenneth Anderson, “Who Owns the Rules of War?” New York Times Magazine, April 13, 2003, p. 38.

[43] Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 259.

[44] Ibid., p. 247.

[45] Pamphlet (PAM) 27-161-2, International Law, Vol. II, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1962, p. 221. These trials, known as the Leipzig trials, demonstrated the problem in obtaining jurisdiction over war criminals—Germany was not defeated and occupied as in World War II. The Leipzig trials did motivate the Allies in 1945 to establish an international tribunal at Nuremberg.

[46] Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 247.

[47] Ibid., p. 373. The Washington Conference of 1922 attempted to regulate capital ships (battleships); the London Conference of 1930 attempted to regulate submarines as well. See PAM 27-161-2, supra, p. 16. For a detailed study of the Naval Treaties, see W. Hays Parks, “Making Law of War Treaties: Lessons from Submarine Warfare Regulation,” Michael N. Schmitt, ed., U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies, Vol. 75, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, p. 339.

[48] The Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris, is formally known as The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, August 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343.

[49] Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 40.

[50] Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th Ed., p. 7, quoting from the International Conciliation Pamphlet, 1941.

[51] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly, December 10, 1948.

[52] Ibid., Preamble.

[53] See the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, Art.VI; the Geneva Conventions of 1949, four separate conventions—on the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, on the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship­wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; and Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 1977. These conventions form the nucleus of what is commonly called “International Humanitar­ian Law.”

[54] See, e.g., George K. Walker, “Principles for Collective Humanitarian Intervention to Succor Other Countries’ Imperiled Indigenous Nationals,” American University International Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, 35; John C. Yoo, “The Dogs That Didn’t Bark: Why Were International Legal Scholars MIA on Kosovo?” Chicago Journal of International Law, Spring 2000, p. 149.

[55] See Fukuyama, n. 4. Recently, Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein’s article “Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age” argues that NATO’s Libya intervention in 2011 was a success and demonstrates the need for more international intervention. Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011. Critics might say it’s too early to draw such a conclusion.

[56] Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Kaplan.

[57] E.g., The Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the International Monetary Fund, to name only a few.

[58] E.g., the START and SALT strategic arms negotiations and Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaties with the USSR, and multilateral international agreements, including the Conventional Weapons Treaty, 1980, the Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993, and the Ottawa Treaty on Anti-Personnel Land Mines, 1997.

[59] The Rome Statute.

[60] UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 2006; 1747, 2007; 1803, 2008; and 1929, 2010.

[61] Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, n. 4. Friedman postulated that eventually everyone who wanted to participate in the benefits of globalization would be bound by its rules—the “golden straitjacket,” as he called it.

[62] Charter of the UN, Article 39.

[63] Ibid., Article 2.

[64] Ibid., Article 5, provides for suspension; Article 6, for expulsion.

[65] The World Factbook, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html . The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, November 21, 1995, commonly called the Dayton Peace Accords, created two semi-autonomous entities, the Bosniak/Bosnian Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Sprska (RS).

[66] Ibid. NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999. Kosovo declared independence in 2008 and is currently recognized by more than 70 states, but Serbian objections and Russian backing have kept Kosovo from gaining admission to the UN.

[67] World Trade Organization sessions have attracted enormous demonstrations by diverse groups ranging from environmentalists to religious organizations to unrepentant communists. Recent “Occupy Wall Street” and related protests in the United States bear a disturbing resemblance to these WTO protests.

[68] Josh Rogin, “Senators accuse China of violating sanctions against Iran,” Foreign Policy on-line edition, Decem­ber 18, 2011, available from thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/18.

[69] In Russia, Putin’s autocratic government seems constantly at odds with American interests. Venezuela charts its own course, has suppressed liberties at home, enjoys close relationships with Cuba and Iran, and plots international mischief. Hugo Chavez fortunately wields little power, and only limited leverage is afforded by his oil wells. Chavez is a two-bit dictator hoping to become a four-bit one. We have already discussed Iran. China is harder to figure, but always pursues its own interests and is not a reliable partner in international efforts against Iran, among other issues. For more on why China behaves as it does, see Henry Kissinger, On China, New York: The Penguin Press, 2011.

