Nuclear Weapons - Like It or Not, They’re here to Stay

ISN: The late external pageKenneth Waltzcall_made argued that it was nuclear deterrence that ultimately banished conflict among the world’s major nations during the Cold War. Do you expect this argument to remain valid in an increasingly interconnected and globalized world?

Liviu Horovitz: Waltz’s theory certainly provoked a very intense debate. On the one hand, many policymakers and academics agreed with him that nuclear weapons helped to ensure that politicians on both sides of the Cold War understood the consequences of escalation and conflict. Indeed, the potential costs of a nuclear exchange were so great that even the most bellicose of politicians had to exercise restraint, or so the argument went. Yet there were others who claimed that nuclear deterrence was not the main reason why East and West never came to blows. For instance, external pageJohn Muellercall_made argued that the appeal of war and territorial gain had diminished markedly in the aftermath of the two previous global conflagrations. Nuclear deterrence, according to this side of the debate, was superfluous to keeping decision-makers cautious about going to war.

However, there can be no denying that a number of states still regard nuclear weapons as useful things to have. Question is do they want them mainly because they actually believe in the necessity of nuclear deterrence, or is it more a case of national pride and bureaucratic considerations? Whatever the rationale, the nuclear club currently consists of nine member-states that are unlikely to give up their respective arsenals any time soon. Beyond the ‘club’, other states continue to hoard technologies that could potentially shorten the time it takes to develop nuclear weapons.

In this respect, globalization has the potential to both weaken and strengthen the salience of the nuclear deterrence debate. Opponents might argue, for example, that an interconnected global society and economic interdependence increases the ‘true’ cost of conflict and conflagration. However, global markets and technological advances have also eased access to proliferation-sensitive technologies. At the same time, rising powers have the potential to fundamentally alter the current global architecture. This has prompted concerns that (nuclear) competition might increase within the international system, rendering deterrence debates much more relevant.

In his debate with Waltz, external pageScott Sagancall_made argued that the most dangerous threats to the world today will not come from conflict between established nuclear powers, but from nuclear accidents or newly-armed nuclear states. To what extent do these arguments hold true?

With nuclear confrontation between established nuclear powers highly unlikely, managing existing arsenals and the entrance of additional members into the nuclear club appear to be the biggest challenges. However, both problems seem manageable, at least for the foreseeable future. My optimistic predictions are no reason for complacency, but an attempt at a realistic assessment of probable developments.

That said, human error and technological complexity continue to make the handling of nuclear weapons a dangerous endeavor. As external pageEric Schlossercall_madehas detailed in a recent book, managing America’s nuclear arsenal during the Cold War came with plenty of accidents and near-misses. And problems are by no means a thing of the past. Both the United States and Russia keep many nuclear weapons on high alert, ready to launch within minutes, thus obliging all other nations to trust that they will make the right choices. Only a few years ago, nuclear tipped cruise missiles were mistakenly loaded on a heavy bomber and transported across the United States. Just recently, dozens of US military officers entrusted with nuclear missiles were accused of cheating on a competency test.

But let’s not forget that nuclear-armed states have invested significantly in the security and safety of their arsenals. Technological improvements, in turn, allow for much higher levels of confidence. Finally, in comparison to the heightened levels of tension in the past, relations between most nuclear armed states appear much more stable now, providing leaders with more time to evaluate their options. So, assuming nuclear armed states do not become complacent about their arsenals, large-scale accidents seem rather unlikely.

If the past is any indication, additional states might, over time and for various reasons, become interested in acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Yet the road to a nuclear arsenal remains expensive and long. And given that Washington will continue to upkeep its role as a guardian of the nonproliferation regime, many aspirants will be persuaded to abstain. With this in mind, a recent volume, edited by external pageWilliam Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanovacall_made, concluded that further proliferation was neither in the offing, nor likely to entail significant contagion.

In addition, new proliferators are likely to distress some more than others. On the one hand, new nuclear club entrants might raise suspicions among neighbors and need time to develop the secure retaliatory forces needed for stable relationships. This might invite preemption and escalatory postures prone to accidents – causes of concern for all. On the other hand, large powers will suffer most when nuclear proliferation will severely restrict the effectiveness of their overwhelming conventional superiority. It is thus not surprising that superpowers are most interested in preventing additional proliferation.

What is the possibility that nuclear weapons might fall into terrorists’ hands? Should nuclear-armed states be doing even more to safeguard their stockpiles in order to prevent this from happening?

