CSS Launches Strategic Trends 2014

The introduction to Strategic Trends 2014 can be accessed here.

Jonas Grätz, did your chapter for "Strategic Trends 2014" require any modifications as a result of the ongoing events in Ukraine?

The main argument of the chapter – that Russia’s president Putin has adopted a strategy of opposing the Western world to bolster his support at home – had been set long before the situation in Ukraine developed into a full-blown crisis. The events in Ukraine served to confirm this argument, and thereby render it less original. Of course, I did make some changes to the part on Ukraine as the situation escalated and the showdown moved from economics to outright armed intervention.

You’re adamant that the political power base and alignments created by Vladimir Putin will dominate Russia for the foreseeable future. In your opinion, what would be the ‘ideal’ Western response to this?

If anything, the events in Ukraine will serve to accelerate the demise of Putin. But the hardening of Putinism that we are witnessing in the current crisis does not bode well for the future. We might be in for a longer period where Russia tries to use its power tools at hand in a more aggressive way in order to confront and weaken the West.

But Putin is not unreasonable. He will act in this way as long as it pays dividends at home and as long as he can hope to win support for his position in the international arena. Domestically, Putin needs to maintain stability, which concerns both business opportunities for his allies, and the economic well-being of the broader population. Internationally, Putin still hopes to gain dividends with his behavior by ultimately weakening, and not strengthening the West. He thinks that the US has already disengaged from Europe and will withdraw further, while EU countries will ultimately fall for their energy dependence and business opportunities in Russia. In the end, Putin thinks that the West will be too weak not to accept Russia’s re-emergence as a European empire.

Western actors need a complex and durable strategy to tackle this challenge. Unfortunately, this will come with an economic price tag, i.e. it will not be “economically rational”. But the alternative of doing nothing would mean a shift to a Europe not based on common rules and principles, but based on spheres of influence. In essence, the European project would be dead. One part of the response is to reduce the economic harm that Putin’s Russia can cause, which means reducing the share of energy imports and reducing investments into the country.

In addition, banning the export of certain important goods, such as defense or space technologies, will increase the costs for the Russian economy. It will also remind Russian business partners that they are not self-contained and have been benefited from access to goods that the global economy provides. The same is true for targeted sanctions, which are already destabilizing the Russian regime. In any case, economic engagement has to become shallower. This will harm the Russian economy more than it will harm the rest of Europe, but there will be costs for everyone.

Internally, the West has to safeguard its coherence by strengthening NATO, increasing defense spending, and reassuring its eastern members. This also means concluding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which still meets significant resistance from civil society. This leads me to an important point: Western elites need to actively explain and discuss these policies within their societies. Currently, there is a lot of admiration and understanding for Putin in the West, which not only suggests a degree of consternation with their leaders but also a lack of understanding for the sources and consequences of his behavior.

Last but not least, the rest of Europe needs to reach out to Russian society, both by finally granting visa freedom and by stepping up information efforts inside the country. Putin’s monopoly on information has to be broken. Ideally, this would be coordinated with emerging actors such as China and India, but such a strategy seems not feasible at the moment. If the strategy fails, either because there are no real attempts or because the West has proven to be too weak, Europe will witness a rapid shift towards a new interstate system based on imperial power relations rather than on national sovereignty and rules-based integration.

At the moment, there doesn’t appear to be an obvious replacement for Vladimir Putin. Who would you expect to emerge as a contender for the Russian presidency?

This is a very difficult question, but there are several candidates being discussed at the moment. If there is an intra-regime reshuffling, a more anti-Western and Slavic course might compete with a more pragmatic and businesslike leader. The anti-Western and Slavic course might be represented by current deputy prime minister Dmitri Rogozin, who is responsible for Russia’s defense industry and a former ambassador to NATO. He is a staunch nationalist and opposes the West out of principle.

A less outspoken and more culturally conscious alternative would be the current head of Russian state railways Vladimir Yakunin. He is a strong supporter of Russian orthodoxy and thinks Western influence and globalization serve to undermine Russian spirituality and ultimately the Russian state. Both choices would bode ill for Russia’s future as a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state. If Putin gets ousted by people that prioritize wealth creation over identity, CEO of state oil company Rosneft, Igor Sechin, would be an obvious choice. He is a patriot of Russia, but is also business-minded and flexible.

If the opposition movement grows stronger and turns up the heat against the regime (which seems a remote prospect at the moment) Aleksey Navalny would be the only suitable candidate. He is a Russian patriot and favors Slavs over other people. He has become popular for exposing the corruption of Putin and his associates. Yet, because he has been imprisoned, his coming to power remains a very distant prospect.

Lisa Watanabe, in your chapter of "Strategic Trends 2014" you look at how the EU has adapted to the evolving situation in its 'southern neighborhood' over the past few years. What were the EU’s strategic goals in the region prior to the Arab Spring and how have they been affected by events since then?