[70] Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. p. 8.

[71] Paraphrasing Mark Twain’s “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.” See www.cs.cmu.edu/~ralf/quotes.html.

[72] There is, in fact, little international law governing terrorism. No international agreement on terrorism exists, and no international agreement defines the term. Several treaties address individual terrorist acts—hijacking, murder, money laundering, illegal crossing of borders, etc., but their solutions require state action—apprehension, extradition, and prosecution of individual terrorists.

[73] Kofi A. Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” The Economist, September 18, 1999, p. 49.

[74] Ibid.

[75] See Thomas W. McShane, “Blame it on the Romans: Pax Americana and the Rule of Law,” Parameters, Vol. 32, Summer 2002, p. 57.

[76] G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and The Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 29.

[77] Kissinger, Diplomacy, n. 33, p. 453: “Only a country as idealistic, as pioneering, and as relatively inexperienced as the United States could have advanced a plan for global economic recovery based solely on its own resources.”

[78] David E. Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, “Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts Say,” New York Times, October 14, 2007, available from www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/washington/14weapons.html?adxnnl=1&pagewanted=print&adxnnlx=1325174984-erXf1aH1VRgmqusnHc+KaA. Both attacks were criticized, and preemptive attack remains a controversial issue in international law. Iranian efforts for several years to expand its nuclear program to produce weapons-grade plutonium keeps the issue in the public spotlight.

[79] Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009.

[80] See Benjamin A. Valentino, “The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention,” Foreign Affairs, November/De­cember 2011, p. 60.

[81] Craig Whitlock, “Pentagon trimming ranks of generals, admirals,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2011, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagon-trimming-ranks-of-generals-admirals/2011/12/20/gIQAhAU7MP_story.html?tid=pm_world_pop.

[82] Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2010, pp. 15-16. Bacevich, a retired Army officer and college professor, writes extensively on the need to curtail what he describes as “the national security state,” which he feels has not been necessary since the end of the Cold War. Bacevich argues that we will be more secure with less intervention abroad and rejects the need for global primacy. We do not need it and cannot afford it, he says.

[83] Despite DoD documents styling this “an era of persistent conflict,” it is actually an era of widespread peace when measured by the current numbers of interstate conflicts. See Joshua S. Goldstein and Steven Pinker, “War Really is Going Out of Style,” New York Times, December 18, 2011, available from www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-out-of-style.html?ref=todayspaper.

[84] Zakaria, The Post-American World, p. xxvii. He describes the world as “. . . a messy and contentious one, with few easy answers. But for all its problems, it is still a remarkably peaceful one.” At the other end of the spectrum, James Reston, Jr., reminds us that war is a “natural condition of mankind.” James Reston, Jr., “Is It Worth One More Soldier?” USA Today, August 17, 2011.

[85] E.g., the Cambodia Tribunal, known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, is a joint effort with the Cambodians in the lead and the UN in support. The tribunal has been in existence for 10 years, and so far has tried and convicted only one of the five indicted leaders of the Khmer Rouge genocide from 1975-79, which killed some 1.7 million Cambodians. The convicted defendant, Kaing Guek Eav, received a sentence of 35 years which was reduced to 19 years on appeal. See the Yale University website at www.yale.edu/cgp/news.html, or the Tribunal website at www.eccc.gov.kh/en.

[86] Kissinger, Diplomacy, n. 33, p. 47. With apologies to the so-called Powell-Weinberger doctrine, named after General Colin Powell and former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, which enunciates conditions under which American military forces should be engaged in conflict abroad. The Powell-Weinberger doctrine is Realist and Conser­vative in viewpoint and would severely restrict the use of American military force abroad. The Wilson-Bush doctrine is Idealist and Liberal in its orientation—the promotion of liberty is the highest value.