Given the damage that even a small or relatively crude device could inflict upon a city, it’s no surprise that many have worried about the prospect of terrorists launching a nuclear attack. Numerous individuals, organizations, and states have worked hard to render these risks smaller – a laudable cause deserving further attention. Fortunately, the chances of such a dreadful event happening are slim. Most terrorist groups pursue political goals that can hardly be aided by nuclear weapons. In the case of a civil conflict, for example, unleashing nuclear devastation on your opponents is likely to have as equally serious consequences for your ethnic group or support base.

The most fanatical of organizations, like al Qaeda or Aum Shinrikyo, have expressed an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Fortunately, however, where there’s a will, there’s not always a way. That’s mainly because even the most sophisticated of terrorists lack the wherewithal to develop nuclear weapons from scratch. Take, for example, the process of uranium enrichment or plutonium separation. While these are both well-established technologies, even reasonably developed states need to allocate large financial and human resources to the task. Therefore, terrorists would both need to obtain a sufficient quantity of “ready-made” fissile materials and acquire the expertise to fashion bombs and delivery vehicles.

While experts disagree on the difficulty of the second task, fissile materials will not be available off the shelf any time soon. Many states, most notably the United States, have invested heavily in order to secure nuclear materials around the globe. And while illicit trafficking of nuclear materials still happens, available reporting suggests that the materials believed to be in circulation are way below those required for developing a nuclear device. For instance, a Russian was arrested in Georgia in 2006 trying to sell 80 grams of highly enriched uranium. Roughly twenty five kilograms are needed to make one bomb.

In addition, it’s simply not in any nuclear-armed state’s interest to share weapons with terrorists. Sharing the most destructive of weapons with groups one does not fully control serves few strategic aims. Also, as external pageKeir Lieber and Daryl Presscall_made recently pointed out, attribution is very likely after high-casualty terror attacks. Tracing a group that detonated a nuclear weapon to its state sponsor would not be very difficult, as few countries both sponsor terrorists and have nuclear weapons.

That said, concerns nevertheless remain that radical factions within a state might be able to gain control over its nuclear arsenal. This has prompted the United States to begin drafting contingency plans for forcibly securing Pakistani nuclear warheads in the event of a serious crisis. Yet, as external pageNaeem Salik and Kenneth Luongocall_made note, Islamabad seems to have cooperated with Washington over the past decade and taken a number of steps to improve the command and control systems of its nuclear weapons.

Scientific advances have undoubtedly allowed major global powers to develop increasingly sophisticated and lethal conventional weapons and cyber capabilities. Is there any chance that these technologies might one day assume something like the deterrent value of nuclear weapons?

Such developments seem rather unlikely. Even though scientific advances remain difficult to predict, the uniquely destructive power of nuclear weapons will always be hard to beat. Yes, robotics is already revolutionizing the conduct of war, and the ability to deploy unmanned vehicles might significantly improve a state’s ability to engage in low-level conflict. However, in terms of deterrence between established nuclear powers, little has changed. Similarly, while “cyberwar” has become a fashionable term, cyber offenses have - for the time being - little to do with acts of war. As external pageThomas Ridcall_made recently argued, all politically motivated cyber-attacks have been sophisticated versions of sabotage, espionage, or subversion.

Finally, although nuclear weapons are habitually lumped together with chemical and biological arms and labeled “weapons of mass destruction,” the reality is that they are by no means comparable. For example, a chemical attack carried out under ideal conditions could result in a few thousand deaths. Biological agents can have more dire consequences, but the high degree of uncertainty in predicting the lethality of biological agents significantly diminishes the deterrence quality of these weapons. These categories of weapons will surely play an important role in the future. Yet, for those who believe in the need for reliable deterrence, nuclear weapons are likely to remain the arms of choice.

Arguing that nuclear weapons still matter in the 21^st century is one thing, changing the mindsets of those states and actors that oppose this viewpoint is a very different matter. How might established nuclear powers and supporters of this side of the debate go about trying to win over the skeptics?

Established nuclear powers that believe that nuclear weapons are necessary are bound to live with a perpetual dilemma. On the home front, a certain level of acceptance within domestic populations is necessary in order to maintain and modernize nuclear arsenals. Thus, a rationale has to be displayed for domestic consumption. Deterrence or prestige is sometimes mentioned, but the apparent necessity to counterbalance other powers’ arsenals predominates. However, when it comes to the international stage, praising the necessity and utility of your nuclear weapons is probably not a good idea. Other states might find your arguments persuasive and pursue their own nuclear options. Much more important, vilifying proliferators for doing nothing else than imitating their own “best practices” might become a much harder task. For all these reasons, nuclear weapons possessors walk a fine line between pride and denial, between modernizing your nuclear arsenals and professing a desire for ultimate disarmament.