Prior to the uprisings, the EU’s strategic goal was to create a “ring of well governed countries” along its southern neighborhood. The primary tool with which it sought to do this was the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This seeks to enable the EU to work with those southern partner states that lack an EU membership perspective to generate the closest possible political association and economic integration. Southern partner countries would agree to demonstrate their commitment to the principles of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, good governance, and a market economy. For its part, the EU would support partner states in their efforts to achieve these goals. Essentially, the EU sought to contribute to the creation of a stable neighborhood through the ‘export’ of its norms and values.

The Arab uprisings laid bare the EU’s failure to find an effective way to influence partner countries that had no prospect of EU membership. Even though EU support was linked to conditionality, it was nevertheless granted even when conditions had not been met. Leaders of southern partner states also proved adept at exploiting the EU’s overriding concern with stability and avoiding political reforms, this being particularly the case following 9/11. Moreover, the assumption that supporting established regimes would ensure some degree of stability in the EU’s neighborhood was shown to be extremely short-sighted. Following the uprisings, the EU’ strategic goal of creating a type of buffer zone to its south remains largely unchanged, as does the Eurocentric logic behind it.

What has the EU done to adapt to these changes and achieve its goals?

The EU has attempted to recalibrate its approach to its southern neighborhood, especially towards North African states where it hopes to contribute to democratic transitions. In May 2011, the EU launched a ‘new’ approach, based on an adapted ENP that attempted to reinforce political conditionality and offer more in order to incentivize partner countries to embark on difficult reforms. The revised ENP grounds the EU’s engagement with its southern partners on the so-called ‘more for more’ principle that promises more benefits – more money, more markets and more mobility - in return for more progress on democratic reforms. In part, the revised ENP reflects the EU’s failure to significantly foster democratic reforms in its southern neighborhood in the past, as well as recognition that if it wants to influence the reform process in these countries it needs to offer more.

The ENP has become the centerpiece of the EU’s revised approach to its southern neighborhood and the key means by which it seeks to achieve its objective of creating a zone of well-governed states to its south in order to secure its security and energy interests. Other policy tools available to the EU continue to exist largely in parallel to the ENP. The multilateral framework of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) that is supposed to complement the ENP remains in the background, partly due to disagreements among EU member states as to what role it should play as part of the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings, and is not integrated into a coherent strategic vision for the EU’s engagement with its southern neighborhood. The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is also plagued by a lack of unity among member states, also remains unconnected to an overarching strategy for guiding EU engagement with its southern partners.

Ultimately, you argue that the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings represents little more than a repackaging of its existing approach. What will be the likely consequences of this non-adjustment and what does it mean for Brussels’ ability to secure its long-term interests in the region?

Indeed, the revisited ENP is essentially a repackaging of an existing approach. It is largely based on adapting the instruments that were already available to the EU prior to the uprisings, although there has been an effort to reinforce political conditionality. As the EU’s primary foreign policy tool underpinning its engagement with North Africa, the revised ENP leaves the EU ill-equipped not only to influence transitions in its southern neighborhood, but also to consolidate its role in relation to other powers that are seeking to make gains in the context of shifts underway in the sub-region.

In the changing geopolitical context of North Africa, the Gulf States and Turkey in particular are consciously attempting to gain influence in the transition states and carve out a place for themselves. The EU will find it hard to navigate the new geopolitical terrain of North Africa by relying primarily on its revised neighborhood policy. The low scale of the EU’s funding means that it cannot expect to have a significant impact on North African states, particularly in light of the generous and less onerous aid and financial assistance from the Gulf States. The EU’s soft power towards its southern partners is not only weak due to limited funds, but also due to its ailing economy and lack of cultural ties that are not tainted by colonialism. The revised ENP overestimates the EU’s power of attraction for North African countries. Short of a new strategic approach to its southern neighborhood, the EU could see its already doubtful influence even further eroded.

Given that regional balances are likely to become particularly important in shaping dynamics and the limited role of extra-regional powers, the EU would do well to further develop strategic partnerships with regional actors making strategic inroads in North Africa. Were the EU to strengthen its partnerships with regional political actors as part of a genuinely new strategic approach to its southern neighborhood, its chances of avoiding an erosion of its influence and securing its interests would be greater.

Prem Mahadevan, what makes the Taliban model of insurgency both so different and so much more successful than others?

The Taliban model is presaged on a sound appreciation of the limitations of great power armies. Previously, insurgencies in the post-World War II international system were either rooted in the politics of decolonization or the geopolitics of the Cold War. Talibanized insurgency is different because it does not rely on rhetorical sympathy and material support from foreign governments. Instead, it seeks to wear out non-indigenous security forces through a prolonged war of attrition, waged by resources that are obtained locally or smuggled by non-state actors. To that extent, it is a modernized form of classic Maoist doctrine, which advocates a steady drumbeat of offensive operations over an extended timescale.

The Taliban have proven to be adept at manipulating the media, despite the best efforts of coalition and Afghan government spokespersons to contain the reputational damage caused. Their extensive usage of improvised explosive devices has elevated what was previously a tactical weapon system into a strategic factor that can reduce the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations. Their willingness to conduct ambushes in relatively open terrain – a big difference from the jungle combat that characterized the Vietnam War – has shown that airpower is not enough of a deterrent to insurgents. Future conflicts are likely to see more guerrilla groups being emboldened by the thought that they can resist superior military forces through carefully husbanding their resources for a long war.

Is there any evidence that the Taliban model is spreading to other regions?

As yet, there are no other theaters where Talibanized insurgency has been transplanted in its entirety. However, aspects of this particular model can already be observed elsewhere. In Iraq, for example, swarming attacks on urban targets bear a strong resemblance to operations in northeastern Afghanistan by the Haqqani Network, a loose affiliate of the Taliban. In Somalia and Kenya, Al Shabaab has used social media to make its adversaries look incompetent thereby effectively masking its own heavy defeats from public view. In Mali, suicide bombings have begun to target foreign troops. The reason for this proliferation of tactics is that Talibanized insurgency does not exist in an ideological vacuum – it benefits from the support of fellow travelers in the jihadist community. It was Iraqi insurgents who first taught the Taliban how to produce sophisticated IEDs and introduced the Afghans to the concept of suicide bombing. Thereafter, the Taliban perfected these techniques on their own, and have in all probability, shared them with other radical Islamist groups that have an operational presence in the Af-Pak region.

Over the years, the “denial of access” doctrine has represented an important shift in asymmetric warfare tactics. What does it actually mean for Western forces on the ground?

It means that their freedom to operate freely within a combat area will be substantially reduced. It is important here to differentiate between the ‘anti-access’ element, which aims to literally deny foreign military forces the ability to enter a combat zone, and the ‘area denial’ element. The latter has a more limited purpose – to make life difficult for foreign troops and engender a siege mentality among them. Even if they can establish a physical presence in an area, they will not be proactive in consolidating and expanding on this, due to the risk of sudden attack. Area denial operations are not linear – the enemy can hit you from any direction, since there is no well-defined battlefront which he would normally be expected to advance from. This level of uncertainty grates on the nerves of soldiers deployed in a combat zone and eventually leads to a decline in their operational effectiveness.

Michael Haas, in your chapter ("Mounting challenges to geostrategic access") you argue that the global liberal security order is hanging in the balance, primarily because state and non-state actors have grown in their ability to deny the United States and its allies access to vital portions of the sea, air, space, and cyber domains. Is that necessarily a bad thing?

Historically, the US-led global security order has proved rather resilient in the face of evolving military threats, and has survived economic perturbations and geopolitical shifts of some magnitude. Hence, the challenges it currently faces could simply induce another round of adaptation and refocusing. However, when a long-standing model of structuring security relations comes under serious pressure, as is currently the case, a period of uncertainty and tension is likely to ensue. This can be resolved in several ways, none of which would necessarily end badly, but all of which could.

Two scenarios stand out. First, with the requisite economic resources and leadership, the West could try to reassert its advantages and cow revisionist actors into submission. Given the United States’ expansive definition of its security needs, this would be its default option. Depending on whether other great and middle powers end up “inside” or “outside” this revamped liberal security system, it could be a permanent anchor of stability – or a breeding ground for future challenges. Second, the US could be pushed back or decide on some kind of strategic retrenchment, which would result in an order in which Western preferences and ideas would still be important, but would no longer be the only game in town. Conceivably, this could lead to a more stable and balanced model for ordering global security affairs, though probably not one in which Western democracies would feel equally “at home” or equally validated. That said, a system that is multipolar in military as well as economic terms could also be a recipe for endemic great power rivalry and warfare, on which the incumbent system has arguably had a dampening effect.

What should the West, including the United States and its allies, do in order to maintain and enhance the security order that they created?

If the foundations of the current order are to be maintained, the US will have to find ways of sustaining its core security commitments even with a much-reduced margin of military superiority. One way of doing so is to make these commitments more self-supporting. This would entail a more prominent military role for capable and dependable allies like Japan and Australia in the Asia-Pacific, or Poland in Europe. Europe as a whole would finally have to learn to pay for its own security and arrest the decline of its military forces. With a more assertive Russia on its doorstep, this prospect now seems somewhat less distant than it did just a few months ago.

Western countries would also have to fundamentally rethink their approach to military procurement, which currently results in the acquisition of ever smaller numbers of ever more expensive platforms. As far as the United States itself is concerned, the adoption of an explicit “economy of force” posture could go a long way towards preserving an overall military advantage. This would involve the forward deployment of lighter, cheaper and more expendable forces backed up by the long-range striking power of a large, strategically mobile reserve force centered on the continental United States and a few key installations overseas that are well out of reach of regional anti-access forces. Such a force might not be as useful for countering limited transgressions, but would be effective at preserving core US and allied interests, when and where they are actually challenged. In essence, the West would use its military power only where it is truly necessary and keep it in reserve where it is not. Of course, this is quite the opposite of what the US and its allies have been doing for the last 10-15 years.

How likely is this to happen?

Currently, the United States is still very much holding on to its established posture, which is becoming less viable almost by the day. The ongoing defense cuts are hollowing out its forces, but an adaptation of their basic structure and make-up for an era of selective dominance remains outstanding. The same is true of its allies in Europe and elsewhere, who would like the US to increase its commitments, rather than scale them back. While these preferences are not set in stone, it is unlikely that they will change quickly. In the Asia-Pacific, China’s military modernization and assertive behavior is clearly acting as a catalyst for adaptation and may eventually necessitate a rebalancing of responsibilities, with the US becoming more of a creditor of last resort. In Europe, the ongoing Crimean crisis may well set in motion similar dynamics, although it is still too early to tell what its exact effects will be.

Martin Zapfe, does the United States have a grand strategy or is this term misleading?

Martin Zapfe: Perhaps the most striking characteristic about US foreign policy under Barack Obama is the neat-total absence of a grand strategy. When compared with his predecessor, whose “Global War on Terror” combined military means with a transformative democratic vision, Obama is a pragmatic president. The sole decision that could qualify as a “grand strategy” – if followed through – is the famous “pivot”: the strategic rebalancing of US interests, and the recurrent re-focusing of military, financial and political resources to the Asia-Pacific. However, three years after the “pivot” was announced, policies and personnel decisions of the second Obama administration have cast doubts among allies and antagonists alike as to whether the pivot still underpins US foreign policy. The jury is still out.

Of course, academics and pundits alike tend to look for the “strategic” dimensions of foreign policy, only to be disappointed by real-world developments being driven by external events. However, the US does have its history of successfully implemented strategies, linked to the names of foreign policy giants like Dean Acheson and Henry Kissinger. The Obama administration, as even his many proponents concede, shuns this foreign policy area.

So why has US foreign policy become more 'pragmatic' under President Obama? Have external constraints become more significant?

The strategic pragmatism of the Obama administration has complex roots, combining both external and internal factors. There are, for example, three major interdependent external factors to take into account.

First, the global financial crisis helped to focus an already “domestic” president on domestic politics. Its long-term effects on the federal budget will shape US foreign policy for years to come. The Pentagon will have to slash both numbers and capabilities if it is to comply with the 2011 budget cuts and the devastating “lawn-mower” of sequestration. Second, while the US military will stay preeminent, it cannot refuse to prioritize. These cuts come at a time when the US public is still influenced by the profound financial and human costs of two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the broader elements of President Bush’s “War on Terror”. While public support is not completely opposed to further military interventions – the administration has a lot of leeway – Barack Obama’s successor will have every reason to be cautious with foreign policy adventures given that they will be facing (re-)election campaigns.

Finally, the United States’ ties with the rest of the world will profoundly loosen once the shale energy revolution gains full track. Although US foreign policy was never only about energy security, US dependence on a stable supply from the Middle East more often than not infused a dose of “Realpolitik” into the White House’s thinking. While the US will still be dependent on a stable global market for energy, this dependence will shrink. Even more important, the perceived importance of energy supplies will shrink, reinforcing the two external trends described above.

Against this backdrop, the personality of President Obama gains even more importance. He is, primarily, a domestic president, who, contrary to his visionary speeches, has a pragmatic understanding of foreign policy. Plus, he is an intellectual who shuns the idea that you could steer a country with a “grand strategy” by simplifying reality. Put another way, Obama’s pragmatism is shaped by external events, but reinforced by internal factors, most notably the president himself.

What legacy will the Obama administration have on US foreign policy?

It is still too early to determine the legacy of President Obama on US foreign policy. What can be said is that the executive-heavy, ideological and interventionist War on Terror that shaped US foreign policy and domestic politics for almost eight years is over. Barack Obama ended two wars that rank among the longest in US history. Yet the transformative effect of Obama on US foreign policy and the world that many observers longed for has predictably not materialized. He might stand, for the years to come, as the president who made – or at least tried to make – the long-awaited step from Europe to Asia, thereby reviving the US’ status as a Pacific state in the process. However, it might well be the events in Ukraine that will determine the real, lasting legacy of the Obama years.